Jim Stone University of New Orleans
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  • Faculty, University of New Orleans
  • PhD, University of Colorado, Boulder, 82.

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  1. Jim Stone (forthcoming). Virtueless Knowledge. Philosophical Studies:1-7.
    This paper argues that reliabilist virtue epistemology is mistaken. Descartes supposes a supremely powerful deceiver is determined to trick him into believing falsehoods. Beliefs Descartes cannot rationally doubt, even allowing the demon’s best efforts, count as indubitable knowledge. I give an instance of indubitable knowledge and argue that it is not attributable to an epistemic competence. Since not all knowledge is virtuous, knowledge cannot be identified with virtuous true belief.
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  2. Jim Stone (2013). 'Unlucky' Gettier Cases. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94 (3):421-430.
    This article argues that justified true beliefs in Gettier cases often are not true due to luck. I offer two ‘unlucky’ Gettier cases, and it's easy enough to generate more. Hence even attaching a broad ‘anti-luck’ codicil to the tripartite account of knowledge leaves the Gettier problem intact. Also, two related questions are addressed. First, if epistemic luck isn't distinctive of Gettier cases, what is? Second, what do Gettier cases reveal about knowledge?
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  3. JIm Stone (2011). CORNEA, Scepticism and Evil. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (1):59-70.


    The Principle of Credulity: 'It is basic to human knowledge of the world that we believe things are as they seem to be in the absence of positive evidence to the contrary' [Swinburne 1996: 133]. This underlies the Evidential Problem of Evil, which goes roughly like this: ‘There appears to be a lot of suffering, both animal and human, that does not result in an equal or greater utility. So there's probably some pointless suffering. As God's existence precludes pointless suffering, (...)
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  4. Jim Stone (2010). Counterpart Theory V. The Multiverse: Reply to Watson. Analysis 71 (1):96-100.
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  5. Jim Stone (2010). Harry Potter and the Spectre of Imprecision. Analysis 70 (4):638-644.
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  6. Jim Stone (2009). Moderate Monism: Reply to Noonan and Mackie. Analysis 69 (1):91-95.
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  7. Jim Stone (2009). Trumping the Causal Influence Account of Causation. Philosophical Studies 142 (2):153 - 160.
    Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example.
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  8. Jim Stone (2009). Why Counterpart Theory and Modal Realism Are Incompatible. Analysis 69 (4):650-653.
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  9. Jim Stone (2008). Review of" Mindsight". [REVIEW] Essays in Philosophy 9 (2):3.
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  10. Jim Stone (2007). Contextualism and Warranted Assertion. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):92–113.
    Contextualists offer "high-low standards" practical cases to show that a variety of knowledge standards are in play in different ordinary contexts. These cases show nothing of the sort, I maintain. However Keith DeRose gives an ingenious argument that standards for knowledge do go up in high-stakes cases. According to the knowledge account of assertion (Kn), only knowledge warrants assertion. Kn combined with the context sensitivity of assertability yields contextualism about knowledge. But is Kn correct? I offer a rival account of (...)
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  11. Jim Stone (2007). Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism: A Reply to Eagle. Analysis 67 (295):263–267.
  12. Jim Stone (2007). Persons Are Not Made of Temporal Parts. Analysis 67 (1):7–11.
  13. Jim Stone (2007). Pascal's Wager and the Persistent Vegetative State. Bioethics 21 (2):84–92.
    I argue that a version of Pascal's Wager applies to the persistent vegetative state with sufficient force that it ought to part of advance directives.
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  14. Jim Stone (2005). Counterpart Theory and Three-Dimensionalism: A Reply. Analysis 65 (288):325–329.
  15. Jim Stone (2005). Why Counterpart Theory and Three-Dimensionalism Are Incompatible. Analysis 65 (Jan):24-27.
  16. Jim Stone (2005). Why Counterpart Theory and Four-Dimensionalism Are Incompatible. Analysis 65 (288):329–333.
  17. Jim Stone (2005). Why There Still Are No People. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (1):174-191.
    This paper argues that there are no people. If identity isn't what matters in survival, psychological connectedness isn't what matters either. Further, fissioning cases do not support the claim that connectedness is what matters. I consider Peter Unger's view that what matters is a continuous physical realization of a core psychology. I conclude that if identity isn't what matters in survival, nothing matters. This conclusion is deployed to argue that there are no people. Objections to Eliminativism are considered, especially that (...)
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  18. Theodore Sider, Against Vague Existence, Jim Stone & Evidential Atheism (2003). Learned to Stop Worrying and Let the Children Drown 1–22 Jonathan Schaffer/Overdetermining Causes 23–45 Sharon Ryan/Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief 47–79 Sarah Mcgrath/Causation and the Making/Allowing. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 114:293-294.
