Year:

  1. M. Arnold-Cathalifaud & D. Thumala-Dockendorff (2016). To What Extent Can Second-Order Cybernetics Be a Foundation for Psychology? Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):520-521.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology” by Bernard Scott. Upshot: Scott’s proposal is well-founded and opens interesting possibilities. We selected some critical aspects of his argumentation and discuss them in the context of the constructivist perspective. We highlight as Scott’s “blind spot” his statement - presented without further argument - of the need for a conceptual and theoretical unification of psychology from the perspective of second-order cybernetics. We find this especially worrisome as it is based on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2.  2
    Y. Ataria (2016). On the Too Often Overlooked Complexity of the Tension Between Subject and Object. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):550-552.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: Gasparyan’s article ignores the inherent tension of being a human who is both a subject and an object at the same time. Any theory of consciousness must include both of these dimensions.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. P. Baron (2016). Obstacles to Cybernetics Becoming a Conceptual Framework and Metanarrative in the Psychologies. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):524-527.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology” by Bernard Scott. Upshot: Scott’s ideas of a unifying conceptual framework and metanarrative for the seemingly divergent psychology fields may be met with challenges. Four obstacles are presented, which can be addressed in order to mitigate resistance to Scott achieving his goal of cybernetics fulfilling these dual roles in the psychologies.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4. G. Becerra (2016). Connecting Second-Order Cybernetics’ Revolution with Genetic Epistemology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):468-470.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental Revolution in Science” by Stuart A. Umpleby. Upshot: Connecting Umpleby’s article with Piaget and García’s genetic epistemology, I will argue that the revolution the former discerns is more comprehensive. Additionally, since the latter differ from cybernetic and radical traditions in their philosophical assumptions about society and its conditioning on knowledge, I will suggest that these assumptions must be considered to explain each constructivist program’s achievements and challenges.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5. E. Buchinger (2016). The Social and the Psychological: Conceptual Cybernetic Unification Vs Disciplinary Analysis? Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):527-528.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology” by Bernard Scott. Upshot: Psychology and sociology are distinct academic disciplines but nevertheless closely interrelated. What are the benefits of conceptual integration using a cybernetic approach and what are the strengths of progressing within the disciplinary paths?
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. P. A. Cariani (2016). Beware False Dichotomies. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):472-475.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental Revolution in Science” by Stuart A. Umpleby. Upshot: While I agree with most of the thrust of second-order cybernetics, I find the dichotomy of first- vs. second-order cybernetics conceptually and historically problematic because it implicitly conflates the cybernetics of nonhuman systems with realist conceptions of observer-free science. The dichotomy may be divisive and unhealthy for cybernetics by driving natural scientists and engineers out of the movement, thereby undermining the universality (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  1
    L. F. Christy Jr (2016). Opening the Black Box of Minds: Theatre as a Laboratory of System Unknowns. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):616-618.
    Open peer commentary on the article ““Black Box” Theatre: Second-Order Cybernetics and Naturalism in Rehearsal and Performance” by Tom Scholte. Upshot: What von Foerster accomplished in raising the specter of second-order cybernetics now requires experimental design and the heavy lifting of theory to complete his quest for new ways of thinking. Scholte’s “black box theatre” points to research into non-trivial systems as a formal means of grasping living systems.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. B. Clarke & D. Chansky (2016). Audience and Autopoiesis. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):610-612.
    Open peer commentary on the article ““Black Box” Theatre: Second-Order Cybernetics and Naturalism in Rehearsal and Performance” by Tom Scholte. Upshot: Scholte’s approach to theater as a black box to be probed indicates that the vocabulary of second-order cybernetics provides an analytical repertoire adequate to the complexity of theatrical phenomena, from the construction of the play in rehearsal to the delivery of the play in performance. While it was hard to discern the precise details in some of Scholte’s experimental protocols, (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9. A. M. Collings (2016). Eigenforms, Coherence, and the Imaginal. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):501-502.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetics, Reflexivity and Second-Order Science” by Louis H. Kauffman. Upshot: This commentary reflects broadly on the concept of eigenform and reflexive domains, focusing on the idea that second-order science is neither the same as nor completely distinct from ordinary living.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. M. de Sousa van Stralen (2016). Digital Design Research and Second-Order Cybernetics. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):586-587.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Design Research as a Variety of Second-Order Cybernetic Practice” by Ben Sweeting. Upshot: I claim that the parallels between design research, second-order cybernetics and second-order science, as discussed by Sweeting in the target article, are more explicit in digital design. The discussion of SOC and SOS can point towards the creation of an epistemological foundation to digital design, where self-reflexivity and the inclusion of the observer are central questions.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. J. dos Santos Cabral Filho (2016). Cybernetics Is the Answer, but What Was the Conversation About? Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):587-589.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Design Research as a Variety of Second-Order Cybernetic Practice” by Ben Sweeting. Upshot: It is suggested that the main arguments of the target article could be constructed in an easier way and would become even more compelling if a radical consideration of the systemic nature of design were taken into account.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12. T. R. Flanagan (2016). Second-Order Cybernetics Needs a Unifying Methodology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):475-478.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental Revolution in Science” by Stuart A. Umpleby. Upshot: Theory without a strong methodology is stranded in philosophy. Principles devolved from theory can be applied to situations in the arena of practice in many ways; however, a continually improving science must refine its theories with feedback from data drawn from the use of continually improving sets of codified methodologies. Second-order cybernetics is contingent upon sense-making within sapient systems. A perspective on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13. K. Forsythe (2016). Conserving the Disposition for Wonder. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):503-505.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetics, Reflexivity and Second-Order Science” by Louis H. Kauffman. Upshot: I demonstrate how Kauffman’s cogently argued article requires an act of imagination. I distinguish the act of perception, and its transformation as conception, as imagining. It is how we distinguish both the creation and exploration of our experience in context since, when we make a distinction, we also define the context, and this cannot be accomplished without circularity.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14. D. Gasparyan (2016). Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):539-549.
