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Forthcoming articles
  1. Anna Giustina & Uriah Kriegel (forthcoming). Phenomenal Knowledge, Introspection, and Inner Awareness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7.
    Phenomenal beliefs are beliefs about the phenomenal properties of one's concurrent conscious states. It is an article of commonsense that such beliefs tend to be justified. Philosophers have been less convinced. It is sometimes claimed that phenomenal beliefs are not on the whole justified, on the grounds that (i) they are typically based on introspection and (ii) introspection is often unreliable. Here we argue against (ii). Central to our case is a pair of distinctions: one between what we call fact-introspection (...)
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  2. Adrian Alsmith (forthcoming). Mental Activity & the Sense of Ownership. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that (...)
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  3. Cristina Borgoni (forthcoming). Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    In this work, I argue for the possibility of epistemic akrasia. An individual S is epistemically akratic if the following conditions hold: (1) S knowingly believes that P though she judges that it is epistemically wrong to do so and (2) Having these mental states displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to classic akrasia. I propose two different types of epistemic akrasia involving different kinds of evidence on which the subject bases her evaluation of her akratic belief. I (...)
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  4. Robert Cowan (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject’s perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception’s epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically ‘downgrades’ their experience. On the (...)
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  5. Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency , mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency (...)
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  6. Santiago Echeverri (forthcoming). Object Files, Properties, and Perceptual Content. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    Object files are mental representations that enable perceptual systems to keep track of objects as numerically the same. How is their reference fixed? A prominent approach, championed by Zenon Pylyshyn and John Campbell, makes room for a non-satisfactional use of properties to fix reference. This maneuver has enabled them to reconcile a singularist view of reference with the intuition that properties must play a role in reference fixing. This paper examines Campbell’s influential defense of this strategy. After criticizing it, a (...)
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  7. Kate Falkenstien (forthcoming). Explaining the Effect of Morality on Intentionality: The Role of Underlying Questions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    People's moral judgments affect their judgments of intentionality for actions that succeeded by luck. This article aimed to explain that phenomenon by suggesting that people's judgments of intentionality are driven by the underlying questions they have considered. We examined two types of questions: questions about why people act, and questions about how they succeed in acting. In a series of experiments, we found that people prefer different questions for neutral and immoral actions (Studies 1 and 2) and that asking them (...)
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  8. Ulf Hlobil (forthcoming). Chains of Inferences and the New Paradigm in the Psychology of Reasoning. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning draws on Bayesian formal frameworks, and some advocates of the new paradigm think of these formal frameworks as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference. I argue that Bayesian theories should not be seen as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference, where by “Bayesian theories” I mean theories that claim that all rational credal states are probabilistically coherent and that rational adjustments of degrees of belief in the light of (...)
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  9. Zoe Jenkin & Susanna Siegel (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetrability: Modularity, Epistemology, and Ethics. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-15.
    Introduction to Special Issue of Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Overview of the central issues in cognitive architecture, epistemology, and ethics surrounding cognitive penetrability. Special issue includes papers by philosophers and psychologists: Gary Lupyan, Fiona Macpherson, Reginald Adams, Anya Farennikova, Jona Vance, Francisco Marchi, Robert Cowan.
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  10. Neil Levy (forthcoming). Dissolving the Puzzle of Resultant Moral Luck. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-13.
    The puzzle of resultant moral luck arises when we are disposed to think that an agent who caused a harm deserves to be blamed more than an otherwise identical agent who did not. One popular perspective on resultant moral luck explains our dispositions to produce different judgments with regard to the agents who feature in these cases as a product not of what they genuinely deserve but of our epistemic situation. On this account, there is no genuine resultant moral luck; (...)
