| Question | Answer | Comments | |
| A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept: yes | BonJour's "Toward a moderate rationalism" seems right to me. | |
| Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Accept: nominalism | Yes to properties (tropes), but no to universals, classes, and abstract objects. | |
| Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Lean toward: subjective | | |
| Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Accept: yes | | |
| Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: internalism | Internalism for justification, but not sure justification (so understood) is necessary for knowledge. | |
| External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Accept: non-skeptical realism | | |
| Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Lean toward: no free will | I suspect the ordinary concept (or concepts) is too much of a jumble. But some (compatibilist) replacement may do well enough. | |
| God: theism or atheism? | Lean toward: atheism | I mostly go with Hume's Philo here. | |
| Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept: rationalism | Checked, however, by that passage about "fairyland" in Hume's Inquiry | |
| Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Lean toward: invariantism | | |
| Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Accept: non-Humean | No laws, just law-statements (and powers to make them true). | |
| Logic: classical or non-classical? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
| Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Accept: externalism | | |
| Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Lean toward: moral anti-realism | I've wavered a lot on this. Might change tomorrow. | |
| Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Lean toward: naturalism | | |
| Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Accept: physicalism | Hard to answer this given that the term's meaning is contested. But I think that on at least one central understanding of the term, I'd count as a physicalist. | |
| Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Accept: cognitivism | | |
| Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
| Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Lean toward: one box | Haven't thought about this in a long time, but I recall worrying a lot about backtracking counterfactuals, which I'm told to reject, but instead just find very elusive. | |
| Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Lean toward: consequentialism | Can't get my head around the other views. | |
| Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Lean toward: qualia theory | But not if qualia are taken (by definition) to be non-physical. In any case, waver between this and representationalism. | |
| Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Accept: biological view | Animalism for the "What am I?" question. Not sure this entails the bio view of personal identity, but is certainly friendly to it. | |
| Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Insufficiently familiar with the issue | | |
| Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Lean toward: Fregean | | |
| Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Accept: scientific realism | | |
| Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Lean toward: death | | |
| Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Lean toward: B-theory | | |
| Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Accept: switch | I don't think the problem is whether you should switch in this case. (Isn't it clear you should switch?) The problem is why you should switch in this case but not switch (or push) in another case that appears the same in all morally relevant respects. (Sally Haslanger makes a similar point commenting on her own views.) | |
| Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Lean toward: correspondence | Waver between correspondence and deflationary (and suspect that there might not be a substantive difference between the two). | |
| Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Lean toward: conceivable but not metaphysically possible | | |
