Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1.  81
    Gordon Belot (forthcoming). Curve-Fitting for Bayesians? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv061.
    Bayesians often assume, suppose, or conjecture that for any reasonable explication of the notion of simplicity a prior can be designed that will enforce a preference for hypotheses simpler in just that sense. Further, it is often claimed that the Bayesian framework automatically implements Occam’s razor—that conditionalizing on data consistent with both a simple theory and a complex theory more or less inevitably favours the simpler theory. But it is shown here that there are simplicity-driven approaches to curve-fitting problems that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Vincent Bergeron (forthcoming). Functional Independence and Cognitive Architecture. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv005.
    In cognitive science, the concept of dissociation has been central to the functional individuation and decomposition of cognitive systems. Setting aside debates about the legitimacy of inferring the existence of dissociable systems from behavioral dissociation data, the main idea behind the dissociation approach is that two cognitive systems are dissociable, and therefore viewed as distinct, if each can be damaged, or impaired, without affecting the other system’s functions. In this paper, I propose a notion of functional independence that does not (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  3.  18
    Gregor Betz (forthcoming). Truth in Evidence and Truth in Arguments Without Logical Omniscience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv015.
    Science advances by means of argument and debate. Based on a formal model of complex argumentation, this article assesses the interplay between evidential and inferential drivers in scientific controversy, and explains, in particular, why both evidence accumulation and argumentation are veritistically valuable. By improving the conditions for applying veritistic indicators , novel evidence and arguments allow us to distinguish true from false hypotheses more reliably. Because such veritistic indicators also underpin inductive reasoning, evidence accumulation and argumentation enhance the reliability of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. Richard Bradley & H. Orri Stefánsson (forthcoming). Counterfactual Desirability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv023.
    The desirability of what actually occurs is often influenced by what could have been. Preferences based on such value dependencies between actual and counterfactual outcomes generate a class of problems for orthodox decision theory, the best-known perhaps being the so-called Allais Paradox. In this paper we solve these problems by extending Richard Jeffrey's decision theory to counterfactual prospects, using a multidimensional possible-world semantics for conditionals, and showing that preferences that are sensitive to counterfactual considerations can still be desirability maximising. We (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  5. Cameron Buckner (forthcoming). Transitional Gradation in the Mind: Rethinking Psychological Kindhood. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv020.
    I here critique the application of the traditional, similarity-based account of natural kinds to debates in psychology. A challenge to such accounts of kindhood—familiar from the study of biological species—is a metaphysical phenomenon that I call ‘transitional gradation’: the systematic progression of slightly modified transitional forms between related candidate kinds. Where such gradation proliferates, it renders the selection of similarity criteria for kinds arbitrary. Reflection on general features of learning—especially on the gradual revision of concepts throughout the acquisition of expertise—shows (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. Christopher Clarke (forthcoming). Multi-Level Selection and the Explanatory Value of Mathematical Decompositions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv008.
    Do multi-level selection explanations of the evolution of social traits deepen the understanding provided by single-level explanations? Central to the former is a mathematical theorem, the multi-level Price decomposition. I build a framework through which to understand the explanatory role of such non-empirical decompositions in scientific practice. Applying this general framework to the present case places two tasks on the agenda. The first task is to distinguish the various ways of suppressing within-collective variation in fitness, and moreover to evaluate their (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7. Michael E. Cuffaro (forthcoming). On the Significance of the Gottesman-Knill Theorem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv016.
    According to the Gottesman-Knill theorem, quantum algorithms which utilise only the operations belonging to a certain restricted set are efficiently simulable classically. Since some of the operations in this set generate entangled states, it is commonly concluded that entanglement is insufficient to enable quantum computers to outperform classical computers. I argue in this paper that this conclusion is misleading. First, the statement of the theorem (that the particular set of quantum operations in question can be simulated using a classical computer) (...)
    Direct download (11 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8.  42
    Michael E. Cuffaro (forthcoming). Reconsidering No-Go Theorems From a Practical Perspective. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    I argue that our judgements regarding the locally causal models which are compatible with a given quantum no-go theorem implicitly depend, in part, on the context of inquiry. It follows from this that certain no-go theorems, which are particularly striking in the traditional foundational context, have no force when the context switches to a discussion of the physical systems we are capable of building with the aim of classically reproducing quantum statistics. I close with a general discussion of the possible (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  44
    S. Dasgupta (forthcoming). Symmetry as an Epistemic Notion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axu049.
    Symmetries in physics are a guide to reality. That much is well known. But what is less well known is why symmetry is a guide to reality. What justifies inferences that draw conclusions about reality from premises about symmetries? I argue that answering this question reveals that symmetry is an epistemic notion twice over. First, these inferences must proceed via epistemic lemmas: premises about symmetries in the first instance justify epistemic lemmas about our powers of detection, and only from those (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  10.  36
    Will Davies (forthcoming). Colour Vision and Seeing Colours. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Colour vision plays a foundational explanatory role in the philosophy of colour, and serves as perennial quarry in the wider philosophy of perception. I present two contributions to our understanding of this notion. The first is to develop a constitutive approach to characterising colour vision. This approach seeks to comprehend the nature of colour vision qua psychological kind, as contrasted with traditional experiential approaches, which prioritise descriptions of our ordinary visual experience of colour. The second contribution is to argue that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11.  1
    Joe Dewhurst (forthcoming). Individuation Without Representation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw018.
