Online research in philosophy

Causal claims are context sensitive. According to the old orthodoxy (Mackie 1974, Lewis 1986, inter alia), the context sensitivity of causal claims is all due to conversational pragmatics. According to the new contextualists (Hitchcock 1996, Woodward 2003, Maslen 2004, Menzies 2004, Schaffer 2005, and Hall ms), at least some of the context sensitivity of causal claims is semantic in nature. I want to discuss the prospects for causal contextualism, by asking why causal claims are context sensitive, what they are sensitive (...) to, and where they are sensitive to it. I will take these questions in turn. Thus in §1 I will wonder why causal claims are context sensitive, and suggest that the matter is semantic rather than pragmatic. In §2 I will consider what causal claims are sensitive to, and propose that the sensitivity is to contrasts rather than defaults or models. Finally in §3 I will ask where in the semantic machinery the contrast sensitivity might sit, and conclude in puzzlement. (shrink)

Imagine that Ann, asked to name her favorite treat, answers: “Licorice is tasty.” Imagine that Ben, having hidden some licorice in the cupboard, whispers to Ann: “There might be licorice in the cupboard.” What (if any) propositions have Ann and Ben expressed? And what (if anything) determines whether these propositions are true?

What knowledge is imperiled by skeptical doubt? That is, what range of beliefs may be called into doubt by skeptical nightmares like the Cartesian demon hypothesis? It is generally thought that demons have limited powers, perhaps only threatening a posteriori knowledge of the external world, but at any rate not threatening principles like the cogito. I will argue that there is a demon—the debasing demon—with unlimited powers, which threatens universal doubt. Rather than deceiving us with falsities, the debasing demon would (...) allow us true beliefs, but only as guesses. (shrink)

Propositions are the contents of declaratives, and the objects of attitudes. For instance, if Ann asserts that it is raining, and if Ben believes what Ann asserts, then it seems as if one and the same proposition is the content of Ann’s assertion, and the object of Ben’s belief. But—on the orthodox semantic framework detailed in Kaplan 1989a—the content of what Ann asserts is inspecific with respect to such features as the world and time of the rainfall, and is only (...) true or false relative to an index specifying these further features. Yet the object of what Ben believes seems to concern a specific world and time, and does not seem to require an index to assess for truth. (shrink)

In Ordinary Objects,1 Thomasson pursues an integrated conception of ontology and metaontology. In ontology, she defends the existence of shoes, ships, and other ordinary objects. In metaontology, she defends a deflationary view of ontological inquiry, designed to suck the air out of arguments against ordinary objects. The result is an elegant and insightful defense of a common sense worldview. I am sympathetic—in spirit if not always in letter—with Thomasson’s ontology. But I am skeptical of her deflationary metaontology. Indeed, I think (...) that her metaontology and her ontology are in tension. Her metaontology dismisses certain ontological questions as unanswerable, but her ontology in fact answers these very questions. For example, Thomasson dismisses the special composition question on its intended interpretation as “unanswerable” (p. 136), but she goes on to defend the standard answer of the universalist (p. 184). Thus, my primary argument will be that Thomasson should reject deflationary metaontology, by her own lights. Thomasson’s main line of argument—as I understand it—runs as follows. First, she argues from the need for sortals in reference determination to the existence of analytic entailments for referring terms. In particular, she argues that it is analytic that if there are particles arranged cupwise, then there is a cup. Second, she argues from the existence of analytic entailments for referring terms to the existence of ordinary objects. Since all sides agree that there are particles arranged cupwise, all sides are committed to cups. Third, she argues from the existence of analytic entailments for referring terms to the unanswerability of certain ontological questions. This deflationary metaontology is then used to further buttress the claim that ordinary objects exist. See Figure 1 for a flowchart. There are certainly other positions defended in Ordinary Objects, and other connections between the four positions diagrammed. Indeed Thomasson may well regard the four positions diagrammed as all being interconnected.. (shrink)

