Michael Tye University of Texas at Austin
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  1. Michael Tye, Precis of Color, Content, and Consciousness.
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  2. Michael Tye, “Qualia,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Revised 31 July 2007).
    Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, (...)
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  3. B. Cutter & M. Tye (forthcoming). Pains and Reasons: Why It is Rational to Kill the Messenger. Philosophical Quarterly.
    In this paper, we defend the representationalist theory of phenomenal consciousness against a recent objection due to Hilla Jacobson, who charges representationalism with a failure to explain the role of pain in rationalizing certain forms of behavior. In rough outline, her objection is that the representationalist is unable to account for the rationality of certain acts, such as the act of taking pain killers, which are aimed at getting rid of the experience of pain rather than its intentional object. If (...)
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  4. M. Tye (forthcoming). Forthcoming (B)" Externalism and Memory,". Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume.
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  5. Michael Tye (forthcoming). Phenomenal Externalism, Lolita, and the Planet Xenon. In Terence E. Horgan & David Sosa (eds.), Collection on the Philosophy of Jaegwon Kim. Mit Press.
     
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  6. Michael Tye (forthcoming). What is the Content of a Hallucinatory Experience? In Berit Brogaard (ed.), Does Perception have Content? Oxford University Press.
    Keith has just taken a hallucinogenic drug. A few minutes earlier, he was occupied with the beginning of H.H. Price's well-known book on perception. The combined effect of these activities is that Keith is now hallucinating a ripe tomato. This is not a de re hallucination. There is no particular tomato located elsewhere out of Keith's vision such that he is hallucinating that tomato as being before him. Keith is hallucinating a tomato without there being any particular tomato that he (...)
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  7. Michael Tye (2014). Does Conscious Seeing Have A Finer Grain Than Attention? Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2):154-158.
    Ned Block says ‘yes’ (, ). His position is based on the phenomenon of identity-crowding. According to Block, in cases of identity-crowding, something is consciously seen even though one cannot attend to it. In taking this view, Block is opposing a position I have taken in recent work (Tye 2009a, 2009b, 2010). He is also contributing to a vigorous recent debate in the philosophy of mind over the relation, if any, between consciousness and attention. Who is right? Not surprisingly, I (...)
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  8. Michael Tye (2014). Speaks on Strong Property Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):85-86.
    Strong property representationalism, as applied to visual experience, is the thesis that the phenomenal character of a visual experience is one and the same as the property complex or ‘sensible profile’ represented by that experience. Speaks discusses the following argument against this thesis:Let ‘RED’ stand for the phenomenal character of the experience of red.(1) Red = RED (strong property representationalism).(2) My pen has no representational properties, but is red.Hence,(3) My pen has a phenomenal character but no representational properties.Since (3) is (...)
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  9. Michael Tye (2014). Transparency, Qualia Realism and Representationalism. Philosophical Studies 170 (1):39-57.
    In this essay, I want to take another look at the phenomenon of transparency and its relevance to qualia realism and representationalism. I don’t suppose that what I have to say will cause those who disagree with me to change their minds, but I hope not only to clarify my position and that of others who are on my side of the debate but also to respond to various criticisms and objections that have arisen over the last 10–15 years or (...)
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  10. Mark Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2013). Seven Puzzles of Thought: And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts. Oup Oxford.
    Sainsbury and Tye present a new theory, 'originalism', which provides natural, simple solutions to puzzles about thought that have troubled philosophers for centuries. They argue that concepts are to be individuated by their origin, rather than epistemically or semantically. Although thought is special, no special mystery attaches to its nature.
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  11. R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2012). Seven Puzzles of Thought: And How to Solve Them: An Originalist Theory of Concepts. OUP Oxford.
