Alex Byrne Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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  1. Alex Byrne, Knowing Right and Wrong: Is Morality a Natural Phenomenon?
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  2. Alex Byrne, Gert on the Shifted Spectrum.
    As Gert says, the basic claim of representationism is that the phenomenal character of an experience supervenes on its representational content. Restricted to color experience, representationism may be put as follows.
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  3. Alex Byrne (forthcoming). Intentionality. In J. Pfeifer & Sahotra Sarkar (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. Routledge.
    Some things are _about_, or are _directed on_ , or _represent_, other things. For example, the sentence 'Cats are animals' is about cats (and about animals), this article is about intentionality, Emanuel Leutze's most famous painting is about Washington's crossing of the Delaware, lanterns hung in Boston's North Church were about the British, and a map of Boston is about Boston. In contrast, '#a$b', a blank slate, and the city of Boston are not about anything. Many mental states and events (...)
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  4. Alex Byrne (2013). Perception and Evidence. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):1-13.
    Perception is a source of knowledge: by looking at a white cup on a desk, one can come to know that there is a white cup on a desk. Schellenberg’s character Percy is in such an agreeable situation, the “good case”. Her hapless Hallie, on the other hand, is in the “bad case”: she is hallucinating a white cup on a desk. (For maximum contrast we may take Hallie to be a lifelong victim of hallucination, waiving the usual externalist worries (...)
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  5. Alex Byrne (2012). Hmm… Hill on the Paradox of Pain. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 161 (3):489-496.
    Hmm… Hill on the paradox of pain Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-8 DOI 10.1007/s11098-011-9811-5 Authors Alex Byrne, Department of Linguistics and Philosophy, MIT, 32-d808, Cambridge, MA 02139-4307, USA Journal Philosophical Studies Online ISSN 1573-0883 Print ISSN 0031-8116.
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  6. Alex Byrne (2012). Knowing What I See. In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. Oxford University Press. 183.
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  7. A. Byrne (2011). Seeing, Doing, and Knowing: A Philosophical Theory of Sense Perception, by Mohan Matthen. Mind 119 (476):1206-1210.
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  8. Alex Byrne (2011). Review Essay of Dorit Bar-On's "Speaking My Mind". [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (3):705 - 717.
    “Avowals” are utterances that “ascribe [current] states of mind”; for instance utterances of ‘I have a terrible headache’ and ‘I’m finding this painting utterly puzzling’ (Bar-On 2004: 1). And avowals, “when compared to ordinary empirical reports…appear to enjoy distinctive security” (1), which Bar-On elaborates as follows: A subject who avows being tired, or scared of something, or thinking that p, is normally presumed to have the last word on the relevant matters; we would not presume to criticize her self-ascription or (...)
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  9. Alex Byrne (2011). Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities. In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oup Oxford.
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  10. Alex Byrne (2011). Transparency, Belief, Intention. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):201-221.
    This paper elaborates and defends a familiar ‘transparent’ account of knowledge of one's own beliefs, inspired by some remarks of Gareth Evans, and makes a case that the account can be extended to mental states in general, in particular to knowledge of one's intentions.
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  11. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2011). Are Colors Secondary Qualities? In Lawrence Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities: The Historical and Ongoing Debate. Oxford University Press.
     
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  12. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2011). Are Colors Secondary Qualities? In L. Nolan (ed.), Primary and Secondary Qualities. Oxford.
    The Dangerous Book for Boys Abstract: Seventeenth and eighteenth century discussions of the senses are often thought to contain a profound truth: some perceptible properties are secondary qualities, dispositions to produce certain sorts of experiences in perceivers. In particular, colors are secondary qualities: for example, an object is green iff it is disposed to look green to standard perceivers in standard conditions. After rebutting Boghossian and Velleman’s argument that a certain kind of secondary quality theory is viciously circular, we discuss (...)
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  13. Alex Byrne (2010). Recollection, Perception, Imagination. Philosophical Studies 148 (1):15 - 26.
    Remembering a cat sleeping (specifically, recollecting the way the cat looked), perceiving (specifically, seeing) a cat sleeping, and imagining (specifically, visualizing) a cat sleeping are of course importantly different. Nonetheless, from the first-person perspective they are palpably alike. Our first question is.
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  14. Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (2010). How Do Things Look to the Color-Blind? In Jonathan D. Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press. 259.
    Our question is: how do things look to the color-blind? But what does that mean? Who are the “color-blind”? Approximately 7% of males and fewer than 1% of females (of European descent1) have some form of inherited defect of color vision, and as a result are unable to discriminate some colored stimuli that most of us can tell apart. (‘Color defective’ is an alternative term that is often used; we will continue to speak with the vulgar.) Color vision defects constitute (...)
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  15. David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne (2010). How Do Things Look to the Color-Blind? In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press. 259.
    forthcoming in Color Ontology and Color Science, ed. J. Cohen and M. Matthen (MIT).
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  16. David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne (2010). How Do Things Look to the Color-Blind? In Jonathan Cohen & Mohan Matthen (eds.), Color Ontology and Color Science. Mit Press. 259.
    1. Introduction Our question is: how do things look to the color-blind? But what does that mean? Who are the “color-blind”? Approximately 7% of males and fewer than 1% of females (of European descent1) have some form of inherited defect of color vision, and as a result are unable to discriminate some colored stimuli that most of us can tell apart. (‘Color defective’ is an alternative term that is often used; we will continue to speak with the vulgar.) Color vision (...)
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  17. Alex Byrne (2009). Experience and Content. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):429-451.
    The 'content view', in slogan form, is 'Perceptual experiences have representational content'. I explain why the content view should be reformulated to remove any reference to 'experiences'. I then argue, against Bill Brewer, Charles Travis and others, that the content view is true. One corollary of the discussion is that the content of perception is relatively thin (confined, in the visual case, to roughly the output of 'mid-level' vision). Finally, I argue (briefly) that the opponents of the content view are (...)
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  18. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.) (2009). Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.
    Classic texts that define the disjunctivist theory of perception.
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  19. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (2009). Introduction. In Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (eds.), Disjunctivism: Contemporary Readings. MIT Press.
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  20. Josip Balabanić, Damir Barbarić, Boran Berčić, Giovanni Boniolo, Branka Brujić, Alex Byrne, Erik Carlson, Maudemarie Clark, Nadežda Čačinovič & Zvonimir Čuljak (2008). Elvio Baccarini. Prolegomena 7:1.
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  21. Alex Byrne (2008). Knowing That I Am Thinking. In Anthony E. Hatzimoysis (ed.), Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press.
    Soc. …I speak of what I scarcely understand; but the soul when thinking appears to me to be just talking—asking questions of herself and answering them, affirming and denying. And when she has arrived at a decision, either gradually or by a sudden impulse, and has at last agreed, and does not doubt, this is called her opinion. I say, then, that to form an opinion is to speak, and opinion is a word spoken,—I mean, to oneself and in silence, (...)
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  22. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2008). Basic Sensible Qualities and the Structure of Appearance. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):385-405.
    A sensible quality is a perceptible property, a property that physical objects (or events) perceptually appear to have. Thus smells, tastes, colors and shapes are sensible qualities. An egg, for example, may smell rotten, taste sour, and look cream and round.1,2 The sensible qualities are not a miscellanous jumble—they form complex structures. Crimson, magenta, and chartreuse are not merely three different shades of color: the first two are more similar than either is to the third. Familiar color spaces or color (...)
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  23. Alex Byrne & Heather Logue (2008). Either/Or. In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 314-19.
    This essay surveys the varieties of disjunctivism about perceptual experience. Disjunctivism comes in two main flavours, metaphysical and epistemological.
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  24. David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne (2008). Basic Sensible Qualities and the Structure of Appearance. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):385-405.
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  25. Alex Byrne (2007). Possibility and Imagination. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):125–144.
    forthcoming in Philosophical Perspectives.
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  26. Alex Byrne (2007). Review: Soames on Quine and Davidson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 135 (3):439 - 449.
    A discussion of Quine and Davidson, as interpreted and criticized in Scott Soames' "Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume II".
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  27. Alex Byrne (2007). Soames on Quine and Davidson. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 135 (3):439 - 449.
    A discussion of Quine and Davidson, as interpreted and criticized in Scott Soames’ Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, Volume II.
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  28. Alex Byrne (2007). Truest Blue. Analysis 67 (293):87-92.
    1. The “puzzle” Physical objects are coloured: roses are red, violets are blue, and so forth. In particular, physical objects have fine-grained shades of colour: a certain chip, we can suppose, is true blue (unique, or pure blue). The following sort of scenario is commonplace. The chip looks true blue to John; in the same (ordinary) viewing conditions it looks (slightly) greenish-blue to Jane. Both John and Jane are “normal” perceivers. Now, nothing can be both true blue and greenish-blue; since (...)