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  11. Fiona Macpherson (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding: A Reply to Lupyan. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
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  12. Patrick Maynard (forthcoming). Wayfinding: ‘Public’ as Interactive/ Information Display and the New Sciences of Mind. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
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  13. Robert Carry Osborne (forthcoming). Debunking Rationalist Defenses of Common-Sense Ontology: An Empirical Approach. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    Debunking arguments typically attempt to show that a set of beliefs or other intensional mental states bear no appropriate explanatory connection to the facts they purport to be about. That is, a debunking argument will attempt to show that beliefs about p are not held because of the facts about p. Such beliefs, if true, would then only be accidentally so. Thus, their causal origins constitute an undermining defeater. Debunking arguments arise in various philosophical domains, targeting beliefs about morality, the (...)
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  14. T. Parent (forthcoming). The Empirical Case Against Infallibilism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    Philosophers and psychologists generally hold that, in light of the empirical data, a subject lacks infallible access to her own mental states. However, while subjects certainly are fallible in some ways, I show that the data fails to discredit that a subject has infallible access to her own occurrent thoughts and judgments. This is argued, first, by revisiting the empirical studies, and carefully scrutinizing what is shown exactly. Second, I argue that if the data were interpreted to rule out all (...)
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  15. András Szigeti (forthcoming). Why Change the Subject? On Collective Epistemic Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    This paper argues that group attitudes can be assessed in terms of standards of rationality and that group-level rationality need not be due to individual-level rationality. But it also argues that groups cannot be collective epistemic agents and are not collectively responsible for collective irrationality. I show that we do not need the concept of collective epistemic agency to explain how group-level irrationality can arise. Group-level irrationality arises because even rational individuals can fail to reason about how their attitudes will (...)
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  16. Assaf Weksler (forthcoming). Retinal Images and Object Files: Towards Empirically Evaluating Philosophical Accounts of Visual Perspective. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-13.
    According to an influential philosophical view I call “the relational properties view” (RPV), “perspectival” properties, such as the elliptical appearance of a tilted coin, are relational properties of external objects. Philosophers have assessed this view on the basis of phenomenological, epistemological or other purely philosophical considerations. My aim in this paper is to examine whether it is possible to evaluate RPV empirically. In the first, negative part of the paper I consider and reject a certain tempting way of doing so. (...)
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  17. Reginald B. Adams Jr & Kestutis Kveraga (forthcoming). Social Vision: Functional Forecasting and the Integration of Compound Social Cues. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    For decades the study of social perception was largely compartmentalized by type of social cue: race, gender, emotion, eye gaze, body language, facial expression etc. This was partly due to good scientific practice , and partly due to assumptions that each type of social cue was functionally distinct from others. Herein, we present a functional forecast approach to understanding compound social cue processing that emphasizes the importance of shared social affordances across various cues . We review the traditional theories of (...)
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  18. Johanna C. Badcock (forthcoming). A Neuropsychological Approach to Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Thought Insertion - Grounded in Normal Voice Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    A neuropsychological perspective on auditory verbal hallucinations links key phenomenological features of the experience, such as voice location and identity, to functionally separable pathways in normal human audition. Although this auditory processing stream framework has proven valuable for integrating research on phenomenology with cognitive and neural accounts of hallucinatory experiences, it has not yet been applied to other symptoms presumed to be closely related to AVH – such as thought insertion. In this paper, I propose that an APS framework offers (...)
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  19. Berit Brogaard, Kristian Marlow & Kevin Rice (forthcoming). Do Synesthetic Colors Grab Attention in Visual Search? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-14.
    Recent research on synesthesia has focused on how the condition may depend on selective attention, but there is a lack of consensus on whether selective attention is required to bind colors to their grapheme inducers. In the present study, we used a novel change detection paradigm to examine whether synesthetic colors guide the subject’s attention to the location of the inducer or whether selective attention is required to act as a unique feature during visual search. If synesthetic experiences are elicited (...)
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  20. Peter Carruthers (forthcoming). Two Systems for Mindreading? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    A number of two-systems accounts have been proposed to explain the apparent discrepancy between infants’ early success in nonverbal mindreading tasks, on the one hand, and the failures of children younger than four to pass verbally-mediated false-belief tasks, on the other. Many of these accounts have not been empirically fruitful. This paper focuses, in contrast, on the two-systems proposal put forward by Ian Apperly and colleagues . This has issued in a number of new findings . The present paper shows (...)