    How can one think about the same thing twice without knowing that it's the same thing? How can one think about nothing at all (for example Pegasus, the mythical flying horse)? Is thinking about oneself special? One could mistake one's car for someone else's, but it seems one could not mistake one's own headache for someone else's. Why not? -/- R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye provide an entirely new theory--called 'originalism'-- which provides simple and natural solutions to these puzzles (...)
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  12. Michael Tye (2012). Précis of Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):187-189.
  13. Michael Tye (2012). Reply to Crane, Jackson and McLaughlin. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):215-232.
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  14. Michael Tye (2012). Cohen on Color Relationism. Analytic Philosophy 53 (3):297-305.
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  15. Michael Tye (2012). 13 Knowing What It Is Like. Philosophical Inquiry 36 (1):300.
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  16. Brian Cutter & Michael Tye (2011). Tracking Representationalism and the Painfulness of Pain. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):90-109.
  17. R. M. Sainsbury & Michael Tye (2011). An Originalist Theory of Concepts. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):101-124.
    We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and (...)
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  18. Michael Tye (2011). Knowing What It Is Like. In John Bengson & Marc A. Moffett (eds.), Knowing How: Essays on Knowledge, Mind, and Action. Oxford University Press, Usa. 300.
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  19. Michael Tye & Briggs Wright (2011). Is There a Phenomenology of Thought? In Tim Bayne & Michelle Montague (eds.), Cognitive Phenomenology. Oxford University Press. 35.
  20. Michael Tye (2010). Attention, Seeing, and Change Blindness. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):410-437.
  21. Michael Tye (2010). Up Close with the Speckled Hen. Analysis 70 (2):283-286.
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  22. Michael Tye (2009). A New Look at the Speckled Hen. Analysis 69 (2):258 - 263.
    (forthcoming in Analysis) We owe the problem of the speckled hen to Gilbert Ryle. It was suggested to A.J. Ayer by Ryle in connection with Ayer’s account of seeing. Suppose that you are standing before a speckled hen with your eyes trained on it. You are in good light and nothing is obstructing your view. You see the hen in a single glance. The hen has 47 speckles on its facing side, let us say, and the hen ap­ pears speckled (...)
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  23. Michael Tye (2009). Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. Mit Press.
    Introduction -- Phenomenal consciousness -- Phenomenal consciousness and self-representation -- The connection between phenomenal consciousness and creature consciousness -- Consciousness of things -- Real world puzzle cases -- Why consciousness cannot be physical and why it must be -- What is the thesis of physicalism? -- Why consciousness cannot be physical -- Why consciousness must be physical -- Physicalism and the appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Some terminological points -- Why physicalists appeal to phenomenal concepts -- Various accounts of phenomenal (...)
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  24. Michael Tye (2009). Interview for Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions. In Patrick Grim (ed.), Mind and Consciousness: 5 Questions. Automatic Press.
    I went up to Oxford as an undergraduate to study physics. I chose Oxford over Cambridge at the urging of my school physics teacher who was an Oxford man. When I arrived, I found out that, as a physics student, I was expected to spend one day a week in the laboratory. This seemed to me extremely unappealing not only because it would interfere with my social life but also because the practical side of physics was, to my mind, deadly (...)
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  25. Michael Tye (2009). Representationalist Theories of Consciousness. In B. McLaughlin & A. Beckermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press.
    This essay surveys representationalist theories of phenomenal consciousness as well as the major arguments for them. It also takes up two major objections. The essay is divided into five sections. Section I offers some introductory remarks on phenomenal consciousness. Section II presents the classic view of phenomenal consciousness to which representationalists are opposed. Section III canvasses various versions of representationalism about consciousness. Section IV lays out the main arguments for the representationalist stance. The final section addresses the two objections.
     
