Joshua Alexander Siena College
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  1. Joshua Alexander, Chad Gonnerman & John Waterman (forthcoming). Salience and Epistemic Egocentrism: An Empirical Study. In James Beebe (ed.), Advances in Experimental Epistemology. Continuum.
    Jennifer Nagel (2010) has recently proposed a fascinating account of the decreased tendency to attribute knowledge in conversational contexts in which unrealized possibilities of error have been mentioned. Her account appeals to epistemic egocentrism, or what is sometimes called the curse of knowledge, an egocentric bias to attribute our own mental states to other people (and sometimes our own future and past selves). Our aim in this paper is to investigate the empirical merits of Nagel’s hypothesis about the psychology involved (...)
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  2. Jonathan M. Weinberg, Joshua Alexander, Chad Gonnerman & Shane Reuter (2013). Restrictionism and Reflection: Challenge Deflected, or Simply Redirected? The Monist 95 (2):200-222.
    It has become increasingly popular to respond to experimental philosophy by suggesting that experimental philosophers haven’t been studying the right kind of thing. One version of this kind of response, which we call the reflection defense, involves suggesting both that philosophers are interested only in intuitions that are the product of careful reflection on the details of hypothetical cases and the key concepts involved in those cases, and that these kinds of philosophical intuitions haven’t yet been (and possibly cannot be) (...)
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  3. Joshua Alexander (2012). Author Q & A. The Philosophers' Magazine 58:125-126.
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  4. Joshua Alexander (2012). Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction. Polity Press.
  5. Joshua Alexander, Mark Alicke, Holly Andersen, Michael Anderson, Kristin Andrews, István Aranyosi, Adam Arico, Nomy Arpaly, Robert Audi & Andrew Bailey (2012). Philosophical Psychology Would Like to Thank the Following for Contributing to the Journal as Reviewers This Past Year: Fred Adams Kenneth Aizawa. Philosophical Psychology 25 (1):161-163.
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  6. S. Matthew Liao, Alex Wiegmann, Joshua Alexander & Gerard Vong (2012). Putting the Trolley in Order: Experimental Philosophy and the Loop Case. Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):661-671.
    In recent years, a number of philosophers have conducted empirical studies that survey people's intuitions about various subject matters in philosophy. Some have found that intuitions vary accordingly to seemingly irrelevant facts: facts about who is considering the hypothetical case, the presence or absence of certain kinds of content, or the context in which the hypothetical case is being considered. Our research applies this experimental philosophical methodology to Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous Loop Case, which she used to call into question (...)
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  7. Kathleen Akins, Pignocchi Alessandro, Joshua Alexander, Anna Alexandrova, Keith Allen, Sophie Allen, Colin Allen, Maria Alvarez, Santiago Amaya & Ben Ambridge (2010). Philosophical Psychology Would Like to Thank Our Reviewers for Their Generous Contributions to the Journal in 2010. Jonathan Adler Kenneth Aizawa. Philosophical Psychology 23 (6):845-848.
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  8. Joshua Alexander (2010). Is Experimental Philosophy Philosophically Significant? Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):377-389.
    Experimental philosophy has emerged as a very specific kind of response to an equally specific way of thinking about philosophy, one typically associated with philosophical analysis and according to which philosophical claims are measured, at least in part, by our intuitions. Since experimental philosophy has emerged as a response to this way of thinking about philosophy, its philosophical significance depends, in no small part, on how significant the practice of appealing to intuitions is to philosophy. In this paper, I defend (...)
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  9. Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan Weinberg (2010). Competence: What's In? What's Out? Who Knows? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 33 (4):329-330.
    Knobe's argument rests on a way of distinguishing performance errors from the competencies that delimit our cognitive architecture. We argue that other sorts of evidence than those that he appeals to are needed to illuminate the boundaries of our folk capacities in ways that would support his conclusions.
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  10. Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2010). Accentuate the Negative. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.
    Our interest in this paper is to drive a wedge of contention between two different programs that fall under the umbrella of “experimental philosophy”. In particular, we argue that experimental philosophy’s “negative program” presents almost as significant a challenge to its “positive program” as it does to more traditional analytic philosophy.
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  11. Jonathan M. Weinberg, Chad Gonnerman, Cameron Buckner & Joshua Alexander (2010). Are Philosophers Expert Intuiters? Philosophical Psychology 23 (3):331-355.
    Recent experimental philosophy arguments have raised trouble for philosophers' reliance on armchair intuitions. One popular line of response has been the expertise defense: philosophers are highly-trained experts, whereas the subjects in the experimental philosophy studies have generally been ordinary undergraduates, and so there's no reason to think philosophers will make the same mistakes. But this deploys a substantive empirical claim, that philosophers' training indeed inculcates sufficient protection from such mistakes. We canvass the psychological literature on expertise, which indicates that people (...)
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  12. Stacey Swain, Joshua Alexander & Jonathan Weinberg (2008). The Instability of Philosophical Intuitions: Running Hot and Cold on Truetemp. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1):138-155.
    A growing body of empirical literature challenges philosophers’ reliance on intuitions as evidence based on the fact that intuitions vary according to factors such as cultural and educational background, and socio-economic status. Our research extends this challenge, investigating Lehrer’s appeal to the Truetemp Case as evidence against reliabilism. We found that intuitions in response to this case vary according to whether, and which, other thought experiments are considered first. Our results show that compared to subjects who receive the Truetemp Case (...)
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  13. Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg (2007). Analytic Epistemology and Experimental Philosophy. Philosophy Compass 2 (1):56–80.
    It has been standard philosophical practice in analytic philosophy to employ intuitions generated in response to thought-experiments as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In part as a response to this practice, an exciting new movement—experimental philosophy—has recently emerged. This movement is unified behind both a common methodology and a common aim: the application of methods of experimental psychology to the study of the nature of intuitions. In this paper, we will introduce two different views concerning the relationship that (...)
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  14. R. Ackermann, G. Aichholzer, J. Alexander, T. J. Allen, H. Arendt, J. M. Atienza & Atting Tw (2005). Index of Names Abbarno, J., 122n, 128 Abetti, G., 184n, 202 Achterhuis, H., 37. In Wenceslao J. González (ed.), Science, Technology and Society: A Philosophical Perspective. Netbiblo.
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  15. J. Alexander (2004). An Essay on Historical, Philosophical and Theological Attitudes to Modern Political Thought. History of Political Thought 25 (1):116-148.
  16. P. Abir-Am, J. Alexander, S. Altaian, W. Arnold, D. Amon, S. Arrhenius, W. T. Astbury, H. J. Bagg, O. Bail & D. Baltimore (1996). Claude, A. 73. In Sahotra Sarkar (ed.), The Philosophy and History of Molecular Biology: New Perspectives. Kluwer Academic. 249.
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  17. Mw Oboyle, Cp Benbow & J. Alexander (1992). The Role of the Right-Hemisphere in Intellectual Giftedness. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 30 (6):447-447.
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  18. Pj Schwanenflugel, Wv Fabricius, K. Bigler & J. Alexander (1991). The Conceptual Organization of Mental Verbs. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society 29 (6):478-478.
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  19. J. Alexander & D. G. Paz (1974). The Treasury Grants, 1833-1839. British Journal of Educational Studies 22 (1):78 - 92.
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