Julien Deonna University of Geneva
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  • Faculty, University of Geneva

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33 items found.
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  1. Emma Dayer-Tieffenbach & Julien Deonna (eds.) (forthcoming). Dictionnaire des valeurs. Edition D’Ithaque.
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  2. J. Deonna & F. Lauria (eds.) (forthcoming). The Nature of Desire. Oxford University Press.
     
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  3. Julien Deonna & Emma Tieffenbach (eds.) (forthcoming). Dictionnaire des Valeurs. Edition D’Ithaque.
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  4. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (forthcoming). Getting Bodily Feelings Into Emotional Experience in the Right Way. Emotion Review.
    We argue that the main objections against two central tenets of a Jamesian account of the emotions, i.e. that (1) different types of emotions are associated with specific types of bodily feelings (Specificity), and that (2) emotions are constituted by patterns of bodily feeling (Constitution), do not succeed. In the first part, we argue that several reasons adduced against Specifity, including one inspired by Schachter and Singer’s work, are unconvincing. In the second part, we argue that Constitution, too, can withstand (...)
     
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  5.  37
    Florian Cova, Julien Deonna & David Sander (2015). Introduction: Moral Emotions. Topoi 34 (2):397-400.
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  6.  47
    Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2015). Emotions as Attitudes. Dialectica 69 (3):293-311.
    In this paper, we develop a fresh understanding of the sense in which emotions are evaluations. We argue that we should not follow mainstream accounts in locating the emotion–value connection at the level of content and that we should instead locate it at the level of attitudes or modes. We begin by explaining the contrast between content and attitude, a contrast in the light of which we review the leading contemporary accounts of the emotions. We next offer reasons to think (...)
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  7. Julien Deonna, Christine Tappolet & Fabrice Teroni (2015). Emotions: Philosophical Issues About. WIREs Cognitive Science 1:193-207.
    We start this overview by discussing the place of emotions within the broader affective domain – how different are emotions from moods, sensations and affective dispositions? Next, we examine the way emotions relate to their objects, emphasizing in the process their intimate relations to values. We move from this inquiry into the nature of emotion to an inquiry into their epistemology. Do they provide reasons for evaluative judgements and, more generally, do they contribute to our knowledge of values? We then (...)
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  8.  6
    David Sander, Julien Deonna, Florian Cova & Anna Marmodoro (2015). Untimely Reviews. Topoi 34 (2):539-539.
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  9.  24
    Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (2015). Value and Emotion. In Tobias Brosch & David Sander (eds.), The Handbook of Value. Oxford University Press 155-174.
    What is the role of emotions in elucidating the nature of value? For example, should dangerousness be understood in term of the fear response? What is the role of emotions in our getting access to values? For example, what may be the role of fear in becoming aware that a given animal is dangerous? What value do emotions have? For example, is fear of special value because it helps behaving appropriately towards its object? We shall take up these three questions (...)
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  10.  18
    Rupert Brown, Jesse Allpress, Roger Giner Sorolla, Julien Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2014). Two Faces of Shame: Moral Shame and Image Shame Differently Predict Positive and Negative Responses to Ingroup Wrongdoing. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 40 (10):1270-1284.
    This article proposes distinctions between guilt and two forms of shame: Guilt arises from a violated norm and is characterized by a focus on specific behavior; shame can be characterized by a threatened social image (Image Shame) or a threatened moral essence (Moral Shame). Applying this analysis to group-based emotions, three correlational studies are reported, set in the context of atrocities committed by (British) ingroup members during the Iraq war (Ns = 147, 256, 399). Results showed that the two forms (...)
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  11.  99
    Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (2014). In What Sense Are Emotions Evaluations? In Cain Todd & Sabine Roeser (eds.), Emotion and Value. Oxford 15-31.
    In this chapter, we first introduce the idea that emotions are evaluations. Next, we explore two approaches attempting to account for this idea in terms of attitudes that are alleged to become emotional when taking evaluative contents. According to the first approach, emotions are evaluative judgments. According to the second, emotions are perceptual experiences of evaluative properties. We explain why this theory remains unsatisfactory insofar as it shares with the evaluative judgement theory the idea that emotions are evaluations in virtue (...)
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  12. Florian Cova & Julien Deonna (2013). Being Moved. Philosophical Studies (3):1-20.
