Year:

  1. Y. Sandy Berkovski (2015). A Hobbesian Theory of Shame. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):125-150.
    On most accounts present in the literature, the complex experience of shame has the injury to self-esteem as its main component. A major objection to this idea is that it fails to differentiate between shame and disappointment in oneself. I argue that previous attempts to respond to the objection are unsatisfactory. I argue further that the distinction should refer to the different ways the subject's self-esteem is formed. A necessary requirement for shame is that the standards and values by which (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  2. Silvia Carli (2015). The Love Affair Between Philosophy and Poetry: Aristotle's Poetics and Narrative Identity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):151-177.
    In order to grasp the distinctive character of the object imitated in tragedies, Aristotle's Poetics introduces a new notion of action, which does not refer to individual ethical deeds as in the Ethics. Rather, it signifies a whole with a beginning, a middle, and an end, whose constitutive components are events. This paper argues that the notion of agents undergoes a parallel transformation in the treatise on poetry. It no longer refers exclusively to the authors of ethical deeds, but to (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  3. Jon Garthoff (2015). The Salience of Moral Character. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):178-195.
    In this essay I review an underappreciated strand of thought according to which the best Kantian moral theory has less in common with paradigmatically deontological theories and more in common with virtue theories than is standardly maintained. I then argue this program should be continued further, to provide not only a virtue-based account of moral judgment but also a virtue-based account of moral worth. I make a case that this fusion of Kantian theory with virtue theory provides the best account (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  4. Harmen Ghijsen (2015). Grounding Perceptual Dogmatism: What Are Perceptual Seemings? Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):196-215.
    Perceptual Dogmatism holds that if it perceptually seems to S that p, then S has immediate prima facie justification for the belief that p. Various philosophers have made the notion of a perceptual seeming more precise by distinguishing perceptual seemings from both sensations and beliefs to accommodate a) the epistemic difference between perceptual judgments of novices and experts, and, b) the problem of the speckled hen. Using somewhat different terminology, perceptual seemings are supposed to be high-level percepts instead of low-level (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  5. Christopher Grau (2015). McMahan on Speciesism and Deprivation. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):216-226.
    Jeff McMahan has long shown himself to be a vigorous and incisive critic of speciesism, and in his essay “Our Fellow Creatures” he has been particularly critical of speciesist arguments that draw inspiration from Wittgenstein. In this essay I consider his arguments against speciesism generally and the species-norm account of deprivation in particular. I argue that McMahan's ethical framework is more nuanced and more open to the incorporation of speciesist intuitions regarding deprivation than he himself suggests. Specifically, I argue that, (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  6. Stephen Ingram (2015). After Moral Error Theory, After Moral Realism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (2):227-248.
    Moral abolitionists recommend that we get rid of moral discourse and moral judgement. At first glance this seems repugnant, but abolitionists think that we have overestimated the practical value of our moral framework and that eliminating it would be in our interests. I argue that abolitionism has a surprising amount going for it. Traditionally, abolitionism has been treated as an option available to moral error theorists. Error theorists say that moral discourse and judgement are committed to the existence of moral (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  7. James DiFrisco (2015). Élan Vital Revisited: Bergson and the Thermodynamic Paradigm. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):54-73.
    The received view of Bergson's philosophy of life is that it advances some form of vitalism under the heading of an “élan vital.” This paper argues against the vitalistic interpretation of Bergson's élan vital as it appears in Creative Evolution in favor of an interpretation based on his overlooked reflections on entropy and energetics. Within the interpretation developed here, the élan vital is characterized not as a spiritualistic “vital force” but as a tendency of organization opposed to the tendency of (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  8. Keith Horton (2015). The Authority Account of Prudential Options. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):17-35.
    The Authority Account provides a new explanation why commonsense morality contains prudential options—options that permit agents to perform actions that promote their own wellbeing more than the action they have most reason to do, from the moral point of view. At the core of that explanation are two claims. The first is that moral requirements are traditionally widely taken to have an authoritative status; that is, to be rules that morality imposes by right. The second is that in order for (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  9. Gordon-Roth Jessica (2015). Locke on the Ontology of Persons. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):97-123.
    The importance of John Locke's discussion of persons is undeniable. Locke never explicitly tells us whether he thinks persons are substances or modes, however. We are thus left in the dark about a fundamental aspect of Locke's view. Many commentators have recently claimed that Lockean persons are modes. In this paper I swim against the current tide in the secondary literature and argue that Lockean persons are substances. Specifically I argue that what Locke says about substance, power, and agency commits (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  10. Meghan Masto (2015). Empathy and Its Role in Morality. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):74-96.
    In this paper, I will argue, contra Prinz, that empathy is a crucial component of our moral lives. In particular, I argue that empathy is sometimes epistemologically necessary for identifying the right action; that empathy is sometimes psychologically necessary for motivating the agent to perform the right action; and that empathy is sometimes necessary for the agent to be most morally praiseworthy for an action. I begin by explaining what I take empathy to be. I then discuss some alleged problems (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  11. Emily Anne Parker (2015). Singularity in Beauvoir's The Ethics of Ambiguity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):1-16.
    Though it has gone unnoticed so far in Beauvoir Studies, the term “singularity” is a technical one for Simone de Beauvoir. In the first half of the essay I discuss two reasons why this term has been obscured. First, as is well known Beauvoir has not been read in the context of the history of philosophy until recently. Second, in The Ethics of Ambiguity at least, singularité is translated both inconsistently and quite misleadingly. In the second half of the essay (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
  12. Krista K. Thomason (2015). The Moral Value of Envy. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):36-53.
    It is common to think that we would be morally better people if we never felt envy. Recently, some philosophers have rejected this conclusion by arguing that envy can often be directed toward unfairness or inequality. As such, they conclude that we should not suppress our feelings of envy. I argue, however, that these defenses only show that envy is sometimes morally permissible. In order to show that we would not be better off without envy, we must show how envy (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    My bibliography  
     
    Export citation  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues