Jonathan Way University of Southampton
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  • Faculty, University of Southampton
  • PhD, University of California at Santa Barbara, 2008.

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  • None specified

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  1. Jonathan Way (forthcoming). Intentions, Akrasia, and Mere Permissibility. Organon F.
    Something is wrong with akrasia, means-end incoherence, and intention inconsistency. This observation has lead many philosophers to postulate 'wide-scope' requirements against these combinations of attitudes. But some philosophers have argued that this is unwarranted. They claim that we can explain what is wrong with these combinations of attitudes by appealing only to plausible independent claims about reasons for particular beliefs and intentions. In this paper, I argue that these philosophers may well be right about akrasia but that they are wrong (...)
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  2. Jonathan Way (2013). Instrumental Rationality. In Tim Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philsophy. Routledge.
    This is a short introductory article. I focus on three questions: What is instrumental rationality? What are the principles of instrumental rationality? Could instrumental rationality be all of practical rationality?
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  3. Jonathan Way (2013). Morality and the Emotions. Edited by Carla Bagnoli. (Oxford UP, 2011. Pp. Vi + 304. Price £37.50.). [REVIEW] Philosophical Quarterly 63 (252):610-612.
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  4. Jonathan Way (2013). Value and Reasons to Favour. Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.
  5. Mark Schroeder, Jonathan Way, Gregg Strauss, Tim Willenken, Matthew Talbert, Angela M. Smith, James A. Montmarquet, Nicole Hassoun, Virginia Held & Nicholas Wolterstorff (2012). 10. Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness Robert S. Taylor, Reconstructing Rawls: The Kantian Foundations of Justice as Fairness (Pp. 632-637). [REVIEW] Ethics 122 (3).
     
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  6. Jonathan Way (2012). Explaining the Instrumental Principle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):487-506.
    The Wide-Scope view of instrumental reason holds that you should not intend an end without also intending what you believe to be the necessary means. This, the Wide-Scoper claims, provides the best account of why failing to intend the believed means to your end is a rational failing. But Wide-Scopers have struggled to meet a simple Explanatory Challenge: why shouldn't you intend an end without intending the necessary means? What reason is there not to do so? In the first half (...)
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  7. Jonathan Way (2012). Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason. Ethics 122 (3):489-515.
    According to fitting-attitudes accounts of value, the valuable is what there is sufficient reason to value. Such accounts face the famous wrong kind of reason problem. For example, if an evil demon threatens to kill you unless you value him, it may appear that you have sufficient reason to value the demon, although he is not valuable. One solution to this problem is to deny that the demon’s threat is a reason to value him. It is instead a reason to (...)
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  8. Jonathan Way (2011). The Symmetry of Rational Requirements. Philosophical Studies 155 (2):227-239.
    Some irrational states can be avoided in more than one way. For example, if you believe that you ought to A you can avoid akrasia by intending to A or by dropping the belief that you ought to A. This supports the claim that some rational requirements are wide-scope. For instance, the requirement against akrasia is a requirement to intend to A or not believe that you ought to A. But some writers object that this Wide-Scope view ignores asymmetries between (...)
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  9. Jonathan Way (2010). Defending the Wide-Scope Approach to Instrumental Reason. Philosophical Studies 147 (2):213 - 233.
    The Wide-Scope approach to instrumental reason holds that the requirement to intend the necessary means to your ends should be understood as a requirement to either intend the means, or else not intend the end. In this paper I explain and defend a neglected version of this approach. I argue that three serious objections to Wide-Scope accounts turn on a certain assumption about the nature of the reasons that ground the Wide-Scope requirement. The version of the Wide-Scope approach defended here (...)
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  10. Jonathan Way (2010). The Normativity of Rationality. Philosophy Compass 5 (12):1057-1068.
    This article is an introduction to the recent debate about whether rationality is normative – that is, very roughly, about whether we should have attitudes which fit together in a coherent way. I begin by explaining an initial problem – the “detaching problem” – that arises on the assumption that we should have coherent attitudes. I then explain the prominent “wide-scope” solution to this problem, and some of the central objections to it. I end by considering the options that arise (...)
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  11. Jonathan Way (2009). Two Accounts of the Normativity of Rationality. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy.
    Recent views of reasons and rationality make it plausible that it can sometimes be rational to do what you have no reason to do. A number of writers have concluded that if this is so, rationality is not normative. But this is a mistake. Even if we assume a tight connection between reasons and normativity, the normativity of rationality does not require that there is always reason to be rational. The first half of this paper illustrates this point with reference (...)
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  12. Jonathan Way (2007). Self-Knowledge and the Limits of Transparency. Analysis 67 (295):223–230.
    A number of recent accounts of our first-person knowledge of our attitudes give a central role to transparency - our capacity to answer the question of whether we have an attitude by answering the question of whether to have it. In this paper I raise a problem for such accounts, by showing that there are clear cases of first-person knowledge of attitudes which are not transparent.
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  13. Jonathan Way, Reasons and Rationality.
    Philosophers have long been interested in the relationship between reasons and the requirements of morality. Do we all have reason to do what morality requires? For instance, do I have reason to keep my promises, help the poor, and refrain from harming others, even if doing these things would serve neither my desires nor interests? Quite apart from their independent interest, these questions have deep implications for meta-ethics. For it is widely held that there is a constitutive connection between reasons (...)
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  14. Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way, Broome on Reasoning.
    Among the many important contributions of John Broome’s Rationality Through Reasoning is an account of what reasoning is and what makes reasoning correct. In this paper we raise some problems for both of these accounts and recommend an alternative approach.
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