Matti Eklund Uppsala Universitet
Contact
  • No contact info.

Affiliations
  • Faculty, Uppsala Universitet
  • PhD, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2000.

Areas of specialization
  • None specified

Areas of interest

blank
About me
Not much to say..
My works
73 items found.
Sort by:
  1. Matti Eklund, Evaluative Language and Evaluative Reality.
  2. Matti Eklund (forthcoming). Book Review. Truth. Alexis Burgess and John Burgess. [REVIEW] History and Philosophy of Logic.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Matti Eklund (forthcoming). Review of Vagueness in Context, by Stewart Shapiro. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Matti Eklund (2014). Rayo's Metametaphysics. 57 (4):483-497.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. M. Eklund (2013). Williams on the Normative Silence of Indeterminacy. Analysis 73 (2):264-271.
    In his recent Analysis article (2012), Robert Williams considers two puzzles relating to indeterminacy. On the basis of these puzzles, he defends a seemingly radical view on the normative role of indeterminacy. He speaks of indeterminacy as ‘normatively silent’. There are two ways of understanding the view that Williams defends. On one understanding, the view ends up being indistinguishable from one of the more traditional views Williams rejects, the view that phenomena of different kinds fall under the umbrella level ‘indeterminacy’. (...)
    Direct download (10 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Matti Eklund (2013). Carnap's Metaontology. Noûs 47 (2):229-249.
  7. Matti Eklund (2013). Metaphysical Vagueness and Metaphysical Indeterminacy. Metaphysica 14 (2):165-179.
    The topic of this paper is whether there is metaphysical vagueness. It is shown that it is important to distinguish between the general phenomenon of indeterminacy and the more narrow phenomenon of vagueness (the phenomenon that paradigmatically rears its head in sorites reasoning). Relatedly, it is important to distinguish between metaphysical indeterminacy and metaphysical vagueness. One can wish to allow metaphysical indeterminacy but rule out metaphysical vagueness. As is discussed in the paper, central argument against metaphysical vagueness, like those of (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Matti Eklund (2013). Trends and Progress in Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 44 (3):276-292.
    This article is in three parts. The first discusses trends in philosophy. The second defends reliance on intuitions in philosophy from some doubts that have recently been raised. The third discusses Philip Kitcher's contention that contemporary analytic philosophy does not have its priorities straight. While the three parts are independent, there is a common theme. Each part defends what is regarded as orthodoxy from attacks. Of course there are other reasonable challenges to philosophical methodology. The article's aim is just to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Matti Eklund (2012). Alternative Normative Concepts. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):139-157.
  10. Matti Eklund (2012). Multitude, Tolerance and Language-Transcendence. Synthese 187 (3):833-847.
    Rudolf Carnap's 1930s philosophy of logic, including his adherence to the principle of tolerance, is discussed. What theses did Carnap commit himself to, exactly? I argue that while Carnap did commit himself to a certain multitude thesis—there are different logics of different languages, and the choice between these languages is merely a matter of expediency—there is no evidence that he rejected a language-transcendent notion of fact, contrary to what Warren Goldfarb and Thomas Ricketts have prominently argued. (In fact, it is (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Matti Eklund (2011). 4. Being Metaphysically Unsettled. In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. 6--149.
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Matti Eklund (2011). Being Metaphysically Unsettled: Barnes and WIlliams on Metaphysical Indeterminacy and Vagueness. In Karen Bennett & Dean Zimmerman (eds.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics Vol. 6. Oxford University Press. 6.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  13. Matti Eklund (2011). Book Review. Quantifier Variance and Realism: Essays in Metaontology. Eli Hirsch. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Review.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  14. Matti Eklund (2011). Recent Work on Vagueness. Analysis 71 (2):352-363.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  15. Matti Eklund (2011). Truth. History and Philosophy of Logic 33 (1):106 - 108.
    History and Philosophy of Logic, Volume 33, Issue 1, Page 106-108, February 2012.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  16. Matti Eklund (2011). The Philosophy of Philosophy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):752-754.
