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Forthcoming articles
  1. J. Y. Beziau & Logica Universalis (forthcoming). c© 2005 Birkhäuser Verlag Basel/Switzerland. Logica Universalis:19.
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  2. D. M. Gabbay & O. Rodrigues (forthcoming). Probabilistic Argumentation: An Equational Approach. Logica Universalis:1-38.
    There is a generic way to add any new feature to a system. It involves identifying the basic units which build up the system and introducing the new feature to each of these basic units. In the case where the system is argumentation and the feature is probabilistic we have the following. The basic units are: the nature of the arguments involved; the membership relation in the set S of arguments; the attack relation; and the choice of extensions. Generically to (...)
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  3. D. M. Gabbay & O. Rodrigues (forthcoming). Equilibrium States in Numerical Argumentation Networks. Logica Universalis:1-63.
    Given an argumentation network with initial values to the arguments, we look for algorithms which can yield extensions compatible with such initial values. We find that the best way of tackling this problem is to offer an iteration formula that takes the initial values and the attack relation and iterates a sequence of intermediate values that eventually converges leading to an extension. The properties surrounding the application of the iteration formula and its connection with other numerical and non-numerical techniques proposed (...)
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  4. Frédéric Goubier & Ernesto Perini-Santos (forthcoming). When the World is Not Enough: Medieval Ways to Deal with the Lack of Referents. Logica Universalis:1-23.
    According to several late medieval logicians, the use the universal quantifier ‘omnis’ creates the requirement that the sentence refers to at least three items—the principle of sufficientia appellatorum. The commitment is such that, when the quota is not fulfilled, one has to import the missing items from the realm of the nonexistent. While the central argument for this principle, whose origin is Aristotle’s De Caelo, stems from the contrast between unrestricted universal quantifiers and binary quantifiers, the discussion is often mixed (...)
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  5. Wolfgang Lenzen (forthcoming). Ockham’s Calculus of Strict Implication. Logica Universalis:1-11.
    In his main work Summa Logicae written around 1323, William of Ockham developed a system of propositional modal logic which contains almost all theorems of a modern calculus of strict implication. This calculus is formally reconstructed here with the help of modern symbols for the operators of conjunction, disjunction, implication, negation, possibility, and necessity.
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  6. Ana María Mora-Márquez (forthcoming). Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito on the Universal Sign ‘Every. Logica Universalis:1-19.
    In this article I present the analysis of the syncategorematic term ‘omnis’ in the commentaries on the Topics by the Parisian masters of Arts Boethius of Dacia and Radulphus Brito. I shall focus on the different relations between subject, predicate and particular instances that obtain in universally quantified statements, and in particular on the relations that obtain in universally quantified statements with an empty subject. I also attempt to highlight some continuities and ruptures with respect to this problem in its (...)
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  7. L. I. Perlovsky (forthcoming). Logic Versus Mind. Logica Universalis.
     
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  8. Stephen Read (forthcoming). Paradox, Closure and Indirect Speech Reports. Logica Universalis:1-15.
    Bradwardine’s solution to the the logical paradoxes depends on the idea that every sentence signifies many things, and its truth depends on things’ being wholly as it signifies. This idea is underpinned by his claim that a sentence signifies everything that follows from what it signifies. But the idea that signification is closed under entailment appears too strong, just as logical omniscience is unacceptable in the logic of knowledge. What is needed is a more restricted closure principle. A clue can (...)
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