    Shagrir (2001) and Sprevak (2010) explore the apparent necessity of representation for the individuation of digits (and processors) in computational systems. I will first offer a response to Sprevak’s argument that does not mention Shagrir’s original formulation, which was more complex. I then extend my initial response to cover Shagrir’s argument, thus demonstrating that it is possible to individuate digits in non-representational computing mechanisms. I also consider the implications that the non-representational individuation of digits would have for the broader theory (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  12
    Benjamin Eva (forthcoming). Topos Theoretic Quantum Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv057.
    Topos Quantum Theory (TQT) is standardly portrayed as a kind of ‘neo-realist’ reformulation of quantum mechanics. In this paper, we study the extent to which TQT can really be characterised as a realist formulation of the theory, and examine the question of whether the kind of realism that is provided by TQT satisfies the philosophical motivations that are usually associated with the search for a realist reformulation of quantum theory. Specifically, we show that the notion of the quantum state is (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. E. J. Green (forthcoming). A Layered View of Shape Perception. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv042.
    This article develops a view of shape representation both in visual experience and in subpersonal visual processing. The view is that, in both cases, shape is represented in a ‘layered’ manner: an object is represented as having multiple shape properties, and these properties have varying degrees of abstraction. I argue that this view is supported both by the facts about visual phenomenology and by a large collection of evidence in perceptual psychology. Such evidence is provided by studies of shape discriminability, (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  58
    Sean Gryb & Karim P. Y. Thébault (forthcoming). Time Remains. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv009.
    On one popular view, the general covariance of gravity implies that change is relational in a strong sense, such that all it is for a physical degree of freedom to change is for it to vary with regard to a second physical degree of freedom. At a quantum level, this view of change as relative variation leads to a fundamentally timeless formalism for quantum gravity. Here, we will show how one may avoid this acute ‘problem of time’. Under our view, (...)
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  15. Stephan Hartmann & Matteo Colombo (forthcoming). Bayesian Cognitive Science, Unification and Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv036.
    It is often claimed that the greatest value of the Bayesian framework in cognitive science consists in its unifying power. Several Bayesian cognitive scientists assume that unification is obviously linked to explanatory power. But this link is not obvious, as unification in science is a heterogeneous notion, which may have little to do with explanation. While a crucial feature of most adequate explanations in cognitive science is that they reveal aspects of the causal mechanism that produces the phenomenon to be (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  62
    James Hawthorne, Jürgen Landes, Christian Wallmann & Jon Williamson (forthcoming). The Principal Principle Implies the Principle of Indifference. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv030.
    We argue that David Lewis’s principal principle implies a version of the principle of indifference. The same is true for similar principles that need to appeal to the concept of admissibility. Such principles are thus in accord with objective Bayesianism, but in tension with subjective Bayesianism. 1 The Argument2 Some Objections Met.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17. Casey Helgeson (forthcoming). Modus Darwin Reconsidered. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Modus Darwin is the name given by Elliott Sober to a form of argument that Sober attributes to Darwin in the Origin of Species, and to subsequent evolutionary biologists who have reasoned in the same way. In short, the argument form goes: Similarity, ergo common ancestry. In the present paper I review and critique Sober's analysis of Darwin's reasoning. I argue that modus Darwin has serious limitations that make the argument form unsuited for supporting Darwin's conclusions, and that Darwin did (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  18.  85
    J. C. Jenson (forthcoming). The Belief Illusion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv006.
    I offer a new argument for the elimination of ‘beliefs’ from cognitive science based on Wimsatt’s concept of robustness and a related concept of fragility. Theoretical entities are robust if multiple independent means of measurement produce invariant results in detecting them. Theoretical entities are fragile when multiple independent means of detecting them produce highly variant results. I argue that sufficiently fragile theoretical entities do not exist. Recent studies in psychology show radical variance between what self-report and non-verbal behaviour indicate about (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19.  26
    Beate Krickel (forthcoming). A Regularist Approach to Mechanistic Type-Level Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Most defenders of the new mechanistic approach accept ontic constraints for successful scientific explanation (Illari 2013; Craver 2014). The minimal claim is that scientific explanations have objective truthmakers, namely mechanisms that exist in the physical world independently of any observer and that cause or constitute the phenomena-to- be-explained. How can this idea be applied to type-level explanations? Many authors at least implicitly assume that in order for mechanisms to be the truthmakers of type-level explanation they need to be regular (Andersen (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  38
    Jon Lawhead (forthcoming). Structural Modeling Error and the System Individuation Problem. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Recent work by Frigg et. al. and Mayo-Wilson have called attention to a particular sort of error associated with attempts to model certain complex systems: structural modeling error. The assessment of the degree of SME in a model presupposes agreement between modelers about the best way to individuate natural systems, an agreement which can be more problematic than it appears. This problem, which we dub “the system individuation problem” arises in many of the same contexts as SME, and the two (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  18
    Olivier Massin (forthcoming). The Composition of Forces. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv048.
