Errol Lord University of Pennsylvania
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About me
I am an Assistant Professor at the University of Pennsylvania. I completed my PhD at Princeton University in June 2013.
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  1. Errol Lord (forthcoming). Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation. In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 10. Oxford University Press.
    Objectivists about obligation hold that obligations are determined by all of the normatively relevant facts. Perspectivalists, on the other hand, hold that only facts within one's perspective can determine what we are obligated to do. In this paper I argue for a perspectivalist view. On my view, what you are obligated to do is determined by the normative reasons you possess. My argument for my view is anchored in the thought that our obligations have to be action-guiding in a certain (...)
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  2. Errol Lord (forthcoming). Epistemic Reasons, Evidence, and Defeaters. In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. Oxford University Press.
    The post-Gettier literature contained many views that tried to solve the Gettier problem by appealing to the notion of defeat. Unfortunately, all of these views are false. The failure of these views greatly contributed to a general distrust of reasons in epistemology. However, reasons are making a comeback in epistemology, both in general and in the context of the Gettier problem. There are two main aims of this paper. First, I will argue against a natural defeat based resolution of the (...)
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  3. Errol Lord & Barry Maguire (eds.) (forthcoming). Weighing Reasons. Oxford University Press.
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  4. Errol Lord (2014). The Coherent and the Rational. Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):151-175.
  5. Errol Lord (2013). From Independence to Conciliationism: An Obituary. Australasian Journal of Philosophy (2):1-13.
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Volume 92, Issue 2, Page 365-377, June 2014.
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  6. Errol Lord (2013). The Importance of Being Rational. Dissertation, Princeton University
    My dissertation is a systematic defense of the claim that what it is to be rational is to correctly respond to the reasons you possess. The dissertation is split into two parts, each consisting of three chapters. In Part I--Coherence, Possession, and Correctly Responding--I argue that my view has important advantages over popular views in metaethics that tie rationality to coherence (ch. 2), defend a novel view of what it is to possess a reason (ch. 3), and defend a novel (...)
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  7. Errol Lord (2013). The Real Symmetry Problem(s) for Wide-Scope Accounts of Rationality. Philosophical Studies:1-22.
    You are irrational when you are akratic. On this point most agree. Despite this agreement, there is a tremendous amount of disagreement about what the correct explanation of this data is. Narrow-scopers think that the correct explanation is that you are violating a narrow-scope conditional requirement. You lack an intention to x that you are required to have given the fact that you believe you ought to x. Wide-scopers disagree. They think that a conditional you are required to make true (...)
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  8. Errol Lord (2011). Violating Requirements, Exiting From Requirements, and the Scope of Rationality. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (243):392-399.
    It is generally agreed that many types of attitudinal incoherence are irrational, but there is controversy about why they are. Some think incoherence is irrational because it violates certain wide-scope conditional requirements, others (‘narrow-scopers’) that it violates narrow-scope conditional requirements. In his paper ‘The Scope of Rational Requirements’, John Brunero has offered a putative counter-example to narrow-scope views. But a narrow-scoper should reject a crucial assumption which Brunero makes, namely, the claim that we always violate conditional narrow-scope requirements when we (...)
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  9. Errol Lord (2010). Having Reasons and the Factoring Account. Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296.
    It’s natural to say that when it’s rational for me to φ, I have reasons to φ. That is, there are reasons for φ-ing, and moreover, I have some of them. Mark Schroeder calls this view The Factoring Account of the having reasons relation. He thinks The Factoring Account is false. In this paper, I defend The Factoring Account. Not only do I provide intuitive support for the view, but I also defend it against Schroeder’s criticisms. Moreover, I show that (...)
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  10. Errol Lord (2008). Dancy on Acting for the Right Reason. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (3):1-7.
    It is a truism that agents can do the right action for the right reason. To put the point in terms more familiar to ethicists, it is a truism that one’s motivating reason can be one’s normative reason. In this short note, I will argue that Jonathan Dancy’s preferred view about how this is possible faces a dilemma. Dancy has the choice between accounting for two plausible constraints while at the same time holding an outlandish philosophy of mind by his (...)
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