    Context: Contemporary philosophy of consciousness has not yet come up with an acceptable theory of consciousness. Philosophers are still not able to reach agreement, and have come to a deadlock, since all possible approaches seem to have been exhausted and all the arguments repeatedly discussed. Problem: It may be assumed that the crisis has been caused by factors rooted in initial, wrong attitudes to knowledge or, more specifically, in epistemology focused on first-order cybernetics. The situation might be altered if philosophy (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15. D. Gasparyan (2016). Author’s Response: Phenomenology of the System: Intentionality, Differences, Understanding, and the Unity of Consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):564-571.
    Upshot: I focus on the group of ideas concerning the nature of consciousness as a phenomenological system, i.e., intentionality, differences, understanding, and the unity of consciousness. Also, I try to link this phenomenological system with second-order cybernetics and to clarify the scientific status of the self-descriptive theory of consciousness.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16. T. G. Gill (2016). Viva the Fundamental Revolution! Confessions of a Case Writer. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):478-481.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental Revolution in Science” by Stuart A. Umpleby. Upshot: The process of writing a discussion case study requires that a researcher become embedded in the domain being studied; it entails constructing a reality as it is perceived by the participants; it demands a high level of humility, since complex environments have a tendency to thwart rational reasoning processes. Unfortunately, these very characteristics lead conventional researchers to disparage case writing, even questioning (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  3
    D. Griffiths (2016). Understanding Design From a Second-Order Cybernetics Perspective: Is There a Place for Material Agency? Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):581-583.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Design Research as a Variety of Second-Order Cybernetic Practice” by Ben Sweeting. Upshot: This commentary supports Sweeting’s case for the relationship between the design tradition, second-order cybernetics and second-order science. It argues, however, that the extension of this argument to other intellectual traditions and areas of practice is complicated by differing views of material agency.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  18.  1
    C. M. Herr (2016). What Can Cybernetics Learn From Design? Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):583-585.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Design Research as a Variety of Second-Order Cybernetic Practice” by Ben Sweeting. Upshot: Based on Sweeting’s central question of what design can bring to cybernetics, this commentary extends and adds further depth to the target article. Aspects discussed include the nature of practice in relation to design, the introduction of designerly ways of acting and thinking through acting to cybernetics, and the re-introduction of material experimentation typical of early cybernetics.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. M. Hohl (2016). Rigor in Research, Honesty and Values. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):585-586.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Design Research as a Variety of Second-Order Cybernetic Practice” by Ben Sweeting. Upshot: I reflect on the theme of honesty in research and discuss the adjoining requirements of rigor from an academic perspective. Central to my discussion is Glanville’s assertion that what researchers - from either science or design - presented was not what they actually thought and did.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20. A. Jelić (2016). Design Research in the Age of Neuroscience: The Value of the Second-Order Cybernetic Practice Perspective. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):589-590.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Design Research as a Variety of Second-Order Cybernetic Practice” by Ben Sweeting. Upshot: This commentary highlights the relevance of understanding design research as a variety of second-order cybernetic practice. It does so by illustrating possible contributions of this view to several concrete issues surrounding the introduction of neuroscientific framework to architectural design. Based on the implications of Sweeting’s article, I suggest that the specific case of an interdisciplinary dialogue between architecture and cognitive science can (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  1
    L. H. Kauffman (2016). Cybernetics, Reflexivity and Second-Order Science. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):489-497.
    Context: Second-order cybernetics and its implications have been understood within the cybernetics community for some time. These implications are important for understanding the structure of scientific endeavor, and for researchers in other fields to see the reflexive nature of scientific research. This article is about the role of context in the creation and exploration of our experience. Problem: The purpose of this article is to point out the fundamental nature of the circularity in cybernetics and in scientific work in general. (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. L. H. Kauffman (2016). Author’s Response: Distinction, Eigenform and the Epistemology of the Imagination. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):505-508.
    Upshot: Eigenform is a precondition for distinction and distinction is a precondition for eigenform. While my target article discussed eigenform and reflexivity, it could just as well have discussed distinctions and the emergence of distinctions. This theme was implicit in many of the comments. We make this circularity explicit for the sake of a deeper understanding.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23. V. Kenny (2016). Wielding the Cybernetic Scythe in the Blunting Undergrowth of Psychological Confusion. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):517-519.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology” by Bernard Scott. Upshot: Given the fragmental state of what is known as “psychology,” I think it would be an error to attempt to “unify” such chaos and that efforts would be better spent dissolving the illusion that “psychology” exists and instead redesigning a genuinely psychological psychology that has relevance to daily living.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  2
    U. Kordeš (2016). Where Is Consciousness? Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):552-554.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: I join Gasparyan’s discussion on a possibility of having a theory of consciousness without ignoring the intrinsic self-referentiality of such an endeavour. My questions are: If we acknowledge the primacy of consciousness, is a theory of consciousness even possible? If so, what purpose would it serve? Explaining consciousness “from the inside” leads to some epistemological and methodological dilemmas, one of which is the encounter of phenomenal (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25. E. Landgraf (2016). Naturalism in Improvisation and Embodiment. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):613-615.