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  21. Filipe Drapeau Vieira Contim (forthcoming). Mental Files and Non-Transitive De Jure Coreference. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-24.
    Among other virtues, Mental Files Theory provides a straightforward explanation of de jure coreference, i.e. identity of referent guaranteed by meaning alone: de jure coreference holds between terms when these are associated with the same mental file from which they inherit their reference. In this paper, I discuss an objection that Angel Pinillos raises against Mental Files Theory and other similar theories: the theory predicts that de jure coreference should be transitive, just like identity. Yet there are cases, involving ‘slash-terms’, (...)
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  22. Christian Dahlman, Farhan Sarwar, Rasmus Bååth, Lena Wahlberg & Sverker Sikström (forthcoming). Prototype Effect and the Persuasiveness of Generalizations. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    An argument that makes use of a generalization activates the prototype for the category used in the generalization. We conducted two experiments that investigated how the activation of the prototype affects the persuasiveness of the argument. The results of the experiments suggest that the features of the prototype overshadow and partly overwrite the actual facts of the case. The case is, to some extent, judged as if it had the features of the prototype instead of the features it actually has. (...)
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  23. Leon de Bruin, Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos (forthcoming). Mental Agency as Self-Regulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-11.
    The article proposes a novel approach to mental agency that is inspired by Victoria McGeer’s work on self-regulation. The basic idea is that certain mental acts (e.g., judging that p) leave further work to be done for an agent to be considered an authoritative self-ascriber of corresponding dispositional mental states (e.g., believing that p). First, we discuss Richard Moran’s account of avowals, which grounds first-person authority in deliberative, self-directed agency. Although this view is promising, we argue that it ultimately fails (...)
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  24. Anna Farennikova (forthcoming). Perception of Absence and Penetration From Expectation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    I argue that perception of absence presents a top-down effect from expectations on perception, but then show that this cognitive effect is atypical and indirect. This calls into question usefulness of some of the existing notions of cognitive penetrability of perception and generates new questions about indirect cognitive influences on perception.
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  25. Lucia Foglia & J. Kevin O’Regan (forthcoming). A New Imagery Debate: Enactive and Sensorimotor Accounts. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    Traditionally, the “Imagery Debate” has opposed two main camps: depictivism and descriptivism. This debate has essentially focused on the nature of the internal representations thought to be involved in imagery, without addressing at all the question of action. More recently, a third, “embodied” view is moving the debate into a new phase. The embodied approach focuses on the interdependence of perception, cognition and action, and in its more radical line this approach promotes the idea that perception is not a process (...)
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  26. Shaun Gallagher (forthcoming). Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-15.
    This article addresses questions about the sense of agency and its distinction from the sense of ownership in the context of understanding schizophrenic thought insertion. In contrast to “standard” approaches that identify problems with the sense of agency as central to thought insertion, two recent proposals argue that it is more correct to think that the problem concerns the subject’s sense of ownership. This view involves a “more demanding” concept of the sense of ownership that, I will argue, ultimately depends (...)
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  27. Luca Gasparri (forthcoming). Mental Files and the Lexicon. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-10.
    This paper presents the hypothesis that the representational repertoire underpinning our ability to process the lexical items of a natural language can be modeled as a system of mental files. To start, I clarify the basic phenomena that an account of lexical knowledge should be able to elucidate. Then, I propose to evaluate whether the mental files theory can be brought to bear on an account of the representational format of lexical knowledge by modeling mental words as recognitional files.
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  28. Rachel Goodman (forthcoming). Against the Mental Files Conception of Singular Thought. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    It has become popular of late to identify the phenomenon of thinking a singular thought with that of thinking with a mental file. Proponents of the mental files conception of singular thought claim that one thinks a singular thought about an object o iff one employs a mental file to think about o. I argue that this is false by arguing that there are what I call descriptive mental files, so some file-based thought is not singular thought. Descriptive mental files (...)
