Yuval Avnur Claremont College
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  • Faculty, Claremont College
  • PhD, New York University, 2008.

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  1. Yuval Avnur (forthcoming). In Defense of Secular Belief. Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.
  2. Yuval Avnur (2015). Excuses for Hume's Skepticism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (1):n/a-n/a.
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  3. Yuval Avnur (2015). On an Irrelevant Regress. Theoria 81 (3).
    In a recent article, Wilson argues that Cartesian Scepticism leads to a vicious regress that can only be stopped by rejecting Cartesian Scepticism. If she is right, Wilson has solved one of philosophy's enduring problems. However, her regress is irrelevant to Cartesian Scepticism. This is evident once the proposition that we should have doubts, the person who has doubts, and the person who thinks that we should have doubts are carefully distinguished.
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  4. Yuval Avnur (2012). Closure Reconsidered. Philosophers' Imprint 12 (9).
    Most solutions to the skeptical paradox about justified belief assume closure for justification, since the rejection of closure is widely regarded as a non-starter. I argue that the rejection of closure is not a non-starter, and that its problems are no greater than the problems associated with the more standard anti-skeptical strategies. I do this by sketching a simple version of the unpopular strategy and rebutting the three best objections to it. The general upshot for theories of justification is that (...)
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  5. Yuval Avnur (2012). Mere Faith and Entitlement. Synthese 189 (2):297-315.
    The scandal to philosophy and human reason, wrote Kant, is that we must take the existence of material objects on mere faith . In contrast, the skeptical paradox that has scandalized recent philosophy is not formulated in terms of faith, but rather in terms of justification, warrant, and entitlement. I argue that most contemporary approaches to the paradox (both dogmatist/liberal and default/conservative) do not address the traditional problem that scandalized Kant, and that the status of having a warrant (or justification) (...)
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  6. Yuval Avnur (2011). An Old Problem for the New Rationalism. Synthese 183 (2):175-185.
  7. Yuval Avnur (2011). Hawthorne on the Deeply Contingent A Priori1. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):174-183.
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  8. Yuval Avnur, Anthony Brueckner & Christopher Buford (2011). No Closure On Skepticism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (4):439-447.
    This article is a response to an important objection that Sherrilyn Roush has made to the standard closure-based argument for skepticism, an argument that has been studied over the past couple of decades. If Roush's objection is on the mark, then this would be a quite significant finding. We argue that her objection fails.
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