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  26. Michael Tye (2009). The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):541-562.
    My purpose is to take a close look at the nature of visual content. I discuss the view that visual experiences have only existential contents, the view that visual experiences have either singular or gappy contents, and the view that visual experiences have multiple contents. I also consider a proposal about visual content inspired by Kaplan's well known theory of indexicals. I draw out some consequences of my discussion for the thesis of intentionalism with respect to the phenomenal character of (...)
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  27. Michael Tye (2008). The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory. Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62:25--50.
    The experience of emotion is a fundamental part of human consciousness. Think, for example, of how different our conscious lives would be without such experiences as joy, anger, fear, disgust, pity, anxiety, and embarrassment. It is uncontroversial that these experiences typically have an intentional content. Anger, for example, is normally directed at someone or something. One may feel angry at one=s stock broker for provid- ing bad advice or angry with the cleaning lady for dropping the vase. But it is (...)
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  28. Michael Tye (2007). Intentionalism and the Argument From No Common Content. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589–613.
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. (...)
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  29. Michael Tye (2007). New Troubles for the Qualia Freak. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Jonathan D. Cohen (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. Blackwell Pub..
    The phenomenal character of an experience is what it is like subjectively to undergo the experience. Experiences vary in their phenomenal character, in what it is like to un- dergo them. Think, for example of the subjective differences between feeling a burning pain in a toe, experiencing an itch in an arm, smelling rotten eggs, tasting Marmite, having a visual experience of bright purple, running one’s fingers over rough sandpaper, feeling hungry, experiencing anger, feeling elated. Insofar as what it is (...)
     
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  30. Michael Tye (2007). Phenomenal Consciousness and Cognitive Accessibility. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6):527-528.
    Block tries to show that the results of the Sperling experiment lend support to the view that phenomenology outstrips cognitive accessibility. I argue that Block fails to make a compelling case for this general claim on the basis of the Sperling data.
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  31. Michael Tye (2007). Philosophical Problems of Consciousness. In Max Velmans & Susan Schneider (eds.), The Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. Blackwell. 23--35.
  32. Michael Tye (2007). True Blue Redux. Analysis 67 (1):92-93.
    A chip looks true blue to John and greenish blue to Jane. On the face of it, at least one of the two perceivers has an inaccurate colour experience; for the chip cannot be both true blue and greenish blue. But John and Jane are “normal” perceivers, and there is no privileged class of normal perceivers (Block 1999). This is the puzzle of true blue (Tye.
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  33. Michael Tye (2007). The Problem of Common Sensibles. In Ralph Schumacher (ed.), Perception and Status of Secondary Qualities. Kluwer. 287 - 303.
    In _On The Soul_ (425a-b), Aristotle drew a distinction between those qualities that are perceptible only via a single sense and those that are perceptible by more than one. The latter qualities he called.
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  34. Michael Tye (2007). Intentionalism and the Argument From No Common Content. Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613.
    Disjunctivists (Hinton 1973, Snowdon 1990, Martin 2002, 2006) often motivate their approach to perceptual experience by appealing in part to the claim that in cases of veridical perception, the subject is directly in contact with the perceived object. When I perceive a table, for example, there is no table-like sense-impression that stands as an intermediary between the table and me. Nor am I related to the table as I am to a deer when I see its footprint in the snow. (...)
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  35. Alex Byrne & Michael Tye (2006). Qualia Ain't in the Head. Noûs 40 (2):241-255.
    Qualia internalism is the thesis that qualia are intrinsic to their subjects: the experiences of intrinsic duplicates (in the same or different metaphysically possible worlds) have the same qualia. Content externalism is the thesis that mental representation is an extrinsic matter, partly depending on what happens outside the head.1 Intentionalism (or representationalism) comes in strong and weak forms. In its weakest formulation, it is the thesis that representationally identical experiences of subjects (in the same or different metaphysically (...)
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  36. M. Tye (2006). Another Look At Representationalism About Pain. In M. Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. The Mit Press. Bradford Books. 99-120.
     