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  29. Aidan Gray (forthcoming). Minimal Descriptivism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    Call an account of names satisfactionalist if it holds that object o is the referent of name a in virtue of o’s satisfaction of a descriptive condition associated with a. Call an account of names minimally descriptivistif it holds that if a competent speaker finds ‘a=b’ to be informative, then she must associate some information with ‘a’ which she does not associate with ‘b’. The rejection of both positions is part of the Kripkean orthodoxy, and is also built into extant (...)
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  30. Daniel Gregory (forthcoming). Inner Speech, Imagined Speech, and Auditory Verbal Hallucinations. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    A theory which has had significant influence seeks to explain auditory verbal hallucinations as utterances in inner speech which are not properly monitored and are consequently misattributed to some external source. This paper argues for a distinction between inner speech and imagined speech, on the basis that inner speech is a type of actual speech. The paper argues that AVHs are more likely instances of imagined speech, rather that inner speech, which are not properly monitored : 86–107, 2012), Cho and (...)
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  31. Rachel Gunn (forthcoming). On Thought Insertion. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    By examining first-person descriptions of thought insertion I show that thought insertion is a complex and heterogeneous phenomenon. People experiencing this phenomenon have huge difficulty explaining what it is like due to the bizarre nature of the experience. Through careful analysis of first-person descriptions I identify some of the characteristics of thought insertion. I then briefly examine some of the philosophical literature regarding agency, ownership and thought insertion and conclude that the standard account of the basic characteristics of thought insertion (...)
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  32. Carsten Hansen & Georges Rey (forthcoming). Files and Singular Thoughts Without Objects or Acquaintance: The Prospects of Recanati’s “Actualism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    We argue that Recanati burdens his otherwise salutary “Mental File” account of singular thought with an “Actualist” assumption that he has inherited from the discussion of singular thought since at least Evans, according to which singular thoughts can only be about actual objects: apparent singular thoughts involving “empty” terms lack truth-valuable content. This assumption flies in the face of manifestly singular thoughts involving not only fictional and mistakenly postulated entities, such as Zeus and the planet Vulcan, but also “perceptual inexistents,” (...)
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  33. Clara S. Humpston & Matthew R. Broome (forthcoming). The Spectra of Soundless Voices and Audible Thoughts: Towards an Integrative Model of Auditory Verbal Hallucinations and Thought Insertion. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Patients with psychotic disorders experience a range of reality distortions. These often include auditory-verbal hallucinations , and thought insertion to a lesser degree; however, their mechanisms and relationships between each other remain largely elusive. Here we attempt to establish a integrative model drawing from the phenomenology of both AVHs and TI and argue that they in fact can be seen as ‘spectra’ of experiences with varying degrees of agency and ownership, with ‘silent and internal own thoughts’ on one extreme and (...)
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  34. Jesper Kallestrup (forthcoming). Counteractuals, Counterfactuals and Semantic Intuitions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    Machery et al. claim that analytic philosophers of language are committed to a method of cases according to which theories of reference are assessed by consulting semantic intuitions about actual and possible cases. Since empirical evidence suggests that such intuitions vary both within and across cultures, these experimental semanticists conclude that the traditional attempt at pursuing such theories is misguided. Against the backdrop of Kripke’s anti-descriptivist arguments, this paper offers a novel response to the challenge posed by Machery et al., (...)
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  35. Angelica Kaufmann (forthcoming). Animal Mental Action: Planning Among Chimpanzees. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    I offer an argument for what mental action may be like in nonhuman animals. Action planning is a type of mental action that involves a type of intention. Some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of proximal mental actions, and some intentions are the causal mental antecedents of distal mental actions. The distinction between these two types of “plan-states” is often spelled out in terms of mental content. The prominent view is that while proximal mental actions are caused by mental (...)
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  36. Ágnes Melinda Kovács (forthcoming). Belief Files in Theory of Mind Reasoning. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Humans seem to readily track their conspecifics’ mental states, such as their goals and beliefs from early infancy. However, the underlying cognitive architecture that enables such powerful abilities remains unclear. Here I will propose that a basic representational structure, the belief file, could provide the foundation for efficiently encoding, and updating information about, others’ beliefs in online social interactions. I will discuss the representational possibilities offered by the belief file and the ways in which the repertoire of mental state reasoning (...)
