Joshua Schechter Brown University

  • Faculty, Brown University
  • PhD, New York University, 2006.

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14 items found.
  1.  44
    Joshua Schechter (forthcoming). Explanatory Challenges in Metaethics. In Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. Routledge
    There are several important arguments in metaethics that rely on explanatory considerations. Gilbert Harman has presented a challenge to the existence of moral facts that depends on the claim that the best explanation of our moral beliefs does not involve moral facts. The Reliability Challenge against moral realism depends on the claim that moral realism is incompatible with there being a satisfying explanation of our reliability about moral truths. The purpose of this chapter is to examine these and related arguments. (...)
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  2.  41
    Joshua Schechter (forthcoming). Internalism and Entitlement to Rules and Methods. In Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen & Peter J. Graham (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford University Press
    There are several arguments for internalist theses concerning our justification to employ rules of inference (and belief-forming methods more generally). In this paper, I discuss three such arguments – one based on simple cases, one based on a general conception of epistemic responsibility, and one based on our intuitive reactions to skeptical scenarios. I argue that none of these arguments is successful. Along the way, I argue that there are belief-forming methods that thinkers are epistemically entitled to employ – that (...)
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  3.  86
    Joshua Schechter (forthcoming). No Need for Excuses: Against Knowledge-First Epistemology and the Knowledge Norm of Assertion. In J. Adam Carter, Emma Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge-First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford University Press
  4. Joshua Schechter (2013). Could Evolution Explain Our Reliability About Logic? In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 4. 214.
    We are reliable about logic in the sense that we by-and-large believe logical truths and disbelieve logical falsehoods. Given that logic is an objective subject matter, it is difficult to provide a satisfying explanation of our reliability. This generates a significant epistemological challenge, analogous to the well-known Benacerraf-Field problem for mathematical Platonism. One initially plausible way to answer the challenge is to appeal to evolution by natural selection. The central idea is that being able to correctly deductively reason conferred a (...)
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  5. Joshua Schechter (2013). Deductive Reasoning. In Hal Pashler (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Mind. SAGE Reference
    Deductive reasoning is the kind of reasoning in which, roughly, the truth of the input propositions (the premises) logically guarantees the truth of the output proposition (the conclusion), provided that no mistake has been made in the reasoning. The premises may be propositions that the reasoner believes or assumptions that the reasoner is exploring. Deductive reasoning contrasts with inductive reasoning, the kind of reasoning in which the truth of the premises need not guarantee the truth of the conclusion.
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  6. Joshua Schechter (2013). Rational Self-Doubt and the Failure of Closure. Philosophical Studies 163 (2):428-452.
    Closure for justification is the claim that thinkers are justified in believing the logical consequences of their justified beliefs, at least when those consequences are competently deduced. Many have found this principle to be very plausible. Even more attractive is the special case of Closure known as Single-Premise Closure. In this paper, I present a challenge to Single-Premise Closure. The challenge is based on the phenomenon of rational self-doubt – it can be rational to be less than fully confident in (...)
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  7.  92
    Joshua Schechter (2011). Juxtaposition: A New Way to Combine Logics. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):560-606.
    This paper develops a new framework for combining propositional logics, called "juxtaposition". Several general metalogical theorems are proved concerning the combination of logics by juxtaposition. In particular, it is shown that under reasonable conditions, juxtaposition preserves strong soundness. Under reasonable conditions, the juxtaposition of two consequence relations is a conservative extension of each of them. A general strong completeness result is proved. The paper then examines the philosophically important case of the combination of classical and intuitionist logics. Particular attention is (...)
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  8. Joshua Schechter (2011). Weakly Classical Theories of Identity. Review of Symbolic Logic 4 (4):607-644.
    There are well-known quasi-formal arguments that identity is a "strict" relation in at least the following three senses: (1) There is a single identity relation and a single distinctness relation; (2) There are no contingent cases of identity or distinctness; and (3) There are no vague or indeterminate cases of identity or distinctness. However, the situation is less clear cut than it at first may appear. There is a natural formal theory of identity that is very close to the standard (...)
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  9.  58
    Joshua Schechter (2010). Review of Grounding Concepts by C. S. Jenkins. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2010 (5).
  10. Joshua Schechter (2010). The Reliability Challenge and the Epistemology of Logic. Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):437-464.
    We think of logic as objective. We also think that we are reliable about logic. These views jointly generate a puzzle: How is it that we are reliable about logic? How is it that our logical beliefs match an objective domain of logical fact? This is an instance of a more general challenge to explain our reliability about a priori domains. In this paper, I argue that the nature of this challenge has not been properly understood. I explicate the challenge (...)
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  11. David Enoch & Joshua Schechter (2008). How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):547–579.
    In this paper, we develop an account of the justification thinkers have for employing certain basic belief-forming methods. The guiding idea is inspired by Reichenbach's work on induction. There are certain projects in which thinkers are rationally required to engage. Thinkers are epistemically justified in employing any belief-forming method such that "if it doesn't work, nothing will" for successfully engaging in such a project. We present a detailed account based on this intuitive thought and address objections to it. We conclude (...)
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  12. Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter (2007). Hawthorne's Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief. Philosophical Issues 17 (1):1020-122.
    In the first chapter of his Knowledge and Lotteries, John Hawthorne argues that thinkers do not ordinarily know lottery propositions. His arguments depend on claims about the intimate connections between knowledge and assertion, epistemic possibility, practical reasoning, and theoretical reasoning. In this paper, we cast doubt on the proposed connections. We also put forward an alternative picture of belief and reasoning. In particular, we argue that assertion is governed by a Gricean constraint that makes no reference to knowledge, and that (...)
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  13. Joshua Schechter & David Enoch (2006). Meaning and Justification: The Case of Modus Ponens. Noûs 40 (4):687 - 715.
    In virtue of what are we justified in employing the rule of inference Modus Ponens? One tempting approach to answering this question is to claim that we are justified in employing Modus Ponens purely in virtue of facts concerning meaning or concept-possession. In this paper, we argue that such meaning-based accounts cannot be accepted as the fundamental account of our justification.
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  14.  79
    Joshua Schechter, Luck, Rationality, and Explanation.
    Expanded version of a commentary on Adam Elga's "Lucky to be Rational" delivered at the 2008 Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference.
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