Ezra Heymann Universidad Central de Venezuela
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  • Faculty, Universidad Central de Venezuela
  • PhD, Universit├Ąt Heidelberg, 1977.

Areas of specialization
  • None specified

Areas of interest

My philosophical views


My philosophical views

The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.

See also:

A priori knowledge: yes or no?Accept: yesMathenatics is an example of a priori knowledge by way of empirical and praxeological suggestions.
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism?Lean toward: nominalismOr better: conceptualism.
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective?Accept: objectiveThey are constituted by objective relations with a living being which has enough freedom to enjoy the way in which things present themselves.
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no?Lean toward: yesAnalytic: analysis of concepts formed on behalf of experience.
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism?Accept: externalismEcological externalism with enough room for meaning internalism.
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism?Accept: non-skeptical realismThat's a perspectival, relational and pragmatic realism, which includes aesthetic and moral qualities.
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will?Accept: compatibilismFreedom is not so much a matter of the will (if there is such a single thing) as of thought and feeling.
God: theism or atheism?Accept: atheismReligious atheism, so God may help us.
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism?Accept an intermediate viewEmpirical control of rational thought.
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism?Accept: contextualism
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean?Lean toward: non-Humean
Logic: classical or non-classical?Accept bothLogical pluralism is a good position. Changes of logical perspectives are important, and I find classicists' self-satisfaction deplorable.
Mental content: internalism or externalism?Accept bothExternal reference with commentaries by means of internally available concepts.
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism?Accept: moral realismIn accordance with relational realism.
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism?Lean toward: naturalismEcological, not physicalist naturalism.
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism?Accept: non-physicalismIf we are speaking about mind and evaluate thoughts and desires, we are speaking in non-physical terms. If we are speaking about neural processing (and eventually care about how to improve it) we are thinking about a physical process.
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism?Accept: cognitivismEmotional cognitivism.
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism?Accept bothWe cannot separate internal arousal and external appeal, nor can we separate reasoning and sentiment.
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes?Insufficiently familiar with the issue
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics?Accept more than oneWe need deontology, care for virtue, and, of course, care for consequences.
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory?Lean toward: disjunctivism
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view?Accept more than oneI prefer not too much identity.
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism?Reject allAccept only fairness and common care.
Proper names: Fregean or Millian?Lean toward: MillianStressing the demonstrative component and also an implicit conceptual one: by 'John' I mean the man and not the second botton of his shirt.
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism?Accept an intermediate viewScientific descriptions are not more (nor less) realistic than everyday descriptions
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death?Accept: death
Time: A-theory or B-theory?Lean toward: B-theoryThe difficult thing is how to explain 'before' and 'after', so we may need also a praxeological A-theory as a complement
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch?Agnostic/undecidedMoral theory must not have in offer a ready-made answer to every possible question.
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?Accept: correspondenceWe should not have qualms about correspondence. We respond to reality, and mappings and matchings, paradigms of correspondence, are at least in first instance a good simile of knowledge.
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible?Lean toward: inconceivableBut to some degree we are all kind of zombies, and not of the smartest ones. See the first lines of Emerson's "Experience".