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Forthcoming articles
  1. Adrian Alsmith (forthcoming). Mental Activity & the Sense of Ownership. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    I introduce and defend the notion of a cognitive account of the sense of ownership. A cognitive account of the sense of ownership holds that one experiences something as one's own only if one thinks of something as one's own. By contrast, a phenomenal account of the sense of ownership holds that one can experience something as one's own without thinking about anything as one's own. I argue that we have no reason to favour phenomenal accounts over cognitive accounts, that (...)
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  2. Cristina Borgoni (forthcoming). Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    In this work, I argue for the possibility of epistemic akrasia. An individual S is epistemically akratic if the following conditions hold: (1) S knowingly believes that P though she judges that it is epistemically wrong to do so and (2) Having these mental states displays a failure of rationality that is analogous to classic akrasia. I propose two different types of epistemic akrasia involving different kinds of evidence on which the subject bases her evaluation of her akratic belief. I (...)
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  3. Fabian Dorsch (forthcoming). Focused Daydreaming and Mind-Wandering. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    In this paper, I describe and discuss two mental phenomena which are somewhat neglected in the philosophy of mind: focused daydreaming and mind-wandering. My aim is to show that their natures are rather distinct, despite the fact that we tend to classify both as instances of daydreaming. The first difference between the two, I argue, is that, while focused daydreaming is an instance of imaginative mental agency , mind-wandering is not—though this does not mean that mind-wandering cannot involve mental agency (...)
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  4. Kate Falkenstien (forthcoming). Explaining the Effect of Morality on Intentionality: The Role of Underlying Questions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    People's moral judgments affect their judgments of intentionality for actions that succeeded by luck. This article aimed to explain that phenomenon by suggesting that people's judgments of intentionality are driven by the underlying questions they have considered. We examined two types of questions: questions about why people act, and questions about how they succeed in acting. In a series of experiments, we found that people prefer different questions for neutral and immoral actions (Studies 1 and 2) and that asking them (...)
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  5. Patrick Maynard (forthcoming). Wayfinding: ‘Public’ as Interactive/ Information Display and the New Sciences of Mind. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
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  6. Pendaran Roberts & Kelly Schmidtke (forthcoming). Color Matching and Color Naming: A Reply to Kuehni and Hardin. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-6.
    We recently conducted an experiment to show that a lot of the empirically measured disagreement cited to support the premise that there is mass perceptual disagreement about the colors, a premise often cited by philosophers, is due to conceptual factors. Kuehni and Hardin object to how we measured disagreement and to various aspects of our experimental design. In this reply, we defend our study.
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  7. Amihud Gilead (forthcoming). Can Brain Imaging Breach Our Mental Privacy? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    Brain-imaging technologies have posed the problem of breaching our brain privacy. Until the invention of those technologies, many of us entertained the idea that nothing can threaten our mental privacy, as long as we kept it, for each of us has private access to his or her own mind but no access to any other. Yet, philosophically, the issue of private, mental accessibility appears to be quite unsettled, as there are still many philosophers who reject the idea of private, mental (...)
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  8. Adele Abrahamsen & William Bechtel (forthcoming). Diagrams as Tools for Scientific Reasoning. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-15.
    We contend that diagrams are tools not only for communication but also for supporting the reasoning of biologists. In the mechanistic research that is characteristic of biology, diagrams delineate the phenomenon to be explained, display explanatory relations, and show the organized parts and operations of the mechanism proposed as responsible for the phenomenon. Both phenomenon diagrams and explanatory relations diagrams, employing graphs or other formats, facilitate applying visual processing to the detection of relevant patterns. Mechanism diagrams guide reasoning about how (...)
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  9. Brendan Cline (forthcoming). Nativism and the Evolutionary Debunking of Morality. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    Evolutionary debunking arguments purport to undercut the justification of our moral judgments by showing why a tendency to make moral judgments would evolve regardless of the truth of those judgments. (Machery and Mallon (2010). Evolution of morality. In J.M. Doris and The Moral Psychology Research Group (Eds.), The Moral Psychology Handbook (pp. 3–46). Oxford: Oxford University Press) have recently tried to disarm these arguments by showing that moral cognition – in the sense that is relevant to debunking – is not (...)
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  10. Robert Cowan (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject’s perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception’s epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically ‘downgrades’ their experience. On the (...)
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  11. Leon de Bruin, Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos (forthcoming). Mental Agency as Self-Regulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-11.
    The article proposes a novel approach to mental agency that is inspired by Victoria McGeer’s work on self-regulation. The basic idea is that certain mental acts (e.g., judging that p) leave further work to be done for an agent to be considered an authoritative self-ascriber of corresponding dispositional mental states (e.g., believing that p). First, we discuss Richard Moran’s account of avowals, which grounds first-person authority in deliberative, self-directed agency. Although this view is promising, we argue that it ultimately fails (...)
