James Dreier Brown University
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  • Faculty, Brown University
  • PhD, Princeton University, 1989.

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I'm a metaethicist. I'm on the ETHICS board of editors. And check out the Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy at jesp.org.
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52 items found.
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  1. James Dreier (forthcoming). Boundless Good. Ms.
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  2. Jamie Dreier (2012). Quasi-Realism and the Problem of Unexplained Coincidence. Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):269-287.
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  3. James Dreier (2011). In Defense of Consequentializing. In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 1. Oxford University Press.
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  4. Jamie Dreier (2011). Humean Doubts. In Xu Xiangdong (ed.), Practical Reason. Zhejiang University Press.
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  5. James Dreier (2010). 1. Wedgwood's Argument. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. 5--153.
     
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  6. James Dreier (2010). When Do Goals Explain the Norms That Advance Them? In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford University Press. 5--153.
     
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  7. James Dreier (2010). When Do Goals Advance the Norms That Explain Them? In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 5. Oup Oxford.
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  8. Jamie Dreier (2010). Mackie's Realism. In Richard Joyce & Simon Kirchen (eds.), A World Without Values. Springer.
    The chapter argues that we should draw the line between realist and antirealist metaethics according to whether a theory locates the explanation for the special, puzzling features of moral terms and concepts out in the world, with the content of moral thoughts, or inside the head. This taxonomy places Mackie's error theory in the realist category, contrary to the usual scheme. The paper suggests that in looking for the “queerness” of objective value in the metaphysics of moral properties, Mackie makes (...)
     
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  9. Jamie Dreier (2010). When Do Goals Explain the Rules That Advance Them? Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5.
     
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  10. James Dreier (2009). Practical Conditionals. In David Sobel & Steven Wall (eds.), Reasons for Action. Cambridge University Press. 116--133.
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  11. James Dreier (2009). Relativism (and Expressivism) and the Problem of Disagreement. Philosophical Perspectives 23 (1):79-110.
    Many philosophers, in different areas, are tempted by what variously goes under the name of Contextualism, Speaker Relativism, Indexical Relativism. (I’ll just use Indexical Relativism in this paper.) Thinking of certain problematic expressions as deriving their content from elements of the context of use solves some problems. But it faces some problems of its own, and in this paper I’m interested in one in particular, namely, the problem of disagreement. Two alternative theories, tempting for just the same kinds of expressions (...)
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  12. Jamie Dreier (2008). Shallow, Deeper, Deep: A Few Thoughts on a Small Piece of Walter Sinnott-Armstrong's Moral Skepticisms. Philosophical Books 49 (3):197-206.
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  13. James Dreier (ed.) (2006). Defending Moral Particularism. Blackwell.
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  14. James Dreier (2006). Negation for Expressivists: A Collection of Problems with a Suggestion for Their Solution. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1:217-233.
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  15. James Lawrence Dreier (ed.) (2006). Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory. Blackwell Pub..
    Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory features pairs of newly commissioned essays by some of the leading theorists working in the field today. Brings together fresh debates on the most controversial issues in moral theory Questions include: Are moral requirements derived from reason? How demanding is morality? Are virtues the proper starting point for moral theorizing? Lively debate format sharply defines the issues, and paves the way for further discussion. Will serve as an accessible introduction to the major topics in contemporary (...)
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  16. Jamie Dreier (2006). Disagreeing (About) What to Do. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):714-721.
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  17. Jamie Dreier (2006). Moral Relativism and Moral Nihilism. In David Copp (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Oxford University Press.
     
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  18. Jamie Dreier (2006). Negation for Expressivists. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 1.
     
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  19. Jamie Dreier (2006). Was Moore a Moorean? In Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.), Metaethics After Moore. Oxford University Press. 191.
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  20. Jamie Dreier (2006). Disagreeing (About) What to Do: Negation and Completeness in Gibbard's Norm-Expressivism. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):714 - 721.
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  21. Jamie Dreier (2005). Pettit on Preference for Prospects and Properties – Discussion. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 124 (2):199 - 219.
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  22. James Dreier (2004). Decision Theory and Morality. In Piers Rawling & Al Mele (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Rationality. Oxford. 156--181.
  23. James Dreier (2004). Lockean and Logical Truth Conditions. Analysis 64 (1):84–91.
    1. In ‘A problem for expressivism’ Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit argue ‘that expressivists do not have a persuasive story to tell about how ethical sentences can express attitudes without reporting them and, in particular, without being true or false’ (1998: 240). Briefly: expressivists say that ethical sentences serve to express non-cognitive attitudes, but that these sentences do not report non-cognitive attitudes. The view that ethical sentences do report non-cognitive attitudes is not Expressivism (and not non-cognitivism), but rather a version (...)
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  24. James Dreier (2004). Meta‐Ethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism. Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):23–44.
    This is a paper about the problem of realism in meta-ethics (and, I hope, also in other areas, but that hope is so far pretty speculative). But it is not about the problem of whether realism is true. It is about the problem of what realism is. More specifically, it is about the question of what divides meta-ethical realists from irrealists. I start with a potted history of the Good Old Days.
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  25. James Dreier (2004). Why Ethical Satisficing Makes Sense and Rational Satisficing Doesn't. In Michael Byron (ed.), Satisficing and Maximizing. Cambridge University Press.
     