    Open peer commentary on the article ““Black Box” Theatre: Second-Order Cybernetics and Naturalism in Rehearsal and Performance” by Tom Scholte. Upshot: This commentary adds historical perspective to the use of improvisation and conversation as models for the promotion of naturalism in acting. It wants to denaturalize naturalism and the concept of embodiment in support of Scholte’s reconceptualization of the naturalist theatre, and concludes with a reflection on the societal function of art and theatre today.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. A. Leonard (2016). Obstacles and Opportunities in the Future of Second-Order Cybernetics and Other Compatible Methods. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):466-467.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental Revolution in Science” by Stuart A. Umpleby. Upshot: This commentary looks at the parallel developments in contiguous fields that include and encourage multiple viewpoints and the validity of multiple positions. I contend that necessity will overcome the resistance to disturbing the status quo of power structures when the stakes become high enough.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27. S. Levin (2016). Consciousness as Self-Description and the Inescapability of Reduction. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):561-562.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: I argue that a philosophy of consciousness refocused on second-order cybernetics in the way proposed by Gasparyan could not replace the reductionist program because the question of reduction would arise again within the framework of such an approach.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28. M. R. Lissack (2016). Shed the Name to Find Second-Order Success: Renaming Second-Order Cybernetics to Rescue its Essence. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):470-472.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental Revolution in Science” by Stuart A. Umpleby. Upshot: Buried in the jargon of constructivism and cybernetics lies the essence of what second-order cybernetics can do for its practitioners. The labels and names get in the way; to move forward we must refocus on that essence - which is to ask always how context matters.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29. M. R. Lissack (2016). Finally Understanding Eigenforms. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):499-500.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetics, Reflexivity and Second-Order Science” by Louis H. Kauffman. Upshot: One of cybernetics most confusing and least understood concepts is that of the eigenform. With this article Kauffman has enabled a clear understanding of the concept as “the coherence of a situation that allows a distinction to be made.”.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30. R. J. Martin (2016). The Importance - and the Difficulty - of Moving Beyond Linear Causality. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):521-524.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology” by Bernard Scott. Upshot: This commentary considers linear causality as an underlying model in science and in psychology and the difficulty of changing paradigms to include circularity and other concepts.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. A. Müller (2016). Does Second-Order Cybernetics Provide a Framework for Theatre Studies? Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):618-619.
    Open peer commentary on the article ““Black Box” Theatre: Second-Order Cybernetics and Naturalism in Rehearsal and Performance” by Tom Scholte. Upshot: Scholte’s attempt to link theatre studies with cybernetics faces at least two problems: historically, there could not have been any direct influence between these two fields; and conceptually, do we need second-order cybernetics, and the concept of the black box in particular, to account for the Stanislavski system?
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32. K. H. Müller & A. Riegler (2016). Mapping the Varieties of Second-Order Cybernetics. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):443-454.
    Context: Although second-order cybernetics was proposed as a new way of cybernetic investigations around 1970, its general status and its modus operandi are still far from obvious. Problem: We want to provide a new perspective on the scope and the currently available potential of second-order cybernetics within today’s science landscapes. Method: We invited a group of scholars who have produced foundational work on second-order cybernetics in recent years, and organized an open call for new approaches to second-order cybernetics. The accepted (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. K. Pavlov-Pinus (2016). Theorizing Agents: Their Games, Hermeneutical Tools and Epistemic Resources. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):554-557.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: The aim of my commentary is to support some of Gasparyan’s ideas and to reformulate them in a more constructive way in terms of both formalized hermeneutical procedures and networks and in the light of game-theory approaches.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34. J. Pickering (2016). Self-Description Alone Will Not Account for Qualia. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):559-561.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: The first part of Gasparyan’s article usefully shows how problems must arise if consciousness is approached as if it were a phenomenon separate from the observer. The second part suggests a change of approach from first- to second-order cybernetics will solve these problems. While this, too, is helpful, it is, in essence, an epistemological device that requires something else in order to engage with the fundamental (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. B. Pierce (2016). How Can Meaning Be Grounded Within a Closed Self-Referential System? Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):557-559.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: The account, in the target article, of consciousness as a self-contained, self-referential autopoietic system faces a potential problem when we seek to ground meaning and norms. I will discuss three ways in which meaning can be grounded, the last of which requires reasons for action to be grounded from a subjective point of view, with the qualitative character of affective valence performing a regress-stopping role. I (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36. B. Porr (2016). “Truthful” Acting Emerges Through Forward Model Development. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):612-613.
    Open peer commentary on the article ““Black Box” Theatre: Second-Order Cybernetics and Naturalism in Rehearsal and Performance” by Tom Scholte. Upshot: My aim is to show that “truthful” acting that emerges through improvisation is equivalent to the development of mutual forward models in the actors. If these models match those of the audience members, this is perceived as “truthful.”.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. L. D. Richards (2016). The Many Varieties of Experimentation in Second-Order Cybernetics: Art, Science, Craft. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):621-622.
    Open peer commentary on the article ““Black Box” Theatre: Second-Order Cybernetics and Naturalism in Rehearsal and Performance” by Tom Scholte. Upshot: Scholte proposes using the theatre as a laboratory for experimenting with ideas in second-order cybernetics, adding to the repertoire of approaches for advancing this way of thinking. Second-order cybernetics, as art, science and craft, raises questions about the forms of experimentation most useful in such a laboratory. Theatre provides an opportunity to “play” with the dynamics of human interactions and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  1
    A. Schetz (2016). The Non-Relationality of Consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):562-564.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Consciousness as Self-Description in Differences” by Diana Gasparyan. Upshot: I focus on Gasparyan’s claim that consciousness should be understood analogously to the performative speech acts. I am inclined to agree with her position, but shall, at the same time, try to show that there is no need to maintain a relational character of consciousness, where the relation would be taking place between an act of consciousness and its content. A non-relational character of consciousness could (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39. T. Scholte (2016). Design Cycles: Conversing with Lawrence Halprin. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):579-581.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Design Research as a Variety of Second-Order Cybernetic Practice” by Ben Sweeting. Upshot: This commentary adds environmental architect Lawrence Halprin to Sweeting’s list of examples of design research as second-order cybernetic practice.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  40.  1
    T. Scholte (2016). “Black Box” Theatre: Second-Order Cybernetics and Naturalism in Rehearsal and Performance. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):598-610.
    Context: The thoroughly second-order cybernetic underpinnings of naturalist theatre have gone almost entirely unremarked in the literature of both theatre studies and cybernetics itself. As a result, rich opportunities for the two fields to draw mutual benefit and break new ground through both theoretical and empirical investigations of these underpinnings have, thus far, gone untapped. Problem: The field of cybernetics continues to remain academically marginalized for, among other things, its alleged lack of experimental rigor. At the same time, the field (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41. T. Scholte (2016). Author’s Response: “Playing With Dynamics”: Procedures and Possibilities for a Theatre of Cybernetics. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):623-629.