    This paper defends a realist account of the composition of Newtonian forces, dubbed ‘residualism’. According to residualism, the resultant force acting on a body is identical to the component forces acting on it that do not prevent each other from bringing about its acceleration. Several reasons to favor residualism over alternative accounts of the composition of forces are advanced. (i) Residualism reconciles realism about component forces with realism about resultant forces while avoiding any threat of causal overdetermination. (ii) Residualism provides (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22.  24
    D. Matthiessen (forthcoming). Mechanistic Explanation in Systems Biology: Cellular Networks. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv011.
    It is argued that once biological systems reach a certain level of complexity, mechanistic explanations provide an inadequate account of many relevant phenomena. In this article, I evaluate such claims with respect to a representative programme in systems biological research: the study of regulatory networks within single-celled organisms. I argue that these networks are amenable to mechanistic philosophy without need to appeal to some alternate form of explanation. In particular, I claim that we can understand the mathematical modelling techniques of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  58
    Cailin O'Connor (forthcoming). Evolving to Generalize: Trading Precision for Speed. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv038.
    Biologists and philosophers of biology have argued that learning rules that do not lead organisms to play evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSes) in games will not be stable and thus not evolutionarily successful. This claim, however, stands at odds with the fact that learning generalization---a behavior that cannot lead to ESSes when modeled in games---is observed throughout the animal kingdom. In this paper, I use learning generalization to illustrate how previous analyses of the evolution of learning have gone wrong. It has (...)
    Direct download (6 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  22
    A. C. Paseau (forthcoming). JOHN P. BURGESS Rigor and Structure. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv046.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  29
    Anthony F. Peressini (forthcoming). Causation, Probability, and the Continuity Bind. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Analyses of singular (token-level) causation often make use of the idea that a cause in- creases the probability of its effect. Of particular salience in such accounts are the values of the probability function of the effect, conditional on the presence and absence of the putative cause, analyzed around the times of the events in question: causes are characterized by the effect’s probability function being greater when conditionalized upon them. Put this way it becomes clearer that the ‘behavior’ (continuity) of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26.  28
    R. J. Planer (forthcoming). Are Genetic Representations Read in Development? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axu043.
    The status of genes as bearers of semantic content remains very much in dispute among philosophers of biology. In a series of papers, Nicholas Shea has argued that his ‘infotel’ theory of semantics vindicates the claim that genes carry semantic content. On Shea’s account, each organism is associated with a ‘developmental system’ that takes genetic representations as inputs and produces whole-organism traits as outputs. Moreover, at least in his most recent work on the topic, Shea is explicit in claiming that (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. Juha Saatsi (forthcoming). On Explanations From 'Geometry of Motion'. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw007.
    This paper examines explanations that turn on non-local geometrical facts about the space of possible configurations a system can occupy. I argue that it makes sense to contrast such explanations from "geometry of motion" with causal explanations. I also explore how my analysis of these explanations cuts across the distinction between kinematics and dynamics.
    Direct download (8 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  13
    Ryan Samaroo (forthcoming). There is No Conspiracy of Inertia. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    I examine two claims that arise in Brown’s account of inertial motion in Physical Relativity. Brown claims there is something objectionable about the way in which the motions of free particles in Newtonian theory and special relativity are coordinated. Brown also claims that since a geodesic principle can be derived in Einsteinian gravitation the objectionable feature is explained away. I argue that there is nothing objectionable about inertia and that, while the theorems that motivate Brown’s second claim can be said (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  83
    Jonah N. Schupbach (forthcoming). Robustness Analysis as Explanatory Reasoning. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw008.
    When scientists seek further confirmation of their results, they often attempt to duplicate the results using diverse means. To the extent that they are successful in doing so, their results are said to be robust. This paper investigates the logic of such "robustness analysis" [RA]. The most important and challenging question an account of RA can answer is what sense of evidential diversity is involved in RAs. I argue that prevailing formal explications of such diversity are unsatisfactory. I propose a (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  13
    Charles T. Sebens & Sean M. Carroll (forthcoming). Self-Locating Uncertainty and the Origin of Probability in Everettian Quantum Mechanics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    A longstanding issue in attempts to understand the Everett (Many-Worlds) approach to quantum mechanics is the origin of the Born rule: why is the probability given by the square of the amplitude? Following Vaidman, we note that observers are in a position of self-locating uncertainty during the period between the branches of the wave function splitting via decoherence and the observer registering the outcome of the measurement. In this period it is tempting to regard each branch as equiprobable, but we (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31.  44
    Kim Sterelny & Ben Fraser (forthcoming). Evolution and Moral Realism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv060.
    We are moral apes, a difference between humans and our relatives that has received significant recent attention in the evolutionary literature. Evolutionary accounts of morality have often been recruited in support of error theory: moral language is truth-apt, but substantive moral claims are never true. In this article, we: locate evolutionary error theory within the broader framework of the relationship between folk conceptions of a domain and our best scientific conception of that same domain; within that broader framework, argue that (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  15