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  29. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2007). Truest Blue. Analysis 67 (1):87-92.
    Physical objects are coloured: roses are red, violets are blue, and so forth. In particular, physical objects have fine-grained shades of colour: a certain chip, we can suppose, is true blue (unique, or pure blue). The following sort of scenario is commonplace. The chip looks true blue to John; in the same (ordinary) viewing conditions it looks (slightly) greenish-blue to Jane. Both John and Jane are “normal” perceivers. Now, nothing can be both true blue and greenish-blue; since the chip is (...)
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  30. Alex Byrne, David Hilbert & Susanna Siegel (2007). Do We See More Than We Can Access? Behavioral and Brain Sciences (5-6):501-502.
    Short commentary on a paper by Ned Block.
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  31. David R. Hilbert & Alex Byrne (2007). Color Primitivism. Erkenntnis 66 (1/2):73 - 105.
    The typical kind of color realism is reductive: the color properties are identified with properties specified in other terms (as ways of altering light, for instance). If no reductive analysis is available — if the colors are primitive sui generis properties — this is often taken to be a convincing argument for eliminativism. That is, realist primitivism is usually thought to be untenable. The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in light (...)
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  32. Alex Byrne (2006). Comments. Dialectica 60 (3):337–340.
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  33. Alex Byrne (2006). Color and the Mind-Body Problem. Dialectica 60 (2):223-44.
    b>: there is no “mind-body problem”, or “hard problem of consciousness”; if there is a hard problem of something, it is the problem of reconciling the manifest and scientific images.
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  34. Alex Byrne (2006). Comments on Cohen, Mizrahi, Maund, and Levine. Dialectica 60:223-44.
  35. Alex Byrne (2006). Comments on Cohen, Mizrahi, Maund, and Levine. Dialectica 60:223-244.
    Cohen begins by defining ‘Color Physicalism’ so that the position is incompatible with Color Relationalism (unlike Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 7, and note 18). Physicalism, in any event, is something of a distraction, since Cohen’s argument from perceptual variation is directed against any view on which minor color misperception is common (Byrne and Hilbert 2004). A typical color primitivist, for example, is equally vulnerable to the argument. Suppose that normal human observers S1 and S2 are viewing a chip C, as (...)
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  36. Alex Byrne (2006). Review of Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, Daniel Stoljar (Eds.), There's Something About Mary. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (1).
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  37. Alex Byrne (2006). Review of There's Something About Mary. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 21.
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  38. Alex Byrne (2006). What Mind-Body Problem? Boston Review:27-30.
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  39. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2006). Color Primitivism. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Status of Secondary Qualities. Kluwer. 73 - 105.
    The realist preference for reductive theories of color over the last few decades is particularly striking in light of the generally anti-reductionist mood of recent philosophy of mind. The parallels between the mind-body problem and the case of color are substantial enough that the difference in trajectory is surprising. While dualism and non-.
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  40. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2006). Hoffman's "Proof" of the Possibility of Spectrum Inversion. Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):48-50.
    Philosophers have devoted a great deal of discussion to the question of whether an inverted spectrum thought experiment refutes functionalism. (For a review of the inverted spectrum and its many philosophical applications, see Byrne, 2004.) If Ho?man is correct the matter can be swiftly and conclusively settled, without appeal to any empirical data about color vision (or anything else). Assuming only that color experiences and functional relations can be mathematically represented, a simple mathematical result.
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  41. Alex Byrne & James Pryor (2006). Bad Intensions. In Manuel Garcia-Carpintero & Maci (eds.), Two-Dimensional Semantics: Foundations and Applications. Oxford University Press. 38--54.
    _the a priori role_ (for word T). For instance, perhaps anyone who understands the word _water_ is able to know, without appeal to any further a posteriori information, that _water_ refers to the clear, drinkable natural kind whose instances are predominant in our oceans and lakes (if _water_ refers at all.
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  42. Alex Byrne & Michael Tye (2006). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head.1 Intentionalism (or representationalism) comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects (in the same or different metaphysically (...)
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  43. Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.) (2006). Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press.
