Sven Walter University of Osnabrück
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  • Faculty, University of Osnabrück
  • PhD, University of Saarland, 2005.

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  1. Sven Walter (forthcoming). Situated Cognition: A Field Guide to Some Open Conceptual and Ontological Issues. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    This paper provides an overview over the debate about so-called “situated approaches to cognition” that depart from the intracranialism associated with traditional cognitivism insofar as they stress the importance of body, world, and interaction for cognitive processing. It sketches the outlines of an overarching framework that reveals the differences, commonalities, and interdependencies between the various claims and positions of second-generation cognitive science, and identifies a number of apparently unresolved conceptual and ontological issues.
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  2. Sven Walter (forthcoming). Willusionism, Epiphenomenalism, and the Feeling of Conscious Will. Synthese:1-24.
    While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, i.e., with the (...)
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  3. A. Stephan & S. Walter (eds.) (2013). Handbuch Kognitionswissenschaft. J.B. Metzler.
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  4. Achim Stephan, Sven Walter & Wendy Wilutzky (2013). Emotions Beyond Brain and Body. Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):1-17.
    The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individual's boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make (...)
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  5. Miriam Kyselo & Sven Walter (2011). Belief Integration in Action: A Defense of Extended Beliefs. Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):245-260.
  6. Sven Walter (2011). Zombies, Dualismus und Physikalismus. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 65 (2):241-254.
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  7. Sven Walter & Markus Eronen (2011). Reduction, Multiple Realizability, and Levels of Reality. In Steven French & Juha Saatsi (eds.), Continuum Companion to the Philosophy of Science. Continuum. 138.
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  8. Sven Walter (2010). Cognitive Extension: The Parity Argument, Functionalism, and the Mark of the Cognitive. Synthese 177 (2):285-300.
    During the past decade, the so-called “hypothesis of cognitive extension,” according to which the material vehicles of some cognitive processes are spatially distributed over the brain and the extracranial parts of the body and the world, has received lots of attention, both favourable and unfavourable. The debate has largely focussed on three related issues: (1) the role of parity considerations, (2) the role of functionalism, and (3) the importance of a mark of the cognitive. This paper critically assesses these issues (...)
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  9. Sven Walter (2010). Locked-in Syndrome, Bci, and a Confusion About Embodied, Embedded, Extended, and Enacted Cognition. Neuroethics 3 (1):61-72.
    In a recent contribution to this journal, Andrew Fenton and Sheri Alpert have argued that the so-called “extended mind hypothesis” allows us to understand why Brain Computer Interfaces (BCIs) have the potential to change the self of patients suffering from Locked-in syndrome (LIS) by extending their minds beyond their bodies. I deny that this can shed any light on the theoretical, or philosophical, underpinnings of BCIs as a tool for enabling communication with, or bodily action by, patients with LIS: BCIs (...)
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  10. Sven Walter (2010). Taking Realization Seriously: No Cure for Epiphobia. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 151 (2):207 - 226.
    The realization relation that allegedly holds between mental and physical properties plays a crucial role for so-called non-reductive physicalism because it is supposed to secure both the ontological autonomy of mental properties and, despite their irreducibility, their ability to make a causal difference to the course of the causally closed physical world. For a long time however, the nature of realization has largely been ignored in the philosophy of mind until a couple of years ago authors like Carl Gillett, Derk (...)
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  11. Miriam Kyselo & Sven Walter (2009). Supersizing the Mind. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):803 – 807.
  12. Brian P. McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.) (2009/2011). The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    The study of the mind has always been one of the main preoccupations of philosophers, and has been a booming area of research in recent decades, with remarkable advances in psychology and neuroscience. Oxford University Press now presents the most authoritative and comprehensive guide ever published to the philosophy of mind. An outstanding international team of contributors offer 45 specially written critical surveys of a wide range of topics relating to the mind. The first two sections cover the place of (...)
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  13. Sven Walter (2009). Epiphenomenalism. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  14. Sven Walter (2009). Review: Robert C. Richardson: Evolutionary Psychology as Maladapted Psychology. [REVIEW] Mind 118 (470):523-527.
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  15. Sven Walter (2009). Realisierung und mentale Verursachung. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (5):689-708.
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  16. Sven Walter (2009). Wie frei sind wir eigentlich empirisch? Philosophia Naturalis 46 (1):8-35.
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  17. Sven Walter & Miriam Kyselo (2009). Fred Adams, Ken Aizawa: The Bounds of Cognition. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 71 (2):277-281.
  18. Sven Walter & Miriam Kyselo (2009). Supersizing the Mind. Philosophical Psychology 22 (6):803-807.
  19. Sven Walter, B. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (2009). Epiphenomenalism and the Notion of Causation. In Martina Fürst, Wolfgang Gombocz & Christian Hiebaum (eds.), Gehirne Und Personen. Ontos.
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  20. Ansgar Beckermann, Holm Tetens & Sven Walter (eds.) (2008). Philosophie: Grundlagen Und Anwendungen/Philosophy: Foundations and Applications. Mentis.
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  21. Sven Walter (2008). Ist der Epiphänomenalismus absurd? Ein frischer Blick auf eine tot geglaubte Position. Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 62 (3):415-432.
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  22. Sven Walter (2008). Physicalism, or Something Near Enough, by Jaegwon Kim. European Journal of Philosophy 16 (1):157–161.
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  23. Sven Walter (2008). The Supervenience Argument, Overdetermination, and Causal Drainage: Assessing Kim's Master Argument. Philosophical Psychology 21 (5):673 – 696.
    This paper examines Jaegwon Kim's Supervenience Argument (SA) against nonreductive physicalism, concentrating on Kim's response to two of the most important objections against the SA: First, the Overdetermination Argument, according to which Kim has no convincing argument against the possibility that mental causation might be a case of genuine or systematic overdetermination; second, the Generalization Argument, according to which the SA would entail that causation at any level gives way to causation at the next lower level, thereby leading to an (...)
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  24. Sven Walter & Helen Bohse (eds.) (2008). GAP.6: Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of the Sixth International Congress of the German Society for Analytic Philosophy.
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  25. Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.) (2007/2009). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
    What is the nature of consciousness? How is consciousness related to brain processes? This volume collects thirteen new papers on these topics: twelve by leading and respected philosophers and one by a leading color-vision scientist. All focus on consciousness in the "phenomenal" sense: on what it's like to have an experience. Consciousness has long been regarded as the biggest stumbling block for physicalism, the view that the mind is physical. The controversy has gained focus over the last few decades, and (...)
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  26. Helen Bohse & Sven Walter (eds.) (2007). Selected Contributions to GAP.6: Sixth International Conference of the German Society for Analytical Philosophy, Berlin, 11–14 September 2006. mentis.
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  27. Sven Walter (2007). Determinables, Determinates, and Causal Relevance. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):217-244.
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  28. Sven Walter, Epiphenomenalism. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  29. Sven Walter (2007). The Epistemological Approach to Mental Causation. Erkenntnis 67 (2):273 - 285.
    Epistemological approaches to mental causation argue that the notorious problem of mental causation as captured in the question “How can irreducible, physically realized, and potentially relational mental properties be causally efficacious in the production of physical effects?” has a very simple solution: One merely has to abandon any metaphysical considerations in favor of epistemological considerations and accept that our explanatory practice is a much better guide to causal relevance than the metaphysical reasoning carried out from the philosophical armchair. I argue (...)
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  30. H. Bohse & S. Walter (eds.) (2006). Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.6. mentis.
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  31. Helen Bohse & Sven Walter (eds.) (2006). Ausgewählte Sektionsbeiträge der GAP.6. Sechster Internationaler Kongress der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie. Mentis.
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  32. Brian P. McLaughlin & Sven Walter (eds.) (2006). Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
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  33. Michael Pauen, Alexander Staudacher & Sven Walter (2006). Epiphenomenalism: Dead End or Way Out? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):7-19.
     