    J. P. Studd (forthcoming). Abstraction Reconceived. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axu035.
    Neologicists have sought to ground mathematical knowledge in abstraction. One especially obstinate problem for this account is the bad company problem. The leading neologicist strategy for resolving this problem is to attempt to sift the good abstraction principles from the bad. This response faces a dilemma: the system of ‘good’ abstraction principles either falls foul of the Scylla of inconsistency or the Charybdis of being unable to recover a modest portion of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory with its intended generality. This article (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   1 citation  
  33.  22
    Karim P. Y. Thebault, Seamus Bradley & Alexander Reutlinger (forthcoming). Modelling Inequality. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Econophysics is a new and exciting cross-disciplinary research field that applies models and modelling techniques from statistical physics to economic systems. It is not, however, without its critics: prominent figures in more mainstream economic theory have criticised some elements of the methodology of econophysics. One of the main lines of criticism concerns the nature of the modelling assumptions and idealisations involved, and a particular target are `kinetic exchange' approaches used to model the emergence of inequality within the distribution of individual (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. Brad Weslake (forthcoming). A Partial Theory of Actual Causation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    One part of the true theory of actual causation is a set of conditions responsible for eliminating all of the non-causes of an effect that can be discerned at the level of counterfactual structure. I defend a proposal for this part of the theory.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  35.  20
    Alastair Wilson (forthcoming). The Quantum Doomsday Argument. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv035.
    If the most familiar overlapping interpretation of Everettian quantum mechanics is correct, then each of us is constantly splitting into multiple people. This consequence gives rise to the quantum doomsday argument, which threatens to draw crippling epistemic consequences from EQM. However, a diverging interpretation of EQM undermines the quantum doomsday argument completely. This appears to tell in favour of the diverging interpretation. But it is surprising that a metaphysical question that is apparently underdetermined by the physics should be settled by (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  87
    Holly Andersen (forthcoming). Complements, Not Competitors: Causal and Mathematical Explanations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    A finer-grained delineation of a given explanandum reveals a nexus of closely related causal and non- causal explanations, complementing one another in ways that yield further explanatory traction on the phenomenon in question. By taking a narrower construal of what counts as a causal explanation, a new class of distinctively mathematical explanations pops into focus; Lange’s characterization of distinctively mathematical explanations can be extended to cover these. This new class of distinctively mathematical explanations is illustrated with the Lotka-Volterra equations. There (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37.  12
    L. Casini (forthcoming). Can Interventions Rescue Glennan's Mechanistic Account of Causality? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv014.
    Glennan appeals to interventions to solve the ontological and explanatory regresses that threaten his mechanistic account of causality . I argue that Glennan’s manoeuvre fails. The appeal to interventions is not able to address the ontological regress, and it blocks the explanatory regress only at the cost of making the account inapplicable to non-modular mechanisms. I offer a solution to the explanatory regress that makes use of dynamic Bayesian networks. My argument is illustrated by a case study from systems biology, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  9
    M. P. Cohen (forthcoming). On Three Measures of Explanatory Power with Axiomatic Representations. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv017.
    Jonah N. Schupbach and Jan Sprenger and Vincenzo Crupi and Katya Tentori have recently proposed measures of explanatory power and have shown that they are characterized by certain arguably desirable conditions or axioms. I further examine the properties of these two measures, and a third measure considered by I. J. Good and Timothy McGrew . This third measure also has an axiomatic representation. I consider a simple coin-tossing example in which only the Crupi–Tentori measure does not perform well. The Schupbach–Sprenger (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  31
    C. Glymour & C. Hanson (forthcoming). Reverse Inference in Neuropsychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv019.
    Reverse inference in cognitive neuropsychology has been characterized as inference to ‘psychological processes’ from ‘patterns of activation’ revealed by functional magnetic resonance or other scanning techniques. Several arguments have been provided against the possibility. Focusing on Machery’s presentation, we attempt to clarify the issues, rebut the impossibility arguments, and propose and illustrate a strategy for reverse inference. 1 The Problem of Reverse Inference in Cognitive Neuropsychology2 The Arguments2.1 The anti-Bayesian argument3 Patterns of Activation4 Reverse Inference Practiced5 Seek and Ye Shall (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40. Eric Hochstein (forthcoming). When Does "Folk Psychology" Count as Folk Psychological? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv028.
    It has commonly been argued that certain types of mental descriptions, specifically those characterized in terms of propositional attitudes, are part of a folk psychological understanding of the mind. Recently, however, it has also been argued that this is the case even when such descriptions are employed as part of scientific theories in domains like social psychology and comparative psychology. In this paper, I argue that there is no plausible way to understand the distinction between folk and scientific psychology that (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  5
    E. Kummerfeld & K. J. S. Zollman (forthcoming). Conservatism and the Scientific State of Nature. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv013.
    Those who comment on modern scientific institutions are often quick to praise institutional structures that leave scientists to their own devices. These comments reveal an underlying presumption that scientists do best when left alone—when they operate in what we call the ‘scientific state of nature’. Through computer simulation, we challenge this presumption by illustrating an inefficiency that arises in the scientific state of nature. This inefficiency suggests that one cannot simply presume that science is most efficient when institutional control is (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  9
    Sandra D. Mitchell & Angela M. Gronenborn (forthcoming). After Fifty Years, Why Are Protein X-Ray Crystallographers Still in Business? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv051.
    It has long been held that the structure of a protein is determined solely by the interactions of the atoms in the sequence of amino acids of which it is composed, and thus the stable, biologically functional conformation should be predictable by ab initio or de novo methods. However, except for small proteins, ab initio predictions have not been successful. We explain why this is the case and argue that the relationship among the different methods, models, and representations of protein (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  77
    Robert Smithson (forthcoming). The Principle of Indifference and Inductive Scepticism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv029.
