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• Faculty, Elmhurst College
• PhD, King's College London, 2004.

• Philosophy of Law
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• Philosophy of Cognitive Science
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• Philosophy of Mind

Katrina is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Elmhurst College, in Illinois. Her areas of specialty include philosophy of law, philosophy of mind, and ethics, and she holds a Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of London, King's College. Katrina's Ph.D. thesis, entitled 'Psychology and the Criminal Law', supervised by David Papineau, explored the nature of the folk concepts underpinning criminal responsibility, and the way in which those concepts may be updated via scientific psychology. Katrina also has a J.D. from DePaul University College of Law. Before teaching at Elmhurst College she held the Rockefeller Fellowship in Law and Public Policy and a Visiting Professorship in philosophy at Dartmouth College. Prior to earning her Ph.D., Katrina worked as a senior research analyst on projects for the National Institute of Justice.

9 items found. Sort by: publication yearfirst authorviewingsaddition date Katrina L. Sifferd (2013). Translating Scientific Evidence Into the Language of the ‘Folk’: Executive Function as Capacity-Responsibility. In Nicole A. Vincent (ed.), Legal Responsibility and Neuroscience. Oxford University Press. There are legitimate worries about gaps between scientific evidence of brain states and function (for example, as evidenced by fMRI data) and legal criteria for determining criminal culpability. In this paper I argue that behavioral evidence of capacity, motive and intent appears easier for judges and juries to use for purposes of determining criminal liability because such evidence triggers the application of commonsense psychological (CSP) concepts that guide and structure criminal responsibility. In contrast, scientific evidence of neurological processes and function (...) – such as evidence that the defendant has a large brain tumor – will not generally lead a judge or jury to directly infer anything that is relevant to the legal determination of criminal culpability . (Vincent 2008) In these cases, an expert witness will be required to indicate to the fact-finder what this evidence means with regard to mental capacity; and then another inference will have to be made from this possible lack of capacity to the legal criteria for guilt, cast in CSP terms.<br><br>To reliably link evidence of brain function and structure and assessment of criminal responsibility, we need to re-conceptualize the mental capacities necessary for responsibility, particularly those that are recognized as missing or compromised by the doctrines of “legal capacity” (Hart 1968) and “diminished capacity.” I argue that formulating these capacities as executive functions within the brain can provide this link. I further claim that it would be extremely useful to consider evidence of executive function as related to the diminished capacity doctrine at sentencing. This is because it is primarily at this stage in criminal proceedings where the use of the diminished capacity doctrine is most prevalent, as evidenced by the recent Supreme Court cases of Atkins v. Virginia (536 U.S. 304 (2002)) and Roper v. Simmons (543 U.S. 551 (2005)).<br>. (shrink) Control and Responsibility in Meta-Ethics Philosophy of Law, General Works in Philosophy of Law Psychopathology and Responsibility in Meta-Ethics The Nature of Folk Psychology in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Katrina Sifferd (2012). Changing the Criminal Character: Nanotechnology and Criminal Punishment. In A. Santosuosso (ed.), Proceedings of the 2011 Law and Science Young Scholars Symposium. Pavia University Press. This chapter examines how advances in nanotechnology might impact criminal sentencing. While many scholars have considered the ethical implications of emerging technologies, such as nanotechnology, few have considered their potential impact on crucial institutions such as our criminal justice system. Specifically, I will discuss the implications of two types of technological advances for criminal sentencing: advanced tracking devices enabled by nanotechnology, and nano-neuroscience, including neural implants. The key justifications for criminal punishment- including incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution – apply very (...) differently to criminal sentences using these emerging technologies than they do to imprisonment. Further, use of these technologies would represent a shift away from retribution as the primary justification for criminal punishment. In addition, the possibility of nano-neural implants entails a new model of rehabilitation: namely, involuntary rehabilitation aimed at changing an offender’s character, rather than his environment. (shrink) Nanotechnology in Applied Ethics Punishment in Criminal Law in Philosophy of Law Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Katrina Sifferd & William Hirstein (2012). On the Criminal Culpability of Successful and Unsucessful Psychopaths. Neuroethics 6 (1):129-140. The psychological literature now differentiates between two types of psychopath:successful (with little or no criminal record) and unsuccessful (with a criminal record). Recent research indicates that earlier findings of reduced autonomic activity, reduced prefrontal grey matter, and compromised executive activity may only be true of unsuccessful psychopaths. In contrast, successful psychopaths actually show autonomic and executive function that exceeds that of normals, while having no difference in prefrontal volume from normals. We argue that many successful psychopaths are legally responsible for (...) their actions, as they have the executive capacity to choose not to harm (and thus are legally rational). However, many unsuccessful psychopaths have a lack of executive function that should at least partially excuse them from criminal culpability. Although a successful psychopath's increased executive function may occur in conflict with, rather than in consonance with their increased autonomic activity - producing a cognitive style characterized by self deception and articulate-sounding, but unsound reasoning - they may be capable of recognizing and correcting their lack of autonomic data, and thus can be held responsible. (shrink) Defenses in Criminal Law in Philosophy of Law Law in Professional Areas Neuroscience in Cognitive Sciences Punishment in Criminal Law in Philosophy of Law Direct download (4 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   William Hirstein & Katrina Sifferd (2011). The Legal Self: Executive Processes and Legal Theory. Consciousness and Cognition 20:151-176. When laws or legal principles mention mental states such as intentions to form a contract, knowledge of risk, or purposely causing a death, what parts of the brain are they speaking about? We argue here that these principles are tacitly directed at our prefrontal executive processes. Our current best theories of consciousness portray it as a workspace in which executive processes operate, but what is important to the law is what is done with the workspace content rather than the content (...) itself. This makes executive processes more important to the law than consciousness, since they are responsible for channeling conscious decision-making into intentions and actions, or inhibiting action.We provide a summary of the current state of our knowledge about executive processes, which consists primarily of information about which portions of the prefrontal lobes perform which executive processes. Then we describe several examples in which legal principles can be understood as tacitly singling out executive processes, including principles regarding defendants’ intentions or plans to commit crimes and their awareness that certain facts are the case(for instance, that a gun is loaded), as well as excusatory principles which result in lesser responsibility for those who are juveniles, mentally ill, sleepwalking, hypnotized, or who suffer from psychopathy. (shrink) Defenses in Criminal Law in Philosophy of Law Folk Concepts and Folk Intuitions in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Free Will and Neuroscience in Philosophy of Action Law in Professional Areas Neurophilosophy in Philosophy of Cognitive Science Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Katrina Sifferd (2011). Neuroethics. In Vilayanur Ramachandran (ed.), Encyclopedia of Human Behavior, 2e. Elsevier. According to Adina Roskies, the neuroscience of ethics is concerned with a neuroscientific understanding of the brain processes that underpin moral judgment and behavior. The ethics of neuroscience, on the other hand, includes the potential impact advances in neuroscience may have on social, moral and philosophical ideas and institutions, as well as the ethical principles that should guide brain research, treatment of brain disease, and cognitive enhancement. This entry discusses these different aspects of neuroethics, with a special focus on the (...) way in which neuroscience might impact our sense of self and personal responsibility, a concern that cuts across these categories. For example, I discuss whether advancing knowledge of brain states or processes undermine common notions of free will and responsibility. I also examine whether certain treatments of brain abnormality are ethical (is it acceptable to irreversibly ‘cure’ pedophilia or obsessive/compulsive disorder?), a discussion that falls squarely under the category of the ethics of neuroscience. Finally, I discuss whether the neuroscience of ethics can provide insight into who should be deemed criminally responsible via a neuroscientific analysis of intentional action. (shrink) Neuroethics, Misc in Applied Ethics Neuroscience in Cognitive Sciences Neuroscience of Ethics in Normative Ethics Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Katrina Sifferd (2008). Nanotechology and the Attribution of Responsibility. Nanotechnology, Law and Business 5 (2):177. Criminal Law, Misc in Philosophy of Law Moral Responsibility, Misc in Meta-Ethics Philosophy of Mind, General Works in Philosophy of Mind Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Katrina Sifferd (2007). Can Baird's View of Adolescent Morality Inform Adolescent Criminal Justice Policy? In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Philosophy Vol. 3: The Neuroscience of Morality. Justice in Social and Political Philosophy Moral Judgment, Misc in Meta-Ethics Direct download     My bibliography     Export citation   Katrina L. Sifferd (2006). In Defense of the Use of Commonsense Psychology in the Criminal Law. Law and Philosophy 25 (6):571 - 612. The criminal law depends upon 'commonsense' or 'folk' psychology, a seemingly innate theory used by all normal human beings as a means to understand and predict other humans' behavior. This paper discusses two major types of arguments that commonsense psychology is not a true theory of human behavior, and thus should be eliminated and replaced. The paper argues that eliminitivist projects fail to provide evidence that commonsense psychology is a false theory, and argues that there is no need to seek (...) a replacement theory of behavior for use in the criminal law. (shrink) Defenses in Criminal Law in Philosophy of Law Direct download (5 more)     My bibliography     Export citation   Katrina Sifferd (2003). Making Sense of Modern Darwinism. Heredity 90:418. Despite the high profile of evolutionary explanations of human behaviour, their status remains highly disputed. Are all evolutionary explanations of human behaviour sensational 'just so' stories, or is there a proper science of sociobiology? Sense and Nonsense provides an answer to this question by assessing the legitimacy of a range of evolutionary approaches to human behaviour. No categories Direct download (2 more)     My bibliography     Export citation

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