Brendan Balcerak Jackson University of Konstanz
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  • Research staff, University of Konstanz
  • PhD, Cornell University, 2005.

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  1. Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2013). Reasoning as a Source of Justification. Philosophical Studies 164 (1):113-126.
    In this essay we argue that reasoning can sometimes generate epistemic justification, rather than merely transmitting justification that the subject already possesses to new beliefs. We also suggest a way to account for it in terms of the relationship between epistemic normative requirements, justification and cognitive capacities.
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  2. Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2013). Defusing Easy Arguments for Numbers. Linguistics and Philosophy 36 (6):447-461.
    Pairs of sentences like the following pose a problem for ontology: (1) Jupiter has four moons. (2) The number of moons of Jupiter is four. (2) is intuitively a trivial paraphrase of (1). And yet while (1) seems ontologically innocent, (2) appears to imply the existence of numbers. Thomas Hofweber proposes that we can resolve the puzzle by recognizing that sentence (2) is syntactically derived from, and has the same meaning as, sentence (1). Despite appearances, the expressions ‘the number of (...)
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  3. Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2013). Metaphysics, Verbal Disputes and the Limits of Charity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):412-434.
    Intuitively, (1)-(3) seem to express genuine claims (true or false) about what the world is like, attempts to correctly describe parts of extra-linguistic reality. By contrast, it is tempting to regard (4)-(6) as merely reflecting decisions (or conventions, or dispositions, or rules) concerning the terms in which that extra-linguistic reality is described, decisions about which things to label with 'vixen', 'bachelor' or 'cup'.
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  4. Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2013). Verbal Disputes and Substantiveness. Erkenntnis (1):1-24.
    One way to challenge the substantiveness of a particular philosophical issue is to argue that those who debate the issue are engaged in a merely verbal dispute. For example, it has been maintained that the apparent disagreement over the mind/brain identity thesis is a merely verbal dispute, and thus that there is no substantive question of whether or not mental properties are identical to neurological properties. The goal of this paper is to help clarify the relationship between mere verbalness and (...)
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  5. Magdalena Balcerak Jackson & Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2012). Understanding and Philosophical Methodology. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):185-205.
    According to Conceptualism, philosophy is an independent discipline that can be pursued from the armchair because philosophy seeks truths that can be discovered purely on the basis of our understanding of expressions and the concepts they express. In his recent book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson argues that while philosophy can indeed be pursued from the armchair, we should reject any form of Conceptualism. In this paper, we show that Williamson’s arguments against Conceptualism are not successful, and we sketch (...)
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  6. Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2012). Worlds and Individuals, Possible and Otherwise. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (1):205 - 206.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 90, Issue 1, Page 205-206, March 2012.
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  7. Brendan Balcerak Jackson (2009). Understanding and Semantic Structure: Reply to Timothy Williamson. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 109 (1pt3):337-343.
    In his essay ‘“Conceptual Truth”’, Timothy Williamson (2006) argues that there are no truths or entailments that are constitutive of understanding the sentences involved. In this reply I provide several examples of entailment patterns that are intuitively constitutive of understanding in just the way that Williamson rejects, and I argue that Williamson’s argument does nothing to show otherwise. Williamson bolsters his conclusion by appeal to a certain theory about the nature of understanding. I argue that his theory fails to consider (...)
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  8. Brendan Jackson (2007). Beyond Logical Form. Philosophical Studies 132 (2):347 - 380.
    Notice that each of (1)–(4) is an instance of a more general pattern. For example, we could replace ‘black’ in (1) with any of a wide range of other adjectives such as ‘furry’ or ‘hungry’ or ‘three-legged’, without rendering the entailment invalid or any less obvious. Similarly, there are a number of verbs that occur in entailments parallel to (3): ‘Moe boiled the water; so the water boiled’; ‘Bart blew up the school; so the school blew up’; ‘Homer sank the (...)
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  9. Brendan Jackson (2007). Truth Vs. Pretense in Discourse About Motion (or, Why the Sun Really Does Rise). Noûs 41 (2):298–317.
    These days it is widely agreed that there is no such thing as absolute motion and rest; the motion of an object can only be characterized with respect to some chosen frame of reference.1 This is a fact of which many of us are well-aware, and yet a cursory consideration of the ways we ascribe motion to objects gives the impression that it is a fact we persistently ignore. We insist to the police officer that we came to a full (...)
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  10. Brendan Jackson (2006). Logical Form: Classical Conception and Recent Challenges. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):303-316.
    The term ‘logical form’ has been called on to serve a wide range of purposes in philosophy, and it would be too ambitious to try to survey all of them in a single essay. Instead, I will focus on just one conception of logical form that has occupied a central place in the philosophy of language, and in particular in the philosophical study of linguistic meaning. This is what I will call the classical conception of logical form. The classical conception, (...)
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  11. M. Michael, A. B. Zwi, H. Rutsch, W. J. Moss, M. Ramakrishan, A. Siegle, D. Storms, B. Weiss, K. Dasgupta & B. Jackson (2002). Issue 4: Integrating Gender Into Emergency Responses. Developing World Bioethics 2 (2):109-130.
     
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  12. R. Hastings, B. Jackson & Z. Zvolensky (eds.) (2001). Proceedings From SALT XI. CLC.
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  13. B. Jackson (1999). Report Regarding: Karlin Et Al. V. Foust Et Al., August 12, 1996. Irb 14 (4):443.
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  14. B. Jackson (1987). Critique of Deboer and the Paradox of Subjectivity. Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 18 (1):38-48.
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