    Many theorists have proposed that we can use the principle of indifference to defeat the inductive sceptic. But any such theorist must confront the objection that different ways of applying the principle of indifference lead to incompatible probability assignments. Huemer offers the explanatory priority proviso as a strategy for overcoming this objection. With this proposal, Huemer claims that we can defend induction in a way that is not question-begging against the sceptic. But in this article, I argue that the opposite (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  56
    Kenneth Aizawa & Carl Gillett (forthcoming). Multiple Realization and Methodology in Neuroscience and Psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
  45.  24
    Anna Alexandrova (forthcoming). Kristin Shrader-Frechette Tainted: How Philosophy of Science Can Expose Bad Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv045.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  31
    J. Azzouni & O. Bueno (forthcoming). True Nominalism: Referring Versus Coding. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv004.
    One major motivation for nominalism, at least according to Hartry Field, is the desirability of intrinsic explanations: explanations that don’t invoke objects that are causally irrelevant to the phenomena being explained. There is something right about the search for such explanations. But that search must be carefully implemented. Nothing is gained if, to avoid a certain class of objects, one only introduces other objects and relations that are just as nominalistically questionable. We will argue that this is the case for (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  10
    T. M. Baetu (forthcoming). The 'Big Picture': The Problem of Extrapolation in Basic Research. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv018.
    Both clinical research and basic science rely on the epistemic practice of extrapolation from surrogate models, to the point that explanatory accounts presented in review papers and biology textbooks are in fact composite pictures reconstituted from data gathered in a variety of distinct experimental setups. This raises two new challenges to previously proposed mechanistic-similarity solutions to the problem of extrapolation: one pertaining to the absence of mechanistic knowledge in the early stages of research and the second to the large number (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. Y. Balashov & M. Janssen (forthcoming). Presentism and Relativity, Http:/Philsci-Archive. Pitt. Edu, Forthcoming In. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
  49. Yuri Balashov & Michel Janssen (forthcoming). Forthcoming.“Presentism and Relativity.”. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
  50.  31
    Jeffrey A. Barrett & Brian Skyrms (forthcoming). Self-Assembling Games. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv043.
    We consider how cue-reading, sensory-manipulation, and signalling games may initially evolve from ritualized decisions and how more complex games may evolve from simpler games by polymerization, template transfer, and modular composition. Modular composition is a process that combines simpler games into more complex games. Template transfer, a process by which a game is appropriated to a context other than the one in which it initially evolved, is one mechanism for modular composition. And polymerization is a particularly salient example of modular (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  51.  5
    James P. Binkoski (forthcoming). On the Viability of Galilean Relationalism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw002.
    I explore the viability of a Galilean relational theory of space-time—a theory that includes a three-place collinearity relation among its stock of basic relations. Two formal results are established. First, I prove the existence of a class of dynamically possible models of Newtonian mechanics in which collinearity is uninstantiated. Second, I prove that the dynamical properties of Newtonian systems fail to supervene on their Galilean relations. On the basis of these two results, I argue that Galilean relational space-time is too (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  52. R. Bishop & Leonard A. Smith (forthcoming). Beyond the Shadow Lies Doubt. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  53.  3
    Lisa Bortolotti (forthcoming). Epistemic Benefits of Elaborated and Systematized Delusions in Schizophrenia. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv024.
    In this article I ask whether elaborated and systematized delusions emerging in the context of schizophrenia have the potential for epistemic innocence. Cognitions are epistemically innocent if they have significant epistemic benefits that could not be attained otherwise. In particular, I propose that a cognition is epistemically innocent if it delivers some significant epistemic benefit to a given agent at a given time, and if alternative cognitions delivering the same epistemic benefit are unavailable to that agent at that time. Elaborated (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  54.  6
    Lisa Bortolotti & Rachel Gunn (forthcoming). Philip Gerrans the Measure of Madness: Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Neuroscience, and Delusional Thought. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv032.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  55.  9
    Seamus Bradley (forthcoming). Constraints on Rational Theory Choice. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv063.
    In a recent article, Samir Okasha presented an argument that suggests that there is no rational way to choose among scientific theories. This would seriously undermine the view that science is a rational enterprise. In this article, I show how a suitably nuanced view of what scientific rationality requires allows us to sidestep this argument. In doing so, I present a new argument in favour of voluntarism of the type favoured by van Fraassen. I then show how such a view (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  56.  6
    Camilla Colombo & Katie Steele (forthcoming). Daniel Steel Philosophy and the Precautionary Principle: Science, Evidence, and Environmental Policy. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw001.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  57.  7
    Adrian Currie (forthcoming). Hot-Blooded Gluttons: Dependency, Coherence, and Method in the Historical Sciences. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw005.
    Our epistemic access to the past is infamously patchy: historical information degrades and disappears and bygone eras are often beyond the reach of repeatable experiments. However, historical scientists have been remarkably successful at uncovering and explaining the past. I argue that part of this success is explained by the exploitation of dependencies between historical events, entities, and processes. For instance, if sauropod dinosaurs were hot blooded, they must have been gluttons; the high-energy demands of endothermy restrict sauropod grazing strategies. Understanding (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  58.  8
    R. Dardashti, K. P. Y. Thebault & E. Winsberg (forthcoming). Confirmation Via Analogue Simulation: What Dumb Holes Could Tell Us About Gravity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv010.
