Year:

  1.  4
    N. F. Barrett (2016). What Is at Stake in the Disagreement Between Interactivity and Enaction? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):249-251.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Interactivity and Enaction in Human Cognition” by Matthew Isaac Harvey, Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen & Sune Vork Steffensen. Upshot: To sort out their differences with enactive theory, interactivity theorists would do better to focus on operational closure only insofar as it constitutes a condition of intrinsic normativity or self-regulated coupling.
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  2.  10
    M. Beaton (2016). Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):265-276.
    Context: Direct realism is a non-reductive, anti-representationalist theory of perception lying at the heart of mainstream analytic philosophy, where it is currently generating a lot of interest. For all that, it is widely held to be both controversial and anti-scientific. On the other hand, the sensorimotor theory of perception initially generated a lot of interest within enactive philosophy of cognitive science, but has arguably not yet delivered on its initial promise. Problem: I aim to show that the sensorimotor theory and (...)
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  3.  5
    M. Beaton (2016). Author’s Response: The Personal Level in Sensorimotor Theory. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):289-297.
    Upshot: I offer responses to the commentaries on my target article in five short sections. The first section, about the plurality of lived worlds, concerns issues of quite general interest to readers of this journal. The second section presents some reasons for rejecting “enabling” as well as “constitutive” representational approaches to understanding the mind. In the remaining three sections, I clarify aspects of sensorimotor direct realism relating to the self, qualia, counterfactuals, and the notion of “mastery.”.
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  4.  7
    M. Beaton (2016). Crossing the Explanatory Gap by Legwork, Not by Fiat. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):364-366.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: I strongly agree with Kirchhoff and Hutto that consciousness and embodied action are one and the same, but I disagree when they say this identity cannot be fully explained and must simply be posited. Here I attempt to sketch the outlines of just such an explanation.
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  5.  2
    J. M. Bishop (2016). Phenomenal Promiscuity. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):284-285.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: Sensorimotor direct realism is too promiscuous in its account of sensation.
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  6.  5
    M. Bitbol & E. Antonova (2016). On the Too Often Overlooked Radicality of Neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):354-356.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: We point out that the significance of the neurophenomenological approach to the “hard problem” of consciousness is underrated and misunderstood by the authors of the target article. In its original version, neurophenomenology implies nothing less than a change in our own being to dispel the mere sense that there is a problem to (...)
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  7.  4
    P. A. Cariani (2016). Learning of New Percept-Action Mappings Is a Constructive Process of Goal-Directed Self-Modification. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):322-324.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: In my view, the clash between ecological psychology, enactivism, and constructivism in general has more to do with irreconcilable metaphysical and theoretical incommensurabilities than disagreements about specific mechanisms or processes of perception. Even with mutual enabling of action and perception, some internal process of self-modification is still needed if novel behavior is to be adequately explained.
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  8.  3
    F. Cummins (2016). Enaction, and Its Relation to Science in an Objective Key. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):245-246.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Interactivity and Enaction in Human Cognition” by Matthew Isaac Harvey, Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen & Sune Vork Steffensen. Upshot: Enaction, as a paradigm, is still negotiating its position with respect to science done in an objective key. Some of the problems identified by the authors arise by treating enactive descriptions as if they were realist accounts. Negotiating a resolution here will demand progress all round.
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  9.  5
    T. J. Davis & M. T. Turvey (2016). One World, Multiple Organisms: Specificity /Autocatakinetics Versus Enactivism/Autopoiesis. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):330-332.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: We extend the authors’ arguments on direct perception, specificity, and foundational principles to concerns for theories of joint action. We argue for the usefulness of the affordance concept in an ecological theory of social interaction; highlighting linkages between theories of affordance-based behavior and fundamental, physical principles.
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  10.  6
    H. De Jaegher (2016). Intersubjectivity in the Study of Experience. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):393-395.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: I propose that getting the empirical study of subjective experience off to a good start requires an intersubjective approach, in both theory and method, where intersubjectivity is understood not in the standard science way of verification by others, but rather as participation in the investigation of how experience transforms when examining it together. I argue that this will greatly help do justice to and (...)
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  11.  3
    P. De Jesus (2016). Sweeping Anthropomorphism Under the MAT. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):216-218.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: Villalobos and Ward reappraise enactivism’s “Jonasian turn” and discover an untenable anthropomorphism at its core. As a corrective to this, the authors propose a Maturanian-inspired account of experience that could accommodate central enactive insights while avoiding anthropomorphism. In this commentary, I will delve a bit deeper into Villalobos and Ward’s treatment of anthropomorphism. In so doing, I will show (...)
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  12.  3
    M. de Pinedo (2016). The Ontology of Perception: Agency, Evolution and Representationalism. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):332-334.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: The aim of my commentary is to complement some of the main points defended in the target article. In particular, I want to explore further the central role of agent-level explanations and of evolution for our understanding of a meaningful environment. I finish by wondering whether an excessive focus on ontological questions could be problematic for a proper defence of (...)
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  13.  2
    E. A. Di Paolo (2016). Across the Uncanny Valley: The Ecological, the Enactive, and the Strangely Familiar. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):327-329.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: I contrast enactivist and ecological perspectives on some of the themes raised by the authors. I discuss some of their worries about the notion of sense-making and other epistemological aspects of enactivism.
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  14.  3
    D. Dotov (2016). Perception-Action Mutuality Does Not Obviate Emergence or the Animal’s Active Role in the Perceptual Act. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):308-309.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: The main goal of this commentary is to make more discriminative the comparison between enactive and ecological theories of perception. Emergence at the level of the animal-environment system might be playing the role attributed to mental construction in basic perceptual processes. If correct, this would render some forms of enactivism compatible with the theoretical tenets of the target article.
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  15.  3
    R. D. Ellis (2016). Enactive Consciousness and Gendlin’s Dream Analysis. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):425-427.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: A neurophenomenological approach to the enactive account of consciousness in general is supported by an account of how the brain functions in creating imagery of non-present objects and situations. Three types of non-sensory imagery are needed to ground our consciousness of sensory imagery: proprioceptive imagery, motor imagery, and what Eugene Gendlin calls the (...)
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  16.  2
    T. Froese (2016). Interactivity Should Aim to Extend, Not Reject, the Conceptual Foundations of Enaction. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):247-249.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Interactivity and Enaction in Human Cognition” by Matthew Isaac Harvey, Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen & Sune Vork Steffensen. Upshot: Enaction is a diverse research program and some of its texts can be interpreted in terms of a critical contrast to interactivity. Yet much of the former has already started to move in a direction favored by the latter: toward systematic studies of how human activity is shaped by social, cultural, and technological influences. Interactivity could therefore help (...)
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  17.  3
    M. F. Fultot (2016). What Kind of Epistemic Activity is Expert Introspection? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):397-398.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: A constructivist epistemology might help us better understand what kind of knowledge expert introspection cannot deliver. Indeed, there are well-known trade-offs with regard to the insights that can be gained through introspection. If trivialization is to be avoided, then it should be assumed that, contrary to standard science, introspection just is not a declarative kind of knowledge.
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  18.  3
    M. F. Fultot, L. Nie & C. Carello (2016). Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):298-307.
    Context: The dominant approach to the study of perception is representational/computational, with an emphasis on the achievements of the brain and the nervous system, which are taken to construct internal models of the world. Alternatives include ecological, embedded, embodied, and enactivist approaches, all of which emphasize the centrality of action in understanding perception. Problem: Despite sharing many theoretical commitments that lead to a rejection of the classical approach, the alternatives are characterized by important contrasts and points of divergence. Here we (...)
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  19.  2
    M. F. Fultot, L. Nie & C. Carello (2016). Authors’ Response: Complementarity of Symmetry and Asymmetry. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):335-345.
    Upshot: Gibsonian and enactivist thinkers appear to diverge primarily with respect to the emphasis placed on the contributions of the organism to perception-action. Enactivists claim that a fundamental asymmetry in the organism-environment relationship should be credited for the existence of meaning in the world. Gibsonians counter that theory must reckon with both the asymmetry and symmetry between organism and environment as well as with the role of specificational information in underwriting their coordination.
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  20.  3
    R. Gahrn-Andersen & M. I. Harvey (2016). Phenomenological Teleology and Human Interactivity. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):224-226.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: We argue that Villalobos and Ward’s criticism misses two crucial aspects of Varelian enactivism. These are, first, that enactivism attempts to offer a rigorous scientific justification for its teleological claims, and second, that enactivism in fact pays too little attention to the nature of human phenomenology and intentionality, rather than anthropomorphically over-valuing it.
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  21.  3
    P. Gaitsch (2016). Modern Anthropomorphism and Phenomenological Method. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):220-221.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: As a reply to the criticism that anthropomorphism and modern science are incompatible, targeting Jonasian phenomenology and Varelian enactivism, I suggest considering the concept of modern anthropomorphism, which seems prima facie compatible with the pluralistic situation of today’s life sciences. My further claim is that the phenomenological method is intrinsically linked with this sort of anthropomorphism.
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  22.  4
    S. Gallagher (2016). Identity or Dynamic Structure? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):363-364.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: It is not clear what Kirchhoff and Hutto mean by identity when they claim that there is no gap between the phenomenal and the physical. Understanding the relation between causation and diachronic constitution, I suggest that phenomenal-physical existence is better characterized as a dynamically articulated form, structure, or gestalt.
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  23.  2
    H. Gash (2016). The Epistemological Dance: Difference, Experience and Representation. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):280-282.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: Accepting the biological origins and limits of what we know is a foundation stone of radical constructivist research. A corollary is that RC considers realism as allowing an impossible comparison between knowledge and reality. Recent works such as that presented in the target article have a more nuanced position in relation to “reality.” Points of similarity and difference between RC and direct realism (...)
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  24.  3
    D. Gasparyan (2016). Not to Avoid But Legitimize: Why the Gap Could Be Natural For the Enactive World. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):356-358.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: I show that the gap problem is of no threat to the enactivist approach; moreover, if the enactivism model is thoroughly thought over through extending ontology, it may turn out that the gap should be naturally built in the wholeness of the world at the level of its self-cognition.
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  25.  2
    J. C. González (2016). Blurring the Differences Between the Dream, Perceptual and Hallucinatory Experiences Is Not the Answer. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):417-419.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: Enaction and neurophenomenology are indeed appropriate and productive theoretical and methodological tools for studying perception. But moving from the perceptual domain to the hallucinatory and dreaming domain with these tools requires a prior careful examination of the similarities and differences across these domains. The authors point in the right direction for studying dream (...)
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  26.  2
    X. A. González-Grandón (2016). The Gap Or Not The Gap: Is That The Neurophenomenological Question? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):359-361.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: Kirchhoff and Hutto argue that the metaphysical commitments of neurophenomenology, as formulated by Varela in 1996, endorse a form of non-reductionism, which assumes and does not resolve the hard problem of consciousness. Although I share Kirchhoff and Hutto’s conceptual concern, I disagree that denying the gap between the phenomenal and the physical, opting (...)
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  27.  2
    D. G. Gozli (2016). Phenomenology as Critique, Discovery, and Justification. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):389-391.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: Consistent with constructivism, phenomenology attempts to ground knowledge in an understanding of subjectivity. Although the phenomenological method can serve as a source of new insights and important critique of the conventional modes of understanding, the method’s effectiveness in the context of justification remains problematic.
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  28.  2
    M. I. Harvey, R. Gahrn-Andersen & S. V. Steffensen (2016). Interactivity and Enaction in Human Cognition. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):234-245.
    Context: Distributed language and interactivity are central members of a set of concepts that are rapidly developing into rigorous, exciting additions to 4E cognitive science. Because they share certain assumptions and methodological commitments with enactivism, the two have sometimes been confused; additionally, while enactivism is a well-developed paradigm, interactivity has relied more on methodological development and on a set of focal examples. Problem: The goal of this article is to clarify the core conceptual commitments of both interactivity-based and enactive approaches (...)
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  29.  2
    M. I. Harvey, R. Gahrn-Andersen & S. V. Steffensen (2016). Authors’ Response: Explanatory Pluralism and Precise Conceptual Development. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):254-264.