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  37. Michael Tye (2006). Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem. Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.
    At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness. It is consciousness, and in particular _phenomenal_ consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing. Many philosophers hold that no defi nition of phenomenal consciousness is possible: any such putative defi nition would automatically use the concept of phenomenal consciousness and thus render the defi nition circular. The usual view is that the concept of phenomenal consciousness is one that must be explained by (...)
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  38. Michael Tye (2006). Nonconceptual Content and Fineness of Grain. In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press.
     
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  39. Michael Tye (2006). Nonconceptual Content, Richness, and Fineness of Grain. In Tamar S. Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 504–30.
     
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  40. Michael Tye (2006). The Puzzle of True Blue. Analysis 66 (291):173–178.
    Most men and nearly all women have non-defective colour vision, as measured by standard colour tests such as those of Ishihara and Farns- worth. But people vary, according to gender, race and age in their per- formance in matching experiments. For example, when subjects are shown a screen, one half of which is lit by a mixture of red and green lights and the other by yellow or orange light, and they are asked to ad- just the mixture of lights (...)
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  41. Michael Tye (2006). The Truth About True Blue. Analysis 66 (292):340–344.
    Cohen, Hardin, and McLaughlin (2006) complain that my solution to the puzzle of true blue (Tye 2006) depends upon my assuming that 'all variation in colour experience among standard perceivers in standard circumstances is at the level of fine-grained hues (4)'. That assumption, they say, is false: 'there is in fact variation in colour experience among.
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  42. Michael Tye (2006). The Thesis of Nonconceptual Content. European Review of Philosophy 6:7-30.
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  43. Michael Tye (2005). Another Look at Representationalism and Pain. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Mit Press.
     
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  44. Michael Tye (2005). In Defense of Representationalism: Reply to Commentaries. In Murat Aydede (ed.), Pain: New Essays on its Nature and the Methodology of its Study. Cambridge Ma: Bradford Book/Mit Press. 163-176.
     
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  45. Michael Tye (2005). On the Nonconceptual Content of Experience. Schriftenreihe-Wittgenstein Gesellschaft.
    I suppose that substantive philosophical theses are much like second marriages. The philo- sophical thesis I wish to discuss in this paper is the thesis that experiences have nonconceptual content. I shall not attempt to argue that _all_ experiences have nonconceptual content nor that the only contents experiences have are nonconceptual. Instead, I want to ? esh out the thesis of nonconceptual content for experience in more detail than has been offered hithertofore and to provide a variety of motivations for (...)
     
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  46. Michael Tye (2003). A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts. In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Minds and Persons. Cambridge University Press. 91-105.
    1) There is widespread agreement that consciousness must be a physical phenomenon, even if it is one that we do not yet understand and perhaps may never do so fully. There is also widespread agreement that the way to defend physicalism about consciousness against a variety of well known objections is by appeal to phenomenal concepts (Loar 1990, Lycan 1996, Papineau 1993, Sturgeon 1994, Tye 1995, 2000, Perry 2001) . There is, alas, no agreement on the nature of phenomenal concepts.
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  47. Michael Tye (2003). Blurry Images, Double Vision, and Other Oddities: New Problems for Representationalism? In Quentin Smith & Aleksandar Jokic (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. Oxford University Press.
     
