Online research in philosophy

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• Faculty, University of Alberta
• PhD, University of Pittsburgh, 2006.

• None specified

• Philosophy of Biology
• Philosophy of Mind
• Philosophy of Language
• Epistemology
• Natural Sciences

My work combines the history and philosophy of biology with epistemology and the philosophy of mind and language by attempting to understand scientific practice and concept use (including its historical change) from an epistemological and semantic point of view. I am particularly interested in the field of evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) and its 19th and 20th century antecedents. My recent research includes theories of concepts, the rationality of semantic change, how the context-sensitive use of scientific terms supports successful practice, integrating different approaches and explanations in evolutionary and developmental biology, and non-reduction in biology.

29 items found. Sort by: publication yearfirst authorviewingsaddition date Ingo Brigandt, Scientific Practice, Conceptual Change, and the Nature of Concepts. The theory of concepts advanced in the present discussion aims at accounting for a) how a concept makes successful practice possible, and b) how a scientific concept can be subject to rational change in the course of history. To this end, I suggest that each scientific concept consists of three components of content: 1) the concept. Conceptual Change in Philosophy of Mind Homology in Philosophy of Biology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ualberta.ca   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt, Reference Determination and Conceptual Change. The paper discusses reference determination from the point of view of conceptual change in science. The first part of the discussion uses the homology concept, a natural kind term from biology, as an example. It is argued that the causal theory of reference gives an incomplete account of reference determination even in the case of natural kind terms. Moreover, even if descriptions of the referent are taken into account, this does not yield a satisfactory account of reference in the case (...) of the homology concept. I suggest that in addition to the factors that standard theories of reference invoke the scientific use of concepts and the epistemic interests pursued with concepts are important factors in determining the reference of scientific concepts. In the second part, I argue for a moderate holism about reference determination according to which the set of conditions that determine the reference of a concept is relatively open and different conditions may be reference fixing depending on the context in which this concept is used. It is also suggested that which features are reference determining in a particular case may depend on the philosophical interests that underlie reference ascription and the study of conceptual change. (shrink) Conceptual Change and Meaning Change in General Philosophy of Science Conceptual Change in Philosophy of Mind Causal Theories of Reference in Philosophy of Language Homology in Philosophy of Biology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ualberta.ca   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt, Author Display. The theory of concepts advanced in the dissertation aims at accounting for a) how a concept makes successful practice possible, and b) how a scientific concept can be subject to rational change in the course of history. Traditional accounts in the philosophy of science have usually studied concepts in terms only of their reference; their concern is to establish a stability of reference in order to address the incommensurability problem. My discussion, in contrast, suggests that each scientific concept consists of (...) three components of content: 1) reference, 2) inferential role, and 3) the epistemic goal pursued with the concept's use. I argue that in the course of history a concept can change in any of these three components, and that change in one component—including change of reference—can be accounted for as being rational relative to other components, in particular a concept's epistemic goal. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt, Biological Kinds and the Causal Theory of Reference. This paper uses an example from biology, the homology concept, to argue that current versions of the causal theory of reference give an incomplete account of reference determination. It is suggested that in addition to samples and stereotypical properties, the scientific use of concepts and the epistemic interests pursued with concepts are important factors in determining the reference of natural kind terms. Reference in Science in General Philosophy of Science Conceptual Change in Philosophy of Mind Homology in Philosophy of Biology Causal Theories of Reference in Philosophy of Language Natural Kinds in Metaphysics In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ualberta.ca cogprints.org papers.ssrn.com   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt, Umdl Texts Login Home. This article reviews the recent reissuing of Richard Owen’s On the Nature of Limbs and its three novel, introductory essays. These essays make Owen’s 1849 text very accessible by discussing the historical context of his work and explaining how Owen’s ideas relate to his larger intellectual framework. In addition to the ways in which the essays point to Owen’s relevance for contemporary biology, I discuss how Owen’s unity of type theory and his homology claims about fins and limbs compare with (...) modern views. While the phenomena studied by Owen are nowadays of major interest to evolutionary developmental biology, research in evo devo has largely shifted from homology (which was Owen’s concern) towards evolutionary novelty, e.g., accounting for fins as a novelty. Still, I argue that questions about homology are important and raise