    Eleven distinguished philosophers have contributed specially written essays on a set of topics much debated in recent years, including physicalism, qualia, semantic competence, conditionals, presuppositions, two-dimensional semantics, and the relation between logic and metaphysics. All these topics are prominent in the work of Robert Stalnaker, a major presence in contemporary philosophy, in honor of whom the volume is published. It also contains a substantial new essay in which Stalnaker replies to his critics, and sets out his current views on the (...)
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  44. Alex Byrne (2005). Introspection. Philosophical Topics 33 (1):79-104.
    I know various contingent truths about my environment by perception. For example, by looking, I know that there is a computer before me; by hearing, I know that someone is talking in the corridor; by tasting, I know that the coffee has no sugar. I know these things because I have some built-in mechanisms specialized for detecting the state of my environment. One of these mechanisms, for instance, is presently transducing electromagnetic radiation (in a narrow band of wavelengths) coming from (...)
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  45. Alex Byrne (2005). Is Snow White? Boston Review.
    CURRENT ISSUE table of contents FEATURES new democracy forum new fiction forum poetry fiction film archives ABOUT US masthead mission rave reviews contests writers? guidelines internships advertising SERVICES bookstore locator literary links subscribe.
     
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  46. Alex Byrne (2005). Knowing Our Minds. Boston Review.
    ancient Greek temple at Delphi and is quoted approvingly by Socrates in the _First_.
     
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  47. Alex Byrne (2005). Perception and Conceptual Content. In Ernest Sosa & Matthias Steup (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Blackwell. 231--250.
    Perceptual experiences justify beliefs—that much seems obvious. As Brewer puts it, “sense experiential states provide reasons for empirical beliefs” (this volume, xx). In Mind and World McDowell argues that we can get from this apparent platitude to the controversial claim that perceptual experiences have conceptual content: [W]e can coherently credit experiences with rational relations to judgement and belief, but only if we take it that spontaneity is already implicated in receptivity; that is, only if we take it that experiences have (...)
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  48. Alex Byrne (2004). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):245-247.
  49. Alex Byrne (2004). How Hard Are the Sceptical Paradoxes? Noûs 38 (2):299–325.
    The sceptic about the external world presents us with a paradox: an apparently acceptable argument for an apparently unacceptable conclusion—that we do not know anything about the external world. Some paradoxes, for instance the liar and the sorites, are very hard. The defense of a purported solution to either of these two inevitably deploys the latest in high-tech philosophical weaponry. On the other hand, some paradoxes are not at all hard, and may be resolved without much fuss. They do not (...)
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  50. Alex Byrne, Inverted Qualia. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Qualia inversion thought experiments are ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of mind (largely due to the influence of Shoemaker 1982 and Block 1990). The most popular kind is one or another variant of Locke's hypothetical case of.
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  51. Alex Byrne (2004). What Phenomenal Consciousness is Like. In Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology. John Benjamins.
    The terminology surrounding the dispute between higher-order and first-order theories of consciousness is piled so high that it sometimes obscures the view. When the debris is cleared away, there is a real prospect.
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  52. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2004). Comments and Criticism. Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):37-43.
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  53. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2004). Hardin, Tye, and Color Physicalism. Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):37-43.
    Larry Hardin has been the most steadfast and influential critic of physicalist theories of color over the last 20 years. In their modern form these theories originated with the work of Smart and Armstrong in the 1960s and 1970s1 and Hardin appropriately concentrated on their views in his initial critique of physicalism.2 In his most recent contribution to this project3 he attacks Michael Tye’s recent attempts to defend and extend color physicalism.4 Like Byrne and Hilbert5, Tye identifies color with the (...)
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  54. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2004). Hardin, Tye, and Color Physicalism. Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):37-43.
    Larry Hardin has been the most steadfast and influential critic of physicalist theories of color over the last 20 years. In their modern form these theories originated with the work of Smart and Armstrong in the 1960s and 1970s1 and Hardin appropriately concentrated on their views in his initial critique of physicalism.2 In his most recent contribution to this project3 he attacks Michael Tye’s recent attempts to defend and extend color physicalism.4 Like Byrne and Hilbert5, Tye identifies color with the (...)
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  55. Alex Byrne (2003). Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):261-274.
    Consciousness, Color, and Content is a significant contribution to our understanding of consciousness, among other things. I have learned a lot from it, as well as Tye’s other writings. What’s more, I actually agree with much of it – fortunately for this symposium, not all of it. The book continues the defense of the “PANIC” theory of phenomenal consciousness that Tye began in Ten Problems of Consciousness (1995). A fair chunk of it, though, is largely independent of this theory: the (...)
