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Forthcoming articles
  1. Olle Blomberg (forthcoming). Common Knowledge and Reductionism About Shared Agency. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    Most reductionist accounts of intentional joint action include a condition that it must be common knowledge between participants that they have certain intentions and beliefs that cause and coordinate the joint action. However, this condition has typically simply been taken for granted rather than argued for. The condition is not necessary for ensuring that participants are jointly responsible for the action in which each participates, nor for ensuring that each treats the others as partners rather than as social tools. It (...)
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  2. Nir Fresco (forthcoming). Information-How. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    The distinction between knowledge-how and knowledge-that has long been debated in the epistemological literature. This distinction can, arguably, be better understood in terms of a more fundamental distinction between information-how and information-that. Information-how is prescriptive and informs a cognitive agent about which action can be performed to achieve a particular outcome. Information-that is descriptive and informs the agent about events, objects, and states of affairs in the world. Since the latter has received more attention in the epistemological literature, this article (...)
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  3. Catherine Legg (forthcoming). An Aristotelian Realist Philosophy of Mathematics: Mathematics as the Science of Quantity and Structure, by Franklin, James. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  4. Ned Markosian (forthcoming). The Right Stuff. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    This paper argues for including stuff in one's ontology. The distinction between things and stuff is first clarified, and then three different ontologies of the physical universe are spelled out: a pure thing ontology, a pure stuff ontology, and a mixed ontology of both things and stuff. Eleven different reasons for including stuff in one's ontology are given. Then five objections to positing stuff are considered and rejected.
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  5. Kris McDaniel (forthcoming). Propositions: Individuation and Invirtuation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-12.
    The pressure to individuate propositions more finely than intensionally—that is, hyper-intensionally—has two distinct sources. One source is the philosophy of mind: one can believe a proposition without believing an intensionally equivalent proposition. The second source is metaphysics: there are intensionally equivalent propositions, such that one proposition is true in virtue of the other but not vice versa. I focus on what our theory of propositions should look like when it's guided by metaphysical concerns about what is true in virtue of (...)
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  6. Rafe McGregor (forthcoming). Narrative Representation and Phenomenological Knowledge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that narrative representations can provide knowledge in virtue of their narrativity, regardless of their truth value. I set out the question in section 1, distinguishing narrative cognitivism from aesthetic cognitivism and narrative representations from non-narrative representations. Sections 2 and 3 argue that exemplary narratives can provide lucid phenomenological knowledge, which appears to meet both the epistemic and narrativity criteria for the narrative cognitivist thesis. In section 4, I turn to non-narrative representation, focusing (...)
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  7. Robin McKenna (forthcoming). Assertion, Complexity, and Sincerity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    The target of this paper is the ‘simple’ knowledge account of assertion, according to which assertion is constituted by a single epistemic rule of the form ‘One must: assert p only if one knows p’. My aim is to argue that those who are attracted to a knowledge account of assertion should prefer what I call the ‘complex’ knowledge account, according to which assertion is constituted by a system of rules all of which are, taken together, constitutive of assertion. One (...)
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  8. Rekha Nath (forthcoming). George Sher, Equality for Inegalitarians. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    What are society’s distributive obligations to its members? The central contribution of this book lies in its novel response to this question.
     
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  9. Jonathan Schaffer (forthcoming). What Not to Multiply Without Necessity. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    The Razor commands us not to multiply entities without necessity. I argue for an alternative principle—The Laser—which commands us not to multiply fundamental entities without necessity.
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  10. Nathaniel Sharadin (forthcoming). Nothing but the Evidential Considerations? Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
    A number of philosophers have claimed that non-evidential considerations cannot play a role in doxastic deliberation as motivating reasons to believe a proposition. This claim, interesting in its own right, naturally lends itself to use in a range of arguments for a wide array of substantive philosophical theses. I argue, by way of a counterexample, that the claim to which all these arguments appeal is false. I then consider and reply to seven objections to my counterexample. Finally, as a way (...)