I accept that 1 and 2 differ in truth-value, but see no reason why this requires two types of conditionals. Rather, the difference between 1 and 2 seems to me to be a difference in the antecedent and consequent conditions, flanking one and the same conditional. That is, I hold that the difference between 1 and 2 should not be thought of as per the schema: 1a. p C1 q 2a. p C2 q where C1 and C2 are two different (...) types of conditionals. The difference is better conceived via the schema: 1b. p1 C q1 2b. p2 C q2 which features a single type of conditional C flanked by different antecedent and consequent conditions: indicative and subjunctive conditions, respectively. (shrink)

Michael Moore’s Causation and Responsibility offers an integrated conception of the law, morality, and metaphysics, centered on the notion of causation, grounded in a detailed knowledge of case law, and supported on every point by cogent argument. This is outstanding work. It is a worthy successor to Harte and Honoré’s classic Causation in the Law, and I expect that it will guide discussion for many years to come.

Logical atomism so understood contrasts with a view—which traces back at least to Aristotle’s Categories—on which the world is a world of things. Logical atomism also contrasts with an abundant fact ontology, which posits a one-one correspondence between facts and truths. On this abundant fact ontology, the distinct truths Fa, Fa & Fa, and ~~Fa each respectively correspond to the distinct facts [Fa], [Fa & Fa], and [~~Fa]. Whereas on the logical atomist view, these many truths are made true by (...) the one sparse fact [Fa]. Logical atomism is thus a fact ontology, of a specifically sparse sort. (shrink)

According to Hume (2007: 145), our concepts of causation, resemblance, and contiguity are the foundation of all of our reasoning concerning matters of fact, and “to us the cement of the universe”. As Carroll (1994: 118) puts the point: “With regard to our total conceptual apparatus, causation is at the center of the center”. Causation is certainly central to the law. Many liability doctrines in both criminal law and torts explicitly require that the defendant has caused harm to the plaintiff (...) (c.f. Moore 2009: 3). Thus—given that the law uses “cause” in the ordinary sense, and not its own stipulatively defined sense—our concepts of causation and of legal liability can illuminate each other. (shrink)

Many of us were raised to believe the following story. By the end of the nineteenth century, darkness was over the surface of the deep. Philosophy was dominated by neo-Hegelian monistic idealism, and plunged into obscurity and confusion. And then there was light. As the twentieth century dawned, Russell and Moore separated from the neo-Hegelians by defending external relations, pluralism, realism, clarity, and all that is Good. The creation myth of analytic philosophy—like many founding myths—contains some traces of truth. By (...) the end of the nineteenth century, philosophy was indeed dominated by neo-Hegelian monistic idealism. Russell and Moore did indeed separate from the neo-Hegelians by defending external relations, pluralism, and realism. Russell and Moore were much clearer than their predecessors, and this was Good. But the neo-Hegelians actually had an argument for their monism—the argument from internal relatedness—which went misunderstood, and which may even be sound. Or so I will argue. Overview of the argument: The argument from internal relatedness, as I will reconstruct it, proceeds in two stages. First, it is argued that all things are internally related in ways that render them interdependent. Second, the substantial unity of the whole universe is inferred from the interdependence of all of its parts. Overall the argument runs from universal internal relatedness to priority monism. The guiding idea is that failure of free recombination is the modal signature of an integrated monistic cosmos. Overview of the paper: In section 1 I will clarify the key concepts of monism, priority, internal relatedness, and free recombination. In section 2 I will consider the second stage of the argument—from universal internal relatedness to monism—and provide some proofs. In section 3 I will turn to the first stage of the argument—that all things are internally related—and show how some plausible contemporary views vindicate this claim. I will conclude in section 4 by considering how the pluralist might respond.. (shrink)

