Online research in philosophy

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sarch@umich.edu

• Graduate student, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor
• PhD, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2009.

• Normative Ethics
• Meta-Ethics

• Philosophy of Law
• Metaphilosophy
• Normative Ethics

I recently received my Ph.D. in Philosophy from the University of Massachusetts, Amherst. My dissertation was entitled "On the Objectivity of Welfare", and I defended it in August 2009. My main interest is in normative ethical questions about well-being and moral rightness, but I'm also interested in questions about the method of reflective equilibrium in ethics, the role of intuitions in this method, and the justification of moral theories in general. I also have interests (too numerous to list here) in philosophy of law and social and political philosophy. In the fall of 2009, I began studying law at University of Michigan. (I'm also the editor of the 'Well-Being' category here on PhilPapers, so if you have recommendations for literature that you think should be included, please email me. Thanks for your help!)

3 items found. Sort by: publication yearfirst authorviewingsaddition date Alexander Sarch (forthcoming). Internalism About a Person's Good: Don't Believe It. Philosophical Studies. Internalism about a person's good is roughly the view that in order for something to intrinsically enhance a person's well-being, that person must be capable of caring about that thing. I argue in this paper that internalism about a person's good should not be believed. Though many philosophers accept the view, Connie Rosati provides the most comprehensive case in favor of it. Her defense of the view consists mainly in offering five independent arguments to think that at least some form (...) of internalism about one's good is true. But I argue that, on closer inspection, not one of these arguments succeeds. The problems don't end there, however. While Rosati offers good reasons to think that what she calls 'two-tier internalism' would be the best way to formulate the intuition behind internalism about one's good, I argue that two-tier internalism is actually false. In particular, the problem is that no substantive theory of well-being is consistent with two-tier internalism. Accordingly, there is reason to think that even the best version of internalism about one's good is in fact false. Thus, I conclude, the prospects for internalism about a person's good do not look promising. (shrink) Internalism and Externalism about Reasons in Philosophy of Action Objective Accounts of Well-Being in Value Theory, Miscellaneous Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Alexander Sarch (2010). Bealer and the Autonomy of Philosophy. Synthese 172 (3). George Bealer has provided an elaborate defense of the practice of appealing to intuition in philosophy. In the present paper, I argue that his defense fails. First, I argue that Bealer’s theory of determinate concept possession, even if true, would not establish the “autonomy” of philosophy. That is, even if he is correct about what determinate concept possession consists in, it would not follow that it is possible to answer the central questions of philosophy by critical reflection on our intuitions. (...) Furthermore, I argue that Bealer’s account of determinate concept possession in fact faces serious problems. Accordingly, I conclude that Bealer does not succeed in vindicating the appeal to intuition in philosophy. (shrink) Conceptual Analysis in Metaphilosophy Epistemology of Intuition in Epistemology Intuition, Misc in Epistemology Philosophical Methods, Misc in Metaphilosophy Rationalism in Metaphilosophy The Nature of Intuition in Epistemology Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | At my library | More options ... Alexander Sarch (2008). What's Wrong with Megalopsychia? Philosophy 83 (2):231-253. Ancient Greek Ethics in Ancient Greek Philosophy Aristotle in Ancient Greek Philosophy Topics in Virtue Ethics, Misc in Normative Ethics Reading list   |  Discuss  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: journals.cambridge.org dx.doi.org   | Scholar | At my library | More options ...

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