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  48. Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness and Persons: Unity and Identity. MIT Press.
  49. Michael Tye (2003). Consciousness, Color, and Content. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 235.
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  50. Michael Tye (2003). On the Virtue of Being Poised: Reply to Seager. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):275-280.
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  51. Michael Tye (2003). Phenomenal Character and Color: Reply to Maund. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):281 - 285.
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  52. Michael Tye (2003). Precis of Ten Problems of Consciousness. In John Heil (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: A Guide and Anthology. Oup Oxford.
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  53. Michael Tye (2003). Review: On the Virtue of Being Poised: Reply to Seager. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):275 - 280.
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  54. Michael Tye (2003). Review: Phenomenal Character and Color: Reply to Maund. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):281 - 285.
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  55. Michael Tye (2003). Review: The Panic Theory: Reply to Byrne. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):287 - 290.
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  56. Michael Tye, To PANIC or Not to PANIC? -Reply to Byrne.
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  57. Michael Tye (2003). The PANIC Theory: Reply to Byrne. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 113 (3):287-290.
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  58. Michael Tye, William E. Seager, Barry Maund & Alex Byrne (2003). Ten Problems of Consciousness. Discussions. Author's Reply. Philosophical Studies 113 (3):233 - 290.
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  59. Michael Tye (2002). On the Location of a Pain. Analysis 62 (2):150-153.
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  60. Michael Tye (2002). Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience. Noûs 36 (1):137-51.
    Representationalism is a thesis about the phenomenal character of experiences, about their immediate subjective ‘feel’.1 At a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character. So understood, the thesis is silent on the nature of phenomenal character. Strong or pure representationalism goes further. It aims to tell us what phenomenal character is. According to the theory developed in Tye 1995, phenomenal character is one and the same (...)
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  61. Michael Tye (2002). Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press.
    Experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is _like_ for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philoso- phers often use the term 'qualia' to refer to the introspectively accessible properties of experiences (...)
     
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  62. Peter Bradley & Michael Tye (2001). Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves. Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):469-487.
    According to color realism, object colors are mind-independent properties that cover surfaces or permeate volumes of objects. In recent years, some color scientists and a growing number of philosophers have opposed this view on the grounds that realism about color cannot accommodate the apparent unitary/binary structure of the hues. For example, Larry Hardin asserts,
    the unitary-binary structure of the colors as we experience them
    corresponds to no known physical structure lying outside nervous
    systems that is causally involved (...)
    Similarly, Evan Thompson says. (shrink)
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  63. M. Tye (2001). Oh Yes It Is. Mind 110 (439):695-697.
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  64. Michael Tye (2001). Of Colors, Kestrels, Caterpillars, and Leaves. Journal of Philosophy 98 (9):469-487.
    According to color realism, object colors are mind-independent properties that cover surfaces or permeate volumes of objects. In recent years, some color scientists and a growing number of philosophers have opposed this view on the grounds that realism about color cannot accommodate the apparent unitary/binary structure of the hues. For example, Larry Hardin asserts, the unitary-binary structure of the colors as we experience them corresponds to no known physical structure lying outside nervous systems that is causally involved in the perception (...)
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  65. Michael Tye (2001). Oh Yes It Is. Mind 110 (439):695-697.
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  66. Michael Tye (2001). Oh Yes It Is. Mind 110 (439):695-697.
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  67. Michael Tye (2001). Oh Yes It Is. Mind 110 (439):695-697.
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  68. John Carriero, Michael Ferejohn, Michael Jubien, Philip Kain, Kwong-Loi Shun, David W. Smith, Michael Tye, Julie Van Camp & Georgia Warnke (2000). Richard Arneson University of California, San Diego Alison Leigh Brown Northern Arizona University. Philosophical Studies 99 (1).
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  69. Michael Tye (2000). Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press.
    A further development of Tye's theory of phenomenal consciousness along with replies to common objections.
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  70. Michael Tye (2000). Knowing What It is Like: The Ability Hypothesis and the Knowledge Argument. In Gerhard Preyer (ed.), Consciousness, Color, and Content. MIT Press. 223.
  71. Michael Tye (2000). Shoemaker's the First-Person Perspective and Other Essays. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):461-464.
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  72. Michael Tye (2000). Vagueness and Reality. Philosophical Topics 28 (1):195--210.
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  73. Michael Tye (1999). Phenomenal Consciousness: The Explanatory Gap as a Cognitive Illusion. Mind 108 (432):705-25.
    The thesis that there is a troublesome explanatory gap between the phenomenal aspects of experiences and the underlying physical and functional states is given a number of different interpretations. It is shown that, on each of these interpretations, the thesis is false. In supposing otherwise, philosophers have fallen prey to a cognitive illusion, induced largely by a failure to recognize the special character of phenomenal concepts.
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  74. B. P. McLaughlin & M. Tye (1998). Is Privileged Access Incompatible with Content-Externalism? Philosophical Review 107:349-380.
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  75. Brian P. McLaughlin & Michael Tye (1998). Externalism, Twin Earth, and Self-Knowledge. In C. Macdonald, Peter K. Smith & C. Wright (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds: Essays in Self-Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 285--320.
  76. Brian P. McLaughlin & Michael Tye (1998). Is Content-Externalism Compatible with Privileged Access? Philosophical Review 107 (3):349-380.
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  77. Michael Tye (1998). Externalism and Memory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 72 (72):77-94.
    [Michael Tye] Externalism about thought contents has received enormous attention in the philosophical literature over the past fifteen years or so, and it is now the established view. There has been very little discussion, however, of whether memory contents are themselves susceptible to an externalist treatment. In this paper, I argue that anyone who is sympathetic to Twin Earth thought experiments for externalism with respect to certain thoughts should endorse externalism with respect to certain memories. /// [Jane Heal] Tye claims (...)
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  78. Michael Tye (1998). Inverted Earth, Swampman, and Representationalism. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):459-78.
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  79. Michael Tye (1998). Pr. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):649-656.
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  80. Michael Tye (1998). Précis of Ten Problems of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):649-656.
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  81. Michael Tye (1998). Review: Précis of Ten Prolems of Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):649 - 656.
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  82. Michael Tye (1998). Review: Response to Discussants. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):679 - 687.
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  83. Michael Tye (1998). Reply to Block, Jackson, and Shoemaker on Ten Problems of Consciousness. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3).
     