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  12. Anna Farennikova (forthcoming). Perception of Absence and Penetration From Expectation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    I argue that perception of absence presents a top-down effect from expectations on perception, but then show that this cognitive effect is atypical and indirect. This calls into question usefulness of some of the existing notions of cognitive penetrability of perception and generates new questions about indirect cognitive influences on perception.
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  13. Marcello Frixione & Antonio Lombardi (forthcoming). Street Signs and Ikea Instruction Sheets: Pragmatics and Pictorial Communication. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    A classical objection to pictorial communication is that pictures are intrinsically ambiguous and a picture, per se, can communicate an indeterminate number of different contents. The standard interpretation of this objection is that pictures are subordinate to language and that pictorial communication is parasitic on verbal communication. We argue that in many cases verbal communication presents a similar indeterminacy, which is resolved by resorting to pragmatic mechanisms. In this spirit, we propose a pragmatic approach which explains pictorial communication in terms (...)
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  14. Shaun Gallagher (forthcoming). Relations Between Agency and Ownership in the Case of Schizophrenic Thought Insertion and Delusions of Control. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-15.
    This article addresses questions about the sense of agency and its distinction from the sense of ownership in the context of understanding schizophrenic thought insertion. In contrast to “standard” approaches that identify problems with the sense of agency as central to thought insertion, two recent proposals argue that it is more correct to think that the problem concerns the subject’s sense of ownership. This view involves a “more demanding” concept of the sense of ownership that, I will argue, ultimately depends (...)
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  15. Valeria Giardino & Gabriel Greenberg (forthcoming). Introduction: Varieties of Iconicity. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    This introduction aims to familiarize readers with basic dimensions of variation among pictorial and diagrammatic representations, as we understand them, in order to serve as a backdrop to the articles in this volume. Instead of trying to canvas the vast range of representational kinds, we focus on a few important axes of difference, and a small handful of illustrative examples. We begin in Section 1 with background: the distinction between pictures and diagrams, the concept of systems of representation, and that (...)
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  16. Rachel Goodman (forthcoming). Against the Mental Files Conception of Singular Thought. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-25.
    It has become popular of late to identify the phenomenon of thinking a singular thought with that of thinking with a mental file. Proponents of the mental files conception of singular thought claim that one thinks a singular thought about an object o iff one employs a mental file to think about o. I argue that this is false by arguing that there are what I call descriptive mental files, so some file-based thought is not singular thought. Descriptive mental files (...)
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  17. Aidan Gray (forthcoming). Minimal Descriptivism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    Call an account of names satisfactionalist if it holds that object o is the referent of name a in virtue of o’s satisfaction of a descriptive condition associated with a. Call an account of names minimally descriptivistif it holds that if a competent speaker finds ‘a=b’ to be informative, then she must associate some information with ‘a’ which she does not associate with ‘b’. The rejection of both positions is part of the Kripkean orthodoxy, and is also built into extant (...)
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  18. Alex Grzankowski (forthcoming). Pictures Have Propositional Content. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-13.
    Although philosophers of art and aesthetics regularly appeal to a notion of ‘pictorial content’, there is little agreement over its nature. The present paper argues that pictures have propositional contents. This conclusion is reached by considering a style of argument having to do with the phenomenon of negation intended to show that pictures must have some kind of non-propositional content. I first offer reasons for thinking that arguments of that type fail. Second, I show that when properly understood, such arguments (...)
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  19. R. G. Kuehni & C. L. Hardin (forthcoming). Color Matching and Color Naming: A Response to Roberts and Schmidtke. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-7.
    In their article ‘In defense of incompatibility, objectivism, and veridicality about color’ P. Roberts and K. Schmidtke offer the results of an experiment supposed to show that if selection of colored samples representing unique hues for subjects (naming) has a greater inter-subject variability than identification of sample pairs with no perceptual difference between them (matching) the result provides support for the philosophical concept of color realism. On examining the results in detail, we find that, according to standard statistical methodology, the (...)
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  20. John Kulvicki (forthcoming). Analog Representation and the Parts Principle. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    Analog representation is often cast in terms of an engineering distinction between smooth and discrete systems. The engineering notion cuts across interesting representational categories, however, so it is poorly suited to thinking about kinds of representation. This paper suggests that analog representations support a pattern of interaction, specifically open-ended searches for content across levels of abstraction. They support the pattern by sharing a structure with what they represent. Continuous systems that satisfy the engineering notion are exemplars of this kind because (...)