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  26. Jamie Dreier (2003). Comments: Gibbard and Moore. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (Supplement):158-164.
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  27. Jamie Dreier (2003). Gibbard and Moore. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (S1):158-164.
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  28. James Dreier (2002). Critical Study: Timmons, Mark; Morality Without Foundations: A Defense of Moral Contextualism. [REVIEW] Noûs 36 (1):152–168.
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  29. James Dreier (2002). Metaethics and Normative Commitment. Philosophical Issues 12 (s1):241-263.
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  30. James Dreier (2002). Philosophical Issues, 12, Realism and Relativism, 2002. In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Realism and Relativism. Blackwell. 241.
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  31. James Dreier (2002). Troubling Developments in Metaethics. [REVIEW] Noûs 36 (1):152 - 168.
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  32. James Dreier (2002). The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):136–143.
  33. James Dreier (2001). Charles Leslie Stevenson. In David Sosa & A. P. Martinich (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Analytic Philosophy. Blackwell.
     
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  34. James Dreier (2001). Humean Doubts About Categorical Imperatives. In Elijah Millgram (ed.), Varieties of Practical Reasoning. MIT Press. 27--48.
  35. James Dreier (2000). Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):619-638.
  36. James Dreier (2000). Dispositions and Fetishes. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 61 (3):619 - 638.
  37. James Dreier (1999). Transforming Expressivism. Noûs 33 (4):558-572.
    In chapter five of Wise Choices, Apt Feelings Allan Gibbard develops what he calls a ‘normative logic’ intended to solve some problems that face an expressivist theory of norms like his. The first is “the problem of embedding: The analysis applies to simple contexts, in which it is simply asserted or denied that such-and-such is rational. It says nothing about more complex normative assertions.”1 That is the problem with which I will be concerned. Though he doesn’t list it as one (...)
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  38. James Dreier (1999). The Authority of Reason, Jean Hampton. Cambridge University Press, 1998, Vi + 310 Pages. [REVIEW] Economics and Philosophy 15 (02):311-.
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  39. James Dreier (1997). Humean Doubts About the Practical Justification of Morality. In Garrett Cullity & Gaut Berys (eds.), Ethics and Practical Reason. Oxford Clarendon Press. 81--100.
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  40. James Dreier (1996). Accepting Agent Centred Norms: A Problem for Non-Cognitivists and a Suggestion for Solving It. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (3):409–422.
    Non-cognitivists claim to be able to represent normative judgment, and especially moral judgment, as an expression of a non-cognitive attitude. There is some reason to worry whether their treatment can incorporate agent centred theories, including much of common sense morality. In this paper I investigate the prospects for a non-cognitivist explanation of what is going on when we subscribe to agent centred theories or norms. The first section frames the issue by focusing on a particularly simple and clear agent centred (...)
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  41. James Dreier (1996). Book Review: The Moral Problem by Michael Smith. [REVIEW] Mind 105 (418):363-367.
  42. James Dreier (1996). Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth. Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.
    This paper is about Truth Minimalism, Norm Expressivism, and the relation between them. In particular, it is about whether Truth Minimalism can help to solve a problem thought to plague Norm Expressivism. To start with, let me explain what I mean by 'Truth Minimalism' and 'Norm Expressivism.'.
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  43. James Dreier (1996). Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan.
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  44. James Dreier (1996). Projectivism. In Macmillan Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan.
     
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  45. James Dreier (1996). Rational Preference: Decision Theory as a Theory of Practical Rationality. Theory and Decision 40 (3):249-276.
    In general, the technical apparatus of decision theory is well developed. It has loads of theorems, and they can be proved from axioms. Many of the theorems are interesting, and useful both from a philosophical and a practical perspective. But decision theory does not have a well agreed upon interpretation. Its technical terms, in particular, ‘utility’ and ‘preference’ do not have a single clear and uncontroversial meaning. How to interpret these terms depends, of course, on what purposes in pursuit of (...)
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  46. James Dreier (1994). Perspectives on the Normativity of Ethics. [REVIEW] Noûs 28 (4):514 - 525.
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  47. James Dreier (1993). Structures of Normative Theories. The Monist 76 (1):22-40.
    Normative theorists like to divide normative theories into classes. One special point of focus has been to place utilitarianism into a larger class of theories which do not necessarily share its view about what is alone of impersonal intrinsic value, namely, individual human well-being, but do share another structural feature, roughly its demand that each person seek to maximize the realization of what is of impersonal intrinsic value. The larger class is distinguished from its complement in two apparently different ways. (...)
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  48. James Dreier (1992). The Supervenience Argument Against Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 30 (3):13-38.
    In 1971, Simon Blackburn worked out an argument against moral realism appealing to the supervenience of the moral realm on the natural realm.1 He has since revised the argument, in part to take account of objections,2 but the basic structure remains intact. While commentators3 seem to agree that the argument is not successful, they have not agreed upon what goes wrong. I believe this is because no attempt has been made to see what happens when Blackburn's argument is addressed to (...)
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  49. J. Dreier (1991). Books in Review. Political Theory 19 (1):129-133.
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  50. James Dreier (1991). Book Review: Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory by Gerald F. Gaus. [REVIEW] Ethics 102 (1):164-.
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  51. James Dreier (1991). Skepticism in Ethics, by Panayot Butchvarov. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (4):934-938.
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  52. James Dreier (1990). Internalism and Speaker Relativism. Ethics 101 (1):6-26.
    In this article I set out a reason for believing in a form of metaethical relativism. In rough terms, the reason is this: a widely held thesis, internalism, tells us that to accept (sincerely assert, believe, etc.) a moral judgment logically requires having a motivating reason. Since the connection is logical, or conceptual, it must be explained by a theory of what it is to accept a moral claim. I argue that the internalist feature of moral expressions can best be (...)
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