Suppose that Ann says, “Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.” Her audience may well agree. Her knowledge ascription may seem true. But now suppose that Ben—in a different context—also says “Keith knows that the bank will be open tomorrow.” His audience may well disagree. His knowledge ascription may seem false. Indeed, a number of philosophers have claimed that people’s intuitions about knowledge ascriptions are context sensitive, in the sense that the very same knowledge ascription can seem true (...) in one conversational context but false in another. This purported fact about people’s intuitions serves as one of the main pieces of evidence for epistemic contextualism, which is the view that the truth conditions of a knowledge attribution can differ from one conversational context to another. Opponents of contextualism have replied by trying to explain these purported intuitions in other ways. For instance, they have proposed that these purported intuitions may be explained via shifts in what is at stake for the subject, pragmatic shifts in what is assertible, or performance shifts in our liability to error. Yet a recent series of empirical studies threatens to undermine this whole debate. These studies presented ordinary people with precisely the sorts of cases that have been discussed in the contextualism literature and examined these people’s intuitions about the relevant knowledge attributions. Strikingly, the results suggest that people simply do not have the intuitions they were purported to have. Looking at this recent evidence, it is easy to come away with the feeling that the whole contextualism debate was founded on a myth. The various sides offered conflicting explanations for a certain pattern of intuitions, but the empirical evidence suggests that this pattern of intuitions does not exist. Our aim is to defend a form of contextualism in the face of this new threat. We acknowledge that some of the specific claims made by earlier contextualists might be undermined by recent experimental results, but we suggest that a different form of contextualism—based on the idea that conversational context provides the relevant contrast—can answer this empirical challenge.. (shrink)

I argue that the one and only truthmaker is the world. This view can be seen as arising from (i) the view that truthmaking is a relation of grounding holding between true propositions and fundamental entities, together with (ii) the view that the world is the one and only fundamental entity. I argue that this view provides an elegant and economical account of the truthmakers, while solving the problem of negative existentials, in a way that proves ontologically revealing.

Which is prior, whole or part? Consider a circle. Imagine it divided into any two semicircular parts. Is the circle prior, with the semicircles existing in virtue of the circle? Or are the semicircles prior, with the circle existing in virtue of the semicircles?

What is the relation between material objects and spacetime regions? Supposing that spacetime regions are one sort of substance, there remains the question of whether or not material objects are a second sort of substance. This is the question of dualistic versus monistic substantivalism . I will defend the monistic view. In particular, I will maintain that material objects should be identified with spacetime regions. There is the spacetime manifold, and the fundamental properties are pinned directly to it.

On the now dominant Quinean view, metaphysics is about what there is. Metaphysics so conceived is concerned with such questions as whether properties exist, whether meanings exist, and whether numbers exist. I will argue for the revival of a more traditional Aristotelian view, on which metaphysics is about what grounds what. Metaphysics so revived does not bother asking whether properties, meanings, and numbers exist (of course they do!) The question is whether or not they are fundamental.

Knowledge ascriptions are contrast-sensitive. One natural explanation for this is that the knowledge relation is contrastive ( s knows that p rather than q ). But can the binary view of knowledge ( s knows that p ) explain contrast-sensitivity? I review some of the linguistic data supporting contrast-sensitivity, and critique the three main binary explanations for contrast-sensitivity. I conclude that the contrast-sensitivity of knowledge ascriptions shows that knowledge is a contrastive relation.

This entry focuses on two of the more historically important monisms: existence monism and priority monism . Existence monism targets concrete objects and counts by tokens. This is the doctrine that exactly one concrete object exists. Priority monism also targets concrete objects, but counts by basic tokens. This is the doctrine that exactly one concrete object is basic, which will turn out to be the classical doctrine that the whole is prior to its parts.

In What’s Wrong With Microphysicalism?, Andreas H üttemann argues against the ontological priority of the microphysical, in favour of a ‘pluralism’ that accepts physical systems of all scales as interdependent equals. This is thoughtful and original work, deploying an understanding of the relevant physics to mount a serious challenge to the dominant microphysicalist view. Microphysicalism, as H üttemann characterizes it, is the thesis of the ‘ontological priority of the micro-level’ (p. 7). As Kim puts it, the world is the way (...) it is ‘because the micro-world is the way it is’ ([1984], p. 100). H üttemann notes that microphysicalism comes in such specific forms as. (shrink)

