Jonathan C.W. Edwards University College London

  • Faculty, University College London

Areas of specialization
  • None specified

Areas of interest

About me
I have recently retired from University College, following an enjoyable and productive career in biomedical science based largely on complex cellular interactions in the immune response. Since 2001 my main interest has switched to the problem of defining the cellular biophysical events that correspod to sentience. A detailed account of my approach, together with publications and online essays is at
My works
6 items found.
  1.  6
    Jonathan Edwards (2013). EM Fields and the Meaning of Meaning: Response to Johnjoe McFadden. Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (9-10):9-10.
    McFadden has recently raised several cogent points about the problems of 'Gestalt Information' and the meaning of meaning in human experience, in particular the central problem of 'binding'. Very reasonably, he has tried to resolve these problems in terms of a unified electromagnetic field. However, certain premises on which his arguments are based are open to question. Of these, two deserve particular note. The claim that individual neurons only have access to a tiny number of bits of information seems wrong, (...)
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    Alfredo Pereira Jr, J. Edwards, C. Nunn, A. Trehub & M. Velmans (2010). Understanding Consciousness: A Collaborative Attempt to Elucidate Contemporary Theories. Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (5-6):5-6.
    Nature Network Groups hosted an invited workshop on 'Theories of Consciousness' during the second semester of 2009. There were presentations by each of 15 authors active in the field, followed by debate with other presenters and invitees. A week was allocated to each of the theories proposed; general discussion threads were also opened from time to time, as seemed appropriate. We offer here an account of the principal outcomes. It can be regarded as a contemporary, 'state of the art' snapshot (...)
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    Jonathan C. W. Edwards (2008). Are Our Spaces Made of Words? Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (1):63-83.
    It is argued that both neuroscience and physics point towards a similar re-assessment of our concepts of space, time and 'reality', which, by removing some apparent paradoxes, may lead to a view which can provide a natural place for consciousness and language within biophysics. There are reasons to believe that relationships between entities in experiential space and time and in modern physicists' space and time are quite different, neither corresponding to our geometric schooling. The elements of the universe may be (...)
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  4. Michael Beaton, J. Bricklin, Louis C. Charland, J. C. W. Edwards, Ilya B. Farber, Bill Faw, Rocco J. Gennaro, C. Kaernbach, C. M. H. Nunn, Jaak Panksepp, Jesse J. Prinz, Matthew Ratcliffe, Jacob J. Ross, S. Murray, Henry P. Stapp & Douglas F. Watt (2006). Switched-on Consciousness - Clarifying What It Means - Response to de Quincey. Journal of Consciousness Studies 13 (4):7-12.
  5. Jonathan C. W. Edwards (2006). How Many People Are There in My Head and in Hers? An Exploration of Single Cell Consciousness. Exeter: Imprint Academic.
    This expands the proposal in 'Is consciousness only a property of individual cells?' to attempt to cover all relevant psychological, neuroscientific and philosophical issues. Some of the material is now dated (in 2011) but chiefly in the sense that tentative proposals have become firmer views for me. An example of this is the clarification of complementarities in "Are our spaces made of words?'.
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    Jonathan C. W. Edwards (2005). Is Consciousness Only a Property of Individual Cells? Journal of Consciousness Studies 12 (4-5):60-76.
    We perceive colour, shape, sound and touch 'bound together' in a single experience. The following arguments about this binding phenomenon are raised: (1) The individual signals passing from neurone to neurone are not bound together, whether as elements of information or physically. (2) Within a single cell, binding in terms of bringing together of information is potentially feasible. A physical substrate may also be available. (3) It is therefore proposed that a bound conscious experience must be a property of an (...)
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