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  37. Peter Langland-Hassan (forthcoming). Hearing a Voice as One’s Own: Two Views of Inner Speech Self-Monitoring Deficits in Schizophrenia. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    Many philosophers and psychologists have sought to explain experiences of auditory verbal hallucinations and “inserted thoughts” in schizophrenia in terms of a failure on the part of patients to appropriately monitor their own inner speech. These self-monitoring accounts have recently been challenged by some who argue that AVHs are better explained in terms of the spontaneous activation of auditory-verbal representations. This paper defends two kinds of self-monitoring approach against the spontaneous activation account. The defense requires first making some important clarifications (...)
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  38. Pablo López-Silva (forthcoming). Schizophrenia and the Place of Egodystonic States in the Aetiology of Thought Insertion. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    Despite the diagnostic relevance of thought insertion for disorders such as schizophrenia, the debates about its aetiology are far from resolved. This paper claims that in paying exclusive attention to the perceptual and cognitive impairments leading to delusional experiences in general, current deficit approaches overlook the role that affective disturbances might play in giving rise to cases of thought insertion. In the context of psychosis, affective impairments are often characterized as a consequence of the stress and anxiety caused by delusional (...)
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  39. Gary Lupyan (forthcoming). Reply to Macpherson: Further Illustrations of the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-5.
    My reply to Macpherson begins by addressing whether it is effects of cognition on early vision or perceptual performance that I am interested in. I proceed to address Macpherson’s comments on evidence from cross-modal effects, interpretations of linguistic effects on image detection, evidence from illusions, and the usefulness of predictive coding for understanding cognitive penetration. By stressing the interactive and distributed nature of neural processing, I am committing to a collapse between perception and cognition. Following such a collapse, the very (...)
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  40. Gary Lupyan (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetrability of Perception in the Age of Prediction: Predictive Systems Are Penetrable Systems. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    The goal of perceptual systems is to allow organisms to adaptively respond to ecologically relevant stimuli. Because all perceptual inputs are ambiguous, perception needs to rely on prior knowledge accumulated over evolutionary and developmental time to turn sensory energy into information useful for guiding behavior. It remains controversial whether the guidance of perception extends to cognitive states or is locked up in a “cognitively impenetrable” part of perception. I argue that expectations, knowledge, and task demands can shape perception at multiple (...)
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  41. Fiona Macpherson (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetration and Predictive Coding: A Commentary on Lupyan. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-14.
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  42. Francesco Marchi (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetrability of Social Perception: A Case for Emotion Recognition. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-4.
    Adams & Kveraga argue that social visual perception is cognitively penetrable by extending a top-down model for visual object recognition to visual perception of social cues. Here I suggest that, in their view, a clear link between the top-down contextual influences that modulate social visual perception and the perceptual experience of a subject is missing. Without such a link their proposal is consistent with explanations that need not involve cognitive penetration of perceptual experience but only modifications of perceptual judgments formed (...)
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  43. Radek Ocelák (forthcoming). Categorical Perception” and Linguistic Categorization of Color. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    This paper offers a conceptual clarification of the phenomenon commonly referred to as categorical perception of color, both in adults and in infants. First, I argue against the common notion of categorical perception as involving a distortion of the perceptual color space. The effects observed in the categorical perception research concern categorical discrimination performance and the underlying processing; they need not directly reflect the relations of color similarity and difference. Moreover, the methodology of the research actually presupposes that the relations (...)
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  44. Josef Perner & Brian Leahy (forthcoming). Mental Files in Development: Dual Naming, False Belief, Identity and Intensionality. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    We use mental files to present an analysis of children's developing understanding of identity in alternative naming tasks and belief. The core assumption is that younger children below the age of about 4 years create different files for an object depending on how the object is individuated . They can anchor them to the same object, hence think of the same object whether they think of it as a rabbit or as an animal. However, the claim is, they cannot yet (...)