challenges even for explanations of novelty. (shrink) No categories In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (forthcoming). Beyond Reduction and Pluralism: Toward an Epistemology of Explanatory Integration in Biology. Erkenntnis. The paper works towards an account of explanatory integration in biology, using as a case study explanations of the evolutionary origin of novelties-a problem requiring the integration of several biological fields and approaches. In contrast to the idea that fields studying lower level phenomena are always more fundamental in explanations, I argue that the particular combination of disciplines and theoretical approaches needed to address a complex biological problem and which among them is explanatorily more fundamental varies with the problem pursued. (...) Solving a complex problem need not require theoretical unification or the stable synthesis of different biological fields, as items of knowledge from traditional disciplines can be related solely for the purposes of a specific problem. Apart from the development of genuine interfield theories, successful integration can be effected by smaller epistemic units (concepts, methods, explanations) being linked. Unification or integration is not an aim in itself, but needed for the aim of solving a particular scientific problem, where the problem's nature determines the kind of intellectual integration required. (shrink) Epistemic Contextualism in Epistemology Evolutionary Developmental Biology in Philosophy of Biology Reduction and Interlevel Relations, Misc in General Philosophy of Science Nonreductive Materialism in Philosophy of Mind Reductionism in General Philosophy of Science In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ualberta.ca philsci-archive.pitt.edu   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (forthcoming). The Epistemic Goal of a Concept: Accounting for the Rationality of Semantic Change and Variation. Synthese. The discussion presents a framework of concepts that is intended to account for the rationality of semantic change and variation, suggesting that each scientific concept consists of three components of content: 1) reference, 2) inferential role, and 3) the epistemic goal pursued with the concept’s use. I argue that in the course of history a concept can change in any of these components, and that change in the concept’s inferential role and reference can be accounted for as being rational relative (...) to the third component, the concept’s epistemic goal. This framework is illustrated and defended by application to the history of the gene concept. It is explained how the molecular gene concept grew rationally out of the classical gene concept despite a change in reference, and why the use and reference of the contemporary molecular gene concept may legitimately vary from context to context. (shrink) Semantic Theories in Philosophy of Language Classical and Molecular Genetics in Philosophy of Biology Conceptual Change and Meaning Change in General Philosophy of Science Conceptual Change in Philosophy of Mind Gene Concepts in Philosophy of Biology Theory Change in General Philosophy of Science Rationality in Epistemology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ualberta.ca philsci-archive.pitt.edu springerlink.com   | Scholar | More.. Robert A. Wilson, Matthew J. Barker & Ingo Brigandt (forthcoming). When Traditional Essentialism Fails: Biological Natural Kinds. Philosophical Topics 35(1&2). Essentialism is widely regarded as a mistaken view of biological kinds, such as species. After recounting why (sections 2-3), we provide a brief survey of the chief responses to the “death of essentialism” in the philosophy of biology (section 4). We then develop one of these responses, the claim that biological kinds are homeostatic property clusters (sections 5-6) illustrating this view with several novel examples (section 7). Although this view was first expressed 20 years ago, and has received recent discussion (...) and critique, it remains underdeveloped and is often misrepresented by its critics (section 8). (shrink) Essentialism about Species in Philosophy of Biology Essentialism in Metaphysics Biological Natural Kinds in Philosophy of Biology Natural Kinds in Metaphysics In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2010). Scientific Reasoning Is Material Inference: Combining Confirmation, Discovery, and Explanation. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 24:31-43. Whereas an inference (deductive as well as inductive) is usually viewed as being valid in virtue of its argument form, the present paper argues that scientific reasoning is material inference, i.e., justified in virtue of its content. A material inference is licensed by the empirical content embodied in the concepts contained in the premisses and conclusion. Understanding scientific reasoning as material inference has the advantage of combining different aspects of scientific reasoning, such as confirmation, discovery, and explanation. This approach explains (...) why these different aspects (including discovery) can be rational without conforming to formal schemes, and why scientific reasoning is local, i.e., justified only in certain domains and contingent on particular empirical facts. The notion of material inference also fruitfully interacts with accounts of conceptual change and psychological theories of concepts. (shrink) Concepts in Philosophy of Mind Conceptual Change and Meaning Change in General Philosophy of Science Confirmation in General Philosophy of Science Explanation in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Discovery in General Philosophy of Science Induction in General Philosophy of Science In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ualberta.ca philsci-archive.pitt.edu   | Scholar | More.. Leandro Assis & Ingo Brigandt (2009). Homology: Homeostatic Property Cluster Kinds in Systematics and Evolution. Evolutionary