    The second volume in the Blackwell Brown Lectures in Philosophy, this volume offers an original and provocative take on the nature and methodology of philosophy. Based on public lectures at Brown University, given by the pre-eminent philosopher, Timothy Williamson Rejects the ideology of the 'linguistic turn', the most distinctive trend of 20th century philosophy Explains the method of philosophy as a development from non-philosophical ways of thinking Suggests new ways of understanding what contemporary and past philosophers are doing.
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  17. Matti Eklund (2011). What Are Thick Concepts? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (1):25-49.
    Many theorists hold that there is, among value concepts, a fundamental distinction between thin ones and thick ones. Among thin ones are concepts like good and right. Among concepts that have been regarded as thick are discretion, caution, enterprise, industry, assiduity, frugality, economy, good sense, prudence, discernment, treachery, promise, brutality, courage, coward, lie, gratitude, lewd, perverted, rude, glorious, graceful, exploited, and, of course, many others. Roughly speaking, thick concepts are value concepts with significant descriptive content. I will discuss a number (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  18. Matti Eklund (2010). Book Review. The Philosophy of Philosophy. Timothy Williamson. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88:752-4.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  19. Matti Eklund, Fictionalism. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  20. Matti Eklund (2010). Rejectionism About Truth. In Cory D. Wright & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), New Waves in Truth. Palgrave Macmillan.
    I think it often happens, for various reasons, that philosophers defend radical views which, first, are too radical to be plausible, and second, are such that a less radical and more plausible view would satisfy the underlying motivations. Here is a historical example. The logical positivists famously sought to eliminate traditional metaphysics by arguing that the statements metaphysicians make are meaningless because of being unverifiable. Much of the ensuing discussion concerned whether verifiability is really necessary for meaningfulness. But clearly, even (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  21. Matti Eklund (2010). Vagueness and Second-Level Indeterminacy. In Richard Dietz & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Cuts and Clouds: Vaguenesss, its Nature and its Logic. Oup Oxford.
    My theme here will be vagueness. But first recall Quine’s arguments for the indeterminacy of translation and the inscrutability of reference. (I will presume these arguments to be familiar.) If Quine is right, then there are radically different acceptable assignments of semantic values to the expressions of any language: different assignments of semantic values that for all that is determined by whatever it is that determines semantic value are all acceptable, and all equally good. Quine even argued that the indeterminacy (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  22. Matti Eklund (2009). Bad Company and Neo-Fregean Philosophy. Synthese 170 (3):393 - 414.
    A central element in neo-Fregean philosophy of mathematics is the focus on abstraction principles, and the use of abstraction principles to ground various areas of mathematics. But as is well known, not all abstraction principles are in good standing. Various proposals for singling out the acceptable abstraction principles have been presented. Here I investigate what philosophical underpinnings can be provided for these proposals; specifically, underpinnings that fit the neo-Fregean's general outlook. Among the philosophical ideas I consider are: general views on (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  23. Matti Eklund (2009). Carnap and Ontological Pluralism. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford University Press. 130--56.
    My focus here will be Rudolf Carnap’s views on ontology, as these are presented in the seminal “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950). I will first describe how I think Carnap’s distinction between external and internal questions is best understood. Then I will turn to broader issues regarding Carnap’s views on ontology. With certain reservations, I will ascribe to Carnap an ontological pluralist position roughly similar to the positions of Eli Hirsch and the later Hilary Putnam. Then I turn to some (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  24. Matti Eklund (2009). On Some Recent Criticisms of the 'Linguistic' Approach to Ontology. Dialectica 63 (3):313-323.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  25. Matti Eklund (2009). Reality and Thought. In John Shand (ed.), Central Issues of Philosophy. Wiley-Blackwell.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  26. Matti Eklund (2009). The Frege–Geach Problem and Kalderon's Moral Fictionalism. Philosophical Quarterly 59 (237):705-712.
    Mark Eli Kalderon has argued for a fictionalist variant of non-cognitivism. On his view, what the Frege–Geach problem shows is that standard non-cognitivism proceeds uncritically from claims about use to claims about meaning; if non-cognitivism's claims were solely about use it would be on safe ground as far as the Frege–Geach problem is concerned. I argue that Kalderon's diagnosis is mistaken: the problem concerns the non-cognitivist's account of the use of moral sentences too.
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  27. Matti Eklund (2008). Book Review. Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy. Heather Dyke. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  28. Matti Eklund (2008). Deconstructing Ontological Vagueness. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38 (1):117-140.