    In this paper, we argue that, barring a few important exceptions, the phenomenon we refer to using the expression “being moved” is a distinct type of emotion. In this paper’s first section, we motivate this hypothesis by reflecting on our linguistic use of this expression. In section two, pursuing a methodology that is both conceptual and empirical, we try to show that the phenomenon satisfies the five most commonly used criteria in philosophy and psychology for thinking that some affective episode (...)
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  13.  22
    Florian Cova, Julien Deonna & David Sander (2013). The Emotional Shape of Our Moral Life: Anger-Related Emotions and Mutualistic Anthropology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (1):86 - 87.
    The evolutionary hypothesis advanced by Baumard et al. makes precise predictions on which emotions should play the main role in our moral lives: morality should be more closely linked to emotions (like contempt and disgust) than to emotions (like anger). Here, we argue that these predictions run contrary to most psychological evidence.
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  14.  27
    Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2013). What Role for Emotions in Well-Being? Philosophical Topics 41 (1):123-142.
    It is striking that for each major theory of well-being, there exists a companion theory of the emotions. Thus, to classical hedonic views of well-being, there corresponds no less classical pure feeling views of the emotions; to desire views that conceive of well-being in terms of desire satisfaction, there corresponds a variety of theories approaching the emotions in terms of the satisfaction/frustration of desires; and finally, to so called objective list theories of well-being, there corresponds a variety of theories that (...)
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  15.  53
    Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2012). From Justified Emotions to Justified Evaluative Judgements. Dialogue 51 (1):55-77.
    ABSTRACT: Are there justified emotions? Can they justify evaluative judgements? We first explain the need for an account of justified emotions by emphasizing that emotions are states for which we have or lack reasons. We then observe that emotions are explained by their cognitive and motivational bases. Considering cognitive bases first, we argue that an emotion is justified if and only if the properties the subject is aware of constitute an instance of the relevant evaluative property. We then investigate the (...)
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  16.  62
    Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2011). The Emotions: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.
    The emotions are at the centre of our lives and, for better or worse, imbue them with much of their significance. The philosophical problems stirred up by the existence of the emotions, over which many great philosophers of the past have laboured, revolve around attempts to understand what this significance amounts to. Are emotions feelings, thoughts, or experiences? If they are experiences, what are they experiences of? Are emotions rational? In what sense do emotions give meaning to what surrounds us? (...)
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  17.  38
    Julien Deonna, Fabrice Teroni & Raffaele Rodogno (2011). In Defense of Shame. Oxford University Press.
    Is shame social? Is it superficial? Is it a morally problematic emotion? Researchers in disciplines as different as psychology, philosophy, and anthropology have thought so. But what is the nature of shame and why are claims regarding its social nature and moral standing interesting and important? Do they tell us anything worthwhile about the value of shame and its potential legal and political applications? -/- In this book, Julien Deonna, Raffaele Rodogno, and Fabrice Teroni propose an original philosophical account of (...)
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  18.  28
    Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (2011). Is Shame a Social Emotion? In Anita Konzelmann Ziv, Keith Lehrer & Hans Bernard Schmid (eds.), Self-Evaluation: Affective and Social Grounds of Intentionality. Springer 193-212.
    In this article, we present, assess and give reasons to reject the popular claim that shame is essentially social. We start by presenting several theses which the social claim has motivated in the philosophical literature. All of them, in their own way, regard shame as displaying a structure in which "others" play an essential role. We argue that while all these theses are true of some important families of shame episodes, none of them generalize so as to motivate the conclusion (...)
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  19. Julien A. Deonna & Klaus R. Scherer (2010). The Case of the Disappearing Intentional Object: Constraints on a Definition of Emotion. Emotion Review 2 (1):44-52.
    Taking our lead from Solomon’s emphasis on the importance of the intentional object of emotion, we review the history of repeated attempts to make this object disappear. We adduce evidence suggesting that in the case of James and Schachter, the intentional object got lost unintentionally. By contrast, modern constructivists seem quite determined to deny the centrality of the intentional object in accounting for the occurrence of emotions. Griffiths, however, downplays the role objects have in emotion noting that these do not (...)
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  20.  45
    Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2009). Taking Affective Explanations to Heart. Social Science Information 48 (3):359-377.
