| Question | Answer | Comments | |
| A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Lean toward: no | | |
| Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Accept an intermediate view | proustian platonism⦠the platonism of a past that has never present. The way ideas exist is in space and time, but not the objective measurable space and time. They are the very structure of lived space and time. | |
| Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Lean toward: objective | on the condition that the "objectivity" in question be understood in a very basic sense: as residing in the object (but the object inasmuch as it is perceived). | |
| Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Lean toward: yes | | |
| Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Reject both | cf. the two other externalism-internalism questions. | |
| External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Reject all | again: after having read "The Visible and the Invisible", those alternatives cannot be taken seriously any more. | |
| Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Lean toward: compatibilism | | |
| God: theism or atheism? | Lean toward: theism | | |
| Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Reject both | Again, Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology proposes a symmetric rejection of this characteristical modern alternative. By a careful description of the process of perception, one understands that empiricism and rationalism both rest on unjustified presuppositions. | |
| Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Accept: contextualism | From a phenomenological point of view, knowledge is a relation between a thinking self / subject and an object intended in an act of grasping. Since the self is essentially embodied, and therefore situated in space and time, knowledge is ultimately contextual to this embodiment. | |
| Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Skip | | |
| Logic: classical or non-classical? | Skip | | |
| Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Reject both | From a phenomonological point of view, the so called "mental content" is intentional, and therefore in strict correlation to the act of (for example) perception. I.e. Intentionality implies that subjectivity is by nature openness to the world, it is always already open. In short the alternative between the internal and the external doesn't looses its relevance. | |
| Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Accept another alternative | | |
| Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Skip | | |
| Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Accept: non-physicalism | | |
| Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept: non-cognitivism | | |
| Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Reject both | cf. the other internalism-externalism question | |
| Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Skip | | |
| Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Lean toward: virtue ethics | | |
| Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Reject all | Merleau-Ponty in 1945 was well ahead of those alternatives. | |
| Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
| Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Accept: egalitarianism | | |
| Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Skip | | |
| Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Reject both | | |
| Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Skip | | |
| Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Skip | | |
| Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Skip | | |
| Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Other | heideggerian | |
| Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Skip | | |
