Cory D. Wright California State University, Long Beach
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  1. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (forthcoming). Varieties of Alethic Pluralism (and Why Alethic Disjunctivism is Relatively Compelling)∗. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
    The aim of this paper is to provide an overview of various forms of alethic pluralism. Along the way we will draw a number of distinctions that, hopefully, will be useful in mapping the pluralist landscape. Finally, we will argue that a commitment to alethic disjunctivism, a certain brand of pluralism, might be difficult to avoid for adherents of the other pluralist views to be discussed. We will proceed as follows: Section 1 introduces alethic monism and alethic pluralism. Section 2 (...)
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  2. C. Wright (forthcoming). Why Frege Did Not Deserve His Granum Salis. A Note on the Paradox of" The Concept House" and the Ascription of Bedeutungen to Predicates. Grazer Philosophische Studien.
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  3. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.) (2013). Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
    The relative merits and demerits of historically prominent views such as the correspondence theory, coherentism, pragmatism, verificationism, and instrumentalism have been subject to much attention in the truth literature and have fueled the long-lived debate over which of these views is the most plausible one. While diverging in their specific philosophical commitments, adherents of these historically prominent views agree in at least one fundamental respect. They are all alethic monists. They all endorse the thesis that there is only one property (...)
     
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  4. Njll Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (2013). Pluralism About Truth as Alethic Disjunctivism. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (eds.), Truth and Pluralism: Current Debates. Oxford University Press.
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  5. Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Cory D. Wright (2012). Pluralist Theories of Truth. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  6. Iris Rooij, Cory D. Wright & Todd Wareham (2012). Intractability and the Use of Heuristics in Psychological Explanations. Synthese 187 (2):471-487.
    Many cognitive scientists, having discovered that some computational-level characterization f of a cognitive capacity φ is intractable, invoke heuristics as algorithmic-level explanations of how cognizers compute f. We argue that such explanations are actually dysfunctional, and rebut five possible objections. We then propose computational-level theory revision as a principled and workable alternative.
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  7. Cory D. Wright (2012). Is Pluralism About Truth Inherently Unstable? Philosophical Studies 159 (1):89-105.
    Although it’s sometimes thought that pluralism about truth is unstable---or, worse, just a non-starter---it’s surprisingly difficult to locate collapsing arguments that conclusively demonstrate either its instability or its inability to get started. This paper exemplifies the point by examining three recent arguments to that effect. However, it ends with a cautionary tale; for pluralism may not be any better off than other traditional theories that face various technical objections, and may be worse off in facing them all.
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  8. Cory D. Wright (2012). Mechanistic Explanation Without the Ontic Conception. European Journal of Philosophy of Science 2 (3):375-394.
    The ontic conception of scientific explanation has been constructed and motivated on the basis of a putative lexical ambiguity in the term explanation. I raise a puzzle for this ambiguity claim, and then give a deflationary solution under which all ontically-rendered talk of explanation is merely elliptical; what it is elliptical for is a view of scientific explanation that altogether avoids the ontic conception. This result has revisionary consequences for New Mechanists and other philosophers of science, many of whom have (...)
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  9. Cory D. Wright (2010). Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265-283.
    Functionalists about truth employ Ramsification to produce an implicit definition of the theoretical term _true_, but doing so requires determining that the theory introducing that term is itself true. A variety of putative dissolutions to this problem of epistemic circularity are shown to be unsatisfactory. One solution is offered on functionalists' behalf, though it has the upshot that they must tread on their anti-pluralist commitments.
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  10. Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.) (2010). New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
    New Waves in Truth offers eighteen new and original research papers on truth and other alethic phenomena by twenty of the most promising young scholars working on truth today. Contributions to the volume span truth ascriptions, deflationism, realism and the correspondence theory, the value of truth, and kinds of truth and truth-apt discourse. The research programs of the contributors are beginning to reset that agenda, and each is positioned to make new waves throughout the subject.
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  11. Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (2010). New Waves in Truth. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
  12. Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.) (2010). New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
  13. Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
    When talking about truth, we ordinarily take ourselves to be talking about one-and-the-same thing. Alethic monists suggest that theorizing about truth ought to begin with this default or pre-reflective stance, and, subsequently, parlay it into a set of theoretical principles that are aptly summarized by the thesis that truth is one. Foremost among them is the invariance principle.
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  14. Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jll Pedersen (2010). Truth, Pluralism, Monism, Correspondence. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
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  15. William Bechtel & Cory D. Wright (2009). What is Psychological Explanation? In P. Calvo & J. Symons (eds.), Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. Routledge. 113--130.
    Due to the wide array of phenomena that are of interest to them, psychologists offer highly diverse and heterogeneous types of explanations. Initially, this suggests that the question "What is psychological explanation?" has no single answer. To provide appreciation of this diversity, we begin by noting some of the more common types of explanations that psychologists provide, with particular focus on classical examples of explanations advanced in three different areas of psychology: psychophysics, physiological psychology, and information-processing psychology. To analyze what (...)
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  16. Cory D. Wright (2008). Embodied Cognition: Grounded Until Further Notice? British Journal of Psychology 99:157-164.
    Embodied Cognition is the kind of view that is all trees, no forest. Mounting experimental evidence gives it momentum in fleshing out the theoretical problems inherent in Cognitivists’ separation of mind and body. But the more its proponents compile such evidence, the more the fundamental concepts of Embodied Cognition remain in the dark. This conundrum is nicely exemplified by Pecher and Zwaan’s (2005) book, Grounding Cognition, which is a programmatic attempt to rally together an array of empirical results and linguistic (...)