    Upshot: Operational concepts underpinning a proposed cybersemiotic theatrical laboratory are further refined while questions regarding its experimental orientation remain.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42. T. Schönwälder-Kuntze (2016). Remarks From a Continental Philosophy Point of View. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):497-499.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetics, Reflexivity and Second-Order Science” by Louis H. Kauffman. Upshot: The commentary focuses on some similarities between Kauffman’s remarks on reflective, self-referential science, Kant’s “Copernican turn” and the historicization of knowledge within “continental philosophy.”.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43. B. Scott (2016). Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):509-517.
    Context: The field of psychology consists of many specialist domains of activity, which lack shared foundations. This means that the field as a whole lacks conceptual coherence. Problem: The aim of the article is to show how second-order cybernetics can provide both foundations and a unifying conceptual framework for psychology. Method: The field of psychology is overviewed. There is then a demonstration of how cybernetics can provide both foundations and a unifying conceptual framework. This entails defining some key cybernetics concepts (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  1
    B. Scott (2016). Author’s Response: On Becoming and Being a Cybernetician. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):532-538.
    Upshot: I discuss further why my proposals may not be taken up by all and say more about their usefulness, my understanding of what it is to be a cybernetician and the underlying coherent form that I see amongst different “versions” of cybernetics. I also elaborate on what is social about psychosocial unities and elaborate their relevance for studies of social systems.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45. T. Stingl de Vasconcelos Guedes (2016). Second Thoughts on Cybernetic Unifications. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):528-530.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology” by Bernard Scott. Upshot: While Scott’s perspective is an inspiring attempt to unify psychology, much more impact from second-order cybernetics would be needed to build an appropriate and comprehensive cybernetic framework to unify an actor-based field such as psychology. In particular, I identify three aspects that need to be addressed: the problem of levels, the problem of multiple-level dynamics, and the problem of being sufficiently different.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46. L. Šugman Bohinc (2016). Cybernetics and Synergetics as Foundations for Complex Approach Towards Complexities of Life. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):530-532.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Cybernetic Foundations for Psychology” by Bernard Scott. Upshot: Based on my personal and professional experiences as a university teacher of social work, systemic psychotherapy, and education, I suggest the concepts of third-order cybernetics and synergetics as a support to creating a more unified and integrated framework of psychology to better understand and deal with complex, self-organizing systems.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47. B. Sweeting (2016). Design Research as a Variety of Second-Order Cybernetic Practice. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):572-579.
    Context: The relationship between design and science has shifted over recent decades. One bridge between the two is cybernetics, which offers perspectives on both in terms of their practice. From around 1980 onwards, drawing on ideas from cybernetics, Glanville has suggested that rather than apply science to design, it makes more sense to understand science as a form of design activity, reversing the more usual hierarchy between the two. I return to review this argument here, in the context of recent (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48. B. Sweeting (2016). Author’s Response: Beyond Application. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):591-597.
    Upshot: I reinforce the idea of broad connections between cybernetics, design and science that become apparent when the messy processes implicit in each are reflected on more explicitly. In so doing, I treat design not as a field in which cybernetic ideas are to be applied, but one in which they are reflected on and pursued.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49. B. Sweeting (2016). A Theatre for Exploring the Cybernetic. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):619-620.
    Open peer commentary on the article ““Black Box” Theatre: Second-Order Cybernetics and Naturalism in Rehearsal and Performance” by Tom Scholte. Upshot: The parallels that Scholte has drawn between cybernetics and theatre open up a new avenue for exploring cybernetic ideas. This complements the way that cybernetics has invoked design as a way of questioning the relationship between cybernetics and action.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  1
    S. A. Umpleby (2016). Second-Order Cybernetics as a Fundamental Revolution in Science. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):455-465.
    Context: The term “second-order cybernetics” was introduced by von Foerster in 1974 as the “cybernetics of observing systems,” both the act of observing systems and systems that observe. Since then, the term has been used by many authors in articles and books and has been the subject of many conference panels and symposia. Problem: The term is still not widely known outside the fields of cybernetics and systems science and the importance and implications of the work associated with second-order cybernetics (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  51. S. A. Umpleby (2016). Author’s Response: Struggling to Define an Identity for Second-Order Cybernetics. Constructivist Foundations 11 (3):481-488.
    Upshot: Second-order cybernetics is an important field for the scientific enterprise but it has difficulty explaining itself to those outside the field and defining itself to those inside the field.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  52.  4
    N. F. Barrett (2016). What Is at Stake in the Disagreement Between Interactivity and Enaction? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):249-251.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Interactivity and Enaction in Human Cognition” by Matthew Isaac Harvey, Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen & Sune Vork Steffensen. Upshot: To sort out their differences with enactive theory, interactivity theorists would do better to focus on operational closure only insofar as it constitutes a condition of intrinsic normativity or self-regulated coupling.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  53.  16
    M. Beaton (2016). Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):265-276.
    Context: Direct realism is a non-reductive, anti-representationalist theory of perception lying at the heart of mainstream analytic philosophy, where it is currently generating a lot of interest. For all that, it is widely held to be both controversial and anti-scientific. On the other hand, the sensorimotor theory of perception initially generated a lot of interest within enactive philosophy of cognitive science, but has arguably not yet delivered on its initial promise. Problem: I aim to show that the sensorimotor theory and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  54.  8
    M. Beaton (2016). Author’s Response: The Personal Level in Sensorimotor Theory. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):289-297.
