Errol Lord University of Pennsylvania
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About me
I am an Assistant Professor at the University of Pennsylvania. I completed my PhD at Princeton University in June 2013.
My works
22 items found.
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  1. Errol Lord (forthcoming). Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press
    The post-Gettier literature contained many views that tried to solve the Gettier problem by appealing to the notion of defeat. Unfortunately, all of these views are false. The failure of these views greatly contributed to a general distrust of reasons in epistemology. However, reasons are making a comeback in epistemology, both in general and in the context of the Gettier problem. There are two main aims of this paper. First, I will argue against a natural defeat based resolution of the (...)
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    Errol Lord (forthcoming). The Explanatory Problem for Cognitivism About Practical Reason. In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Practical and Epistemic.
    Cognitivists about practical reason hold that we can explain why certain wide-scope requirements of practical rationality are true by appealing to certain epistemic requirements. Extant discussions of cognitivism focus solely on two claims. The first is the claim that intentions involve beliefs. The second is that whenever your intentions are incoherent in certain ways, you will be epistemically irrational. Even if the cognitivist successfully defends these claims, she still needs to show that they entail certain practical requirements. That is, she (...)
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  3.  78
    Errol Lord (forthcoming). What You're Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!). Mind.
    It is a truism that we ought to be rational. Despite this (or because of it), it has become popular to think that it is not the case that we ought to be rational. In this paper I argue for a view about rationality--the view that what you are rationally required to do is determined by the normative reasons you possess--by showing that it can vindicate that we ought to be rational. I do this by showing that it is independently (...)
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  4.  92
    Errol Lord (2016). Justifying Partiality. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (3):569-590.
    It’s an undeniable fact about our moral lives that we are partial towards certain people and projects. Despite this, it has traditionally been very hard to justify partiality. In this paper I defend a novel partialist theory. The context of the paper is the debate between three different views of how partiality is justified. According to the first view, partiality is justified by facts about our ground projects. According to the second view, partiality is justified by facts about our relationships (...)
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  5.  44
    Errol Lord (2016). On The Intellectual Conditions for Responsibility: Acting for the Right Reasons, Conceptualization, and Credit. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (3).
    In this paper I'm interested in the prospects for the Right Reasons theory of creditworthiness. The Right Reasons theory says that what it is for an agent to be creditworthy for X-ing is for that agent to X for the right reasons. The paper has a negative goal and a positive goal. The negative goal is to show that a class of Right Reasons theories are doomed. These theories all have a Conceptualization Condition on acting for the right reasons. Conceptualization (...)
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  6. Errol Lord (2016). On the Rational Power of Aesthetic Testimony. British Journal of Aesthetics 56 (1):1-13.
    Can one know aesthetic facts on the basis of testimony? Optimists say that we can. Pessimists say that we cannot. Daniel Whiting has recently put forth a new argument for pessimism about the epistemic power of aesthetic testimony. He seeks to establish pessimism by arguing that testimonial beliefs cannot justify the downstream reactions that would otherwise be justified if one had aesthetic knowledge. In this paper, I will show that there is a plausible alternative explanation of the data that Whiting (...)
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  7.  17
    Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.) (2016). Weighing Reasons. OUP Usa.
    Normative reasons have become a popular theoretical tool in recent decades. One helpful feature of normative reasons is their weight. The fourteen new essays in this book theorize about many different aspects of weight. Topics range from foundational issues to applications of weight in debates across philosophy.
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  8. Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.) (2016). Weighing Reasons. Oxford University Press Usa.
    Normative reasons have become a popular theoretical tool in recent decades. One helpful feature of normative reasons is their weight. The fourteen new essays in this book theorize about many different aspects of weight. Topics range from foundational issues to applications of weight in debates across philosophy.
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  9. Errol Lord (2015). Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 10. Oxford University Press
    Objectivists about obligation hold that obligations are determined by all of the normatively relevant facts. Perspectivalists, on the other hand, hold that only facts within one's perspective can determine what we are obligated to do. In this paper I argue for a perspectivalist view. On my view, what you are obligated to do is determined by the normative reasons you possess. My argument for my view is anchored in the thought that our obligations have to be action-guiding in a certain (...)
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  10.  38
    Errol Lord (2015). Joshua Gert, Normative Bedrock: Response-Dependence, Rationality, and Reasons , Pp. X + 218. Utilitas 27 (2):251-254.
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  11.  17
    Errol Lord (2015). Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder.In Praise of Desire. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. V+316. $49.95. Ethics 125 (2):562-567.
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  12.  23
    Errol Lord (2015). Partiality, by Simon Keller. Mind 124 (496):1306-1309.
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  13.  28
    Errol Lord (2015). Review: Nomy Arpaly and Timothy Schroeder, In Praise of Desire. [REVIEW] Ethics 125 (2):562-567,.
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  14.  15
    E. Lord (2014). Reasons for Belief. Philosophical Quarterly 64 (257):664-667.
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  15. Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.
  16. Errol Lord (2013). From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-13.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 92, Issue 2, Page 365-377, June 2014.
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  17. Errol Lord (2013). The Importance of Being Rational. Dissertation, Princeton University
    My dissertation is a systematic defense of the claim that what it is to be rational is to correctly respond to the reasons you possess. The dissertation is split into two parts, each consisting of three chapters. In Part I--Coherence, Possession, and Correctly Responding--I argue that my view has important advantages over popular views in metaethics that tie rationality to coherence (ch. 2), defend a novel view of what it is to possess a reason (ch. 3), and defend a novel (...)
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  18. Errol Lord (2013). The Real Symmetry Problem(s) for Wide-Scope Accounts of Rationality. Philosophical Studies (3):1-22.
    You are irrational when you are akratic. On this point most agree. Despite this agreement, there is a tremendous amount of disagreement about what the correct explanation of this data is. Narrow-scopers think that the correct explanation is that you are violating a narrow-scope conditional requirement. You lack an intention to x that you are required to have given the fact that you believe you ought to x. Wide-scopers disagree. They think that a conditional you are required to make true (...)
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  19.  92
    Errol Lord (2011). Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):392-399.
    It is generally agreed that many types of attitudinal incoherence are irrational, but there is controversy about why they are. Some think incoherence is irrational because it violates certain wide-scope conditional requirements, others (‘narrow-scopers’) that it violates narrow-scope conditional requirements. In his paper ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, John Brunero has offered a putative counter-example to narrow-scope views. But a narrow-scoper should reject a crucial assumption which Brunero makes, namely, the claim that we always violate conditional narrow-scope requirements when we (...)
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  20. Errol Lord (2010). Having Reasons and the Factoring Account. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296.
    It’s natural to say that when it’s rational for me to φ, I have reasons to φ. That is, there are reasons for φ-ing, and moreover, I have some of them. Mark Schroeder calls this view The Factoring Account of the having reasons relation. He thinks The Factoring Account is false. In this paper, I defend The Factoring Account. Not only do I provide intuitive support for the view, but I also defend it against Schroeder’s criticisms. Moreover, I show that (...)
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  21. Errol Lord (2008). Dancy on Acting for the Right Reason. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3):1-7.
    It is a truism that agents can do the right action for the right reason. To put the point in terms more familiar to ethicists, it is a truism that one’s motivating reason can be one’s normative reason. In this short note, I will argue that Jonathan Dancy’s preferred view about how this is possible faces a dilemma. Dancy has the choice between accounting for two plausible constraints while at the same time holding an outlandish philosophy of mind by his (...)
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  22.  28
    Andrew Huddleston & E. Lord, Clear Eyes, Full Hearts, Can't Lose: Friday Night Lights and the Value of Inspiration.
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