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  11. Tobias Wilsch (forthcoming). The Deductive-Nomological Account of Metaphysical Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    The paper explores a deductive-nomological account of metaphysical explanation: some truths metaphysically explain, or ground, another truth just in case the laws of metaphysics determine the latter truth on the basis of the former. I develop and motivate a specific conception of metaphysical laws, on which they are general rules that regulate the existence and features of derivative entities. I propose an analysis of the notion of ‘determination via the laws’, based on a restricted form of logical entailment. I argue (...)
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  12. Alex Worsnip (forthcoming). Belief, Credence, and the Preface Paradox. Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
    Many discussions of the “preface paradox” assume that it is more troubling for deductive constraints on rational belief if outright belief is reducible to credence. I show that this is an error: we can generate the problem without assuming such reducibility. All we need are some very weak normative assumptions about rational relationships between belief and credence. The only view that escapes my way of formulating the problem for the deductive closure constraint is in fact itself a reductive view: namely, (...)
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  13. Peter Balint (forthcoming). Book Note. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  14. Matt Duncan (forthcoming). I Think, Therefore I Persist. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    Suppose that you're lying in bed. You just woke up. But you're alert. Your mind is clear and you have no distractions. As you lie there, you think to yourself, ‘2 + 2 = 4.’ The thought just pops into your head. But, wanting to be sure of your mathematical insight, you once again think ‘2 + 2 = 4’, this time really meditating on your thought. Now suppose that you're sitting in an empty movie theatre. The lighting is normal (...)
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  15. Moira Gatens (forthcoming). Book Note. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  16. Nomy Arpaly (forthcoming). Consciousness and Moral Responsibility, by Neil Levy. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
  17. Hagit Benbaji (forthcoming). Why Colour Primitivism? Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    Primitivism is the view that colors are sui generis properties of physical objects. The basic insight underlying primitivism is that colours are as we see them, i.e. they are categorical properties of physical objects—simple, monadic, constant, etc.—just like shapes. As such, they determine the content of colour experience. Accepting the premise that colours are sui generis properties of physical objects, this paper seeks to show that ascribing primitive properties to objects is, ipso facto, ascribing to objects irreducible dispositions to look (...)
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  18. David Boersema (forthcoming). The Myth of Universal Human Rights: Its Origin, History, and Explanation, Along with a More Humane Way, by David N. Stamos. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  19. Craig Callender (forthcoming). Chance and Temporal Asymmetry, Edited by Alastair Wilson. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  20. Glenn Carruthers (forthcoming). Intuitions, Edited by Anthony Robert Booth and Darrell P. Rowbottom. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  21. Bridget Clarke (forthcoming). Book Note. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  22. Andrew Jason Cohen (forthcoming). The Justification of Religious Violence, by Clarke, Steve. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  23. Richard Colledge (forthcoming). Book Note. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  24. John Collins (forthcoming). Risk and Rationality, by Buchak, Lara. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  25. Christopher Cowie (forthcoming). Good News for Moral Error Theorists: A Master Argument Against Companions in Guilt Strategies. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Moral error theories are often rejected by appeal to ‘companions in guilt’ arguments. The most popular form of companions in guilt argument takes epistemic reasons for belief as a ‘companion’ and proceeds by analogy. I show that this strategy fails. I claim that the companions in guilt theorist must understand epistemic reasons as evidential support relations if her argument is to be dialectically effective. I then present a dilemma. Either epistemic reasons are evidential support relations or they are not. If (...)
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  26. Claudio de Almeida & J. R. Fett (forthcoming). Defeasibility and Gettierization: A Reminder. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    For some of us, the defeasibility theory of knowledge remains the most plausible approach to the Gettier Problem. Epistemological fashion and faded memories notwithstanding, persuasive objections to the theory are very hard to find. The most impressive of those objections to the theory that have hitherto gone unanswered are examined and rejected here. These are objections put forward by Richard Feldman, Richard Foley, and John Turri. While these are all interesting, the objection recently put forward by Turri is, we think, (...)
