Don Loeb University of Vermont
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  • Faculty, University of Vermont
  • PhD, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1991.

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  1. Mark Alfano & Don Loeb (2014). .
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  2. Mark Alfano & Don Loeb (2014). Experimental Moral Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy:1-32.
    Experimental moral philosophy began to emerge as a methodology in the last decade of the twentieth century, a branch of the larger experimental philosophy (X-Phi, XΦ) approach. From the beginning, it has been embroiled in controversy on a number of fronts. Some doubt that it is philosophy at all. Others acknowledge that it is philosophy but think that it has produced modest results at best and confusion at worst. Still others think it represents an important advance.
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    Mark Alfano & Don Loeb (2014). Experimental Moral Philosophy. In .
    Experimental moral philosophy began to emerge as a methodology inthe last decade of the twentieth century, a branch of the largerexperimental philosophy approach. From the beginning,it has been embroiled in controversy on a number of fronts. Somedoubt that it is philosophy at all. Others acknowledge that it isphilosophy but think that it has produced modest results at best andconfusion at worst. Still others think it represents an important advance., Before the research program can be evaluated, we should have someconception of (...)
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  4. Don Loeb (2007). The Argument From Moral Experience. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469-484.
    It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory. In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it (...)
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    Don Loeb (2007). The Argument From Moral Experience. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (5):469-484.
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    Don Loeb (2005). Moral Explanations of Moral Beliefs. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):193–208.
    Gilbert Harman and Judith Thomson have argued that moral facts cannot explain our moral beliefs, claiming that such facts could not play a causal role in the formation of those beliefs. This paper shows these arguments to be misguided, for they would require that we abandon any number of intuitively plausible explanations in non-moral contexts as well. But abandoning the causal strand in the argument over moral explanations does not spell immediate victory for the moral realist, since it must still (...)
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    Don Loeb (2003). Gastronomic Realism - A Cautionary Tale. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):30-49.
    Moral realism, the view that there are moral facts that are independent of our beliefs about them, has many defenders. But much less has been said about realism concerning other sorts of value. One of these, gastronomic realism is likely to seem implausible on its face. This paper argues, however, that much of the reasoning used to defend moral realism is about as well suited for defending gastronomic realism. Although these considerations do not directly undermine moral realism, they do suggest (...)
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    D. Loeb (2002). Ethical Norms, Particular Cases. Philosophical Review 111 (1):127-129.
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    Don Loeb (2001). Grethe B. Peterson, Ed., The Tanner Lectures on Human Values:The Tanner Lectures on Human Values. Ethics 112 (1):172-175.
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  10. D. Loeb (1998). Moral Realism and the Argument From Disagreement. Philosophical Studies 90 (3):281-303.
  11.  42
    Don Loeb (1996). Generality and Moral Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (1):79-96.
    Demands for generality sometimes exert a powerful influence on our thinking, pressing us to treat more general moral positions, such as consequentialism, as superior to more specific ones, like those which incorporate agent-centered restrictions or prerogatives. I articulate both foundationalist and coherentist versions of the demands for generality and argue that we can best understand these demands in terms of a certain underlying metaphysical commitment. I consider and reject various arguments which might be offered in support of this commitment, and (...)
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    Don Loeb (1996). Must a Moral Irrealist Be a Pragmatist? American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (2):225 - 233.
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    Don Loeb (1995). Full-Information Theories of Individual Good. Social Theory and Practice 21 (1):1-30.
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  14. Don Loeb (1991). Generality in Moral Reflection. Dissertation, University of Michigan
    Demands of generality pervade contemporary moral philosophy. For example, both Samuel Scheffler and Shelly Kagan demand a general justification for certain agent-centered features of morality. I argue, however, that these demands are often unjustified. My aim is to level the playing field between our more specific and our more general moral convictions, allowing neither to win by default. ;I begin by distinguishing generality from universality and consistency, and go on to identify several common motivations for generality in ethics. For each (...)
     
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