    I will here present a number of problems concerning the idea that there is ontological vagueness, and the related claim that appeal to this idea can help solve some vagueness-related problems. A theme underlying the discussion will be the distinction between vagueness specifically and indeterminacy more generally (and, relatedly, the distinction between ontological vagueness and ontological indeterminacy). Even if the world is somehow ontologically indeterminate it by no means follows that it is, properly speaking, ontologically vague.1..
    Direct download (9 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  29. Matti Eklund (2008). Putnam on Ontology. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 95 (1):203-222.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  30. Matti Eklund (2008). Review of Heather Dyke, Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2008 (11).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  31. Matti Eklund (2008). The Picture of Reality as an Amorphous Lump. In Theodore Sider, John Hawthorne & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Metaphysics. Blackwell Pub.. 382--96.
    (1) Abstract objects. The nominalist (as the label is used today) denies that there exist abstract objects. The platonist holds that there are abstract objects. One example is numbers. The nominalist denies that there are numbers; the platonist typically affirms it.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  32. Matti Eklund (2007). Book Review. Identity and Modality. Fraser MacBride. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  33. Matti Eklund (2007). Characterizing Vagueness. Philosophy Compass 2 (6):896–909.
    Philosophy Compass 2: 896-909. (Link to Philosophy Compass.).
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  34. Matti Eklund (2007). Meaning-Constitutivity. Inquiry 50 (6):559-574.
  35. Matti Eklund (2007). Review of Fraser MacBride (Ed.), Identity and Modality. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (3).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  36. Matti Eklund (2007). The Liar Paradox, Expressibility, Possible Languages. In J. C. Beall (ed.), Revenge of the Liar: New Essays on the Paradox. Oxford University Press.
    Here is the liar paradox. We have a sentence, (L), which somehow says of itself that it is false. Suppose (L) is true. Then things are as (L) says they are. (For it would appear to be a mere platitude that if a sentence is true, then things are as the sentence says they are.) (L) says that (L) is false. So, (L) is false. Since the supposition that (L) is true leads to contradiction, we can assert that (L) is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  37. Matti Eklund (2007). The Ontological Significance of Inscrutability. Philosophical Topics 35 (1-2):115-134.
    I shall here discuss some matters related to the so-called radical indeterminacy or inscrutability arguments due to, e.g., Willard v. O. Quine, Hilary Putnam, John Wallace and Donald Davidson.1 These are arguments that, on the face of it, demonstrate that there is radical indeterminacy in what the expressions in a theory refer to and in what the ontology of the theory is. I will use “inscrutability argument” as a general label for these arguments. My main topic – after I have (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  38. David Liebesman & Matti Eklund (2007). Sider on Existence. Noûs 41 (3):519–528.
    In (2001), (2003), and elsewhere, Ted Sider presents two arguments concerning the existential quantifier which are justly central to the recent discussion of metaontology. What we will call Sider's indeterminacy argument is an attempted reductio of the suggestion that the existential quantifier might be semantically indeterminate. What we will call Sider's naturalness argument is an argument for the claim that the semantic value of the existential quantifier is the most eligible existence-like meaning there is, à la David Lewis' eligibility theory (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  39. Matti Eklund (2006). Book Review. Vagueness in Context. Stewart Shapiro. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  40. Matti Eklund (2006). Finzione, indifferenza e ontologia. Rivista di Estetica 46 (32):71-92.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  41. Matti Eklund (2006). Neo-Fregean Ontology. Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):95–121.
    Neo-Fregeanism in the philosophy of mathematics consists of two main parts: the logicist thesis, that mathematics (or at least branches thereof, like arithmetic) all but reduce to logic, and the platonist thesis, that there are abstract, mathematical objects. I will here focus on the ontological thesis, platonism. Neo-Fregeanism has been widely discussed in recent years. Mostly the discussion has focused on issues specific to mathematics. I will here single out for special attention the view on ontology which underlies the neo-Fregeans’ (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  42. Matti Eklund (2006). Review of Stewart Shapiro, Vagueness in Context. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (5).
