Online research in philosophy

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• Faculty, Wayne State University
• PhD, University of Southern California, 2011.

• 17th/18th Century Philosophy
• Philosophy of Language

• Metaphysics
• Meta-Ethics
• Epistemology
• Philosophy of Mind
• Metaphilosophy
• Philosophy of Action
• 17th/18th Century Philosophy

My philosophical views

In May, 2011, I received my Ph.D. from the philosophy department at USC. In my dissertation, "Just Imagining Things: Hume's Conception-Based Account of Cognition", I offered a qualified defense of Hume's theory of cognition from the Treatise. In August, 2011, I began as an Assistant Professor in the philosophy department at Wayne State University. Beyond my interest in Hume, I also spend time working on the philosophy of Thomas Reid and of John Locke, as well as on contemporary issues in Philosophy of Mind and Language, Epistemology, Metaethics, and Action Theory.

1 item found. Sort by: publication yearfirst authorviewingsaddition date Lewis Powell (forthcoming). How to Refrain From Answering Kripke's Puzzle. Philosophical Studies. In this paper, I investigate the prospects for using the distinction between rejection and denial to resolve Saul Kripke’s puzzle about belief. One puzzle Kripke presents in A Puzzle About Belief poses what would have seemed a fairly straightforward question about the beliefs of the bilingual Pierre, who is disposed to sincerely and reflectively assent to the French sentence Londres est jolie , but not to the English sentence London is pretty , both of which he understands perfectly well. The (...) question to be answered is whether Pierre believes that London is pretty, and Kripke argues, of each answer, that it is unacceptable. On my proposal, either answer to the question is to be rejected, but neither answer is to be denied, using the resource of partially-defined predicates. After demonstrating how this serves as a solution to the puzzle, I illustrate some philosophical motivations—independent of Kripke’s puzzle—for adopting a view on which belief is a partially defined predicate. I conclude that there are decent prospects for the proposed response to Kripke’s puzzle. (shrink) Kripke's Puzzle About Belief in Philosophy of Language Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...

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