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  34. Michael Pauen, Alexander Staudacher & Sven Walter (2006). Editors' Introduction. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):7-19.
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  35. S. Walter & Michael Pauen (2006). Editors' Introduction -- Epiphenomenalism: Dead End or Way Out? Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (s 1-2):7-19.
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  36. Sven Walter (2006). Causal Exclusion as an Argument Against Non-Reductive Physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (1-2):67-83.
     
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  37. Sven Walter (2006). Multiple Realizability and Reduction: A Defense of the Disjunctive Move. Metaphysica 7 (1):43-65.
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  38. Sven Walter (2005). Program Explanations and the Causal Relevance of Mental Properties. Acta Analytica 20:32-47.
     
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  39. Sven Walter (2005). Program Explanations and Causal Relevance. Acta Analytica 20 (36):32-47.
    Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit have defended a non-reductive account of causal relevance known as the ‘program explanation account’. Allegedly, irreducible mental properties can be causally relevant in virtue of figuring in non-redundant program explanations which convey information not conveyed by explanations in terms of the physical properties that actually do the ‘causal work’. I argue that none of the possible ways to spell out the intuitively plausible idea of a program explanation serves its purpose, viz., defends non-reductive physicalism against (...)
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  40. Sven Walter (2005). Program Explanations and Mental Causation. Acta Analytica 20:32 - 47.
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  41. Marc Slors & Sven Walter (2003). Introduction. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):1-13.
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  42. Sven Walter (2003). Erwin Rogler Und Gerhard Preyer: Materialismus, Anomaler Monismus Und Mentale Kausalität. Frankfurt: Humanities Online, 2001. Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):251-255.
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  43. Sven Walter (2003). Physicalism and Mental Causation the Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic.
  44. Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.) (2003). Physicalism and Mental Causation. Imprint Academic.
  45. Sven Walter (2002). Need Multiple Realizability Deter the Identity-Theorist? Grazer Philosophische Studien 65 (1):51-75.
    I will discuss two possible options how a defender of the type identity-theory with respect to mental properties can avoid the conclusion of Putnam's Multiple Realizability Argument. I begin by offering a rigorous formulation of Putnam's argument, which has been lacking so far in the literature (section 2). This rigorous formulation shows that there are basically two possible options for avoiding the argument's conclusion. Contrary to current mainstream, I reject the first option?Kim's 'local reductionism'?as untenable (section 3). I endorse the (...)
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  46. Sven Walter (2002). Terry, Terry, Quite Contrary. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):103-22.
    In 'Jackson on physical information and qualia'(1984) Terry Horgan defended physicalism against Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument by raising what later has been called the 'mode of presentation reply'- arguingthatthe Knowledge Argumentis fallacious because itsubtly equivocates on two different readings of 'physical information'. In 'Mary, Mary, quite contrary' (2000) however, George Graham and Terry Horgan maintain that none of the replies against Jackson has yet been successful, not even Horgan's own 1984 rejoinder.Tosubstantiate their claim, they present an allegedly improved version of (...)
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