Questions about the metaphysics of causation may be usefully divided as follows. First, there are questions about the nature of the causal relata, including (1.1) whether they are in spacetime immanence), (1.2) how fine grained they are individuation), and (1.3) how many there are adicity). Second, there are questions about the metaphysics of the causal relation, including (2.1) what is the difference between causally related and causally unrelated sequences connection), (2.2) what is the difference between sequences related as cause to (...) effect, and those related as effect to cause or as joint effects of a common cause direction), and (2.3) what is the difference between sequences involving the cause, and those involving mere conditions selection). (shrink)

Causation and the laws of nature are nothing over and above the pattern of events, just like a movie is nothing over and above the sequence of frames. Or so I will argue. The position I will argue for is broadly inspired by Hume and Lewis, and may be expressed in the slogan: what must be, must be grounded in what is.

On the truthmaker view of ontological commitment [Heil (From an ontological point of view, 2003); Armstrong (Truth and truthmakers, 2004); Cameron (Philosophical Studies, 2008)], a theory is committed to the entities needed in the world for the theory to be made true. I argue that this view puts truthmaking to the wrong task. None of the leading accounts of truthmaking—via necessitation, supervenience, or grounding—can provide a viable measure of ontological commitment. But the grounding account does provide a needed constraint on (...) what is fundamental. So I conclude that truthmaker commitments are not a rival to quantifier commitments, but a needed complement. The quantifier commitments are what a theory says exists, while the truthmaker commitments are what a theory says is fundamental. (shrink)

How should the contrastivist formulate closure? That is, given that knowledge is a ternary contrastive state Kspq (s knows that p rather than q), how does this state extend under entailment? In what follows, I will identify adequacy conditions for closure, criticize the extant invariantist and contextualist closure schemas, and provide a contrastive schema based on the idea of extending answers. I will conclude that only the contrastivist can adequately formulate closure.

Can there be deterministic chance? That is, can there be objective chance values other than 0 or 1, in a deterministic world? I will argue that the answer is no. In a deterministic world, the only function that can play the role of chance is one that outputs just 0s and 1s. The role of chance involves connections from chance to credence, possibility, time, intrinsicness, lawhood, and causation. These connections do not allow for deterministic chance.

Mereological nihilism is the view that all concrete objects are simple. Existence monism is the view that the only concrete object is one big simple: the world. I will argue that nihilism culminates in monism. The nihilist demands the simplest sufficient ontology, and the monist delivers it. Nothing is cheaper and commoner in philosophy than monism; what, unhappily, is still rare, is an attempt to defend it, and critically to establish its assumptions. [Schiller 1897: 62].

Phil Dowe and Paul Noordhof Cause and Chance: Causation in an Indeterministic World London: Routledge, 2004, $35.00 ISBN: 0415408482, paperback.

‘‘The death of man is nothing to get particularly excited about. It’s one of the visible forms of a much more general decease, if you like. I don’t mean by it the death of god but the death of the subject, of the Subject in capital letters, of the subject as origin and foundation of Knowledge, of Liberty, of Language and History.’’ -- Michel Foucault..

.  Is the relation between properties and the causal powers they confer necessary, or contingent? Necessary, says Sydney Shoemaker on pain of skepticism about the properties. Contingent, says David Lewis, swallowing the skeptical conclusion. I shall argue that Lewis is right about the metaphysics, but that Shoemaker and Lewis are wrong about the epistemology. Properties have intrinsic natures (quiddities), which we can know. On route I shall also argue that (i) the main necessitarian arguments do not converge on a single view, (...) (ii) properties are transworld entities that cannot be handled by counterpart theory, and (iii) quiddistic skepticism is merely external world skepticism writ small. (shrink)

Causation is widely assumed to be a binary relation: c causes e. I will argue that causation is a quaternary, contrastive relation: c rather than C* causes e rather than E*, where C* and E* are nonempty sets of contrast events. Or at least, I will argue that treating causation as contrastive helps resolve some paradoxes.

Much of the extant discussion focuses on the question of whether contextualism resolves skeptical paradoxes. Understandably. Yet there has been less discussion as to the internal structure of contextualist theories. Regrettably. Here, for instance, are two questions that could stand further discussion: (i) what is the linguistic basis for contextualism and (ii) what is the parameter that shifts with context?