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  19. Jim Stone (2003). Evidential Atheism. Philosophical Studies 114 (3):253 - 277.
    Here is a new version of the Evidential Problem of Evil.
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  20. Jim Stone (2003). On Staying the Same. Analysis 63 (4):288–291.
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  21. Jim Stone (2002). Why Sortal Essentialism Cannot Solve Chrysippus’s Puzzle. Analysis 62 (275):216–223.
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  22. Jim Stone (2001). A Theory of Religion Revised. Religious Studies 37 (2):177-189.
    A (revised) account of what all and only religions have in common in virtue of which they are religions.
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  23. Jim Stone (2001). Timothy Fitzgerald the Ideology of Religious Studies. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). Pp. XI+276. $45.00. 0 19 512072. [REVIEW] Religious Studies 37 (2):223-246.
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  24. Jim Stone (2001). What is It Like to Have an Unconscious Mental State? Philosophical Studies 104 (2):179-202.
    HOST is the theory that to be conscious of a mental state is totarget it with a higher-order state (a `HOS'), either an innerperception or a higher-order thought. Some champions of HOSTmaintain that the phenomenological character of a sensory stateis induced in it by representing it with a HOS. I argue that thisthesis is vulnerable to overwhelming objections that flow largelyfrom HOST itself. In the process I answer two questions: `What isa plausible sufficient condition for a quale's belonging to aparticular (...)
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  25. Jim Stone (2000). Review of Eric Olson: 'The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology '. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (No. 2):495-497.
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  26. Jim Stone (2000). Skepticism as a Theory of Knowledge. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (3):527-545.
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  27. Jim Stone (2000). The Human Animal. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 60 (2):495-497.
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  28. Jim Stone (1998). Free Will as a Gift From God: A New Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):257-81.
    I argue that God could give us the robust power to do other than we do in a deterministic universe.
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  29. Jim Stone (1998). Free Will as a Gift From God: A New Compatibilism. Philosophical Studies 92 (3):257-281.
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  30. Jim Stone (1995). Abortion as Murder?: A Response. Journal of Social Philosophy 26 (1):129-146.
    I argue that people who believe fetuses have the same moral right to life as the rest of us have sufficient reasons to refuse to classify abortion as legal murder and to refuse to punish abortion as severely as legal murder.
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  31. Jim Stone (1995). Potentiality and Possibilia: A Reply to Jokic. Journal of Social Philosophy 26 (3):139-141.
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  32. Jim Stone (1994). Advance Directives, Autonomy and Unintended Death. Bioethics 8 (3):223–246.
    Advance directives typically have two defects. First, most advance directives fail to enable people to effectively avoid unwanted medical intervention. Second, most of them have the potential of ending your life in ways you never intended, years before you had to die.
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  33. Jim Stone (1994). Games and Family Resemblances. Philosophical Investigations 17 (No. 2): 435-443.
    An account of the feature all games share in virtue of which they are games.
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  34. Jim Stone (1994). Why Potentiality Still Matters. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 24 (2):281 - 293.
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  35. Jim Stone (1993). Cogito Ergo Sum. Journal of Philosophy 60 (9):462-468.
  36. Jim Stone, Ron Amundson, Jonathan Bennett, Joram Graf Haber, Lina Levit Haber, Jack Nass, Bernard H. Baumrin, Sarah W. Emery, Frank B. Dilley, Marilyn Friedman, Christina Sommers & Alan Soble (1992). Letters to the Editor. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 65 (5):87 - 99.
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  37. Jim Stone (1991). A Theory of Religion. Religious Studies 27 (3):337-351.
    An account of what all and only religions share in virtue of which they are religions.
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  38. Jim Stone (1989). Anselm's Proof. Philosophical Studies 57 (1):79 - 94.
  39. Jim Stone (1988). Parfit and the Buddha: Why There Are No People. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (March):519-32.
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  40. Jim Stone (1987). Why Potentiality Matters. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (December):815-829.
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  41. Jim Stone (1984). Dreaming and Certainty. Philosophical Studies 45 (May):353-368.
    I argue that being wide awake is an epistemic virtue which enables me to recognize immediately that I'm wide awake. Also I argue that dreams are imaginings and that the wide awake mind can immediately discern the difference between imaginings and vivid sense experience. Descartes need only pinch himself.
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  42. Jim Stone (1983). Abortion and the Control of Human Bodies. Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (1):77-85.
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  43. J. Stone (1981). Hume on Identity : A Defense. Philosophical Studies 40 (2):275 - 282.
  44. Jim Stone (1981). Hume on Identity: A Defense. Philosophical Studies 40 (2):275 - 282.
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