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  84. Michael Tye (1998). Response to Discussants. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):679-687.
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  85. Michael Tye (1998). Response to Discussants. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (3):679-687.
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  86. Michael Tye (1997). On the Epistemic Theory of Vagueness. Philosophical Issues 8:247-253.
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  87. Michael Tye, Qualia. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Feelings and experiences vary widely. For example, I run my fingers over sandpaper, smell a skunk, feel a sharp pain in my finger, seem to see bright purple, become extremely angry. In each of these cases, I am the subject of a mental state with a very distinctive subjective character. There is something it is like for me to undergo each state, some phenomenology that it has. Philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ (singular ‘quale’) to refer to the introspectively accessible, (...)
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  88. Michael Tye (1997). Raw Feeling. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (4):968-971.
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  89. Michael Tye (1997). The Problem of Simple Minds: Is There Anything It's Like to Be a Honeybee? [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 88 (3):289-317.
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  90. Michael Tye (1996). Fuzzy Realism and the Problem of the Many. Philosophical Studies 81 (2-3):215 - 225.
  91. Michael Tye (1996). Is Consciousness Vague or Arbitrary? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):679-685.
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  92. Michael Tye (1996). Orgasms Again. Philosophical Issues 7:51-54.
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  93. Michael Tye (1996). Perceptual Experience is a Many-Layered Thing. Philosophical Issues 7:117-126.
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  94. Michael Tye (1996). The Function of Consciousness. Noûs 30 (3):287-305.
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  95. M. Tye (1995). What What its Like is Really Like. Analysis 55 (2):125-126.
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  96. Michael Tye (1995). A Representational Theory of Pains and Their Phenomenal Character. Philosophical Perspectives 9:223-39.
  97. Michael Tye (1995). Blindsight, Orgasm, and Representational Overlap. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268.
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  98. Michael Tye (1995). The Burning House. In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic & Paderborn. 81--90.
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  99. Michael Tye (1995). Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. MIT Press.
    Tye's book develops a persuasive and, in many respects, original argument for the view that the qualitative side of our mental life is representational in...
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  100. Michael Tye (1995). Vagueness: Welcome to the Quicksand. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (S1):1-22.
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  101. Michael Tye (1995). What "What It is Like" is Like. Analysis 55.
     
