My philosophical views

The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.

See also:

QuestionAnswerComments
A priori knowledge: yes or no?Accept: yesMathenatics is an example of a priori knowledge by way of empirical and praxeological suggestions.
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?Lean toward: nominalismOr better: conceptualism.
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?Accept: objectiveThey are constituted by objective relations with a living being which has enough freedom to enjoy the way in which things present themselves.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?Lean toward: yesAnalytic: analysis of concepts formed on behalf of experience.
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?Accept: externalismEcological externalism with enough room for meaning internalism.
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?Accept: non-skeptical realismThat's a perspectival, relational and pragmatic realism, which includes aesthetic and moral qualities.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?Accept: compatibilismFreedom is not so much a matter of the will (if there is such a single thing) as of thought and feeling.
God: theism or atheism?Accept: atheismReligious atheism, so God may help us.
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?Accept an intermediate viewEmpirical control of rational thought.
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?Accept: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?Lean toward: non-Humean
Logic: classical or non-classical?Accept bothLogical pluralism is a good position. Changes of logical perspectives are important, and I find classicists' self-satisfaction deplorable.
Mental content: internalism or externalism?Accept bothExternal reference with commentaries by means of internally available concepts.
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?Accept: moral realismIn accordance with relational realism.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?Lean toward: naturalismEcological, not physicalist naturalism.
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?Accept: non-physicalismIf we are speaking about mind and evaluate thoughts and desires, we are speaking in non-physical terms. If we are speaking about neural processing (and eventually care about how to improve it) we are thinking about a physical process.
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?Accept: cognitivismEmotional cognitivism.
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?Accept bothWe cannot separate internal arousal and external appeal, nor can we separate reasoning and sentiment.
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?Accept more than oneWe need deontology, care for virtue, and, of course, care for consequences.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?Lean toward: disjunctivism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?Accept more than oneI prefer not too much identity.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?Reject allAccept only fairness and common care.
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?Lean toward: MillianStressing the demonstrative component and also an implicit conceptual one: by 'John' I mean the man and not the second botton of his shirt.
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?Accept an intermediate viewScientific descriptions are not more (nor less) realistic than everyday descriptions
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?Accept: death
Time: A-theory or B-theory?Lean toward: B-theoryThe difficult thing is how to explain 'before' and 'after', so we may need also a praxeological A-theory as a complement
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?Agnostic/undecidedMoral theory must not have in offer a ready-made answer to every possible question.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?Accept: correspondenceWe should not have qualms about correspondence. We respond to reality, and mappings and matchings, paradigms of correspondence, are at least in first instance a good simile of knowledge.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?Lean toward: inconceivableBut to some degree we are all kind of zombies, and not of the smartest ones. See the first lines of Emerson's "Experience".