    In this article we argue for the existence of ‘analogue simulation’ as a novel form of scientific inference with the potential to be confirmatory. This notion is distinct from the modes of analogical reasoning detailed in the literature, and draws inspiration from fluid dynamical ‘dumb hole’ analogues to gravitational black holes. For that case, which is considered in detail, we defend the claim that the phenomena of gravitational Hawking radiation could be confirmed in the case that its counterpart is detected (...)
    Direct download (7 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  59.  19
    Igor Douven & Sylvia Wenmackers (forthcoming). Inference to the Best Explanation Versus Bayes’s Rule in a Social Setting. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv025.
    This article compares inference to the best explanation with Bayes’s rule in a social setting, specifically, in the context of a variant of the Hegselmann–Krause model in which agents not only update their belief states on the basis of evidence they receive directly from the world, but also take into account the belief states of their fellow agents. So far, the update rules mentioned have been studied only in an individualistic setting, and it is known that in such a setting (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  60.  13
    M. Esfeld, D. Lazarovici, V. Lam & M. Hubert (forthcoming). The Physics and Metaphysics of Primitive Stuff. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv026.
    The article sets out a primitive ontology of the natural world in terms of primitive stuff—that is, stuff that has as such no physical properties at all—but that is not a bare substratum either, being individuated by metrical relations. We focus on quantum physics and employ identity-based Bohmian mechanics to illustrate this view, but point out that it applies all over physics. Properties then enter into the picture exclusively through the role that they play for the dynamics of the primitive (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   2 citations  
  61.  1
    Matt Farr (forthcoming). Mathias Frisch Causal Reasoning in Physics. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw020.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  62. Benjamin Feintzeig (forthcoming). Toward an Understanding of Parochial Observables. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw010.
    Ruetsche claims that an abstract C*-algebra of observables will not contain all of the physically significant observables for a quantum system with infinitely many degrees of freedom. This would signal that in addition to the abstract algebra, one must use Hilbert space representations for some purposes. I argue to the contrary that there is a way to recover all of the physically significant observables by purely algebraic methods. 1 Introduction2 Preliminaries3 Three Extremist Interpretations3.1 Algebraic imperialism3.2 Hilbert space conservatism3.3 Universalism4 Parochial (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  63.  6
    Luke Fenton-Glynn (forthcoming). A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of the Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv056.
    Joseph Halpern and Judea Pearl draw upon structural equation models to develop an attractive analysis of ‘actual cause’. Their analysis is designed for the case of deterministic causation. I show that their account can be naturally extended to provide an elegant treatment of probabilistic causation. 1 Introduction2 Preemption3 Structural Equation Models4 The Halpern and Pearl Definition of ‘Actual Cause’5 Preemption Again6 The Probabilistic Case7 Probabilistic Causal Models8 A Proposed Probabilistic Extension of Halpern and Pearl’s Definition9 Twardy and Korb’s Account10 Probabilistic (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  64.  6
    Mathias Frisch (forthcoming). Peter Vickersunderstanding Inconsistent Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv034.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  65.  16
    David W. Harker (forthcoming). How to Split a Theory: Scientific Realism and a Defence of Convergence Without Proximity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
  66.  7
    Cecilia Heyes (forthcoming). Tim Lewens Cultural Evolution. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv054.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  67.  42
    Michael Townsen Hicks & Jonathan Schaffer (forthcoming). Derivative Properties in Fundamental Laws. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv039.
    Orthodoxy has it that only metaphysically elite properties can be invoked in scientifically elite laws. We argue that this claim does not fit scientific practice. An examination of candidate scientifically elite laws like Newton’s F = ma reveals properties invoked that are irreversibly defined and thus metaphysically non-elite by the lights of the surrounding theory: Newtonian acceleration is irreversibly defined as the second derivative of position, and Newtonian resultant force is irreversibly defined as the sum of the component forces. We (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  68.  12
    Lina Jansson & Jonathan Tallant (forthcoming). Quantitative Parsimony: Probably for the Better. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv064.
    Our aim in this article is to offer a new justification for preferring theories that are more quantitatively parsimonious than their rivals. We discuss cases where it seems clear that those involved opted for more quantitatively parsimonious theories. We extend previous work on quantitative parsimony by offering an independent probabilistic justification for preferring the more quantitatively parsimonious theories in particular episodes of theory choice. Our strategy allows us to avoid worries that other considerations, such as pragmatic factors of computational tractability (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  69.  14
    Nicholaos Jones (forthcoming). Inference to the More Robust Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw009.
    There is a new argument form within theoretical biology. This form takes as input competing explanatory models; it yields as output the conclusion that one of these models is more plausible than the others. The driving force for this argument form is an analysis showing that one model exhibits more parametric robustness than its competitors. This article examines these inferences to the more robust explanation, analysing them as variants of inference to the best explanation. The article defines parametric robustness and (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  70.  7
    Marie I. Kaiser & Beate Krickel (forthcoming). The Metaphysics of Constitutive Mechanistic Phenomena. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv058.
    The central aim of this article is to specify the ontological nature of constitutive mechanistic phenomena. After identifying three criteria of adequacy that any plausible approach to constitutive mechanistic phenomena must satisfy, we present four different suggestions, found in the mechanistic literature, of what mechanistic phenomena might be. We argue that none of these suggestions meets the criteria of adequacy. According to our analysis, constitutive mechanistic phenomena are best understood as what we will call ‘object-involving occurrents’. Furthermore, on the basis (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  71.  9
    C. Klein (forthcoming). Consciousness, Intention, and Command-Following in the Vegetative State. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv012.
