- Faculty, University of Colorado, Boulder
- PhD, University of Illinois, Chicago, 1996.
Areas of specialization
Areas of interest
My philosophical views
I work primarily in philosophy of mind and the philosophical foundations of cognitive science. But, I've also written papers in philosophy of science (on laws of nature), metaphysics (on properties), and epistemology (on naturalism and the a priori).
- Robert D. Rupert, Extended Cognition, Extended Selection, and Developmental Systems Theory.
- Robert D. Rupert, Embodied Knowledge, Conceptual Change, and the A Priori; or, Justification, Revision, and the Ways Life Could Go.
- Robert D. Rupert, Individual Minds as Groups, Group Minds as Individuals.
- Robert D. Rupert, Keeping HEC in CHEC.
- R. D. Rupert (forthcoming). Review of Embodiment and Cognitive Science by Raymond Gibbs. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews.
- Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Critical Study of Andy Clark's Supersizing the Mind. Journal of Mind and Behavior.
- Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Causal Theories of Intentionality. In Hal Pashler (ed.), The Encyclopedia of the Mind. Sage
- Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Enactivism and Cognitive Science: Triple Review of J. Stewart, O. Gapenne, and E. A. Di Paolo (Eds.), Enaction: Towards a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science; Anthony Chemero, Radical Embodied Cognitive Science; and Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind”. Mind.
- Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). Embodiment, Consciousness, and Neurophenomenology: Embodied Cognitive Science Puts the (First) Person in Its Place. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
- Robert D. Rupert (forthcoming). The Sufficiency of Objective Representation. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. Routledge
- Robert D. Rupert (2016). Enaction: Toward a New Paradigm for Cognitive Science, Edited by John Stewart, Olivier Gapenne, and Ezequiel A. Di Paolo.Radical Embodied Cognitive Science, by Anthony Chemero.The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology, by Mark Rowlands. [REVIEW] Mind 125 (497):209-228.
- Bryce Huebner & Robert D. Rupert (2014). Massively Representational Minds Are Not Always Driven by Goals, Conscious or Otherwise. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2):145-146.
- Robert D. Rupert (2014). Necessity Is Unnecessary: A Response to Bradley. Noûs 48 (3):558-564.
- Robert D. Rupert (2014). The Functionalist's Body. Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 2:258-268.
- Robert D. Rupert (2013). Memory, Natural Kinds, and Cognitive Extension; or, Martians Don't Remember, and Cognitive Science Is Not About Cognition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):25-47.
- Robert D. Rupert (2011). Cognitive Systems and the Supersized Mind. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 152 (3):427 - 436.
- Robert D. Rupert (2011). Empirical Arguments for Group Minds: A Critical Appraisal. Philosophy Compass 6 (9):630-639.
- Robert D. Rupert (2011). Embodiment, Consciousness, and the Massively Representational Mind. Philosophical Topics 39 (1):99-120.
- Robert D. Rupert (2011). On the Scientific Unity of Concepts. Metascience 20 (1):147-151.
- Robert D. Rupert (2011). Review of Mark Rowlands, The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (3).
- Robert D. Rupert (2010). LOT 2: The Language of Thought Revisited. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):559-562.
- Robert D. Rupert (2010). Representation in Extended Cognitive Systems : Does the Scaffolding of Language Extend the Mind? In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press
- Robert D. Rupert (2010). Systems, Functions, and Intrinsic Natures: On Adams and Aizawa's The Bounds of Cognition. [REVIEW] Philosophical Psychology 23 (1):113-123.
- D. Rupert Robert (2009). Cognitive Systems and the Extended Mind. OUP Usa.
- Robert D. Rupert (2009). Innateness and the Situated Mind. In P. Robbins & M. Aydede (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge University Press 96--116.
- Robert D. Rupert (2008). Ceteris Paribus Laws, Component Forces, and the Nature of Special-Science Properties. Noûs 42 (3):349-380.
- Robert D. Rupert (2008). Causal Theories of Mental Content. Philosophy Compass 3 (2):353–380.
- Robert D. Rupert (2008). Frege’s Puzzle and Frege Cases: Defending a Quasi-Syntactic Solution. Cognitive Systems Research 9:76-91.
- Robert D. Rupert (2008). The Causal Theory of Properties and the Causal Theory of Reference, or How to Name Properties and Why It Matters. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3):579 - 612.
- Robert D. Rupert (2007). Realization, Completers, and Ceteris Paribus Laws in Psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (1):1-11.
- Robert D. Rupert (2007). Review of J. T. Ismael, The Situated Self. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (10).
- Robert D. Rupert (2006). Functionalism, Mental Causation, and the Problem of Metaphysically Necessary Effects. Noûs 40 (2):256-83.
- Robert D. Rupert (2006). Review of Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., Embodiment and Cognitive Science. [REVIEW] Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2006 (8).
- Robert D. Rupert (2005). Minding One's Cognitive Systems: When Does a Group of Minds Constitute a Single Cognitive Unit? Episteme 1 (3):177-188.
- Robert D. Rupert (2004). Challenges to the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition. Journal of Philosophy 101 (8):389-428.
- Robert D. Rupert (2001). Coining Terms In The Language of Thought. Journal of Philosophy 98 (10):499-530.
- Robert D. Rupert (2000). Dispositions Indisposed: Semantic Atomism and Fodor's Theory of Content. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81 (3):325-349.
- Robert D. Rupert (1999). Mental Representations and Millikan's Theory of Intentional Content: Does Biology Chase Causality? Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (1):113-140.
- Robert D. Rupert (1999). The Best Test Theory of Extension: First Principle(S). Mind and Language 14 (3):321–355.
- Robert D. Rupert (1998). On the Relationship Between Naturalistic Semantics and Individuation Criteria for Terms in a Language of Thought. Synthese 117 (1):95-131.
- Robert D. Rupert, Against Group Cognitive States.
- Robert D. Rupert, Embodied Functionalism and Inner Complexity: Simon’s 21st-Century Mind.
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