Contextualism treats ‘knows’ as an indexical that denotes different epistemic properties in different contexts. Contrastivism treats ‘knows’ as denoting a ternary relation with a slot for a contrast proposition. I will argue that contrastivism resolves the main philosophical problems of contextualism, by employing a better linguistic model. Contextualist insights are best understood by contrastivist theory.

Are the sparse properties drawn from all the levels of nature, or only the fundamental level? I discuss the notion of sparse property found in Armstrong and Lewis, show that there are tensions in the roles they have assigned the sparse properties, and argue that the sparse properties should be drawn from all the levels of nature. The issue has direct bearing on reductionism. If the sparse properties are drawn from all the levels of nature, then macro-scientific properties are just (...) as primary as microscientific properties, and do not need to be reduced to them. (shrink)

The tracking theory treats knowledge as counterfactual covariation of belief and truth through a sphere of possibilities. I argue that the tracking theory cannot respect perceptual knowledge, because perceptual belief covaries with truth through a discontinuous scatter of possibilities. Perceptual knowledge is subject to inner derailing: there is an inner hollow of perceptual incompetence through which the differences are too small to track. Perceptual knowledge is subject to outer derailing: there are outlying islands of perceptual competence that extend well past (...) skeptical sinkholes. (shrink)

‘‘Thus I believe that there is no part of matter which is not—I do not say divisible—but actually divided; and consequently the least particle ought to be considered as a world full of an infinity of different creatures.’’ (Leibniz, letter to Foucher).

When two rocks shatter the window at once, what causes the window to shatter? Is the throwing of each individual rock a cause of the window shattering, or are the throwings only causes collectively? This question bears on the analysis of causation, and the metaphysics of macro-causation. I argue that the throwing of each individual rock is a cause of the window shattering, and generally that individual overdeterminers are causes.

There are at least three core principles that define the chance role: (1) the Principal Principle, (2) the Basic Chance Principle, and (3) the Humean Principle. These principles seem mutually incompatible. At least, no extant account of chance meets more than one of them. I offer an account of chance which meets all three: L*-chance. So the good news is that L*-chance meets (1)–(3). The bad news is that L*-chance turns out unlawful and unstable. But perhaps this is not such (...) bad news: L*-chance turns out to at least approximate plausible additional core principles concerning lawfulness and stability. And perhaps there is better news: one may treat ‘chance’ as vague, in a way that allows every core principle of chance to be met. 1 Introduction 2 Chance principles 3 Chance principals 4 Principled chance? 5 Unprincipled chance? 6 Principled chances. (shrink)

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Causation, says David Lewis now, is to be understood as the ancestral of counterfactual influence, where C influences E (roughly) iff little changes in C map onto big changes in E. I argue that the influence account provides neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for causation, and suggest that what is missing is the notion of effluence, or physical connection.

The classic version of the relevant alternatives theory (RAT) identifies knowledge with the elimination of relevant alternatives (Dretske 1981, Stine 1976, Lewis 1996, inter alia). I argue that the RAT is trapped by the problem of the missed clue, in which the subject sees but does not appreciate decisive information.

This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from an off-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Please visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.

This article references the following linked citations. If you are trying to access articles from an off-campus location, you may be required to first logon via your library web site to access JSTOR. Please visit your library's website or contact a librarian to learn about options for remote access to JSTOR.

Does G. E. Moore know that he has hands? Yes, says the dogmatist: Moore’s hands are right before his eyes. No, says the skeptic: for all Moore knows he could be a brain-in-a-vat. Yes and no, says the contrastivist: yes, Moore knows that he has hands rather than stumps; but no, Moore does not know that he has hands rather than vat-images of hands. The dogmatist and the skeptic suppose that knowledge is a binary, categorical relation: s knows that p. (...) The contrastivist says that knowledge is a ternary, contrastive relation: s knows that p rather than q. (shrink)

Negative causation occurs when an absence serves as cause, effect, or causal intermediary. Negative causation is genuine causation, or so I shall argue. It involves no physical connection between cause and effect. Thus causes need not be physically connected to their effects.