    Some vegetative state patients show fMRI responses similar to those of healthy controls when instructed to perform mental imagery tasks. Many authors have argued that this provides evidence that such patients are in fact conscious, as response to commands requires intentional agency. I argue for an alternative reading, on which responsive patients have a deficit similar to that seen in severe forms of akinetic mutism. Akinetic mutism is marked by the inability to form and maintain intentions to act. Responsive patients (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  72.  5
    Tarja Knuuttila & Andrea Loettgers (forthcoming). Modelling as Indirect Representation? The Lotka–Volterra Model Revisited. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv055.
    Is there something specific about modelling that distinguishes it from many other theoretical endeavours? We consider Michael Weisberg’s thesis that modelling is a form of indirect representation through a close examination of the historical roots of the Lotka–Volterra model. While Weisberg discusses only Volterra’s work, we also study Lotka’s very different design of the Lotka–Volterra model. We will argue that while there are elements of indirect representation in both Volterra’s and Lotka’s modelling approaches, they are largely due to two other (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  73.  19
    Raymond Lal & Nicholas Teh (forthcoming). Categorical Generalization and Physical Structuralism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv002.
    Category theory has become central to certain aspects of theoretical physics. Bain has recently argued that this has significance for ontic structural realism. We argue against this claim. In so doing, we uncover two pervasive forms of category-theoretic generalization. We call these ‘generalization by duality’ and ‘generalization by categorifying physical processes’. We describe in detail how these arise, and explain their significance using detailed examples. We show that their significance is two-fold: the articulation of high-level physical concepts, and the generation (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography   3 citations  
  74.  4
    Alison K. McConwell (forthcoming). MAUREEN A. O’MALLEY Philosophy of Microbiology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv033.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  75.  5
    G. McWhirter (forthcoming). Behavioural Deception and Formal Models of Communication. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv001.
    Having a satisfactory definition of behavioural deception is important for understanding several types of evolutionary questions. No definition offered in the literature so far is adequate on all fronts. After identifying characteristics that are important for a definition, a new definition of behavioural deception is offered. The new definition, like some other proposed attempts, relies on formal game-theoretic models of signalling. Unlike others, it incorporates explicit consideration of the population in which the potentially deceptive interactions occur. The general structure of (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  76.  9
    Thomas Müller & Tomasz Placek (forthcoming). Defining Determinism. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv049.
    The article puts forward a branching-style framework for the analysis of determinism and indeterminism of scientific theories, starting from the core idea that an indeterministic system is one whose present allows for more than one alternative possible future. We describe how a definition of determinism stated in terms of branching models supplements and improves current treatments of determinism of theories of physics. In these treatments, we identify three main approaches: one based on the study of equations, one based on mappings (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  77.  5
    M. J. Nathan (forthcoming). Unificatory Explanation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv022.
    Philosophers have traditionally addressed the issue of scientific unification in terms of theoretical reduction. Reductive models, however, cannot explain the occurrence of unification in areas of science where successful reductions are hard to find. The goal of this essay is to analyse a concrete example of integration in biology—the developmental synthesis—and to generalize it into a model of scientific unification, according to which two fields are in the process of being unified when they become explanatorily relevant to each other. I (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  78.  4
    Paul Needham (forthcoming). Determining Sameness of Substance. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv050.
    The idea that the extension of a chemical substance is fixed by determining what stands in the relation of being the same substance to a paradigm sample plays a substantial role in chemistry, and procedures of identification that don’t make direct use of the method can be traced back to ones that do. But paradigm samples are not typically selected by ostension, as in Putnam’s version of this procedure. The relevance of ostension is questioned after a discussion of the establishment (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  79.  8
    Mark P. Newman (forthcoming). Theoretical Understanding in Science. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv041.
    In this article I develop a model of theoretical understanding in science. This is a philosophical theory that specifies the conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for a scientist to satisfy the construction ‘S understands theory T ’. I first consider how this construction is preferable to others, then build a model of the requisite conditions on the basis of examples from elementary physics. I then show how this model of theoretical understanding can be made philosophically robust and provide (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  80.  8
    Wendy S. Parker (forthcoming). Computer Simulation, Measurement, and Data Assimilation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv037.
    This article explores some of the roles of computer simulation in measurement. A model-based view of measurement is adopted and three types of measurement—direct, derived, and complex—are distinguished. It is argued that while computer simulations on their own are not measurement processes, in principle they can be embedded in direct, derived, and complex measurement practices in such a way that simulation results constitute measurement outcomes. Atmospheric data assimilation is then considered as a case study. This practice, which involves combining information (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  81.  14
    Emily Paul (forthcoming). Bradford Skow Objective Becoming. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axw011.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  82.  13
    Christopher Pincock (forthcoming). Ian Hacking Why is There Philosophy of Mathematics at All? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv044.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  83.  32
    Grant Ramsey & Andreas De Block (forthcoming). Is Cultural Fitness Hopelessly Confused? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv047.