Biology 36:248-255. Taxa and homologues can in our view be construed both as kinds and as individuals. However, the conceptualization of taxa as natural kinds in the sense of homeostatic property cluster kinds has been criticized by some systematists, as it seems that even such kinds cannot evolve due to their being homeostatic. We reply by arguing that the treatment of transformational and taxic homologies, respectively, as dynamic and static aspects of the same homeostatic property cluster kind represents a good perspective for (...) supporting the conceptualization of taxa as kinds. The focus on a phenomenon of homology based on causal processes (e.g., connectivity, activity-function, genetics, inheritance, and modularity) and implying relationship with modification yields a notion of natural kinds conforming to the phylogenetic-evolutionary framework. Nevertheless, homeostatic property cluster kinds in taxonomic and evolutionary practice must be rooted in the primacy of epistemological classification (homology as observational properties) over metaphysical generalization (series of transformation and common ancestry as unobservational processes). The perspective of individuating characters exclusively by historical-transformational independence instead of their developmental, structural, and functional independence fails to yield a sufficient practical interplay between theory and observation. Purely ontological and ostensional perspectives in evolution and phylogeny (e.g., an ideographic character concept and PhyloCode’s ‘individualism’ of clades) may be pragmatically contested in the case of urgent issues in biodiversity research, conservation, and systematics. (shrink) Essentialism about Species in Philosophy of Biology Biological Natural Kinds in Philosophy of Biology Evolutionary Biology in Philosophy of Biology Homology in Philosophy of Biology Natural Kinds in Metaphysics In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: springerlink.com   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2009). Accounting for Vertebrate Limbs: From Owen's Homology to Novelty in Evo-Devo. Philosophy & Theory in Biology 1:e004. This article reviews the recent reissuing of Richard Owen’s On the Nature of Limbs and its three novel, introductory essays. These essays make Owen’s 1849 text very accessible by discussing the historical context of his work and explaining how Owen’s ideas relate to his larger intellectual framework. In addition to the ways in which the essays point to Owen’s relevance for contemporary biology, I discuss how Owen’s unity of type theory and his homology claims about fins and limbs compare with (...) modern views. While the phenomena studied by Owen are nowadays of major interest to evolutionary developmental biology, research in evo-devo has largely shifted from homology (which was Owen’s concern) towards evolutionary novelty, e.g., accounting for fins as a novelty. Still, I argue that questions about homology are important and raise challenges even for explanations of novelty. (shrink) Homology in Philosophy of Biology Evolutionary Biology in Philosophy of Biology In my reading list   |  Discuss this book review  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ualberta.ca   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2009). Natural Kinds in Evolution and Systematics: Metaphysical and Epistemological Considerations. Acta Biotheoretica 57:77-97. Despite the traditional focus on metaphysical issues in discussions of natural kinds in biology, epistemological considerations are at least as important. By revisiting the debate as to whether taxa are kinds or individuals, I argue that both accounts are metaphysically compatible, but that one or the other approach can be pragmatically preferable depending on the epistemic context. Recent objections against construing species as homeostatic property cluster kinds are also addressed. The second part of the paper broadens the perspective by considering (...) homologues as another example of natural kinds, comparing them with analogues as functionally defined kinds. Given that there are various types of natural kinds, I discuss the different theoretical purposes served by diverse kind concepts, suggesting that there is no clear-cut distinction between natural kinds and other kinds, such as functional kinds. Rather than attempting to offer a unique metaphysical account of ‘natural’ kind, a more fruitful approach consists in the epistemological study of how different natural kind concepts are employed in scientific reasoning. (shrink) Essentialism about Species in Philosophy of Biology Evolutionary Biology in Philosophy of Biology Natural Kinds in Metaphysics Homology in Philosophy of Biology Biological Natural Kinds in Philosophy of Biology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: philsci-archive.pitt.edu springerlink.com   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt & Alan Love, Reductionism in Biology. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Philosophy of Biology Reduction and Interlevel Relations in General Philosophy of Science In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2007). Review of Christian Sachse, Reductionism in the Philosophy of Science. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 200709. Reduction in General Philosophy of Science In my reading list   |  Discuss this book review  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2007). Typology Now: Homology and Developmental Constraints Explain Evolvability. Biology and Philosophy 22:709–725. By linking the concepts of homology and morphological organization to evolvability, this paper attempts to 1) bridge the gap between developmental and phylogenetic approaches to homology and to 2) show that developmental constraints and natural selection are compatible and in fact complementary. I conceive of a homologue as a unit of morphological evolvability, i.e., as a part of an organism that can exhibit heritable phenotypic variation independently of the organism’s other homologues. An account of homology therefore consists in explaining how (...) an organism’s developmental constitution results in different homologues/characters as units that can evolve independently of each other. The explanans of an account of homology is developmental, yet the very explanandum is an evolutionary phenomenon: evolvability in a character-by-character fashion, which manifests itself in phylogenetic patterns as recognized by phylogenetic approaches to homology. While developmental constraints and selection have often been viewed as antagonistic forces, I argue that both are complementary as they concern different parts of the evolutionary process. Developmental constraints, conceived of as the presence of the same set of homologues across phenotypic change, pertain to how heritable variation can be generated in the first place (evolvability), while natural selection operates subsequently on the produced variation. (shrink) Evolutionary Developmental Biology in Philosophy of Biology Homology in Philosophy of Biology Developmental Constraints in Philosophy of Biology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ualberta.ca papers.ssrn.com philsci-archive.pitt.edu springerlink.com   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt & Paul Griffiths (2007). The Importance of Homology for Biology and Philosophy. Biology and Philosophy 22:633–641. Editors' introduction to the special issue on homology (Biology and Philosophy Vol. 22, Issue 5, 2007). Homology in Philosophy of Biology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: papers.ssrn.com ualberta.ca paul.representinggenes.org philsci-archive.pitt.edu springerlink.com   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2006). A Theory of Conceptual Advance: Explaining Conceptual Change in Evolutionary, Molecular, and Evolutionary Developmental Biology. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh The theory of concepts advanced in the dissertation aims at accounting for a) how a concept makes successful practice possible, and b) how a scientific concept can be subject to rational change in the course of history. Traditional accounts in the philosophy of science have usually studied concepts in terms only of their reference; their concern is to establish a stability of reference in order to address the incommensurability problem. My discussion, in contrast, suggests that each scientific concept consists of (...) three components of content: 1) reference, 2) inferential role, and 3) the epistemic goal pursued with the concept's use. I argue that in the course of history a concept can change in any of these three components, and that change in one component—including change of reference—can be accounted for as being rational relative to other components, in particular a concept's epistemic goal. This semantic framework is applied to two cases from the history of biology: the homology concept as used in 19th and 20th century biology, and the gene concept as used in different parts of the 20th century. The homology case study argues that the advent of Darwinian evolutionary theory, despite introducing a new definition of homology, did not bring about a new homology concept (distinct from the pre-Darwinian concept) in the 19th century. Nowadays, however, distinct homology concepts are used in systematics/evolutionary biology, in evolutionary developmental biology, and in molecular biology. The emergence of these different homology concepts is explained as occurring in a rational fashion. The gene case study argues that conceptual progress occurred with the transition from the classical to the molecular gene concept, despite a change in reference. In the last two decades, change occurred internal to the molecular gene concept, so that nowadays this concept's usage and reference varies from context to context. I argue that this situation emerged rationally and that the current variation in usage and reference is conducive to biological practice. The dissertation uses ideas and methodological tools from the philosophy of mind and language, the philosophy of science, the history of science, and the psychology of concepts. (shrink) Philosophy of Linguistics, Miscellaneous in Philosophy of Language Conceptual Change in Philosophy of Mind Evolutionary Biology in Philosophy of Biology Evolutionary Developmental Biology in Philosophy of Biology Inferential Theories of Concepts in Philosophy of Mind Classical and Molecular Genetics in Philosophy of Biology In my reading list   |  Discuss this book  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: etd.library.pitt.edu   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2006). Philosophical Issues in Experimental Biology. Biology and Philosophy 21:423–435. Review essay of The Philosophy of Experimental Biology by Marcel Weber (Cambridge University Press, 2005). Reductive Explanation in General Philosophy of Science Scientific Discovery in General Philosophy of Science Conceptual Change in Philosophy of Mind In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ualberta.ca papers.ssrn.com springerlink.com   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2005). The Early Theoretical Development of Konrad Lorenz and the Motivating Factors Behind His Instinct Concept [La Prima Fase Dello Sviluppo Teorico Di Konrad Lorenz E I Fattori Motivanti Del Suo Concetto Di Istinto]. In M. Celentano & M. Stanzione (eds.), Konrad Lorenz cent'anni dopo: L'eredità scientifica del padre dell'etologia. The present study discusses the early theoretical development of Konrad Lorenz in the period from 1930 to 1937. In this period Lorenz developed his position on instinct in the first place, and thus his theoretical views were subject to change. Despite this change, the paper points to relatively stable features of Lorenz’s approach, which emerged relatively soon in