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  43. Matti Eklund (2006). Semantica e ontologia-Finzione, indifferenza e ontologia. Rivista di Estetica 32:71.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  44. Matti Eklund (2006). Schiffer on Vagueness. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 87 (1):12–23.
    I go through, and criticize, Stephen Schiffer's account of vagueness and the sorites paradox. I discuss his notion of a happy-face solution to a paradox, his appeal to vagueness-related partial belief, his claim that indeterminacy is a psychological notion, and his view that the sorites premise and the inference rule of modus ponens are indeterminate.
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  45. Matti Eklund (2006). The Liar Paradox and Metaphysics. In Jurgis Skilters & Matti Eklund (eds.), Paradox: Logical, Cognitive and Communicative Aspects (Proceedings of the First International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication). University of Latvia Press.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  46. Matti Eklund (2006). Metaontology. Philosophy Compass 1 (3):317-334.
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  47. Jurgis Skilters & Matti Eklund (eds.) (2006). Paradox: Logical, Cognitive and Communicative Aspects (Proceedings of the First International Symposium of Cognition, Logic and Communication). University of Latvia Press.
    No categories
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  48. M. Eklund (2005). Atti [2002a]" Deep Inconsistency". Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80:321-331.
    No categories
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  49. Matti Eklund (2005). Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):557-579.
    When philosophers make claims of the form “Fs are fictions”, what they say is often ambiguous in a crucial way. On one way of understanding it, it has clear ontological implications: there are not really any such things as Fs. But there is also a different, non-ontological way of understanding the claim: as merely asserting that F-assertions are normally made in a fictional spirit. Clearly one can hold that we normally make statements about Fs in a fictional spirit while also (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  50. Matti Eklund (2005). Book Review. Realism and Antirealism. William Alston. [REVIEW] Dialogue 44:786-88.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  51. Matti Eklund (2005). Fiction, Indifference, and Ontology. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):557–579.
    In this paper I outline an alternative to hermeneutic fictionalism, an alternative I call indifferentism, with the same advantages as hermeneutic fictionalism with respect to ontological issues but avoiding some of the problems that face fictionalism. The difference between indifferentism and fictionalism is this. The fictionalist about ordinary utterances of a sentence S holds, with more orthodox views, that the speaker in some sense commits herself to the truth of S. It is only that for the fictionalist this is truth (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  52. Matti Eklund (2005). Realism and Antirealism. Dialogue 44 (4):786-788.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  53. Matti Eklund (2005). Realism and Antirealism Edited by William P. Alston Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002, Viii + 303 Pp. [REVIEW] Dialogue 44 (04):786-.
    No categories
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  54. Matti Eklund (2005). What Vagueness Consists In. Philosophical Studies 125 (1):27-60.
    The main question of the paper is that ofwhat vagueness consists in. This question must be distinguished from other questions about vagueness discussed in the literature. It is argued that familiar accounts of vagueness for general reasons failto answer the question ofwhat vagueness consists in. A positive view is defended, according to which, roughly, the vagueness of an expression consists in it being part ofsemantic competence to accept a tolerance principle for the expression. Since tolerance principles are inconsistent, this is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  55. Matti Eklund (2004). Book Review. Liars and Heaps. J.C. Beall. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  56. Matti Eklund (2004). Book Review. Saving the Difference. Crispin Wright. [REVIEW] Philosophical Review 113:288-92.
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  57. Matti Eklund (2004). Personal Identity, Concerns, and Indeterminacy. The Monist 87 (4):489-511.
    Let the moral question of personal identity be the following: what is the nature of the entities we should focus our prudential concerns and ascriptions of responsibility around? (If indeed we should structure these things around any entities at all.) Let the semantic question of personal identity be the question of what is the nature of the entities that ‘person’ is true of. A naive (in the sense of simple and intuitive) view would have it that the two questions are (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  58. Matti Eklund (2004). Review of J.C. Beall (Ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2004 (7).
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  59. Matti Eklund (2004). Saving the Differences: Essays on Themes From Truth and Objectivity. Philosophical Review 113 (2):288-292.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  60. Matti Eklund (2004). Saving the Differences. Philosophical Review 113 (2):288-292.