    Upshot: I offer responses to the commentaries on my target article in five short sections. The first section, about the plurality of lived worlds, concerns issues of quite general interest to readers of this journal. The second section presents some reasons for rejecting “enabling” as well as “constitutive” representational approaches to understanding the mind. In the remaining three sections, I clarify aspects of sensorimotor direct realism relating to the self, qualia, counterfactuals, and the notion of “mastery.”.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  55.  7
    M. Beaton (2016). Crossing the Explanatory Gap by Legwork, Not by Fiat. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):364-366.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: I strongly agree with Kirchhoff and Hutto that consciousness and embodied action are one and the same, but I disagree when they say this identity cannot be fully explained and must simply be posited. Here I attempt to sketch the outlines of just such an explanation.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  56.  3
    J. M. Bishop (2016). Phenomenal Promiscuity. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):284-285.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: Sensorimotor direct realism is too promiscuous in its account of sensation.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  57.  9
    M. Bitbol & E. Antonova (2016). On the Too Often Overlooked Radicality of Neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):354-356.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: We point out that the significance of the neurophenomenological approach to the “hard problem” of consciousness is underrated and misunderstood by the authors of the target article. In its original version, neurophenomenology implies nothing less than a change in our own being to dispel the mere sense that there is a problem to (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  58.  4
    P. A. Cariani (2016). Learning of New Percept-Action Mappings Is a Constructive Process of Goal-Directed Self-Modification. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):322-324.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: In my view, the clash between ecological psychology, enactivism, and constructivism in general has more to do with irreconcilable metaphysical and theoretical incommensurabilities than disagreements about specific mechanisms or processes of perception. Even with mutual enabling of action and perception, some internal process of self-modification is still needed if novel behavior is to be adequately explained.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  59.  3
    F. Cummins (2016). Enaction, and Its Relation to Science in an Objective Key. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):245-246.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Interactivity and Enaction in Human Cognition” by Matthew Isaac Harvey, Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen & Sune Vork Steffensen. Upshot: Enaction, as a paradigm, is still negotiating its position with respect to science done in an objective key. Some of the problems identified by the authors arise by treating enactive descriptions as if they were realist accounts. Negotiating a resolution here will demand progress all round.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  60.  6
    T. J. Davis & M. T. Turvey (2016). One World, Multiple Organisms: Specificity /Autocatakinetics Versus Enactivism/Autopoiesis. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):330-332.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: We extend the authors’ arguments on direct perception, specificity, and foundational principles to concerns for theories of joint action. We argue for the usefulness of the affordance concept in an ecological theory of social interaction; highlighting linkages between theories of affordance-based behavior and fundamental, physical principles.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  61.  10
    H. De Jaegher (2016). Intersubjectivity in the Study of Experience. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):393-395.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: I propose that getting the empirical study of subjective experience off to a good start requires an intersubjective approach, in both theory and method, where intersubjectivity is understood not in the standard science way of verification by others, but rather as participation in the investigation of how experience transforms when examining it together. I argue that this will greatly help do justice to and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  62.  3
    P. De Jesus (2016). Sweeping Anthropomorphism Under the MAT. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):216-218.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: Villalobos and Ward reappraise enactivism’s “Jonasian turn” and discover an untenable anthropomorphism at its core. As a corrective to this, the authors propose a Maturanian-inspired account of experience that could accommodate central enactive insights while avoiding anthropomorphism. In this commentary, I will delve a bit deeper into Villalobos and Ward’s treatment of anthropomorphism. In so doing, I will show (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  63.  4
    M. de Pinedo (2016). The Ontology of Perception: Agency, Evolution and Representationalism. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):332-334.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: The aim of my commentary is to complement some of the main points defended in the target article. In particular, I want to explore further the central role of agent-level explanations and of evolution for our understanding of a meaningful environment. I finish by wondering whether an excessive focus on ontological questions could be problematic for a proper defence of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  64.  4
    E. A. Di Paolo (2016). Across the Uncanny Valley: The Ecological, the Enactive, and the Strangely Familiar. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):327-329.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: I contrast enactivist and ecological perspectives on some of the themes raised by the authors. I discuss some of their worries about the notion of sense-making and other epistemological aspects of enactivism.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  65.  4
    D. Dotov (2016). Perception-Action Mutuality Does Not Obviate Emergence or the Animal’s Active Role in the Perceptual Act. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):308-309.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: The main goal of this commentary is to make more discriminative the comparison between enactive and ecological theories of perception. Emergence at the level of the animal-environment system might be playing the role attributed to mental construction in basic perceptual processes. If correct, this would render some forms of enactivism compatible with the theoretical tenets of the target article.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  66.  3
    R. D. Ellis (2016). Enactive Consciousness and Gendlin’s Dream Analysis. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):425-427.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: A neurophenomenological approach to the enactive account of consciousness in general is supported by an account of how the brain functions in creating imagery of non-present objects and situations. Three types of non-sensory imagery are needed to ground our consciousness of sensory imagery: proprioceptive imagery, motor imagery, and what Eugene Gendlin calls the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  67.  2
    T. Froese (2016). Interactivity Should Aim to Extend, Not Reject, the Conceptual Foundations of Enaction. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):247-249.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Interactivity and Enaction in Human Cognition” by Matthew Isaac Harvey, Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen & Sune Vork Steffensen. Upshot: Enaction is a diverse research program and some of its texts can be interpreted in terms of a critical contrast to interactivity. Yet much of the former has already started to move in a direction favored by the latter: toward systematic studies of how human activity is shaped by social, cultural, and technological influences. Interactivity could therefore help (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  68.  3
    M. F. Fultot (2016). What Kind of Epistemic Activity is Expert Introspection? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):397-398.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: A constructivist epistemology might help us better understand what kind of knowledge expert introspection cannot deliver. Indeed, there are well-known trade-offs with regard to the insights that can be gained through introspection. If trivialization is to be avoided, then it should be assumed that, contrary to standard science, introspection just is not a declarative kind of knowledge.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  69.  3
    M. F. Fultot, L. Nie & C. Carello (2016). Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):298-307.
    Context: The dominant approach to the study of perception is representational/computational, with an emphasis on the achievements of the brain and the nervous system, which are taken to construct internal models of the world. Alternatives include ecological, embedded, embodied, and enactivist approaches, all of which emphasize the centrality of action in understanding perception. Problem: Despite sharing many theoretical commitments that lead to a rejection of the classical approach, the alternatives are characterized by important contrasts and points of divergence. Here we (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  70.  3
    M. F. Fultot, L. Nie & C. Carello (2016). Authors’ Response: Complementarity of Symmetry and Asymmetry. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):335-345.
