Online research in philosophy

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• Faculty, Kansas State University

• Philosophy of Language
• Logic and Philosophy of Logic
• Philosophy of Mathematics

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I am an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Kansas State University and a Postdoctoral Researcher within the ERC-funded project "Plurals, Predicates, and Paradox: Towards a Type-Free Account" led by Øystein Linnebo at the University of Oslo. I received a PhD in Philosophy and an MSc in Mathematics from The Ohio State University in 2010. My main research interests are in the philosophy of language, philosophical logic, and the philosophy of mathematics. I am currently working on philosophical issues arising in connection with higher-order logics.

3 items found. Sort by: publication yearfirst authorviewingsaddition date Salvatore Florio (forthcoming). Untyped Pluralism. Mind. In the semantic debate about plurals, pluralism is the view that a plural term denotes some things in the domain of quantification and a plural predicate denotes a plural property, i.e a property that can be instantiated by many things jointly. According to a particular version of this view, untyped pluralism, there is no type distinction between objects and properties. In this article, I argue against untyped pluralism by showing that it is subject to a variant of a Russell-style argument (...) put forth by Timothy Williamson and that it clashes with a plural version of Cantor’s theorem. I conclude that pluralists should postulate a type distinction between objects and properties. (shrink) Plural Quantification in Philosophy of Language   My bibliography     Export citation   Salvatore Florio & Stewart Shapiro (forthcoming). Set Theory, Type Theory, and Absolute Generality. Mind. In light of the close connection between the ontological hierarchy of set theory and the ideological hierarchy of type theory, Øystein Linnebo and Agustín Rayo have recently offered an argument in favour of the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended. In this paper, we argue that, since the connection between the two hierarchies is indeed tight, any philosophical conclusions cut both ways. One should either hold that both the ontological hierarchy and the ideological hierarchy are open-ended, or that neither (...) is. If there is reason to accept the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended, that will be because such a view is the most compelling one to adopt on the purely ontological front. (shrink) Ontology of Sets in Philosophy of Mathematics   My bibliography     Export citation   Salvatore Florio & Julien Murzi (2009). The Paradox of Idealization. Analysis 69 (3):461-469. A well-known proof by Alonzo Church, first published in 1963 by Frederic Fitch, purports to show that all truths are knowable only if all truths are known. This is the Paradox of Knowability. If we take it, quite plausibly, that we are not omniscient, the proof appears to undermine metaphysical doctrines committed to the knowability of truth, such as semantic anti-realism. Since its rediscovery by Hart and McGinn ( 1976), many solutions to the paradox have been offered. In this article, (...) we present a new proof to the effect that not all truths are knowable, which rests on different assumptions from those of the original argument published by Fitch. We highlight the general form of the knowability paradoxes, and argue that anti-realists who favour either an hierarchical or an intuitionistic approach to the Paradox of Knowability are confronted with a dilemma: they must either give up anti-realism or opt for a highly controversial interpretation of the principle that every truth is knowable. (shrink) Knowability in Epistemology Direct download (3 more)     My bibliography     Export citation

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