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  56. Alex Byrne (2003). Color and Similarity. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3):641-65.
    Anything is similar to anything, provided the respects of similarity are allowed to be gerrymandered or gruesome, as Goodman observed.2 But similarity in non-gruesome or—as I shall say—genuine respects is much less ecumenical. Colors, it seems, provide a compelling illustration of the distinction as applied to similarities among properties.3 For instance, in innumerable gruesome respects, blue is more similar to yellow than to purple. But in a genuine respect, blue is more similar to purple than to yellow (genuinely more similar, (...)
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  57. Alex Byrne (2003). Review: Consciousness and Nonconceptual Content. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):261 - 274.
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  58. Alex Byrne, The Puzzle of Transparency.
     
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  59. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2003). Color Realism and Color Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
    The target article is an attempt to make some progress on the problem of color realism. Are objects colored? And what is the nature of the color properties? We defend the view that physical objects (for instance, tomatoes, radishes, and rubies) are colored, and that colors are physical properties, specifically types of reflectance. This is probably a minority opinion, at least among color scientists. Textbooks frequently claim that physical objects are not colored, and that the colors are "subjective" or "in (...)
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  60. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2003). Color Realism Redux. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):52-59.
    Our reply is in three parts. The first part concerns some foundational issues in the debate about color realism. The second part addresses the many objections to the version of physicalism about color ("productance physicalism") defended in the target article. The third part discusses the leading alternative approaches and theories endorsed by the commentators.
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  61. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2003). Color Realism Revisited. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):791-793.
    Our reply is in four parts. The first part, R1, addresses objections to our claim that there might be “unknowable” color facts. The second part, R2, discusses the use we make of opponent process theory. The third part, R3, examines the question of whether colors are causes. The fourth part, R4, takes up some issues concerning the content of visual experience.
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  62. David Hilbert & Alex Byrne (2003). Color Perception and Color Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
     
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  63. Michael Tye, William E. Seager, Barry Maund & Alex Byrne (2003). Ten Problems of Consciousness. Discussions. Author's Reply. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 290.
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  64. A. Byrne (2002). Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness. Philosophical Review 111 (4):594-597.
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  65. Alex Byrne (2002). Review: Semantic Values? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):201 - 207.
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  66. Alex Byrne (2002). Something About Mary. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):27-52.
    Jackson's black-and-white Mary teaches us that the propositional content of perception cannot be fully expressed in language.
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  67. Alex Byrne (2002). Semantic Values? [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):201-7.
  68. Alex Byrne, Tye on Color and the Explanatory Gap.
    It will not have escaped notice that the defendant in this afternoon.
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  69. Alex Byrne (2002). Yes, Virginia, Lemons Are Yellow. Philosophical Studies 108 (1-2):213-22.
    This paper discusses a number of themes and arguments in The Quest for Reality: Stroud's distinction between philosophical and ordinary questions about reality; the similarity he finds between the view that coloris unreal and the view that it is subjective; his argument against thesecondary quality theory; his argument against the error theory; and the disappointing conclusion of the book.
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  70. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (2002). Philosophical Issues About Colour Vision. In L. Nagel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Macmillan.
    The primary issues concern whether objects have colours, and what sorts of properties the colours are. Some philosophers hold that nothing is coloured, others that colour are powers to affect perceivers, and others that colours are physical properties.
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  71. A. Byrne (2001). Forthcoming “Something About Mary”. Grazer Philosophische Studien 62.
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  72. Alex Byrne, Chalmers on Epistemic Content.
    1. Let us say that a thought is _about an object _o just in case the truth value of the thought at any possible world W depends on how things are with _o_ in W. Thus the thought that the first Chancellor of the German Empire was an astute diplomatist is not about Bismark, because that thought is true in a world W iff, in W, whoever happens to be the first Chancellor was an astute diplomatist, and that may well (...)
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  73. Alex Byrne (2001). Do Colors Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam and Others. Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):238-245.
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  74. Alex Byrne (2001). Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):238--45.
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  75. Alex Byrne, Don't PANIC: Tye's Intentionalist Theory of Consciousness. A Field Guide to the Philosophy of Mind.
    _Consciousness, Color, and Content_ is a significant contribution to our understanding of consciousness, among other things. I have learned a lot from it, as well as Tye.
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  76. Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
  77. Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199 - 240.
