Timothy Chan University of Oslo

  • Research staff, University of Oslo
  • DPhil, Oxford University, 2006.

Areas of specialization

Areas of interest

About me
I am a researcher at the Centre for the Study of Mind in Nature, University of Oslo, working on the research project 'The Reflective Mind' with the Rational Agency project at CSMN, Oslo. I am interested in the nature of belief and self-knowledge, among other things.
My works
8 items found.
  1. Timothy Chan (2013). Introduction: Aiming at Truth. In The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press 1-16.
    In this introductory chapter to the volume The Aim of Belief, the editor surveys the fundamental questions in current debates surrounding the aim of belief, and identifies the major theoretical approaches. The main arguments of the ten contributions to the volume are outlined and located in the context of the existing literature.
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  2. Timothy Chan (ed.) (2013). The Aim of Belief. Oxford University Press.
    What is belief? "Beliefs aim at truth" is the commonly accepted starting point for philosophers who want to give an adequate account of this fundamental state of mind, but it raises as many questions as it answers. For example, in what sense can beliefs be said to have an aim of their own? If belief aims at truth, does it mean that reasons to believe must also be based on truth? Must beliefs be formed on the basis of evidence alone? (...)
    Direct download  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  3.  70
    Timothy Chan (2012). Spheres of Reason, Edited by Simon Robertson. Mind 121 (484):1122-1128.
    No categories
    Direct download (6 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  4. Timothy Chan & Guy Kahane (2011). The Trouble with Being Sincere. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):215-234.
    Questions about sincerity play a central role in our lives. But what makes an assertion insincere? In this paper we argue that the answer to this question is not as straightforward as it has sometimes been taken to be. Until recently the dominant answer has been that a speaker makes an insincere assertion if and only if he does not believe the proposition asserted. There are, however, persuasive counterexamples to this simple account. It has been proposed instead that an insincere (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5. Timothy Chan (2010). Moore's Paradox is Not Just Another Pragmatic Paradox. Synthese 173 (3):211 - 229.
  6. Timothy Chan (2008). Belief, Assertion and Moore's Paradox. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395 - 414.
    In this article I argue that two received accounts of belief and assertion cannot both be correct, because they entail mutually contradictory claims about Moore’s Paradox. The two accounts in question are, first, the Action Theory of Belief (ATB), the functionalist view that belief must be manifested in dispositions to act, and second, the Belief Account of Assertion (BAA), the Gricean view that an asserter must present himself as believing what he asserts. It is generally accepted also that Moorean assertions (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  7.  1
    Timothy Chan (2008). Belief, Assertion and Moore’s Paradox. Philosophical Studies 139 (3):395-414.
    No categories
    Direct download (2 more)  
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
  8. T. Chan (2002). Jonathan Dancy, Practical Reality. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (1):106-109.
    Export citation  
    My bibliography  
Is this list right?