    Upshot: Gibsonian and enactivist thinkers appear to diverge primarily with respect to the emphasis placed on the contributions of the organism to perception-action. Enactivists claim that a fundamental asymmetry in the organism-environment relationship should be credited for the existence of meaning in the world. Gibsonians counter that theory must reckon with both the asymmetry and symmetry between organism and environment as well as with the role of specificational information in underwriting their coordination.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  71.  3
    R. Gahrn-Andersen & M. I. Harvey (2016). Phenomenological Teleology and Human Interactivity. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):224-226.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: We argue that Villalobos and Ward’s criticism misses two crucial aspects of Varelian enactivism. These are, first, that enactivism attempts to offer a rigorous scientific justification for its teleological claims, and second, that enactivism in fact pays too little attention to the nature of human phenomenology and intentionality, rather than anthropomorphically over-valuing it.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  72.  3
    P. Gaitsch (2016). Modern Anthropomorphism and Phenomenological Method. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):220-221.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: As a reply to the criticism that anthropomorphism and modern science are incompatible, targeting Jonasian phenomenology and Varelian enactivism, I suggest considering the concept of modern anthropomorphism, which seems prima facie compatible with the pluralistic situation of today’s life sciences. My further claim is that the phenomenological method is intrinsically linked with this sort of anthropomorphism.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  73.  5
    S. Gallagher (2016). Identity or Dynamic Structure? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):363-364.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: It is not clear what Kirchhoff and Hutto mean by identity when they claim that there is no gap between the phenomenal and the physical. Understanding the relation between causation and diachronic constitution, I suggest that phenomenal-physical existence is better characterized as a dynamically articulated form, structure, or gestalt.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  74.  2
    H. Gash (2016). The Epistemological Dance: Difference, Experience and Representation. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):280-282.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: Accepting the biological origins and limits of what we know is a foundation stone of radical constructivist research. A corollary is that RC considers realism as allowing an impossible comparison between knowledge and reality. Recent works such as that presented in the target article have a more nuanced position in relation to “reality.” Points of similarity and difference between RC and direct realism (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  75.  4
    D. Gasparyan (2016). Not to Avoid But Legitimize: Why the Gap Could Be Natural For the Enactive World. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):356-358.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: I show that the gap problem is of no threat to the enactivist approach; moreover, if the enactivism model is thoroughly thought over through extending ontology, it may turn out that the gap should be naturally built in the wholeness of the world at the level of its self-cognition.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  76.  2
    J. C. González (2016). Blurring the Differences Between the Dream, Perceptual and Hallucinatory Experiences Is Not the Answer. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):417-419.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: Enaction and neurophenomenology are indeed appropriate and productive theoretical and methodological tools for studying perception. But moving from the perceptual domain to the hallucinatory and dreaming domain with these tools requires a prior careful examination of the similarities and differences across these domains. The authors point in the right direction for studying dream (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  77.  2
    X. A. González-Grandón (2016). The Gap Or Not The Gap: Is That The Neurophenomenological Question? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):359-361.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: Kirchhoff and Hutto argue that the metaphysical commitments of neurophenomenology, as formulated by Varela in 1996, endorse a form of non-reductionism, which assumes and does not resolve the hard problem of consciousness. Although I share Kirchhoff and Hutto’s conceptual concern, I disagree that denying the gap between the phenomenal and the physical, opting (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  78.  2
    D. G. Gozli (2016). Phenomenology as Critique, Discovery, and Justification. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):389-391.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: Consistent with constructivism, phenomenology attempts to ground knowledge in an understanding of subjectivity. Although the phenomenological method can serve as a source of new insights and important critique of the conventional modes of understanding, the method’s effectiveness in the context of justification remains problematic.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  79.  3
    M. I. Harvey, R. Gahrn-Andersen & S. V. Steffensen (2016). Interactivity and Enaction in Human Cognition. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):234-245.
    Context: Distributed language and interactivity are central members of a set of concepts that are rapidly developing into rigorous, exciting additions to 4E cognitive science. Because they share certain assumptions and methodological commitments with enactivism, the two have sometimes been confused; additionally, while enactivism is a well-developed paradigm, interactivity has relied more on methodological development and on a set of focal examples. Problem: The goal of this article is to clarify the core conceptual commitments of both interactivity-based and enactive approaches (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  80.  2
    M. I. Harvey, R. Gahrn-Andersen & S. V. Steffensen (2016). Authors’ Response: Explanatory Pluralism and Precise Conceptual Development. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):254-264.
    Upshot: We agree with commenters that enactivism incorporates a broad variety of methodologies, metaphysical stances, concepts, and investigative approaches, and that this is a good thing. However, we remain concerned that autonomy and sense-making are problematic concepts for post-Varelian enactivism, and that they form the foundations of a conceptual framework that may hamper the development of effective explanations for cognitive activity, as well as the paradigmatic aspirations of this particular enactivist approach.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  81.  4
    V. Havelange (2016). Constitution: Epistemological and Ontological. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):398-399.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: Kordeš’s target article proposes to link constructivism and phenomenology, to their mutual benefit. In order to further this endeavour, this commentary suggests that it is important to distinguish two levels of constitution: the epistemological and the ontological. This may serve to clarify difficulties about achieving intersubjective validation.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  82.  3
    M. Heras-Escribano (2016). Embracing the Environment: Ecological Answers for Enactive Problems. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):309-312.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: This commentary highlights some controversial aspects of enactivism and ecological psychology, specifically the notions of subjectivity and ecological information. I argue that, instead of choosing between them, both theories could complement each other at different levels of analysis in a single research framework for explaining cognition from a situated perspective.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  83.  3
    M. D. Kirchhoff (2016). Dreaming: Ontological and Methodological Considerations. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):420-423.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: This commentary focuses on an ontological claim made by the authors of this target article: that perceiving, imagining and dreaming are inseparable. It explores how best to understand this “inseparability condition.” It is shown that the evidence needed to justify a strict reading of the inseparability condition is lacking, while there is room (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  84.  10