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  21. Patrick Maynard (forthcoming). Wayfinding: Notes on the ‘Public’ as Interactive. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    “Public” is here treated by its three extensions: most broadly, from the merely extrasomatic, where users of representations are initially distinguished from makers, through ‘published’ or for the general public, to the governmental, official—where the discussion begins, before turning in its second half to the more common, middle meaning. What is public in these ways, “spatial representation”, also has the different meanings of representation of space or representation by spatial means, and there are several kinds of space to be considered. (...)
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  22. Bence Nanay (forthcoming). Trompe L’Oeil and the Dorsal/Ventral Account of Picture Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-17.
    While there has been a lot of discussion of picture perception both in perceptual psychology and in philosophy, these discussions are driven by very different background assumptions. Nonetheless, it would be mutually beneficial to arrive at an understanding of picture perception that is informed by both the philosophers’ and the psychologists’ story. The aim of this paper is exactly this: to give an account of picture perception that is valid both as a philosophical and as a psychological account. I argue (...)
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  23. Joëlle Proust (forthcoming). Time and Action: Impulsivity, Habit, Strategy. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-27.
    Granting that various mental events might form the antecedents of an action, what is the mental event that is the proximate cause of action? The present article reconsiders the methodology for addressing this question: Intention and its varieties cannot be properly analyzed if one ignores the evolutionary constraints that have shaped action itself, such as the trade-off between efficient timing and resources available, for a given stake. On the present proposal, three types of action, impulsive, routine and strategic, are designed (...)
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  24. Alessandro Salice (forthcoming). There Are No Primitive We-Intentions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    John Searle’s account of collective intentions in action appears to have all the theoretical pros of the non-reductivist view on collective intentionality without the metaphysical cons of committing to the existence of group minds. According to Searle, when we collectively intend to do something together, we intend to cooperate in order to reach a collective goal. Intentions in the first-person plural form therefore have a particular psychological form or mode, for the we-intender conceives of his or her intended actions as (...)
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  25. Matthew Stone & Una Stojnic (forthcoming). Meaning and Demonstration. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-29.
    In demonstration, speakers use real-world activity both for its practical effects and to help make their points. The demonstrations of origami mathematics, for example, reconfigure pieces of paper by folding, while simultaneously allowing their author to signal geometric inferences. Demonstration challenges us to explain how practical actions can get such precise significance and how this meaning compares with that of other representations. In this paper, we propose an explanation inspired by David Lewis’s characterizations of coordination and scorekeeping in conversation. In (...)
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  26. Justin Sytsma, Jonathan Livengood, Ryoji Sato & Mineki Oguchi (forthcoming). Reference in the Land of the Rising Sun: A Cross-Cultural Study on the Reference of Proper Names. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    A standard methodology in philosophy of language is to use intuitions as evidence. Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich (2004) challenged this methodology with respect to theories of reference by presenting empirical evidence that intuitions about one prominent example from the literature on the reference of proper names (Kripke’s Gödel case) vary between Westerners and East Asians. In response, Sytsma and Livengood (2011) conducted experiments to show that the questions Machery and colleagues asked participants in their study were ambiguous, and that (...)
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  27. András Szigeti (forthcoming). Why Change the Subject? On Collective Epistemic Agency. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    This paper argues that group attitudes can be assessed in terms of standards of rationality and that group-level rationality need not be due to individual-level rationality. But it also argues that groups cannot be collective epistemic agents and are not collectively responsible for collective irrationality. I show that we do not need the concept of collective epistemic agency to explain how group-level irrationality can arise. Group-level irrationality arises because even rational individuals can fail to reason about how their attitudes will (...)
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  28. Barbara Tversky (forthcoming). The Cognitive Design of Tools of Thought. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    When thought overwhelms the mind, the mind puts it into the world, notably in diagrams and gestures.Both use space and arrays of elements, depictive and non-depictive, to convey ideas, concrete and abstract,clear and sketchy. The arrays and the non-depictive elements like boxes and arrows serve to showrelationships and organizations, thematic, categorical, and more. on paper, in the air, in the diagrammedworld. Human actions organize space to convey abstractions: spraction.
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  29. Jona Vance (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetration and the Tribunal of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    Perception purports to help you gain knowledge of the world even if the world is not the way you expected it to be. Perception also purports to be an independent tribunal against which you can test your beliefs. It is natural to think that in order to serve these and other central functions, perceptual representations must not causally depend on your prior beliefs and expectations. In this paper, I clarify and then argue against the natural thought above. All perceptual systems (...)
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  30. Tillmann Vierkant (forthcoming). Is Willpower Just Another Way of Tying Oneself to the Mast? Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-12.
    This paper argues against the intuition that willpower and so called ‘tying to the mast’ strategies are fundamentally different types of mental actions to achieve self control. The argument for this surprising claim is that at least on the most plausible account of willpower (Holton’s mental muscle account) an act of willpower consists in an intentional mental action that disables the mental agent and thereby creates a mental tie. The paper then defends this claim against the objection that tying to (...)
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