    No categories
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  61. Eric Barnes, Neither Truth Nor Empirical Adequacy Explain, Matti Eklund, Deep Inconsistency, Barbara Montero, Harold Langsam, Self-Knowledge Externalism, Christine McKinnon Desire-Frustration, Moral Sympathy & Josh Parsons (2002). INDEX for Volume 80, 2002. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (4):545-548.
    No categories
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  62. Matti Eklund (2002). Deep Inconsistency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):321 – 331.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  63. Matti Eklund (2002). Inconsistent Languages. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-275.
  64. Matti Eklund (2002). Inconsistent Languages. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2):251-75.
    The main thesis of this paper is that we sometimes are disposed to accept false and even jointly inconsistent claims by virtue of our semantic competence, and that this comes to light in the sorites and liar paradoxes. Among the subsidiary theses are that this is an important source of indeterminacy in truth conditions, that we must revise basic assumptions about semantic competence, and that classical logic and bivalence can be upheld in the face of the sorites paradox.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  65. Matti Eklund (2002). Personal Identity and Conceptual Incoherence. Noûs 36 (3):465-485.
  66. Matti Eklund (2002). Peter Van Inwagen on Material Beings. Ratio 15 (3):245–256.
    Peter van Inwagen's book Material Beings is centered on the special composition question: the question of when some simples constitute a complex object. Van Inwagen's answer to this question is that simples only constitute a complex object when they constitute an organism. I argue that van Inwagen's reasoning in favor of this conclusion is unconvincing, and also that the significance of the special composition question itself is doubtful.
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  67. Matti Eklund & Daniel Kolak (2002). Is Hintikka's Logic First-Order? Synthese 131 (3):371 - 388.
    Jaakko Hintikka has argued that ordinary first-order logic should be replaced byindependence-friendly first-order logic, where essentially branching quantificationcan be represented. One recurring criticism of Hintikka has been that Hintikka''ssupposedly new logic is equivalent to a system of second-order logic, and henceis neither novel nor first-order. A standard reply to this criticism by Hintikka andhis defenders has been to show that given game-theoretic semantics, Hintikka''sbranching quantifiers receive the exact same treatment as the regular first-orderones. We develop a different reply, based around (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  68. Matti Eklund (2001). A Vindication of Tarski's Claim About the Liar Paradox. In Timothy Childers & Ondrej Majer (eds.), The Logica Yearbook. Filosofia.
    Translate to English
    |
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  69. Matti Eklund (2001). Supervaluationism, Vagueifiers, and Semantic Overdetermination. Dialectica 55 (4):363–378.
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  70. Matti Eklund (2000). The Aims of Logical Empiricism As a Philosophy of Science. Acta Analytica 15 (25):137-59.
    According to the received view on logical empiricism, the logical empiricists were involved in the same project as Popper, Lakatos and Kuhn: a project of describing actual scientific method and (with the exception of Kuhn) prescribing methodological rules for scientists. Even authors who seek to show that the logical empiricists were not as simpleminded as widely believed agree with this assumption. I argue that the received view has it wrong.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  71. Matti Eklund (1996). On How Logic Became First-Order. Nordic Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (2):147-67.
    Added by a category editor--not an official abstract. -/- Discusses the history (and reasons for the history) implicit in the title, as well as the author's view on same.
    Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  72. Matti Eklund, Reply to Beall and Priest.
    In my ‘Deep Inconsistency’ (2002a) (henceforth DI), I criticized Graham Priest’s dialetheism by unfavorably comparing it to my preferred view on the liar paradox, a view I will here call the meaning–inconsistency view. Perhaps the main claim in Jc Beall and Priest’s reply (henceforth B&P)1 is that I am guilty of an ignoratio: in DI, I argue that Priest (1987) fails to establish the analyticity of certain principles, but, B&P say, Priest (1987) isn’t concerned to argue for the analyticity (...)
    Translate to English
    | Direct download  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  73. Matti Eklund, Regress, Unity, Facts, and Propositions.
    §1. Here is a familiar regress argument: Take the fact that Ed runs. What is the nature of this fact? If we think ‘runs’ stands for a property, the property of running (call it Running), then, arguably, Ed and this property are constituents of this fact. But the fact cannot simply consist of Ed and Running. For Ed can exist and Running can exist even if Ed doesn’t run. For it to be a fact that Ed runs, Ed must instantiate (...)
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
Is this list right?