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  78. Alex Byrne (2001). Phenomenal Consciousness. Peter Carruthers. Mind 110 (440):1057-1062.
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  79. Alex Byrne (2001). Review of Phenomenal Consciousness, by Peter Carruthers. [REVIEW] Mind 110:1057-62.
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  80. Alex Byrne, Robert Stalnaker & Ralph Wedgwood (eds.) (2001). Fact and Value. Mit Press.
    A diverse collection of essays, which reflect the breadth of Judith Jarvis Thomson's philosophical work.
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  81. A. Byrne (2000). Access to Experimental Drugs in Terminal Illness. Ethical Issues: Udo Schuklenk, New York, Pharmaceutical Products Press, 1998, 228 Pages, US$60. [REVIEW] Journal of Medical Ethics 26 (2):148-149.
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  82. Alex Byrne (2000). Two Radical Neuron Doctrines. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):833-833.
    G&S describe the radical neuron doctrine in a number of slightly different ways, and we think this hides an important distinction. On the one hand, the radical neuron doctrine is supposed to have the consequence "that a successful theory of the mind will make no reference to anything like the concepts of linguistics or the psychological sciences as we currently understand them", and so Chomskyan linguistics "is doomed from the beginning" (sect. 2.2.2, paras. 2,3).[1] (Note that `a successful theory' must (...)
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  83. Alex Byrne (1999). Cosmic Hermeneutics. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):347--84.
  84. Alex Byrne (1999). Problems of Vision. Philosophical Review 108 (3):415-418.
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  85. Alex Byrne (1999). Subjectivity is No Barrier. Brain and Behavioral Sciences 22 (6):949-950.
    Palmer's subjectivity barrier seems to be erected on a popular but highly suspect conception of visual experience, and his color room argument is invalid.
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  86. Alex Byrne & N. Hall (1999). Chalmers on Consciousness and Quantum Mechanics. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):370-90.
    The textbook presentation of quantum mechanics, in a nutshell, is this. The physical state of any isolated system evolves deterministically in accordance with Schrödinger's equation until a "measurement" of some physical magnitude M (e.g. position, energy, spin) is made. Restricting attention to the case where the values of M are discrete, the system's pre-measurement state-vector f is a linear combination, or "superposition", of vectors f1, f2,... that individually represent states that..
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  87. Alex Byrne (1998). Dennett Versus Gibson. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (6):751-752.
    Pessoa et al. misinterpret some of Dennett's discussion of filling-in. Their argument against the representational conception of vision and for a Gibsonian alternative is also flawed.
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  88. Alex Byrne (1998). Interpretivism. European Review of Philosophy 3:199-223.
    In the writings of Daniel Dennett and Donald Davidson we find something like the following bold conjecture: it is an a priori truth that there is no gap between our best judgements of a subject's beliefs and desires and the truth about the subject's beliefs and desires. Under ideal conditions a subject's belief-box and desire-box become transparent.
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  89. Alex Byrne (1998). Philosophy of Mind. Philosophical Review 107 (1):113-115.
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  90. Alex Byrne & Ned Hall (1998). Against the PCA-Analysis. Analysis 58 (1):38–44.
    Jonardon Ganeri, Paul Noordhof, and Murali Ramachandran (1996) have proposed a new counterfactual analysis of causation. We argue that this – the PCA-analysis – is incorrect. In section 1, we explain David Lewis’s first counterfactual analysis of causation, and a problem that led him to propose a second. In section 2 we explain the PCA-analysis, advertised as an improvement on Lewis’s later account. We then give counterexamples to the necessity (section 3) and sufficiency (section 4) of the PCA-analysis.
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  91. A. Byrne & A. Hajek (1997). David Hume, David Lewis, and Decision Theory. Mind 106 (423):411-728.
    David Lewis claims that a simple sort of anti-Humeanism-that the rational agent desires something to the extent he believes it to be good-can be given a decision-theoretic formulation, which Lewis calls 'Desire as Belief' (DAB). Given the (widely held) assumption that Jeffrey conditionalising is a rationally permissible way to change one's mind in the face of new evidence, Lewis proves that DAB leads to absurdity. Thus, according to Lewis, the simple form of anti-Humeanism stands refuted. In this paper we investigate (...)
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  92. Alex Byrne (1997). Some Like It HOT: Consciousness and Higher-Order Thoughts. Philosophical Studies 2 (2):103-29.
    Consciousness is the subject of many metaphors, and one of the most hardy perennials compares consciousness to a spotlight, illuminating certain mental goings-on, while leaving others to do their work in the dark. One way of elaborating the spotlight metaphor is this: mental events are loaded on to one end of a conveyer belt by the senses, and move with the belt.
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  93. Alex Byrne & David Hilbert (eds.) (1997). Readings on Color I: The Philosophy of Color. The Mit Press.
    Edward Wilson Averill By the phrase 'anthropocentric account of color' I mean an account of color that makes an assumption of the following form: two ...
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  94. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1997). Colors and Reflectances. In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. Mit Press.
    When we open our eyes, the world seems full of colored opaque objects, light sources, and transparent volumes. One historically popular view, _eliminativism_, is that the world is not in this respect as it appears to be: nothing has any color. Color _realism_, the denial of eliminativism, comes in three mutually exclusive varieties, which may be taken to exhaust the space of plausible realist theories. Acccording to _dispositionalism_, colors are _psychological_ dispositions: dispositions to produce certain kinds of visual experiences. According (...)
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  95. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1997). Glossary of Color Science. In A. Byrne & D. R. Hilbert (eds.), Readings on Color, Volume 2: The Science of Color. Mit Press.
    Anomaloscope An instrument used for detecting anomalies of color vision. The test subject adjusts the ratio of two monochromatic lights to form a match with a third monochromatic light. The most common form of this procedure involves a Rayleigh match: a match between a mixture of monochromatic green and red lights, and a monochromatic yellow light. Normal subjects will choose a matching ratio of red to green light that falls within a fairly narrow range of values. Subjects with anomalous color (...)
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  96. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1997). Introduction. In Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.), The Philosophy of Color. The Mit Press.
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  97. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.) (1997). Phenomenal Character. Mit Press.
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  98. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1997). Readings on Color, Volume 1: The Philosophy of Color. MIT Press.
  99. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1997). Readings on Color, Volume 2: The Science of Color. MIT Press.
     
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  100. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.) (1997). Readings on Color: The Philosophy of Color Vol. I. The Mit Press.
    "This admirable volume of readings is the first of a pair: the editors are to be applauded for placing the philosophy of color exactly where it should go, in ...
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  101. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.) (1997). Readings on Color: The Science of Color. A Bradford Book.
    These volumes will serve as useful resources for anyone interested in philosophy of color perception or color science.
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  102. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (eds.) (1997). The Philosophy of Color. The Mit Press.
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  103. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1997). Unique Hues. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (2):184-185.
    Saunders & van Brakel argue, inter alia, that there is for the claim that there are four unique hues (red, green, blue, and yellow), and that there are two corresponding opponent processes. We argue that this is quite mistaken.
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  104. A. Byrne & M. Thau (1996). In Defence of the Hybrid View. Mind 105 (417):139 - 149.
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  105. Alex Byrne (1996). Behaviourism. In S. D. Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Introductory texts in the philosophy of mind often begin with a discussion of behaviourism, presented as one of the few theories of mind that have been conclusively refuted. But matters are not that simple: behaviourism, in one form or another, is still alive and kicking.
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  106. Alex Byrne (1996). On Misinterpreting Kripke's Wittgenstein. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (2):339-343.
  107. Alex Byrne (1996). Spin Control. In Enrique Villanueva (ed.), Perception. Ridgeview. 261--74.
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  108. Alex Byrne (1996). Spin Control: Comment on McDowell's Mind and World. Philosophical Issues 7:261-73.
    We have justified beliefs about the external world, and some of these are formed directly on the basis of perception. I may justifiably believe that a certain dog is in certain manger, and I may have this belief because I can see that the dog is in the manger. So far, so good.
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  109. Alex Byrne & Michael Thau (1996). In Defence of the Hybrid View. Mind 105 (417):139-149.
    argument fails, and the purpose of this note is to bring out that failure. The view in question which Heck calls the Hybrid Vie~istinguishes between the meanings of names and the contents of beliefs which are expressible using names. According to the Hybrid View the meaning of a name is its referent: names do not have senses. Thus (a) "George Orwell wrote 1984" means the same as (b) "Eric Blair wrote 1984". However, the Hybrid View tells a different story about (...)
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  110. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert (1995). Perception and Causation. Journal of Philosophy 92 (6):323-329.
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  111. Alex Byrne (1994). Behaviorism. In Samuel Guttenplan (ed.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell.
    Introductory texts in the philosophy of mind often begin with a discussion of behaviourism, presented as one of the few theories of mind that have been conclusively refuted. But matters are not that simple: behaviourism, in one form or another, is still alive and kicking.
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  112. Alex Byrne (1993). The Emergent Mind. Dissertation, Princeton University
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  113. Alex Byrne (1993). Truth in Fiction: The Story Continued. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (1):24 – 35.
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  114. Alex Byrne & Michael Thau (1905). On Denoting. Mind 14 (56):479-493.
    Richard Heck, in "The Sense of Communication" (Mind, 104, pp. 79-106, 1995), argues against the "Hybrid View"--the claim, roughly, that names are Millian while beliefs are Fregean. We argue that Heck's argument fails.
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  115. Alex Byrne, McDowell and Wright on Anti-Scepticism Etc..
    On the assumption that we may learn from our elders and betters, this paper approaches some fundamental questions in perceptual epistemology through a dispute between McDowell and Wright about external world scepticism. As explained in section 2, the dispute turns on what McDowell means by claiming that we have “direct perceptual access to environmental facts”. On the interpretation offered in section 3 (and further elaborated in section 7), if we do have “direct perceptual access” then the relevant sceptical argument—in each (...)
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  116. Alex Byrne, Knowing What I Want.
    Vendler, Res Cogitans Knowing that one wants to go to the movies is an example of self-knowledge, knowledge of one’s mental states. It may be foolish to ask the man on the Clapham Omnibus how he knows what he wants, but the question is nonetheless important — albeit neglected by epistemologists. This paper attempts an answer. Before getting to that, the familiar claim that we enjoy “privileged access” to our mental states needs untwining (section 1). A sketch of a theory (...)
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  117. Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert, Urban Light and Color.
    In Colour for Architecture, published in 1976, the editors, Tom Porter and Byron Mikellides, explain that their book was “produced out of an awareness that colour, as a basic and vital force, is lacking from the built environment and that our knowledge of it is isolated and limited.”1 Lack of urban color was then especially salient in Britain—where the book was published—which had just begun to recoil at the Brutalist legacy of angular stained gray concrete strewn across the postwar landscape. (...)
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  118. Alex Byrne, Authors' Response Continuing Commentary on Color Realism and Color Science ".
    Our reply is in four parts. The first part addresses objections to our claim that there might be "unknowable" color facts. The second part discusses the use we make of opponent process theory. The third part examines the question of whether colors are causes. The fourth part takes up some issues concerning the content of visual experience. Our target article had three aims: (a) to explain clearly the structure of the debate about color realism; (b) to introduce an interdisciplinary audience (...)
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  119. Alex Byrne, Boston Review.
    There’s also plenty of controversy about moral law. Should we give much more to charity than we actually do? Is torture permissible under extreme circumstances? Is eating meat wrong? Could it ever be permissible to kill one innocent person in order to save five? But, again we know a lot. Throwing good taste out with the bathwater for the sake of a clear example, everyone knows that boiling babies for fun is wrong. Boiling lobsters is a matter that reasonable people (...)
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  120. Alex Byrne, Colour Vision, Philosophical Issues About.
    The primary issues concern whether objects have colours, and what sorts of properties the colours are. Some philosophers hold that nothing is coloured, others that colour are powers to affect perceivers, and others that colours are physical properties.
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  121. Alex Byrne, Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? A Reply to Langsam Et Al.
    Dispositionalism says that the colours are dispositions to produce certain sorts of experiences in perceivers—that colours are secondary qualities, on one use of that term. Recently dispositionalism has been under attack on the ground that “colours do not look like dispositions” (Dancy 1986, Boghossian and Velleman 1989, McGinn 1996; see also McGinn 1983, 132-6, and Johnston 19921). In response, Langsam has argued that, on the contrary, “colours d o look like dispositions” (2000, 74).2 This note makes three claims. First, neither (...)
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  122. Alex Byrne, Necessary Truths.
    analytic tradition, from its early 20th-century roots in the work of G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell through Saul Kripke’s pioneering advances in..
     
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  123. Alex Byrne, Private Language Problem [Addendum].
    Although the proper formulation and assessment of Ludwig Wittgenstein's argument (or arguments) against the possibility of a private language continues to be disputed, the issue has lost none of its urgency. At stake is a broadly Cartesian conception of experiences that is found today in much philosophy of mind.
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