8 found

Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1.  38
    Emilian Mihailov (forthcoming). Is Deontology a Moral Confabulation? Neuroethics:1-13.
    Joshua Greene has put forward the bold empirical hypothesis that deontology is a confabulation of moral emotions. Deontological philosophy does not steam from "true" moral reasoning, but from emotional reactions, backed up by post hoc rationalizations which play no role in generating the initial moral beliefs. In this paper, I will argue against the confabulation hypothesis. First, I will highlight several points in Greene’s discussion of confabulation, and identify two possible models. Then, I will argue that the evidence does not (...)
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  2.  11
    Athina Demertzi, Eric Racine, Marie-Aurélie Bruno, Didier Ledoux, Olivia Gosseries, Audrey Vanhaudenhuyse, Marie Thonnard, Andrea Soddu, Gustave Moonen & Steven Laureys (forthcoming). Pain Perception in Disorders of Consciousness: Neuroscience, Clinical Care, and Ethics in Dialogue. Neuroethics.
  3.  3
    Fay Niker, Peter B. Reiner & Gidon Felsen (forthcoming). Updating Our Selves: Synthesizing Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Incorporating New Information Into Our Worldview. Neuroethics:1-10.
    Given the ubiquity and centrality of social and relational influences to the human experience, our conception of self-governance must adequately account for these external influences. The inclusion of socio-historical, externalist considerations into more traditional internalist accounts of autonomy has been an important feature of the debate over personal autonomy in recent years. But the relevant socio-temporal dynamics of autonomy are not only historical in nature. There are also important, and under-examined, future-oriented questions about how we retain autonomy while incorporating new (...)
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  4.  3
    Assya Pascalev, Mario Pascalev & James Giordano (forthcoming). Head Transplants, Personal Identity and Neuroethics. Neuroethics:1-8.
    The possibility of a human head transplant poses unprecedented philosophical and neuroethical questions. Principal among them are the personal identity of the resultant individual, her metaphysical and social status: Who will she be and how should the “new” person be treated - morally, legally and socially - given that she incorporates characteristics of two distinct, previously unrelated individuals, and possess both old and new physical, psychological, and social experiences that would not have been available without the transplant? We contend that (...)
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  5.  3
    Jennifer C. Sarrett (forthcoming). Biocertification and Neurodiversity: The Role and Implications of Self-Diagnosis in Autistic Communities. Neuroethics:1-14.
    Neurodiversity, the advocacy position that autism and related conditions are natural variants of human neurological outcomes that should be neither cured nor normalized, is based on the assertion that autistic people have unique neurological differences. Membership in this community as an autistic person largely results from clinical identification, or biocertification. However, there are many autistic individuals who diagnose themselves. This practice is contentious among autistic communities. Using data gathered from Wrong Planet, an online autism community forum, this article describes the (...)
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  6.  1
    Joshua Stein (forthcoming). Valuing Life as Necessary for Moral Status. Neuroethics:1-7.
    Many contemporary accounts of moral status consider an individual’s status to be grounded in some cognitive capacity, e.g. the capacity to experience certain states, to reason morally, etc. One proposed cognitive capacity significant particularly to killing, i.e. having a status that precludes being killed absent cause, is the capacity to value one’s own life. I argue that considering this a condition for moral status is a mistake, as it would lead to the exclusion of some individuals with mental health problems (...)
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  7.  2
    Kevin Patrick Tobia (forthcoming). Personal Identity, Direction of Change, and Neuroethics. Neuroethics:1-7.
    The personal identity relation is of great interest to philosophers, who often consider fictional scenarios to test what features seem to make persons persist through time. But often real examples of neuroscientific interest also provide important tests of personal identity. One such example is the case of Phineas Gage – or at least the story often told about Phineas Gage. Many cite Gage’s story as example of severed personal identity; Phineas underwent such a tremendous change that Gage “survived as a (...)
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  8.  6
    Andrew Vierra (forthcoming). Psychopathy, Mental Time Travel, and Legal Responsibility. Neuroethics:1-8.
    Neil Levy argues that the degree to which psychopaths ought to be held blameworthy for their actions depends on the extent to which they are capable of mental time travel—episodic memory and episodic foresight. Levy claims that deficits in mental time travel prevent psychopaths from fully appreciating what it is to be a person, and, without this understanding, we can at best hold psychopaths blameworthy for harming non-persons. In this paper, I build upon and clarify various (...)
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