    Fitness is a central concept in evolutionary theory. Just as it is central to biological evolution, so, it seems, it should be central to cultural evolutionary theory. But importing the biological fitness concept to CET is no straightforward task—there are many features unique to cultural evolution that make this difficult. This has led some theorists to argue that there are fundamental problems with cultural fitness that render it hopelessly confused. In this essay, we defend the coherency of cultural fitness against (...)
    No categories
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  84.  12
    D. Rickles (forthcoming). Richard Dawid String Theory and the Scientific Method. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axu051.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  85.  29
    Lawrence A. Shapiro (forthcoming). Mechanism or Bust? Explanation in Psychology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv062.
    Proponents of mechanistic explanation have recently suggested that all explanation in the cognitive sciences is mechanistic, even functional explanation. This last claim is surprising, for functional explanation has traditionally been conceived as autonomous from the structural details that mechanistic explanations emphasize. I argue that functional explanation remains autonomous from mechanistic explanation, but not for reasons commonly associated with the phenomenon of multiple realizability. 1 Introduction2 Mechanistic Explanation: A Quick Primer3 Functional Explanation: An Example4 Autonomy as Lack of Constraint5 The Price (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  86.  6
    Tomoji Shogenji (forthcoming). Mediated Confirmation. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv053.
    This article aims to achieve two things: to identify the conditions for transitivity in probabilistic support in various settings, and to uncover the components and structure of the mediated probabilistic relation. It is shown that when the probabilistic relation between the two propositions, x and z, is mediated by multiple layers of partitions of propositions, the impact x has on z consists of the purely indirect impact, the purely bypass impact, and the mixed impact. It is also shown that although (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  87.  10
    Elliott Sober & Mike Steel (forthcoming). Similarities as Evidence for Common Ancestry: A Likelihood Epistemology. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv052.
    Darwin claims in the Origin that similarity is evidence for common ancestry, but that adaptive similarities are ‘almost valueless’ as evidence. This second claim seems reasonable for some adaptive similarities but not for others. Here we clarify and evaluate these and related matters by using the law of likelihood as an analytic tool and by considering mathematical models of three evolutionary processes: directional selection, stabilizing selection, and drift. Our results apply both to Darwin’s theory of evolution and to modern evolutionary (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  88.  8
    Georgie Statham (forthcoming). Contrastive Causal Claims: A Case Study. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv059.
    Contrastive and deviant/default accounts of causation are becoming increasingly common. However, discussions of these accounts have neglected important questions, including how the context determines the contrasts, and what shared knowledge is necessary for this to be possible. I address these questions, using organic chemistry as a case study. Focusing on one example—nucleophilic substitution—I show that the kinds of causal claims that can be made about an organic reaction depend on how the reaction is modelled, and argue that paying attention to (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  89.  8
    U. E. Stegmann (forthcoming). 'Genetic Coding' Reconsidered: An Analysis of Actual Usage. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv007.
    This article reconsiders the theoretical role of the genetic code. By drawing on published and unpublished sources from the 1950s, I analyse how the code metaphor was actually employed by the scientists who first promoted its use. The analysis shows that the term ‘code’ picked out mechanism sketches, consisting of more or less detailed descriptions of ordinary molecular components, processes, and structural properties of the mechanism of protein synthesis. The sketches provided how-possibly explanations for the ordering of amino acids by (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  90. Kim Sterelny (forthcoming). Review of Darwinism Evolving: System Dynamics and the Genealogy of Natural Selection. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  91.  9
    Bas C. Van Fraassen & Joseph Y. Halpern (forthcoming). Updating Probability: Tracking Statistics as Criterion. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv027.
    For changing opinion, represented by an assignment of probabilities to propositions, the criterion proposed is motivated by the requirement that the assignment should have, and maintain, the possibility of matching in some appropriate sense statistical proportions in a population. This ‘tracking’ criterion implies limitations on policies for updating in response to a wide range of types of new input. Satisfying the criterion is shown equivalent to the principle that the prior must be a convex combination of the possible posteriors. Furthermore, (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  92.  18
    Charlotte Werndl & Katie Siobhan Steele (forthcoming). Climate Models, Confirmation and Calibration. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    We argue that concerns about double-counting -- using the same evidence both to calibrate or tune climate models and also to confirm or verify that the models are adequate --deserve more careful scrutiny in climate modelling circles. It is widely held that double-counting is bad and that separate data must be used for calibration and confirmation. We show that this is far from obviously true, and that climate scientists may be confusing their targets. Our analysis turns on a Bayesian/relative-likelihood approach (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  93.  8
    J. H. Woodger (forthcoming). A Reply to Professor Haldane's "a Logical Basis for Genetics". British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
    Woodger discusses what he claims to be haldane's misunderstandings about his article "what do we mean by unborn?" these include primarily the structure of woodger's definitions. (staff).
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  94.  45
    Christian Wüthrich & Craig Callender (forthcoming). What Becomes of a Causal Set? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axv040.
    Unlike the relativity theory it seeks to replace, causal set theory has been interpreted to leave space for a substantive, though perhaps ‘localized’, form of ‘becoming’. The possibility of fundamental becoming is nourished by the fact that the analogue of Stein’s theorem from special relativity does not hold in CST. Despite this, we find that in many ways, the debate concerning becoming parallels the well-rehearsed lines it follows in the domain of relativity. We present, however, some new twists and challenges. (...)
    Direct download (5 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues