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Forthcoming articles
  1. Kate Falkenstien (forthcoming). Explaining the Effect of Morality on Intentionality: The Role of Underlying Questions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    People's moral judgments affect their judgments of intentionality for actions that succeeded by luck. This article aimed to explain that phenomenon by suggesting that people's judgments of intentionality are driven by the underlying questions they have considered. We examined two types of questions: questions about why people act, and questions about how they succeed in acting. In a series of experiments, we found that people prefer different questions for neutral and immoral actions (Studies 1 and 2) and that asking them (...)
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  2. Simon Fitzpatrick (forthcoming). Distinguishing Between Three Versions of the Doctrine of Double Effect Hypothesis in Moral Psychology. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    Based on the results of empirical studies of folk moral judgment, several researchers have claimed that something like the famous Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) may be a fundamental, albeit unconscious, component of human moral psychology. Proponents of this psychological DDE hypothesis have, however, said surprisingly little about how the distinction at the heart of standard formulations of the principle—the distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences—might be cognised when we make moral judgments about people’s actions. I first highlight the (...)
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  3. Robert Hopkins (forthcoming). Episodic Memory as Representing the Past to Oneself. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    Episodic memory is sometimes described as mental time travel. This suggests three ideas: that episodic memory offers us access to the past that is quasi-experiential, that it is a source of knowledge of the past, and that it is, at root, passive. I offer an account of episodic memory that rejects all three ideas. The account claims that remembering is a matter of representing the past to oneself, in a way suitably responsive to how one experienced the remembered episode to (...)
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  4. Stan Klein (forthcoming). Autonoesis and Belief in a Personal Past: An Evolutionary Theory of Episodic Memory Indices. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
    In this paper I discuss philosophical and psychological treatments of the question "how do we decide that an occurrent mental state is a memory and not, say a thought or imagination?" This issue has proven notoriously difficult to resolve, with most proposed indices, criteria and heuristics failing to achieve consensus. Part of the difficulty, I argue, is that the indices and analytic solutions thus far offered seldom have been situated within a well-specified theory of memory function. As I hope to (...)
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  5. Patrick Maynard (forthcoming). Wayfinding: ‘Public’ as Interactive/ Information Display and the New Sciences of Mind. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
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  6. Hisashi Nakao & Kristin Andrews (forthcoming). Ready to Teach or Ready to Learn: A Critique of the Natural Pedagogy Theory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    According to the theory of natural pedagogy, humans have a set of cognitive adaptations specialized for transmitting and receiving knowledge through teaching; young children can acquire generalizable knowledge from ostensive signals even in a single interaction, and adults also actively teach young children. In this article, we critically examine the theory and argue that ostensive signals do not always allow children to learn generalizable knowledge more efficiently, and that the empirical evidence provided in favor of the theory of natural pedagogy (...)
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  7. Hanno Sauer (forthcoming). It's the Knobe Effect, Stupid! Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-19.
    People asymmetrically attribute various agential features such as intentionality, knowledge, or causal impact to other agents when something of normative significance is at stake. I will argue that three questions are of primary interest in the debate about this effect. A methodological question about how to explain it at all; a substantive question about how to explain it correctly: and a normative question about whether to explain it in terms of an error or a legitimate judgmental pattern. The problem, I (...)
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  8. M. Emrah Aktunç (forthcoming). Tackling Duhemian Problems: An Alternative to Skepticism of Neuroimaging in Philosophy of Cognitive Science. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    Duhem’s problem arises especially in scientific contexts where the tools and procedures of measurement and analysis are numerous and complex. Several philosophers of cognitive science have cited its manifestations in fMRI as grounds for skepticism regarding the epistemic value of neuroimaging. To address these Duhemian arguments for skepticism, I offer an alternative approach based on Deborah Mayo’s error-statistical account in which Duhem's problem is more fruitfully approached in terms of error probabilities. This is illustrated in examples such as the use (...)
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  9. Anna Ciaunica (forthcoming). Under Pressure: Processing Representational Decoupling in False-Belief Tasks. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-16.
    Several studies (Onishi and Baillargeon 2005; Surian et al. 2007) demonstrated that children younger than 3 years of age, who consistently fail the standard verbal false-belief task, can anticipate others’ actions based on their attributed false beliefs. This gave rise to the so-called “Developmental Paradox”. De Bruin and Kästner (2012) recently suggested that the Developmental Paradox is best addressed in terms of the relation between coupled (online) and decoupled (offline) processes and argued that if enactivism is to be a genuine (...)
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  10. Robert Cowan (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetrability and Ethical Perception. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    In recent years there has been renewed philosophical interest in the thesis that perceptual experience is cognitively penetrable, i.e., roughly, the view that the contents and/or character of a subject’s perceptual experience can be modified by what a subject believes and desires. As has been widely noted, it is plausible that cognitive penetration has implications for perception’s epistemic role. On the one hand, penetration could make agents insensitive to the world in a way which epistemically ‘downgrades’ their experience. On the (...)
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  11. Leon de Bruin, Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos (forthcoming). Mental Agency as Self-Regulation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-11.
    The article proposes a novel approach to mental agency that is inspired by Victoria McGeer’s work on self-regulation. The basic idea is that certain mental acts (e.g., judging that p) leave further work to be done for an agent to be considered an authoritative self-ascriber of corresponding dispositional mental states (e.g., believing that p). First, we discuss Richard Moran’s account of avowals, which grounds first-person authority in deliberative, self-directed agency. Although this view is promising, we argue that it ultimately fails (...)
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  12. Dorothea Debus (forthcoming). 'Mental Time Travel': Remembering the Past, Imagining the Future, and the Particularity of Events. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    The present paper offers a philosophical discussion of phenomena which in the empirical literature have recently been subsumed under the concept of ‘mental time travel’. More precisely, the paper considers differences and similarities between two cases of ‘mental time travel’, recollective memories (‘R-memories’) of past events on the one hand, and sensory imaginations (‘S-imaginations’) of future events on the other. It develops and defends the claim that, because a subject who R-remembers a past event is experientially aware of a past (...)
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  13. Jérôme Dokic (forthcoming). Feeling the Past: A Two-Tiered Account of Episodic Memory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-14.
    Episodic memory involves the sense that it is “first-hand”, i.e., originates directly from one’s own past experience. An account of this phenomenological dimension is offered in terms of an affective experience or feeling specific to episodic memory. On the basis of recent empirical research in the domain of metamemory, it is claimed that a recollective experience involves two separate mental components: a first-order memory about the past along with a metacognitive, episodic feeling of knowing. The proposed two-tiered account is contrasted (...)
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  14. Anna Farennikova (forthcoming). Perception of Absence and Penetration From Expectation. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-20.
    I argue that perception of absence presents a top-down effect from expectations on perception, but then show that this cognitive effect is atypical and indirect. This calls into question usefulness of some of the existing notions of cognitive penetrability of perception and generates new questions about indirect cognitive influences on perception.
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  15. Jordi Fernández (forthcoming). Memory and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    The aim of this paper is to defend the view that judgments based on episodic memory are immune to error through misidentification. I will put forward a proposal about the contents of episodic memories according to which a memory represents a perception of a past event. I will also offer a proposal about the contents of perceptual experiences according to which a perceptual experience represents some relations that its subject bears to events in the external world. The combination of the (...)
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  16. Christoph Hoerl (forthcoming). Remembering Events and Remembering Looks. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    I describe and discuss one particular dimension of disagreement in the philosophical literature on episodic memory. One way of putting the disagreement is in terms of the question as to whether or not there is a difference in kind between remembering seeing x and remembering what x looks like. I argue against accounts of episodic memory that either deny that there is a clear difference between these two forms of remembering, or downplay the difference by in effect suggesting that the (...)
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  17. Stanley B. Klein (forthcoming). Autonoesis and Belief in a Personal Past: An Evolutionary Theory of Episodic Memory Indices. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    In this paper I discuss philosophical and psychological treatments of the question “how do we decide that an occurrent mental state is a memory and not, say a thought or imagination?” This issue has proven notoriously difficult to resolve, with most proposed indices, criteria and heuristics failing to achieve consensus. Part of the difficulty, I argue, is that the indices and analytic solutions thus far offered seldom have been situated within a well-specified theory of memory function. As I hope to (...)
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  18. R. G. Kuehni & C. L. Hardin (forthcoming). Color Matching and Color Naming: A Response to Roberts and Schmidtke. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-7.
    In their article ‘In defense of incompatibility, objectivism, and veridicality about color’ P. Roberts and K. Schmidtke offer the results of an experiment supposed to show that if selection of colored samples representing unique hues for subjects (naming) has a greater inter-subject variability than identification of sample pairs with no perceptual difference between them (matching) the result provides support for the philosophical concept of color realism. On examining the results in detail, we find that, according to standard statistical methodology, the (...)
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  19. D. Perrin & S. Rousset (forthcoming). The Episodicity of Memory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-22.
    Although episodic memory is a widely studied form of memory both in philosophy and psychology, it still raises many burning questions regarding its definition and even its acceptance. Over the last two decades, cross-disciplinary discussions between these two fields have increased as they tackle shared concerns, such as the phenomenology of recollection, and therefore allow for fruitful interaction. This editorial introduction aims to provide a comprehensive and up-to-date presentation of the main existing conceptions and issues on the topic. After delineating (...)
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  20. James Russell (forthcoming). Episodic Memory as Re-Experiential Memory: Kantian, Developmental, and Neuroscientific Currents. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-21.
    Recent work on the early development of episodic memory in my laboratory has been fuelled by the following assumption: if episodic memory is re-experiential memory then Kant’s analysis of the spatiotemporal nature of experience should constrain and positively influence theories of episodic memory development. The idea is that re-experiential memory will “inherit” these spatiotemporal features. On the basis of this assumption, Russell and Hanna (Mind and Language 27(1):29–54, 2012) proposed that (a) the spatial element of re-experience is egocentric and (b) (...)
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  21. Jona Vance (forthcoming). Cognitive Penetration and the Tribunal of Experience. Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-23.
    Perception purports to help you gain knowledge of the world even if the world is not the way you expected it to be. Perception also purports to be an independent tribunal against which you can test your beliefs. It is natural to think that in order to serve these and other central functions, perceptual representations must not causally depend on your prior beliefs and expectations. In this paper, I clarify and then argue against the natural thought above. All perceptual systems (...)
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