his scientific career and guided his theoretical development in this and beyond this early phase. Evolutionary Biology in Philosophy of Biology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt, An Alternative to Kitcher's Theory of Conceptual Progress and His Account of the Change of the Gene Concept. The present paper discusses Kitcher’s framework for studying conceptual change and progress. Kitcher’s core notion of reference potential is hard to apply to concrete cases. In addition, an account of conceptual change as change in reference potential misses some important aspects of conceptual change and conceptual progress. I propose an alternative framework that focuses on the inferences and explanations supported by scientific concepts. The application of my approach to the history of the gene concept offers a better account of the (...) conceptual progress that occurred in the transition from the Mendelian to the molecular gene than Kitcher’s theory. (shrink) Conceptual Change and Meaning Change in General Philosophy of Science Conceptual Change in Philosophy of Mind Genes in Philosophy of Biology Scientific Progress in General Philosophy of Science In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ualberta.ca philsci-archive.pitt.edu   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2004). Conceptual Role Semantics, the Theory Theory, and Conceptual Change. In Proceedings First Joint Conference of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology and the European Society for Philosophy and Psychology, Barcelona, Spain. The purpose of the paper is twofold. I first outline a philosophical theory of concepts based on conceptual role semantics. This approach is explicitly intended as a framework for the study and explanation of conceptual change in science. Then I point to the close similarities between this philosophical framework and the theory theory of concepts, suggesting that a convergence between psychological and philosophical approaches to concepts is possible. An underlying theme is to stress that using a non-atomist account of concepts (...) is crucial for the successful study of conceptual development and change. (shrink) Semantic Theories in Philosophy of Language Theory-Based Theories of Concepts in Philosophy of Mind Inferentialist Accounts of Meaning and Content in Philosophy of Mind Conceptual Change in Philosophy of Mind In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: phonline.org ualberta.ca cogprints.org cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk citebase.eprints.org   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2004). Holism, Concept Individuation, and Conceptual Change. In M. Hernandez Iglesias (ed.), Proceedings of the 4th Congress of the Spanish Society for Analytic Philosophy. The paper discusses concept individuation in the context of scientific concepts and conceptual change in science. It is argued that some concepts can be individuated in different ways. A particular term may be viewed as corresponding to a single concept (which is ascribed to every person from a whole scientific field). But at the same time, we can legitimately individuate in a more fine grained manner, i.e., this term can also be considered as corresponding to two or several concepts (so (...) that each of these concepts is attributed to a smaller group of persons only). The reason is that there are different philosophical and explanatory interests that underlie a particular study of the change of a scientific term. These interests determine how a concept is to be individuated; and as the same term can be subject to different philosophical studies and interests, its content can be individuated in different ways. (shrink) Conceptual Change in Philosophy of Mind Meaning Holism in Philosophy of Language In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: phonline.org ualberta.ca cogprints.org cogprints.ecs.soton.ac.uk papers.ssrn.com citebase.eprints.org   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2003). Gestalt Experiments and Inductive Observations: Konrad Lorenz's Early Epistemological Writings and the Methods of Classical Ethology. Evolution and Cognition 9:157–170. Ethology brought some crucial insights and perspectives to the study of behavior, in particular the idea that behavior can be studied within a comparative-evolutionary framework by means of homologizing components of behavioral patterns and by causal analysis of behavior components and their integration. Early ethology is well-known for its extensive use of qualitative observations of animals under their natural conditions. These observations are combined with experiments that try to analyze behavioral patterns and establish specific claims about animal behavior. Nowadays, there (...) is still disagreement about the significance of observation and experiments and their relation. (shrink) Perception and Knowledge, Misc in Philosophy of Mind In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2003). Homology in Comparative, Molecular, and Evolutionary Developmental Biology: The Radiation of a Concept. Journal of Experimental Zoology (Molecular and Developmental Evolution) 299:9-17. The present paper analyzes the use and understanding of the homology concept across different biological disciplines. It is argued that in its history, the homology concept underwent a sort of adaptive radiation. Once it migrated from comparative anatomy into new biological fields, the homology concept changed in accordance with the theoretical aims and interests of these disciplines. The paper gives a case study of the theoretical role that homology plays in comparative and evolutionary biology, in molecular biology, and in evolutionary (...) developmental biology. It is shown that the concept or variant of homology preferred by a particular biological field is used to bring about items of biological knowledge that are characteristic for this field. A particular branch