    Upshot: We agree with commenters that enactivism incorporates a broad variety of methodologies, metaphysical stances, concepts, and investigative approaches, and that this is a good thing. However, we remain concerned that autonomy and sense-making are problematic concepts for post-Varelian enactivism, and that they form the foundations of a conceptual framework that may hamper the development of effective explanations for cognitive activity, as well as the paradigmatic aspirations of this particular enactivist approach.
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  30.  4
    V. Havelange (2016). Constitution: Epistemological and Ontological. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):398-399.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: Kordeš’s target article proposes to link constructivism and phenomenology, to their mutual benefit. In order to further this endeavour, this commentary suggests that it is important to distinguish two levels of constitution: the epistemological and the ontological. This may serve to clarify difficulties about achieving intersubjective validation.
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  31.  3
    M. Heras-Escribano (2016). Embracing the Environment: Ecological Answers for Enactive Problems. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):309-312.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: This commentary highlights some controversial aspects of enactivism and ecological psychology, specifically the notions of subjectivity and ecological information. I argue that, instead of choosing between them, both theories could complement each other at different levels of analysis in a single research framework for explaining cognition from a situated perspective.
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  32.  3
    M. D. Kirchhoff (2016). Dreaming: Ontological and Methodological Considerations. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):420-423.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: This commentary focuses on an ontological claim made by the authors of this target article: that perceiving, imagining and dreaming are inseparable. It explores how best to understand this “inseparability condition.” It is shown that the evidence needed to justify a strict reading of the inseparability condition is lacking, while there is room (...)
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  33.  7
    M. D. Kirchhoff & D. D. Hutto (2016). Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):346-353.
    Context: Neurophenomenology, as formulated by Varela, offers an approach to the science of consciousness that seeks to get beyond the hard problem of consciousness. There is much to admire in the practical approach to the science of consciousness that neurophenomenology advocates. Problem: Even so, this article argues, the metaphysical commitments of the enterprise require a firmer foundation. The root problem is that neurophenomenology, as classically formulated by Varela, endorses a form of non-reductionism that, despite its ambitions, assumes rather than dissolves (...)
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  34.  3
    M. D. Kirchhoff & D. D. Hutto (2016). Authors’ Response: Mind Never The Gap, Redux. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):370-374.
    Upshot: We respond to three main challenges that the commentaries have raised. First, we argue that to deal successfully with the hard problem of consciousness, it is not enough to posit a remedy by which to move beyond the hard problem. Second, we argue that it makes no sense to explain identity. Yet this does not commit us to definitions by fiat. The strategy we pursue here, and in the target article, is not to explain identity but to explain away (...)
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  35.  2
    U. Kordeš (2016). Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):375-385.
    Context: Epistemologically, constructivism has reached its goals, particularly by emphasizing the idea of participatory observation, circularity, and the fact that construction is based on experience. However, rather than research, the main occupation of constructivists and second-order cyberneticians seems to lie in making the case for their epistemological idea, which has been exhausted in many aspects. Purpose: To counteract this exhaustion and an increasingly apparent lack of energy, it is argued that constructivism requires a dedicated field of research, a field where (...)
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  36.  2
    U. Kordeš (2016). Author’s Response: Persevering with the Non-Trivial. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):400-406.
    Upshot: The response starts with a clarification of certain points that commentators found insufficiently articulated and then goes on to discuss some of the suggested solutions, all of which are seen as welcome improvements to the original proposal. The need for establishing a research environment acknowledging and nurturing the non-trivial character of experience is emphasised.
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  37.  3
    U. Kordeš (2016). Dreams: An Experimental Laboratory of Phenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):423-425.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: Solomonova and Sha propose a research programme for the study of dreaming based on the theoretical framework of enactivism. This commentary intends to demonstrate several unclear points connected to the theoretical framework applied and the proposed methodological solutions. By considering the potential reach of various phenomenological approaches in the research of dreams, I (...)
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  38.  3
    D. Lloyd (2016). Not-Quite-So Radical Enactivism. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):361-363.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: Enactivism is a welcome development in cognitive science, but its “radical” rejection of representation poses problems for capturing phenomenality. The totality of our interactions exceeds our awareness, so circumscribing the activity that constitutes consciousness seems to require representational guidance.
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  39.  2
    R. Lowe (2016). The Role of Allostasis in Sense-Making: A Better Fit for Interactivity Than Cybernetic-Enactivism? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):251-254.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Interactivity and Enaction in Human Cognition” by Matthew Isaac Harvey, Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen & Sune Vork Steffensen. Upshot: In contrasting an interactivity account alternative to variants on the enactive approach, the authors discuss the role of sense-making. They claim that their interactivity perspective, unlike enactive approaches, accounts for a dependency on “non-local” resources characteristic of many organisms. I draw attention to the cybernetic-enactivist perspective on homeostatic sense-making, which may fundamentally fail to explain the operationally open (...)
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  40.  2
    O. Lukitsch & C. Schreiber (2016). Down the “Preferred Path”: Dispositional Flexibility Constitutes Phenomenal Character. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):367-368.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: We agree with Kirchhoff and Hutto that phenomeno-physical identities have to be motivated to approach the hard problem of consciousness. We propose that REC will do a better job in motivating these identities if intentionality and phenomenality are considered inseparable. We suggest that the notion of dispositional flexibility motivates these phenomeno-intentional identities and (...)
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  41.  2
    O. Markič (2016). In Search of a Remedy. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):385-387.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: The naturalistic paradigm, which relies on the third-person perspective and the exclusion of the observer, cannot accommodate human experience in its scientific enterprise. I present a critical overview of Kordeš’s proposal to merge the constructivist epistemological framework and empirical phenomenology. I doubt whether constructivism actually requires empirical grounding, but I do see constructivism with instrumentalism as a possible framework in which researchers will be (...)
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  42.  3
    H. R. Maturana (2016). Confusion of Reflective Domains? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):213-214.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: I shall not address directly the article on which I am supposed to comment, and that I find very interesting, but I shall make four commentaries on the general subject of the confusion of domains in our reflection on biological and cultural phenomena.
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  43.  4
    M. McGann (2016). Enactivism and Ecological Psychology: Divided by Common Ground. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):312-315.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: Fultot, Nie, and Carello are correct that enactive researchers should be more aware of the research literature on ecological psychology, but their charge of mental construction is off-target. Enactivism and ecological psychology are compatible frameworks with different, complementary, emphases.
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  44.  2
    K. Miyahara (2016). Missing Out On the Radicalism of Neurophenomenology? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):368-370.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: An exegetical worry about Kirchhoff and Hutto’s exposition of neurophenomenology is pointed out. Combining this exegetical critique with an examination of the “strict identity” in the strict identity thesis, I argue that there is more affinity between neurophenomenology and REC than they think.
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  45.  3
    M. Mossio (2016). How Far Can Sensorimotor Direct Realism Go? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):287-289.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: The target article convincingly argues in favor of the idea that the sensorimotor account of perception provides a positive scientific context for direct realism. In some cases, however, perception and experience do not seem to fit easily with sensorimotor direct realism. This raises a question of scope that requires further elaboration.
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  46.  2
    J. -L. Petit (2016). Is Intentionality Banned From Sciences of the Living Being? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):218-219.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: This commentary questions an assumption in the target article to the effect that science prohibits projecting any intentional properties or entities outside of human experience.
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  47.  2
    J. Pickering (2016). Who is “We”? Some Observations on Sensorimotor Direct Realism. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):279-280.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: Sensorimotor direct realism may describe how animals engage with their surroundings. But human beings are not typical animals. Their engagement can be metaphorical as well as direct, in which case the theory has less plausibility.
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  48.  3
    B. Pierce (2016). The Role of External Objects in Perceptual Experience. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):285-287.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: This commentary is broadly sympathetic to the claims made in the target article. I start by questioning whether we can have direct access to an external reality in such a way that our experience is not intrinsically private. I then suggest that the argument for direct realism presented here is inconclusive with regard to whether external objects play a causal or a constitutive (...)
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  49.  2
    J. Proulx (2016). Living Different Enactivist Worlds: A Mathematics Education Researcher’s Point of View on Enactivism. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):226-227.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: Villalobos and Ward’s distinctions between Varelian theories and Maturanian ones about anthropomorphism give rise to questions about what is or is not enactivism. This leads to recognition of an enactivist theoretical multiverse, and to embracing it as a way to advance theorizing along, and beyond, post-positivist lines.
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  50.  3
    E. B. Roesch (2016). In Search of a New Looking Glass: Cognitive Science Is Not Dead, It Is Just Asleep. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):419-420.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: Solomonova and Sha draw inspiration from the work programme that sparked the enactive extension to cognitive science, and propose a framework for dream scientists. This case study for a renewed cognitive science highlights key points that are worth developing, in light of current practices in neuroscience.
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  51.  2
    A. Rosales-Lagarde (2016). Neurophenomenology’s Epistemological Locus and the Need to Consider Its Primitive Sources: Internal Processing and Development. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):427-429.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: Neurophenomenology requires a first-person report at the sub-personal level. Thus, the neurophenomenology of dreaming and sleep can be figuratively located in a model of perspectives and levels of analysis. Even when Solomonova and Sha do admit creativity to explain bizarreness and emphasize dreams’ enaction and, especially, dreams’ perception-dependence, an innate and developmental framework (...)
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  52.  2
    A. Schiavio (2016). Enactive Affordances and the Interplay of Biological and Phenomenological Subjectivity. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):315-317.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: Enactive approaches highlight the deep interdependency of brains, action, agency, and environment in shaping the world we inhabit. This perspective goes beyond input-output models of cognition, postulating instead closed loops of action and perception framed by the agent-environment complementarity. As a unique, dynamical, system, no representational recovery is required for cognitive-behavioral experience to take place.
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  53.  4
    D. Silverman (2016). Representationalism and the Sensorimotor Theory. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):282-284.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: In light of the construal of sensorimotor theory offered by the target article, this commentary examines the role the theory should admit for internal representation.
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  54.  3
    E. Solomonova & X. W. Sha (2016). Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):407-416.
    Context: Phenomenology and the enactive approach pose a unique challenge to dream research: during sleep one seems to be relatively disconnected from both world and body. Movement and perception, prerequisites for sensorimotor subjectivity, are restricted; the dreamer’s experience is turned inwards. In cognitive neurosciences, on the other hand, the generally accepted approach holds that dream formation is a direct result of neural activations in the absence of perception, and dreaming is often equated with “delusions.” Problem: Can enactivism and phenomenology account (...)
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  55.  2
    E. Solomonova & X. W. Sha (2016). Authors’ Response: Towards a Neurophenomenology of Embodied, Skillful Dreaming. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):432-442.
    Upshot: A successful program for an enactive view of dreaming would have to clarify phenomenal and neurophysiological similarities and differences between waking perception, imagination, and dreaming. An embodied and skillful view of the dream process would require careful investigation of somatic sources of dream content, including sensory incorporation, and global, indirect ways in which dream content reacts metaphorically to changes in bodily states. Neurophenomenology of dreams would benefit from developing dreaming-specific approaches to training researchers and participants in phenomenological methods.
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  56.  6
    M. Stapleton (2016). Enactivism Embraces Ecological Psychology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):325-327.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: The authors of the target article seem on the one hand to want to reprimand enactivists for not embracing ecological psychology, and on the other, to criticise them for taking on board some - but not all - of the principles of ecological psychology. In this commentary, I argue that the claim that enactivists have not embraced ecological psychology is (...)
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  57.  2
    P. Steiner (2016). The Many Faces of Experience. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):395-397.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: The priority Kordeš gives to empirical phenomenology in the empirical assessment and grounding of constructivism stems from a restrictive conception of experience that has been questioned by other proponents of what he calls the “phenomenological attitude.”.
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  58.  1
    J. Stewart (2016). Realities in the Plural. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):277-278.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: Direct realism can be better distinguished from objectivism and naïve realism, by recognizing the radical plurality of the incommensurable realities that can be enacted by living organisms in coupling with their environment.
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  59.  2
    T. Strle (2016). On the Necessity of Foundations, Intersubjectivity and Cognitive Science. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):387-389.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: I discuss three of the target article’s topics that I find either problematic or important. First, I discuss a potentially dangerous consequence of claiming that empirical phenomenology necessarily calls for a constructivist foundation. Second, I consider the threat to intersubjective validation and the related problem that the author does not specify what technique one should use for training and collecting data in research on (...)