    M. D. Kirchhoff & D. D. Hutto (2016). Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):346-353.
    Context: Neurophenomenology, as formulated by Varela, offers an approach to the science of consciousness that seeks to get beyond the hard problem of consciousness. There is much to admire in the practical approach to the science of consciousness that neurophenomenology advocates. Problem: Even so, this article argues, the metaphysical commitments of the enterprise require a firmer foundation. The root problem is that neurophenomenology, as classically formulated by Varela, endorses a form of non-reductionism that, despite its ambitions, assumes rather than dissolves (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  85.  4
    M. D. Kirchhoff & D. D. Hutto (2016). Authors’ Response: Mind Never The Gap, Redux. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):370-374.
    Upshot: We respond to three main challenges that the commentaries have raised. First, we argue that to deal successfully with the hard problem of consciousness, it is not enough to posit a remedy by which to move beyond the hard problem. Second, we argue that it makes no sense to explain identity. Yet this does not commit us to definitions by fiat. The strategy we pursue here, and in the target article, is not to explain identity but to explain away (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  86.  4
    U. Kordeš (2016). Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):375-385.
    Context: Epistemologically, constructivism has reached its goals, particularly by emphasizing the idea of participatory observation, circularity, and the fact that construction is based on experience. However, rather than research, the main occupation of constructivists and second-order cyberneticians seems to lie in making the case for their epistemological idea, which has been exhausted in many aspects. Purpose: To counteract this exhaustion and an increasingly apparent lack of energy, it is argued that constructivism requires a dedicated field of research, a field where (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  87.  3
    U. Kordeš (2016). Author’s Response: Persevering with the Non-Trivial. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):400-406.
    Upshot: The response starts with a clarification of certain points that commentators found insufficiently articulated and then goes on to discuss some of the suggested solutions, all of which are seen as welcome improvements to the original proposal. The need for establishing a research environment acknowledging and nurturing the non-trivial character of experience is emphasised.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  88.  4
    U. Kordeš (2016). Dreams: An Experimental Laboratory of Phenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):423-425.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: Solomonova and Sha propose a research programme for the study of dreaming based on the theoretical framework of enactivism. This commentary intends to demonstrate several unclear points connected to the theoretical framework applied and the proposed methodological solutions. By considering the potential reach of various phenomenological approaches in the research of dreams, I (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  89.  4
    D. Lloyd (2016). Not-Quite-So Radical Enactivism. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):361-363.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: Enactivism is a welcome development in cognitive science, but its “radical” rejection of representation poses problems for capturing phenomenality. The totality of our interactions exceeds our awareness, so circumscribing the activity that constitutes consciousness seems to require representational guidance.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  90.  2
    R. Lowe (2016). The Role of Allostasis in Sense-Making: A Better Fit for Interactivity Than Cybernetic-Enactivism? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):251-254.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Interactivity and Enaction in Human Cognition” by Matthew Isaac Harvey, Rasmus Gahrn-Andersen & Sune Vork Steffensen. Upshot: In contrasting an interactivity account alternative to variants on the enactive approach, the authors discuss the role of sense-making. They claim that their interactivity perspective, unlike enactive approaches, accounts for a dependency on “non-local” resources characteristic of many organisms. I draw attention to the cybernetic-enactivist perspective on homeostatic sense-making, which may fundamentally fail to explain the operationally open (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  91.  2
    O. Lukitsch & C. Schreiber (2016). Down the “Preferred Path”: Dispositional Flexibility Constitutes Phenomenal Character. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):367-368.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: We agree with Kirchhoff and Hutto that phenomeno-physical identities have to be motivated to approach the hard problem of consciousness. We propose that REC will do a better job in motivating these identities if intentionality and phenomenality are considered inseparable. We suggest that the notion of dispositional flexibility motivates these phenomeno-intentional identities and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  92.  2
    O. Markič (2016). In Search of a Remedy. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):385-387.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: The naturalistic paradigm, which relies on the third-person perspective and the exclusion of the observer, cannot accommodate human experience in its scientific enterprise. I present a critical overview of Kordeš’s proposal to merge the constructivist epistemological framework and empirical phenomenology. I doubt whether constructivism actually requires empirical grounding, but I do see constructivism with instrumentalism as a possible framework in which researchers will be (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  93.  5
    H. R. Maturana (2016). Confusion of Reflective Domains? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):213-214.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: I shall not address directly the article on which I am supposed to comment, and that I find very interesting, but I shall make four commentaries on the general subject of the confusion of domains in our reflection on biological and cultural phenomena.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  94.  4
    M. McGann (2016). Enactivism and Ecological Psychology: Divided by Common Ground. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):312-315.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: Fultot, Nie, and Carello are correct that enactive researchers should be more aware of the research literature on ecological psychology, but their charge of mental construction is off-target. Enactivism and ecological psychology are compatible frameworks with different, complementary, emphases.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  95.  3
    K. Miyahara (2016). Missing Out On the Radicalism of Neurophenomenology? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):368-370.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Never Mind the Gap: Neurophenomenology, Radical Enactivism, and the Hard Problem of Consciousness” by Michael D. Kirchhoff & Daniel D. Hutto. Upshot: An exegetical worry about Kirchhoff and Hutto’s exposition of neurophenomenology is pointed out. Combining this exegetical critique with an examination of the “strict identity” in the strict identity thesis, I argue that there is more affinity between neurophenomenology and REC than they think.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  96.  5
    M. Mossio (2016). How Far Can Sensorimotor Direct Realism Go? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):287-289.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: The target article convincingly argues in favor of the idea that the sensorimotor account of perception provides a positive scientific context for direct realism. In some cases, however, perception and experience do not seem to fit easily with sensorimotor direct realism. This raises a question of scope that requires further elaboration.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  97.  3
    J. -L. Petit (2016). Is Intentionality Banned From Sciences of the Living Being? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):218-219.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: This commentary questions an assumption in the target article to the effect that science prohibits projecting any intentional properties or entities outside of human experience.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  98.  2
