Joseph Agassi Tel Aviv University, York University
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My philosophical views

The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.

See also:

QuestionAnswerComments
A priori knowledge: yes or no?Accept: no
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?Reject bothFrege refuted the denoattion theory within which this dispute makes sense. otherwise, the question is much broader.
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?Accept: objective
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?Accept bothyes for formal languages, no for natural languages
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?Reject bothjustification is the requirement of the traditional theory of rationality; the critical view of rationality rests on teh inability to offer final justifications.
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?Accept an intermediate viewwhy did you omit commonsense, skeptical realism?
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?Accept: libertarianismthe fact is we do have choices, and teh more options teh better. all teh rest is open to critical debates
God: theism or atheism?The question is too unclear to answerit is unclear why the qustion matters except for the theory of divine providence. now this theory rests on the supposition of the soul going to heaven or to hell (or perhaps purgatory). this supposition is childish.
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?Reject boththe certainty which both these schools were discussing is impossible; knowkedge is conjectural
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?Accept: contextualismall common knowledge claims are qualified by vague conditions such as unless force majeure interferes.
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?Accept: non-Humeanexcept that possibly we will never know them
Logic: classical or non-classical?Accept: classical
Mental content: internalism or externalism?Accept both
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?Accept: moral realism
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?Accept: naturalism
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?The question is too unclear to answerthe word is Neuraths' and it denotes his theory; few even know it, let alone assent to it. this question seemingly rests on ignorance.
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?Accept: cognitivism
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?Accept boththis looks a logical dichotomy but it is a chilce between two theories so labeled and these come from the same stable.
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?Reject bothtoo stupid
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?The question is too unclear to answerall of these options oerlook the fact that our morality has improved through history. think of the response of the international community to the holocaust.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?Reject allall these theories ignore the great improvemetn of the theory of perception, especially by j.j. gibson and edward s. reed.
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?Accept: biological viewagain the choice is between two widespread theories both defunct.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?Lean toward: egalitarianism
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?Accept another alternativesee leonard linsky, referring and nimrod bar-am, extentionalism.
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?Accept: scientific realismclassically scientific realism is a truth claim. popper declared it fregean: scientific theoreis are meaningful: they have truth values: they are either true or false. also, they are empirically testable.
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?Accept: death
Time: A-theory or B-theory?Accept: B-theory
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?Otherin pracatice the problem is context-dependent
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?Accept: correspondencethere are many corespondence theories, all having this or that merit. the commonsnese one takes the cake.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?Accept: conceivable but not metaphysically possible