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  27. Helen De Cruz (forthcoming). Disagreement, by Bryan Frances. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  28. Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic (forthcoming). Physical Computation and Cognitive Science, by Nir Fresco. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  29. Phil Dowe (forthcoming). Book Note. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  30. Antony Eagle (forthcoming). Composition as Identity, Edited by A.J. Cotnoir and Donald L.M. Baxter. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
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  31. Patrick R. Frierson (forthcoming). The Virtue Epistemology of Maria Montessori. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
    This paper shows how Maria Montessori's thought can enrich contemporary virtue epistemology. After a short overview of her ‘interested empiricist’ epistemological framework, I discuss four representative intellectual virtues: sensory acuity, physical dexterity, intellectual love, and intellectual humility. Throughout, I show how Montessori bridges the divide between reliabilist and responsibilist approaches to the virtues and how her particular treatments of virtues offer distinctive and compelling alternatives to contemporary accounts. For instance, she emphasizes how sensory acuity is a virtue for which one (...)
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  32. Alberto Giubilini (forthcoming). What in the World is Moral Disgust? Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    I argue that much philosophical discussion of moral disgust suffers from two ambiguities: first, it is not clear whether arguments for the moral authority of disgust apply to disgust as a consequence of moral evaluations or instead to disgust as a moralizing emotion; second, it is not clear whether the word ‘moral’ is used in a normative or in a descriptive sense. This lack of clarity generates confusion between ‘fittingness’ and ‘appropriateness’ of disgust. I formulate three conditions that arguments for (...)
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  33. George Graham (forthcoming). Philosophical Psychopathology: Philosophy Without Thought Experiments, by Garry Young. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  34. Nicole Hassoun (forthcoming). Eternally Separated Lovers: The Argument From Love. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-11.
    A message scribbled irreverently on the mediaeval walls of the Nonberg cloister says this: ‘Neither of us can go to heaven unless the other gets in.’ It suggests an argument against the view that those who love people who suffer in hell can be perfectly happy, or even free from all suffering, in heaven. This paper considers the challenge posed by this thought to the coherence of the traditional Christian doctrine on which there are some people in hell who are (...)
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  35. Allan Hazlett (forthcoming). The Social Value of Non-Deferential Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    We often prefer non-deferential belief to deferential belief. In the last twenty years, epistemology has seen a surge of sympathetic interest in testimony as a source of knowledge. We are urged to abandon ‘epistemic individualism’ and the ideal of the ‘autonomous knower’ in favour of ‘social epistemology’. In this connection, you might think that a preference for non-deferential belief is a manifestation of vicious individualism, egotism, or egoism. I shall call this the selfishness challenge to preferring non-deferential belief. The aim (...)
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  36. Stephen Hetherington (forthcoming). Empty Ideas: A Critique of Analytic Philosophy, by Peter Unger. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  37. Torfinn Thomesen Huvenes & Andreas Stokke (forthcoming). Information Centrism and the Nature of Contexts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-14.
    Information Centrism is the view that contexts consist of information that can be characterized in terms of the propositional attitudes of the conversational participants. Furthermore, it claims that this notion of context is the only one needed for linguistic theorizing about context-sensitive languages. We argue that Information Centrism is false, since it cannot account correctly for facts about truth and reference in certain cases involving indexicals and demonstratives. Consequently, contexts cannot be construed simply as collections of shared information.
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  38. Masato Ishida (forthcoming). The Logical Structure of Kinds, by Eric Funkhouser. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  39. Marc Johansen (forthcoming). Regularity as a Form of Constraint. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    Regularity theories of causation are guided by the idea that causes are collectively sufficient for their effects. Following Mackie [1974], that idea is typically refined to distinguish collections that include redundant members from those that do not. Causes must be collectively sufficient for their effects without redundancy. While Mackie was surely right that the regularity theory must distinguish collections that are in some sense minimally sufficient for an effect from those that include unnecessary hangers-on, I believe that redundancy is the (...)