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  45. Joëlle Proust (forthcoming). Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-27.
    Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed (...)
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  46. William S. Robinson (forthcoming). Hidden Nature Physicalism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Hidden nature physicalists hold that an experiential quality and its hidden nature are the same property – even though they agree that our experiences are of experiential qualities but are not, in the same sense, experiences of their hidden natures. This paper argues that physicalists must be committed to ultimately giving accounts that involve no non-extensional relations, and that this commitment leads to an inability to explain how our experiences could be of experiential qualities, but not of their hidden natures.
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  47. Johannes Roessler (forthcoming). Thinking, Inner Speech, and Self-Awareness. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    This paper has two themes. One is the question of how to understand the relation between inner speech and knowledge of one’s own thoughts. My aim here is to probe and challenge the popular neo-Rylean suggestion that we know our own thoughts by ‘overhearing our own silent monologues’, and to sketch an alternative suggestion, inspired by Ryle’s lesser-known discussion of thinking as a ‘serial operation’. The second theme is the question whether, as Ryle apparently thought, we need two different accounts (...)
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  48. Alessandro Salice (forthcoming). There Are No Primitive We-Intentions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    John Searle’s account of collective intentions in action appears to have all the theoretical pros of the non-reductivist view on collective intentionality without the metaphysical cons of committing to the existence of group minds. According to Searle, when we collectively intend to do something together, we intend to cooperate in order to reach a collective goal. Intentions in the first-person plural form therefore have a particular psychological form or mode, for the we-intender conceives of his or her intended actions as (...)
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  49. Aaron Schurger & Sebo Uithol (forthcoming). Nowhere and Everywhere: The Causal Origin of Voluntary Action. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    The idea that intentions make the difference between voluntary and non-voluntary behaviors is simple and intuitive. At the same time, we lack an understanding of how voluntary actions actually come about, and the unquestioned appeal to intentions as discrete causes of actions offers little if anything in the way of an answer. We cite evidence suggesting that the origin of actions varies depending on context and effector, and argue that actions emerge from a causal web in the brain, rather than (...)
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  50. Josefa Toribio (forthcoming). Social Vision: Breaking a Philosophical Impasse? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-5.
    I argue that findings in support of Adams and Kveraga’s functional forecast model of emotion expression processing help settle the debate between rich and sparse views of the content of perceptual experience. In particular, I argue that these results in social vision suggest that the distinctive phenomenal character of experiences involving high-level properties such as emotions and social traits is best explained by their being visually experienced as opposed to being brought about by perceptual judgments.
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  51. Jona Vance (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetration and the Tribunal of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    Perception purports to help you gain knowledge of the world even if the world is not the way you expected it to be. Perception also purports to be an independent tribunal against which you can test your beliefs. It is natural to think that in order to serve these and other central functions, perceptual representations must not causally depend on your prior beliefs and expectations. In this paper, I clarify and then argue against the natural thought above. All perceptual systems (...)
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  52. Tillmann Vierkant (forthcoming). Is Willpower Just Another Way of Tying Oneself to the Mast? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-12.
    This paper argues against the intuition that willpower and so called ‘tying to the mast’ strategies are fundamentally different types of mental actions to achieve self control. The argument for this surprising claim is that at least on the most plausible account of willpower (Holton’s mental muscle account) an act of willpower consists in an intentional mental action that disables the mental agent and thereby creates a mental tie. The paper then defends this claim against the objection that tying to (...)
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  53. Sam Wilkinson (forthcoming). A Mental Files Approach to Delusional Misidentification. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    I suggest that we can think of delusional misidentification in terms of systematic errors in the management of mental files. I begin by sketching the orthodox “bottom-up” aetiology of delusional misidentification. I suggest that the orthodox aetiology can be given a descriptivist or a singularist interpretation. I present three cases that a descriptivist interpretation needs to account for. I then introduce a singularist approach, one that is based on mental files, and show how it opens the way for different and (...)
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