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  102. Michael Tye (1995). What What its Like is Really Like. Analysis 55 (2):125-126.
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  103. Michael Tye (1994). Do Pains Have Representational Content? In Roberto Casati, B. Smith & Stephen L. White (eds.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Holder-Pichler-Tempsky.
     
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  104. Michael Tye (1994). Naturalism and the Problem of Intentionality. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (September):122-42.
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  105. Michael Tye (1994). Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum. Noûs 28 (2):159-183.
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  106. Michael Tye (1994). Sorites Paradoxes and the Semantics of Vagueness. Philosophical Perspectives 8:189-206.
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  107. Michael Tye (1994). Why the Vague Need Not Be Higher-Order Vague. Mind 103 (409):43-45.
    Is higher-order vagueness a real phenomenon? Dominic Hyde (1994) claims that it is, and that it is part and parcel of vagueness itself. According to Hyde, any genuinely vague predicate must also be higher-order vague. His argument for this view is unsound, however. The purpose of this note is to expose the fallacy, and to make some related observations on the vague, the higher-order vague, and the vaguely vague.
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  108. Michael Tye (1994). What What It's Like is Really Like. Analyst 1 (4):125 - 126.
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  109. Michael Tye (1993). Blindsight, the Absent Qualia Hypothesis, and the Mystery of Consciousness. In Christopher Hookway (ed.), Philosophy and the Cognitive Sciences. Cambridge University Press. 19-40.
  110. Michael Tye (1993). Image Indeterminacy. In Naomi M. Eilan (ed.), Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell. 356--372.
     
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  111. Michael Tye (1993). Qualia, Content, and the Inverted Spectrum. Noûs 27 (2):159-183.
  112. Michael Tye (1993). Reflections on Dennett and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):891-6.
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  113. Michael Tye (1993). Review: Reflections on Dennett and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):893 - 898.
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  114. Michael Tye (1993). Spatial Representation. Cambridge: Blackwell.
     
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  115. Michael Tye (1992). Naturalism and the Mental. Mind 101 (403):421-441.
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  116. Michael Tye (1992). Visual Qualia and Visual Content. In Tim Crane (ed.), The Contents of Experience. Cambridge University Press. 158--176.
  117. Michael Tye (1991). Representation in Pictorialism and Connectionism. In Terence E. Horgan & John L. Tienson (eds.), Connectionism and the Philosophy of Mind. Kluwer. 309--330.
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  118. Michael Tye (1991). The Imagery Debate. Cambridge: Mit Press.
    Michael Tye untangles the complex web of empirical and conceptual issues of the newly revived imagery debate in psychology between those that liken mental...
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  119. Michael Tye (1990). Vague Objects. Mind 99 (396):535-557.
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  120. Michael Tye (1989). Supervaluationism and the Law of Excluded Middle. Analysis 49 (3):141-143.
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  121. Michael Tye (1989). The Metaphysics of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
  122. Terence Horgan & Michael Tye (1988). Braving the Perils of an Uneventful World. Grazer Philosophische Studien 31:179-186.
    Philosophers who advocate an ontology without events must show how sentences containing apparent reference to events can be systematically paraphrased, or "regimented," into sentences which avoid ontological commitment to these putative entities. Two alternative proposals are set forth for regimenting statements containing putatively event-denoting definite descriptions. Both proposals eliminate the apparent reference to events, while still preserving the validity of inferences sanctioned by the surface grammar of the regimented sentences.
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  123. Michael Tye (1988). The Picture Theory of Images. Philosophical Review 97 (October):497-520.
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  124. Michael Tye (1987). Representation in Pictorialism and Connectionism. Southern Journal of Philosophy Supplement 26 (S1):163-184.
  125. Michael Tye (1986). The Subjective Qualities of Experience. Mind 95 (January):1-17.
  126. N. C. A. Costdaa, David Harrah, Michael Tye, D. S. Clarke, Jeffrey Olen, Robert Young, Richard Campbell, Michael McKinsey, John Peterson, Alex C. Michalos, John Glucker, John T. Blackmore, Eileen Bagus & Barbara Goodwin (1985). Book Reviews. [REVIEW] Philosophia 15 (1-2):279-281.
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  127. Terence E. Horgan & Michael Tye (1985). Against the Token Identity Theory. In Brian P. McLaughlin & Ernest LePore (eds.), Action and Events. Blackwell.
     
