Daniel Star Boston University

  • Faculty, Boston University
  • DPhil, Oxford University, 2007.

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About me
Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Boston University.
My works
18 items found.
  1. Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (forthcoming). Weighing Explanations. In Andrew Reisner & Iwao Hirose (eds.), Weighing and Reasoning: A Festschrift for John Broome. Oxford University Press
  2. Daniel Star (ed.) (forthcoming). The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
  3. Daniel Star (ed.) (forthcoming). The Oxford Handbook of Normativity and Reasons. Oxford University Press.
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  4. Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2013). Reasons, Facts‐About‐Evidence, and Indirect Evidence. Analytic Philosophy 54 (2):237-243.
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  5. Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2013). Weighing Reasons. Journal of Moral Philosophy 10 (1):70-86.
    This paper is a response to two sets of published criticisms of the 'Reasons as Evidence’ thesis concerning normative reasons, proposed and defended in earlier papers. According to this thesis, a fact is a normative reason for an agent to Φ just in case this fact is evidence that this agent ought to Φ. John Broome and John Brunero have presented a number of challenging criticisms of this thesis which focus, for the most part, on problems that it appears to (...)
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  6. Daniel Star (2013). Moral Metaphysics. In Roger Crisp (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics. Oxford University Press
  7. Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2011). On Good Advice: A Reply to McNaughton and Rawling. Analysis 71 (3):506-508.
  8. Daniel Star (2011). Two Levels of Moral Thinking. Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics 1:75-96.
    The purpose of this paper is to introduce a two level account of moral thinking that, unlike other accounts, does justice to three very plausible propositions that seem to form an inconsistent triad: (1) People can be morally virtuous without the aid of philosophy. (2) Morally virtuous people non-accidentally act for good reasons, and work out what it is that they ought to do on the basis of considering such reasons. (3) Philosophers engaged in the project of normative ethics are (...)
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  9. Daniel Star & Candice Delmas (2011). Three Conceptions of Practical Authority. Jurisprudence 2 (1):143-160.
    Joseph Raz’s much discussed service conception of practical authority has recently come under attack from Stephen Darwall, who proposes that we instead adopt a second- personal conception of practical authority.1 We believe that the best place to start understanding practical authority is with a pared back conception of it, as simply a species of normative authority more generally, where this species is picked out merely by the fact that the normative authority in question is authority in relation to action, rather (...)
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  10. Daniel Star (2010). Review of Allan Gibbard, Reconciling Our Aims: In Search of Bases for Ethics (OUP, 2008). [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 119 (2):259-63.
  11. Daniel Star (2010). Review of Terence Cuneo, The Normative Web: An Argument for Moral Realism (OUP, 2007). [REVIEW] Mind 119 (473):210-215.
  12. Daniel Star (2010). Michael Smith. In Graham Oppy & N. N. Trakakis (eds.), A Companion to Philosophy in Australasia. Monash University Publishing
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    Daniel Star (2010). Moral Skepticism for Foxes. Boston University Law Review 90:497-508.
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  14. Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2009). Reasons as Evidence. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 4:215-42.
    In this paper, we argue for a particular informative and unified analysis of normative reasons. According to this analysis, a fact F is a reason to act in a certain way just in case it is evidence that one ought to act in that way. Similarly, F is a reason to believe a certain proposition just in case it is evidence for the truth of this proposition. Putting the relatively uncontroversial claim about reasons for belief to one side, we present (...)
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  15. Stephen Kearns & Daniel Star (2008). Reasons: Explanations or Evidence? Ethics 119 (1):31-56.
  16. Daniel Star (2008). Moral Knowledge, Epistemic Externalism, and Intuitionism. Ratio 21 (3):329-343.
    This paper explores the generally overlooked relevance of an important contemporary debate in mainstream epistemology to philosophers working within ethics on questions concerning moral knowledge. It is argued that this debate, between internalists and externalists about the accessibility of epistemic justification, has the potential to be both significantly influenced by, and have a significant impact upon, the study of moral knowledge. The moral sphere provides a particular type of strong evidence in favour of externalism, and mainstream epistemologists might benefit from (...)
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    Daniel Star (2007). Review of Sean McKeever, Michael Ridge, Principled Ethics: Generalism As a Regulative Ideal. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
  18. Daniel Star (2002). Do Confucians Really Care? A Defense of the Distinctiveness of Care Ethics: A Reply to Chenyang Li. Hypatia 17 (1):77-106.
    Chenyang Li argues, in an article originally published in Hypatia, that the ethics of care and Confucian ethics constitute similar approaches to ethics. The present paper takes issue with this claim. It is more accurate to view Confucian ethics as a kind of virtue ethics, rather than as a kind of care ethics. In the process of criticizing Li's claim, the distinctiveness of care ethics is defended, against attempts to assimilate (...)
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