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  17. Ioan Muntean & Cory D. Wright (2007). Autonomous Agency, AI, and Allostasis: A Biomimetic Perspective. [REVIEW] Pragmatics and Cognition 15 (3):485-513.
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  18. Ioan Muntean & Cory D. Wright (2007). Autonomy, Allostasic Mechanisms, and AI: A Biomimetic Perspective. Pragmatics and Cognition 15:489–513.
    We argue that the concepts of mechanism and autonomy appear to be antagonistic when autonomy is conflated with agency. Once these concepts are disentangled, it becomes clearer how autonomy emerges from complex forms of control. Subsequently, current biomimetic strategies tend to focus on homeostatic regulatory systems; we propose that research in AI and robotics would do well to incorporate biomimetic strategies that instead invoke models of allostatic mechanisms as a way of understanding how to enhance autonomy in artificial systems.
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  19. Gila Sher & Cory D. Wright (2007). Truth as a Normative Modality of Cognitive Acts. In Geo Siegwart & Dirk Griemann (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. 5--280.
    Attention to the conversational role of alethic terms seems to dominate, and even sometimes exhaust, many contemporary analyses of the nature of truth. Yet, because truth plays a role in judgment and assertion regardless of whether alethic terms are expressly used, such analyses cannot be comprehensive or fully adequate. A more general analysis of the nature of truth is therefore required – one which continues to explain the significance of truth independently of the role alethic terms play in discourse. We (...)
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  20. Cory D. Wright (2007). Is Psychological Explanation Going Extinct? In Huib Looren de Jong & Maurice Schouten (eds.), The Matter of the Mind: Philosophical Essays on Psychology, Neuroscience and Reduction. Oxford: Blackwell.
    Psychoneural reductionists sometimes claim that sufficient amounts of lower-level explanatory achievement preclude further contributions from higher-level psychological research. Ostensibly, with nothing left to do, the effect of such preclusion on psychological explanation is extinction. Reductionist arguments for preclusion have recently involved a reorientation within the philosophical foundations of neuroscience---namely, away from the philosophical foundations and toward the neuroscience. In this chapter, I review a successful reductive explanation of an aspect of reward function in terms of dopaminergic operations of the mesocorticolimbic (...)
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  21. Cory D. Wright & William P. Bechtel (2007). Mechanisms and Psychological Explanation. In Paul Thagard (ed.), Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science. Elsevier.
    As much as assumptions about mechanisms and mechanistic explanation have deeply affected psychology, they have received disproportionately little analysis in philosophy. After a historical survey of the influences of mechanistic approaches to explanation of psychological phenomena, we specify the nature of mechanisms and mechanistic explanation. Contrary to some treatments of mechanistic explanation, we maintain that explanation is an epistemic activity that involves representing and reasoning about mechanisms. We discuss the manner in which mechanistic approaches serve to bridge levels rather than (...)
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  22. B. Hale, C. Wright & Gabriel Uzquiano (2006). REVIEWS-The Reason's Proper Study: Essays Toward a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 12 (2):291-293.
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  23. I. Jane, C. Wright & Peter Schotch (2005). REVIEWS-Two Articles on" Relativity". Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 11 (1):84-88.
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  24. Cory Wright (2005). Remarks on the Functionalization of Pluralism About Truth. Synthese 145 (1):1-28.
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  25. Cory D. Wright (2005). On the Functionalization of Pluralist Approaches to Truth. Synthese 145 (1):1-28.
    Traditional inflationary approaches that specify the nature of truth are attractive in certain ways; yet, while many of these theories successfully explain why propositions in certain domains of discourse are true, they fail to adequately specify the nature of truth because they run up against counterexamples when attempting to generalize across all domains. One popular consequence is skepticism about the efficaciousness of inflationary approaches altogether. Yet, by recognizing that the failure to explain the truth of disparate propositions often stems from (...)
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  26. Cory D. Wright (2005). True to Life. International Philosophical Quarterly 45 (2):271-273.
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  27. F. Kroon, E. McCann, B. C. Van Fraassen & C. Wright (2001). Boghossian, P., 1 Fine, A., 107 Grimm, SR, 171 Guleserian, T., 293. Philosophical Studies 106 (306).
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  28. C. Wright (2001). Study Note on Wittgenstein. In Crispin Wright (ed.), Rails to Infinity. Harvard University Press. 433--443.
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  29. Cory D. Wright (2000). Eliminativist Undercurrents in the New Wave Model of Psychoneural Reduction. Journal of Mind and Behavior 21 (4):413-436.
    "New wave" reductionism aims at advancing a kind of reduction that is stronger than unilateral dependency of the mental on the physical. It revolves around the idea that reduction between theoretical levels is a matter of degree, and can be laid out on a continuum between a "smooth" pole (theoretical identity) and a "bumpy" pole (extremely revisionary). It also entails that both higher and lower levels of the reductive relationship sustain some degree of explanatory autonomy. The new wave predicts that (...)
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  30. C. Wright (1998). Business Ethics and Corporate Culture. In Ian Jones & Michael G. Pollitt (eds.), The Role of Business Ethics in Economic Performance. St. Martin's Press. 191.
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  31. C. Wright & P. Clark (eds.) (1988). Mind, Psychoanalysis, and Science. Blackwell.
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