of biology uses its homology concept to pursue its specific theoretical goals. (shrink) Concepts in Philosophy of Mind Evolutionary Biology in Philosophy of Biology Homology in Philosophy of Biology Evolutionary Developmental Biology in Philosophy of Biology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ualberta.ca papers.ssrn.com   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2003). Species Pluralism Does Not Imply Species Eliminativism. Philosophy of Science 70:1305–1316. Marc Ereshefsky argues that pluralism about species suggests that the species concept is not theoretically useful. It is to be abandoned in favor of several concrete species concepts that denote real categories. While accepting species pluralism, the present paper rejects eliminativism about the species category. It is argued that the species concept is important and that it is possible to make sense of a general species concept despite the existence of different concrete species concepts. Species Concepts in Philosophy of Biology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ualberta.ca papers.ssrn.com philsci-archive.pitt.edu journals.uchicago.edu   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2002). Homology and the Origin of Correspondence. Biology and Philosophy 17:389–407. Homology is a natural kind term and a precise account of what homologyis has to come out of theories about the role of homologues in evolution anddevelopment. Definitions of homology are discussed with respect to the questionas to whether they are able to give a non-circular account of thecorrespondenceor sameness referred to by homology. It is argued that standard accounts tiehomology to operational criteria or specific research projects, but are not yetable to offer a concept of homology that does not (...) presuppose a version ofhomology or a comparable notion of sameness. This is the case for phylogeneticdefinitions that trace structures back to the common ancestor as well as fordevelopmental approaches such as Wagner's biological homology concept. Incontrast, molecular homology is able to offer a definition of homology in genesand proteins that explicates homology by reference to more basic notions.Molecular correspondence originates by means of specific features of causalprocesses. It is speculated that further understanding of morphogenesis mightenable biologists to give a theoretically deeper definition of homology alongsimilar lines: an account which makes reference to the concrete mechanisms thatoperate in organisms. (shrink) Homology in Philosophy of Biology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: ualberta.ca papers.ssrn.com springerlink.com   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2001). The Homeopathy of Kin Selection: An Evaluation of Van Den Berghe's Sociobiological Approach to Ethnic Nepotism. Politics and the Life Sciences 20:203–215. The present discussion of sociobiological approaches to ethnic nepotism takes Pierre van den Berghe ʼs theory as a starting point. Two points, which have not been addressed in former analyses, are considered to be of particular importance. It is argued that the behavioral mechanism of ethnic nepotism—as understood by van den Berghe—cannot explain ethnic boundaries and attitudes. In addition, I show that van den Bergheʼs central premise concerning ethnic nepotism is in contradiction to Hamiltonʼs formula, the essential principle of kin (...) selection theory. It is further discussed how other approaches that make reference to ethnic nepotism are related to van den Bergheʼs account and its problems. I conclude with remarks on the evolutionary explanation of ethnic phenomena. (shrink) Sociobiology in Philosophy of Biology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: politicsandthelifesciences.org   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt (2001). Quantifier Elimination in Tame Infinite P-Adic Fields. Journal of Symbolic Logic 66 (3):1493-1503. We give an answer to the question as to whether quantifier elimination is possible in some infinite algebraic extensions of Qp (‘infinite p-adic fields’) using a natural language extension. The present paper deals with those infinite p-adic fields which admit only tamely ramified algebraic extensions (so-called tame fields). In the case of tame fields whose residue fields satisfy Kaplansky’s condition of having no extension of p-divisible degree quantifier elimination is possible when the language of valued fields is extended by the (...) power predicates Pn introduced by Macintyre and, for the residue field, further predicates and constants. For tame infinite p-adic fields with algebraically closed residue fields an extension by Pn predicates is sufficient. (shrink) Model Theory in Logic and Philosophy of Logic In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: jstor.org   | Scholar | More.. Ingo Brigandt, The Role a Concept Plays in Science: The Case of Homology. The present paper gives a philosophical analysis of the conceptual variation in the homology concept. It is argued that different homology concepts are used in evolutionary and comparative biology, in evolutionary developmental biology, and in molecular biology. The study uses conceptual role semantics, focusing on the inferences and explanations supported by concepts, as a heuristic tool to explain conceptual change. The differences between homology concepts are due to the fact that these concepts play different theoretical roles for different biological fields. (...) The specific theoretical needs and explanatory interests of different research approaches lead to different homology concepts. (shrink) Conceptual Change in Philosophy of Mind Homology in Philosophy of Biology In my reading list   |  Discuss this article  |  Edit  |  Categorize  |     My bibliography  |   Export citation  | Other links: philsci-archive.pitt.edu   | Scholar | More..

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