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  1.  11
    Amy Allen (2015). Are We Driven? Critical Theory and Psychoanalysis Reconsidered. Critical Horizons 16 (4):311-328.
    If, as Axel Honneth has recently argued, critical theory needs psychoanalysis for meta-normative and explanatory reasons, this does not settle the question of which version of psychoanalysis critical theorists should embrace. In this paper, I argue against Honneth's favoured version – an intersubjectivist interpretation of Winnicott's object-relations theory – and in favour of an alternative based on the drive-theoretical work of Melanie Klein. Klein's work, I argue, provides critical theorists with a more realistic conception of the person and a richer (...)
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  2.  3
    Julie Connolly (2015). A Fourth Order of Recognition? Critical Horizons 16 (4):393-410.
    This paper argues for the inclusion of a fourth order of recognition, pertaining to self-recognition, in Axel Honneth's critical theory of social recognition. I argue for the significance of this on the basis of examining the critical potential of the social psychology he has developed across his career as it pertains to autonomy, authenticity and agency. However, incorporating a fourth order of recognition into Honneth's internally differentiated account of recognition will not be easy given the architecture of his theory. To (...)
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  3.  2
    J. F. Dorahy (2015). The Breakdown of Reflexivity: Recognition, Reification and the Fragmentation of Experience. Critical Horizons 16 (4):371-392.
    In this essay I offer a qualified defence of Axel Honneth's recognition-theoretical critique of reification. This defence begins by engaging with a cross-section of the recent critical responses to Honneth's theory. In response to these criticisms I develop a reading of the recognition-theoretical critique of reification which illuminates both the intentional structure and pre-ethical nature of affective recognition whilst also reconstructing the existential contours of reification, understood as the “forgetfulness of recognition.” The paper concludes by taking the problem of “forgetfulness” (...)
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  4.  2
    Richard Ganis (2015). Insecure Attachment and Narcissistic Vulnerability: Implications for Honneth's Recognition-Theoretic Reconstruction of Psychoanalysis. Critical Horizons 16 (4):329-351.
    This paper endeavours to move Axel Honneth's recognition-theoretic reconstruction of psychoanalysis beyond its existing focus on the perspective of Winnicott. To this end, it places Honneth into conversation with several non-Winnicottian approaches to the phenomena of insecure attachment and narcissistic vulnerability: the attachment theory of John Bowlby and Mary Ainsworth, the self psychological perspective of Heinz Kohut, and a more recent intersubjectivist psychoanalytic paradigm set forth by Robert Stolorow, George Atwood, Bernard Brandchaft, and Donna Orange. Similar to Honneth, these authors (...)
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  5.  2
    Owen Hulatt (2015). Recognition, Mediation and Proleptic Individuals. Critical Horizons 16 (4):352-370.
    Axel Honneth has had considerable success in grounding his normative social philosophy on recognitive structures, and the capacity of experiences of disrespect to stimulate “struggles for recognition.” These struggles for recognition are held to yield advances in social structure, and to expand the individual's capacity for self-realization. In this paper, I show that this account relies on a supressed dichotomy between the immediate pre-recognitive self, and the mediated self produced intersubjectively. I argue that this dichotomy persists beyond Honneth's explicit use (...)
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  6.  71
    Timo Jütten (2015). Is the Market a Sphere of Social Freedom? Critical Horizons 16 (2):187-203.
    In this paper I examine Axel Honneth’s normative reconstruction of the market as a sphere of social freedom in his 2014 book, Freedom’s Right. Honneth’s position is complex: on the one hand, he acknowledges that modern capitalist societies do not realise social freedom; on the other hand, he insists that the promise of social freedom is implicit in the market sphere. In fact, the latter explains why modern subjects have seen capitalism as legitimate. I will reconstruct Honneth’s conception of social (...)
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