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  40. Jens Johansson (forthcoming). Review of Robert E. Goodin, On Settling (Princeton UP, 2012). [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  41. Sean Johnson (forthcoming). Morally, We Should Prefer to Exist: A Response to Smilansky. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-5.
    In a recent article [AJP, 2013], Saul Smilansky argues that our own existence is regrettable and that we should prefer not to have existed at all. I show why Smilansky's argument is fallacious, if we understand terms like ‘regrettable’ and ‘prefer’ in a straightforward non-deviant way.
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  42. Michael D. Kirchhoff (forthcoming). Species of Realization and the Free Energy Principle. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    This paper examines, for the first time, the relationship between realization relations and the free energy principle in cognitive neuroscience. I argue, firstly, that the free energy principle has ramifications for the wide versus narrow realization distinction: if the free energy principle is correct, then organismic realizers are insufficient for realizing free energy minimization. I argue, secondly, that the free energy principle has implications for synchronic realization relations, because free energy minimization is realized in dynamical agent-environment couplings embedded at multiple (...)
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  43. John Kleinig (forthcoming). Meaning and Morality: Essays on the Philosophy of Julius Kovesi, Edited by Alan Tapper and T. Brian Mooney. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  44. David Kolb (forthcoming). Self-Consciousness and the Critique of the Subject: Hegel, Heidegger, and the Poststructuralists, by Simon Lumsden. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  45. Stephen Law (forthcoming). Natural Kinds of Substance. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    This paper presents an extension of Putnam's account of how substance terms such as ‘water’ and ‘gold’ function and of how a posteriori necessary truths concerning the underlying microstructures of such kinds may be derived. The paper has three aims. I aim to refute a familiar criticism of Putnam's account: that it presupposes what Salmon calls an ‘irredeemably metaphysical, and philosophically controversial, theory of essentialism’. I show how all of the details of Putnam's account—including those that Salmon believes smuggle in (...)
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  46. Seth Lazar (forthcoming). Authorization and The Morality of War. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Why does it matter that those who fight wars be authorized by the communities on whose behalf they claim to fight? I argue that lacking authorization generates a moral cost, which counts against a war's proportionality, and that having authorization allows the transfer of reasons from the members of the community to those who fight, which makes the war more likely to be proportionate. If democratic states are better able than non-democratic states and sub-state groups to gain their community's authorization, (...)
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  47. Lisa Leininger (forthcoming). Presentism and the Myth of Passage. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Presentism is held by most to be the intuitive theory of time, due in large part to the view's supposed preservation of time's passage. In this paper, I strike a blow against presentism's intuitive pull by showing how the presentist, contrary to overwhelming popular belief, is unable to establish temporal change upon which the passage of time is based. I begin by arguing that the presentist's two central ontological commitments, the Present Thesis and the Change Thesis, are incompatible. The main (...)
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  48. Samuel Levey (forthcoming). Leibniz's Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles, by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  49. Eden Lin (forthcoming). The Subjective List Theory of Well-Being. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    A subjective list theory of well-being is one that accepts both pluralism and subjectivism. Such theories have been neglected in discussions of welfare. I argue that this is a mistake. I introduce a subjective list theory called disjunctive desire satisfactionism, and I argue that it is superior to two prominent monistic subjectivist views: desire satisfactionism and subjective desire satisfactionism. In the course of making this argument, I introduce a problem for desire satisfactionism: it cannot accommodate the fact that whenever someone (...)
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  50. Martin A. Lipman (forthcoming). Perspectival Variance and Worldly Fragmentation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    Objects often manifest themselves in incompatible ways across perspectives that are epistemically on a par. The standard response to such cases is to deny that the properties that things appear to have from different perspectives are properties that things really have out there. This type of response seems worrying: too many properties admit of perspectival variance and there are good theoretical reasons to think that such properties are genuinely instantiated. So, we have reason to explore views on which things can (...)
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  51. Simon Lumsden (forthcoming). The Bloomsbury Companion to Existentialism, Edited by Felicity Joseph, Jack Reynolds, and Ashley Woodward. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  52. Olivier Massin (forthcoming). The First Sense: A Philosophical Study of Human Touch, by Fulkerson, Matthew. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  53. Fred D. Miller Jr (forthcoming). Aristotle on the Nature of Community, by Adriel M. Trott. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  54. Rekha Nath (forthcoming). Equality for Inegalitarians, by George Sher. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
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  55. Howard Nye (forthcoming). Expressivism, Pragmatism, and Representationalism, by Huw Price. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  56. Tristram Oliver-Skuse (forthcoming). Emotion and Value, Edited by Roeser, Sabine and Cain Todd. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-1.
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  57. Sami Pihlström (forthcoming). Art and Ethics in a Material World: Kant's Pragmatist Legacy, by McMahon, Jennifer A. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  58. Katherine Ritchie (forthcoming). Can Semantics Guide Ontology? Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    Since the linguistic turn, many have taken semantics to guide ontology. Here, I argue that semantics can, at best, serve as a partial guide to ontological commitment. If semantics were to be our guide, semantic data and semantic treatments would need to be taken seriously. Through an examination of plurals and their treatments, I argue that there can be multiple, equally semantically adequate, treatments of a natural language theory. Further, such treatments can attribute different ontological commitments to a theory. Given (...)
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  59. Andrew Rotondo (forthcoming). Book Note. [REVIEW] Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
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  60. Anita Silvers (forthcoming). Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy, by Mackenzie, Catriona, Wendy Rogers, and Susan Dodds. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-3.
  61. Richard Stillman (forthcoming). Unique Best Deserver Theory and Arguments From Misclassification. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-13.
    It is a core commitment of Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism that an utterance is 1-necessary iff it is a priori. But Jeff Speaks's Argument from Misclassification proves that, on a natural interpretation, E2D assigns necessary 1-intensions to many utterances that speakers deem a posteriori. Given that 1-intensions are meant to formalize a speaker's own understanding of the words she utters, this proof raises serious difficulties for E2D. In response, Elliott, McQueen, and Weber point out that the Argument from Misclassification presupposes a controversial (...)
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  62. Weng Hong Tang (forthcoming). Reliabilism and the Suspension of Belief. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-16.
    What are the conditions under which suspension of belief—or suspension, for short—is justified? Process reliabilists hold that our beliefs are justified if and only if these are produced or sustained by reliable cognitive processes. But they have said relatively little about suspension. Perhaps they think that we may easily extend an account of justified belief to deal with justified suspension. But it's not immediately clear how we may do so; in which case, evidentialism has a distinct advantage over reliabilism. In (...)
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  63. Zhiheng Tang (forthcoming). Absence Causation and a Liberal Theory of Causal Explanation. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-18.
    For the framework of event causation—i.e. the framework according to which causation is a relation between events—absences or omissions pose a problem. Absences, it is generally agreed, are not events; so, under the framework of event causation, they cannot be causally related. But, as a matter of fact, absences are often taken to be causes or effects. The problem of absence causation is thus how to make sense of causation that apparently involves absences as causes or effects. In an influential (...)
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  64. Rosemary Twomey (forthcoming). Aristotle on Perceiving Objects, by Anna Marmodoro. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  65. Andrea C. Westlund (forthcoming). Shared Agency: A Planning Theory of Acting Together, by Michael E. Bratman. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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  66. Nick Wiltsher (forthcoming). Against the Additive View of Imagination. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    According to the additive view of sensory imagination, mental imagery often involves two elements. There is an image-like element, which gives the experiences qualitative phenomenal character akin to that of perception. There is also a non-image element, consisting of something like suppositions about the image's object. This accounts for extra-sensory features of imagined objects and situations: for example, it determines whether an image of a grey horse is an image of Desert Orchid, or of some other grey horse. The view (...)
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  67. Jack Woods (forthcoming). Impassioned Belief, by Michael Ridge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy:1-4.
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