    In this article, the authors examine and debate the categories of emotions, moods, temperaments, character traits and sentiments. They define them and offer an account of the relations that exist among the phenomena they cover. They argue that, whereas ascribing character traits and sentiments (dispositions) is to ascribe a specific coherence and stability to the emotions (episodes) the subject is likely to feel, ascribing temperaments (dispositions) is to ascribe a certain stability to the subject's moods (episodes). The rationale for this (...)
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  21. Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (2009). The Self of Shame. In Mikko Salmela & Verena Mayer (eds.), Emotions, Ethics, and Authenticity. John Benjamins 33-50.
    The evaluations involved in shame are, intuitively at least, of many different sorts. One feels ashamed when seen by others doing something one would prefer doing alone (social shame). One is ashamed because of one’s ugly nose (shame about permanent traits). One feels ashamed of one’s dishonest behavior (moral shame), etc. The variety of evaluations in shame is striking; and it is even more so if one takes a cross-cultural perspective on this emotion. So the difficulty – the “unity problem” (...)
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  22.  10
    Fabrice Teroni & Julien A. Deonna (2009). L'intentionnalité des Émotions: Du Corps aux Valeurs. Revue Européenne des Sciences Sociales 47 (144):25-41.
  23. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2008). Differentiating Shame From Guilt. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (4):1063-1400..
    How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we (...)
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  24. Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2008). Qu’Est-Ce Qu’Une Émotion? Vrin.
    Cet ouvrage répond à la question « Qu’est-ce qu’une émotion? » à la lumière des débats les plus contemporains en philosophie des émotions tout en s’appuyant sur les recherches empiriques les plus récentes au sujet de l’affect. Une fois exposée la manière dont les émotions se distinguent d’autres phénomènes affectifs tels que les humeurs, les sentiments et les dispositions affectives, l’étude propose une élucidation originale du problème majeur auquel fait face aujourd’hui la philosophie des émotions : comment comprendre la spécificité (...)
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  25.  10
    Julien A. Deonna & Fabrice Teroni (2008). Shame's Guilt Disproved. Critical Quarterly 50 (4):65-72.
  26.  20
    F. Teroni & J. Deonna (2008). Differentiating Shame From Guilt. Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):725-740.
    How does shame differ from guilt? Empirical psychology has recently offered distinct and seemingly incompatible answers to this question. This article brings together four prominent answers into a cohesive whole. These are that (a) shame differs from guilt in being a social emotion; (b) shame, in contrast to guilt, affects the whole self; (c) shame is linked with ideals, whereas guilt concerns prohibitions and (d) shame is oriented towards the self, guilt towards others. After presenting the relevant empirical evidence, we (...)
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  27.  34
    Christine Clavien, Julien A. Deonna & Ivo Wallimann (2007). Affective Intentionality and Practical Rationality. Dialectica 61 (3):311–322.
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  28. Julien A. Deonna (2007). The Structure of Empathy. Journal of Moral Philosophy 4 (1):99-116.
    If Sam empathizes with Maria, then it is true of Sam that (1) Sam is aware of Maria's emotion, and (2) Sam ‘feels in tune’ with Maria. On what I call the transparency conception of how they interact when instantiated, I argue that these two conditions are collectively necessary and sufficient for empathy. I first clarify the ‘awareness’ and ‘feeling in tune’ conditions, and go on to examine different candidate models that explain the manner in which these two conditions might (...)
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  29.  7
    Christine Clavien, Julien Deonna & Ivo Wallimann (2006). Introduction: Emotions and Rationality in Moral Philosophy. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 2 (2):5-9.
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  30. Julien A. Deonna (2006). Emotion, Perception and Perspective. Dialectica 60 (1):29–46.
    Abstract The content of an emotion, unlike the content of a perception, is directly dependent on the motivational set of the subject experiencing the emotion. Given the instability of this motivational set, it might be thought that there is no sense in which emotions can be said to pick up information about the environment in the same way that perception does. Whereas it is admitted that perception tracks for us what is the case in the environment, no such tracking relation, (...)
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  31. Julien A. Deonna (2006). Sympathy and Empathy. In D. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Reference 9--344.
     
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  32.  52
    Julien Deonna, Christine Clavien & Ivo Wallimann-Helmer, Affective Intentionality and Practical Rationality.
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  33.  2
    Christine Clavien, Ivo Wallimann-Helmer & Julien Deonna, Introduction: Emotions and Rationality in Moral Philosophy.
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