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  128. Michael Tye (1985). Christopher Peacocke, Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations Reviewed By. Philosophy in Review 5 (4):173-175.
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  129. Michael Tye (1984). Pain and the Adverbial Theory. American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (October):319-328.
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  130. Michael Tye (1984). Supervenience, Materialism, and Functionalism: Comments on Horgan. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (S1):39-43.
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  131. Michael Tye (1984). The Adverbial Approach to Visual Experience. Philosophical Review 93 (April):195-226.
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  132. Michael Tye (1984). The Debate About Mental Imagery. Journal of Philosophy 81 (November):678-91.
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  133. Michael Tye (1983). Functionalism and Type Physicalism. Philosophical Studies 44 (September):161-74.
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  134. Michael Tye (1983). On the Possibility of Disembodied Existence. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (September):275-282.
  135. Michael Tye (1983). Response: Supervenience, Materialism, and Functionalism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (Supplement):39-43.
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  136. Michael Tye (1982). A Causal Analysis of Seeing by Michael Tye. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (March):311-325.
     
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  137. Michael Tye (1982). A Causal Analysis of Seeing. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (3):311-325.
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  138. Michael Tye (1982). A Note on the Synonymy Principle of Property Identity. Analysis 42 (1):52 - 55.
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  139. James Hudson & Michael Tye (1981). Reply to Yu. Analysis 41 (4):176 - 178.
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  140. Michael Tye (1981). On an Objection to the Synonymy Principle of Property Identity. Analysis 41 (1):22 - 26.
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  141. Michael Tye (1981). Scientific Reduction and the Synonymy Principle of Property Identity. Philosophical Studies 40 (2):177 - 185.
  142. James Hudson & Michael Tye (1980). Proper Names and Definite Descriptions with Widest Possible Scope. Analysis 40 (1):63 - 64.
  143. Michael Tye (1980). In Defense of the Words 'Human Body'. Philosophical Studies 38 (2):177 - 182.
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  144. Michael Tye (1979). Brand on Event Identity. Philosophical Studies 35 (1):81 - 89.
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  145. Michael Tye (1978). Sensory Properties. Behaviorism 6 (2):213-219.
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  146. Michael Tye (1978). The Puzzle of Hesperus and Phosphorus. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 56 (3):219 – 224.
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  147. Michael Tye (1977). Bergmann on the Intentionality of Thought. Southern Journal of Philosophy 15 (3):373-381.
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  148. Michael Tye (1975). The Adverbial Theory: A Defence of Sellars Against Jackson. Metaphilosophy 6 (April):136-143.
  149. Michael Tye, Précis Of: Consciousness, Color, & Content (MIT Press, 2000).
    In 1995, in my book, Ten Problems of Consciousness (Bradley Books, MIT Press), I proposed a version of the theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. The present book, in part, consists of a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. It is also concerned with two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness: the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In addition, it connects representationalism with two more general issues: the nature of (...)
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  150. Michael Tye, On Pain and Representational Content.
    I appreciate that such a view needs argument which is not appropriate here. However, I think that there are independent reasons to think that Tye’s theses are problematical. It is difficult to see how these theses are consistent both with what we know about pains, and other perceptual experiences, and with the package of claims that are central to Tye's treatment of pain, and more generally of perceptual experiences, whereby phenomenal character is explained in terms of representational content [as presented (...)
     
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