The answers shown here are not necessarily the same provided as part of the 2009 PhilPapers Survey. These answers can be updated at any time.
Question | Answer | Comments | |
A priori knowledge: yes or no? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Abstract objects: Platonism or nominalism? | Accept: nominalism | Antirealism? That's a bit different in taste to nominalism (as far as it is understood around here). | |
Aesthetic value: objective or subjective? | Accept an intermediate view | Depends on our species... but not really subjective. Can be subject of objective science. | |
Analytic-synthetic distinction: yes or no? | Lean toward: no | | |
Epistemic justification: internalism or externalism? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
External world: idealism, skepticism, or non-skeptical realism? | Accept: skepticism | But you might remember what Wittgenstein said about solipsism, right? Actually I don't find many reasonable differences between skepticism and realism ;-) | |
Free will: compatibilism, libertarianism, or no free will? | Accept: compatibilism | | |
God: theism or atheism? | Accept: atheism | | |
Knowledge: empiricism or rationalism? | Accept: empiricism | | |
Knowledge claims: contextualism, relativism, or invariantism? | Reject all | Now that demands a paper! Too bad I won't be doing that soon ;] | |
Laws of nature: Humean or non-Humean? | Agnostic/undecided | | |
Logic: classical or non-classical? | Accept both | Why would I choose? Depends on the reason we employ logic. | |
Mental content: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: internalism | | |
Meta-ethics: moral realism or moral anti-realism? | Accept: moral anti-realism | | |
Metaphilosophy: naturalism or non-naturalism? | Lean toward: naturalism | | |
Mind: physicalism or non-physicalism? | Lean toward: physicalism | | |
Moral judgment: cognitivism or non-cognitivism? | Lean toward: cognitivism | | |
Moral motivation: internalism or externalism? | Lean toward: internalism | | |
Newcomb's problem: one box or two boxes? | Accept: one box | | |
Normative ethics: deontology, consequentialism, or virtue ethics? | Lean toward: consequentialism | | |
Perceptual experience: disjunctivism, qualia theory, representationalism, or sense-datum theory? | Accept another alternative | | |
Personal identity: biological view, psychological view, or further-fact view? | Accept an intermediate view | | |
Politics: communitarianism, egalitarianism, or libertarianism? | Lean toward: libertarianism | | |
Proper names: Fregean or Millian? | Lean toward: Fregean | | |
Science: scientific realism or scientific anti-realism? | Lean toward: scientific anti-realism | | |
Teletransporter (new matter): survival or death? | Accept: death | | |
Time: A-theory or B-theory? | Accept: B-theory | | |
Trolley problem (five straight ahead, one on side track, turn requires switching, what ought one do?): switch or don't switch? | Lean toward: switch | I think I've mentioned I'm consequentialist rather than anything else :-) | |
Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic? | Accept another alternative | I think it's worth a paper sometime, actually. | |
Zombies: inconceivable, conceivable but not metaphysically possible, or metaphysically possible? | Accept: conceivable but not metaphysically possible | If zombies are about mental states... there's no mental states that are untied with material realisations (as long as you ask me). | |