Sam Coleman University of Hertfordshire
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  • Faculty, University of Hertfordshire
  • PhD, University of London, 2006.

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  1. Sam Coleman, Chalmers's Master Argument and Type Bb Physicalism.
    Chalmers has provided a dilemmatic master argument against all forms of the phenomenal concept strategy. This paper explores a position that evades Chalmers's argument, dubbed Type Bb: it is for Type B physicalists who embrace horn b of Chalmers's dilemma. The discussion concludes that Chalmers fails to show any incoherence in the position of a Type B physicalist who depends on the phenomenal concept strategy.
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  2. Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.) (forthcoming). Phenomenal Qualities. OUP.
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  3. Sam Coleman (2013). Consciousness and The Prospects of Physicalism. By Derk Pereboom. [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (253):824-827.
  4. Sam Coleman (2013). The Real Combination Problem: Panpsychism, Micro-Subjects, and Emergence. Erkenntnis (1):1-26.
    Taking their motivation from the perceived failure of the reductive physicalist project concerning consciousness, panpsychists ascribe subjectivity to fundamental material entities in order to account for macro-consciousness. But there exists an unresolved tension within the mainstream panpsychist position, the seriousness of which has yet to be appreciated. I capture this tension as a dilemma, and offer advice to panpsychists on how to resolve it. The dilemma is as follows: Panpsychists take the micro-material realm to feature phenomenal properties, plus micro-subjects to (...)
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  5. Sam Coleman (2012). Mental Chemistry: Combination for Panpsychists. Dialectica 66 (1):137-166.
    Panpsychism, an increasingly popular competitor to physicalism as a theory of mind, faces a famous difficulty, the ‘combination problem’. This is the difficulty of understanding the composition of a conscious mind by parts (the ultimates) which are themselves taken to be phenomenally qualitied. I examine the combination problem, and I attempt to solve it. There are a few distinct difficulties under the banner of ‘the combination problem’, and not all of them need worry panpsychists. After homing in on the genuine (...)
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  6. Sam Coleman (2012). Review of 'The Mental as Fundamental' Ed. Michael Blamauer. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
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  7. Sam Coleman (2011). There is No Argument That the Mind Extends. Journal of Philosophy 108 (2):100-108.
    There is no Argument that the Mind Extends On the basis of two argumentative examples plus their 'parity principle', Clark and Chalmers argue that mental states like beliefs can extend into the environment. I raise two problems for the argument. The first problem is that it is more difficult than Clark and Chalmers think to set up the Tetris example so that application of the parity principle might render it a case of extended mind. The second problem is that, even (...)
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  8. Sam Coleman (2010). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):133-136.
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  9. Sam Coleman (2010). Reviews Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts . By Michael Tye. Cambridge, Ma.: The Mit Press, 2009, Pp. 256, £25.95. [REVIEW] Philosophy 85 (3):413-418.
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  10. Sam Coleman (2010). Review of Michael Tye's Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW] Philosophy 85 (3):413-418.
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  11. Sam Coleman (2009). Mind Under Matter. In David Skrbina (ed.), Mind that Abides. Benjamins.
    Panpsychism is an eminently sensible view of the world and its relation to mind. If God is a metaphysician, and regardless of the actual truth or falsity of panpsychism, it is certain that he regards the theory as an honest and elegant competitor on the field of ontologies. And if God didn’t create a panpsychist world, then there’s a fair chance that he wishes he had done so, or will do next time around. The difficulties panpsychism faces, then, are not (...)
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  12. Sam Coleman (2009). Review of Daniel N. Robinson, Consciousness and Mental Life. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (1).
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  13. Sam Coleman (2009). Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
    According to the knowledge argument, physicalism fails because when physically omniscient Mary first sees red, her gain in phenomenal knowledge involves a gain in factual knowledge. Thus not all facts are physical facts. According to the ability hypothesis, the knowledge argument fails because Mary only acquires abilities to imagine, remember and recognise redness, and not new factual knowledge. I argue that reducing Mary’s new knowledge to abilities does not affect the issue of whether she also learns factually: I show that (...)
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  14. Allison Barnes, Cara Spencer, Gavin B. Sullivan & Sam Coleman (2007). Preamble. Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):815 – 833.
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  15. Allison Barnes, Cara Spencer, Gavin B. Sullivan & Sam Coleman (2007). Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):815 – 833.
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  16. Sam Coleman (2006). Being Realistic - Why Physicalism May Entail Panexperientialism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (10-11):40-52.
    In this paper I first examine two important assumptions underlying the argument that physicalism entails panpsychism. These need unearthing because opponents in the literature distinguish themselves from Strawson in the main by rejecting one or the other. Once they have been stated, and something has been said about the positions that reject them, the onus of argument becomes clear: the assumptions require careful defence. I believe they are true, in fact, but their defence is a large project that cannot begin (...)
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  17. Sam Coleman, Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts.
    Reading Tye’s new book reminded me of slowly sipping a good specimen of a dry vodka Martini. In both cases much is accomplished by the skilful assembly of only a few key ingredients. I don’t really like dry vodka Martinis, though, and similarly I found many of the thoughts offered by Consciousness Revisited to be too bitter to swallow. A sophisticated piece of work, however, it certainly is.
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