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  60.  1
    S. Taguchi (2016). Can the Lived Experience of Living Beings Be Approached Through Inference? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):215-216.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: Villalobos and Ward seem to disclose a fundamental problem without solving it - a problem to which neither the Jonasian nor the Maturanian inference can offer a solution. It should be addressed by a phenomenological analysis of our basic experience of aliveness.
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  61.  1
    S. Torrance (2016). Varela’s Sixth Step: Teleology and the Re-Visioning of Science. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):221-224.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: Jonas was not defending an unrestrained anthropomorphism but, rather, a “zoomorphism,” which offered a rigorous, considered view of the deep phylogenetic origins of purpose and mind. Jonas did not reject science per se, but an alienated, rigid conception of the latter. His work helped pave the way to a richer science of mind.
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  62.  1
    P. Vermersch (2016). Notes on the Coupling Between the Observer and the Observed in Psycho-Phenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):391-393.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: This commentary supports the view of the target article concerning the interest of taking into account the coupling between the observing scientist and the subject, and applying it in particular to the study of subjective experience. I propose to identify three aspects of coupling: the technical conditions of coupling between the observer and the subject being observed in order to guide introspection; the requirements (...)
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  63.  5
    M. Villalobos & D. Ward (2016). Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):204-212.
    Context: The majority of contemporary enactivist work is influenced by the philosophical biology of Hans Jonas. Jonas credits all living organisms with experience that involves particular “existential” structures: nascent forms of concern for self-preservation and desire for objects and outcomes that promote well-being. We argue that Jonas’s attitude towards living systems involves a problematic anthropomorphism that threatens to place enactivism at odds with cognitive science, and undermine its legitimate aims to become a new paradigm for scientific investigation and understanding of (...)
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  64.  1
    S. Vörös, T. Froese & A. Riegler (2016). Epistemological Odyssey: Introduction to Special Issue on the Diversity of Enactivism and Neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):189-204.
    Context: In the past two decades, the so-called 4E approaches to the mind and cognition have been rapidly gaining in recognition and have become an integral part of various disciplines. Problem: Recently, however, questions have been raised as to whether, and to what degree, these different approaches actually cohere with one another. Specifically, it seems that many of them endorse mutually incompatible, perhaps even contradictory, epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions. Method: By retracing the roots of an alternative conception of mind and (...)
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  65.  3
    D. Ward & M. Villalobos (2016). Authors’ Response: Enactivism, Cognitive Science, and the Jonasian Inference. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):228-233.
    Upshot: In our target article we claimed that, at least since Weber and Varela, enactivism has incorporated a theoretical commitment to one important aspect of Jonas’s philosophical biology, namely its anthropomorphism, which is at odds with the methodological commitments of modern science. In this general reply we want to clarify what we mean by anthropomorphism, and explain why we think it is incompatible with science. We do this by spelling out what we call the “Jonasian inference,” i.e., the idea that (...)
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  66.  1
    K. Werner (2016). Presentation of the World: Gibson and Husserl on the Interplay Between the Objective and the Subjective. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):317-319.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: In this commentary, I focus on several issues concerning the notion of presentation. I argue that Fultot, Nie and Carello do not pay sufficient attention to these problems, despite the fact that Gibson, compared here with Husserl, may be regarded as one of those thinkers who made an important contribution to this.
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  67.  1
    J. M. Windt (2016). We Need to Go Deeper! Conceptual and Methodological Considerations on the Depth of Dream Experience. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):429-432.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: This commentary aims to sharpen the conceptual distinction between the breadth and the depth of dream experience. I discuss several possible readings and argue that the best one construes breadth and depth as distinct but complimentary research strategies distinguished not just by the kinds of evidence they rely on, but also by the (...)
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  68.  2
    K. Zahidi & J. V. Eemeren (2016). Radical Enactivism and Ecological Psychology: Friends or Foes? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):320-322.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: We examine whether there are any irreducible contradictions between ecological psychology and radical enactivism. We concentrate on two points of contention between the two approaches: the relevance of neural structures in understanding perception and the use of semantically loaded concepts in theorizing about perception.
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