    J. Pickering (2016). Who is “We”? Some Observations on Sensorimotor Direct Realism. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):279-280.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: Sensorimotor direct realism may describe how animals engage with their surroundings. But human beings are not typical animals. Their engagement can be metaphorical as well as direct, in which case the theory has less plausibility.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  99.  3
    B. Pierce (2016). The Role of External Objects in Perceptual Experience. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):285-287.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: This commentary is broadly sympathetic to the claims made in the target article. I start by questioning whether we can have direct access to an external reality in such a way that our experience is not intrinsically private. I then suggest that the argument for direct realism presented here is inconclusive with regard to whether external objects play a causal or a constitutive (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  100.  3
    J. Proulx (2016). Living Different Enactivist Worlds: A Mathematics Education Researcher’s Point of View on Enactivism. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):226-227.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: Villalobos and Ward’s distinctions between Varelian theories and Maturanian ones about anthropomorphism give rise to questions about what is or is not enactivism. This leads to recognition of an enactivist theoretical multiverse, and to embracing it as a way to advance theorizing along, and beyond, post-positivist lines.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  101.  4
    E. B. Roesch (2016). In Search of a New Looking Glass: Cognitive Science Is Not Dead, It Is Just Asleep. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):419-420.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: Solomonova and Sha draw inspiration from the work programme that sparked the enactive extension to cognitive science, and propose a framework for dream scientists. This case study for a renewed cognitive science highlights key points that are worth developing, in light of current practices in neuroscience.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  102.  4
    A. Rosales-Lagarde (2016). Neurophenomenology’s Epistemological Locus and the Need to Consider Its Primitive Sources: Internal Processing and Development. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):427-429.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: Neurophenomenology requires a first-person report at the sub-personal level. Thus, the neurophenomenology of dreaming and sleep can be figuratively located in a model of perspectives and levels of analysis. Even when Solomonova and Sha do admit creativity to explain bizarreness and emphasize dreams’ enaction and, especially, dreams’ perception-dependence, an innate and developmental framework (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  103.  5
    A. Schiavio (2016). Enactive Affordances and the Interplay of Biological and Phenomenological Subjectivity. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):315-317.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: Enactive approaches highlight the deep interdependency of brains, action, agency, and environment in shaping the world we inhabit. This perspective goes beyond input-output models of cognition, postulating instead closed loops of action and perception framed by the agent-environment complementarity. As a unique, dynamical, system, no representational recovery is required for cognitive-behavioral experience to take place.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  104.  17
    D. Silverman (2016). Representationalism and the Sensorimotor Theory. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):282-284.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: In light of the construal of sensorimotor theory offered by the target article, this commentary examines the role the theory should admit for internal representation.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  105.  4
    E. Solomonova & X. W. Sha (2016). Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):407-416.
    Context: Phenomenology and the enactive approach pose a unique challenge to dream research: during sleep one seems to be relatively disconnected from both world and body. Movement and perception, prerequisites for sensorimotor subjectivity, are restricted; the dreamer’s experience is turned inwards. In cognitive neurosciences, on the other hand, the generally accepted approach holds that dream formation is a direct result of neural activations in the absence of perception, and dreaming is often equated with “delusions.” Problem: Can enactivism and phenomenology account (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  106.  3
    E. Solomonova & X. W. Sha (2016). Authors’ Response: Towards a Neurophenomenology of Embodied, Skillful Dreaming. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):432-442.
    Upshot: A successful program for an enactive view of dreaming would have to clarify phenomenal and neurophysiological similarities and differences between waking perception, imagination, and dreaming. An embodied and skillful view of the dream process would require careful investigation of somatic sources of dream content, including sensory incorporation, and global, indirect ways in which dream content reacts metaphorically to changes in bodily states. Neurophenomenology of dreams would benefit from developing dreaming-specific approaches to training researchers and participants in phenomenological methods.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  107.  8
    M. Stapleton (2016). Enactivism Embraces Ecological Psychology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):325-327.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: The authors of the target article seem on the one hand to want to reprimand enactivists for not embracing ecological psychology, and on the other, to criticise them for taking on board some - but not all - of the principles of ecological psychology. In this commentary, I argue that the claim that enactivists have not embraced ecological psychology is (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  108.  2
    P. Steiner (2016). The Many Faces of Experience. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):395-397.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: The priority Kordeš gives to empirical phenomenology in the empirical assessment and grounding of constructivism stems from a restrictive conception of experience that has been questioned by other proponents of what he calls the “phenomenological attitude.”.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  109.  1
    J. Stewart (2016). Realities in the Plural. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):277-278.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Sensorimotor Direct Realism: How We Enact Our World” by Michael Beaton. Upshot: Direct realism can be better distinguished from objectivism and naïve realism, by recognizing the radical plurality of the incommensurable realities that can be enacted by living organisms in coupling with their environment.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  110.  2
    T. Strle (2016). On the Necessity of Foundations, Intersubjectivity and Cognitive Science. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):387-389.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: I discuss three of the target article’s topics that I find either problematic or important. First, I discuss a potentially dangerous consequence of claiming that empirical phenomenology necessarily calls for a constructivist foundation. Second, I consider the threat to intersubjective validation and the related problem that the author does not specify what technique one should use for training and collecting data in research on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  111.  2
    S. Taguchi (2016). Can the Lived Experience of Living Beings Be Approached Through Inference? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):215-216.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: Villalobos and Ward seem to disclose a fundamental problem without solving it - a problem to which neither the Jonasian nor the Maturanian inference can offer a solution. It should be addressed by a phenomenological analysis of our basic experience of aliveness.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  112.  1
    S. Torrance (2016). Varela’s Sixth Step: Teleology and the Re-Visioning of Science. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):221-224.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn” by Mario Villalobos & Dave Ward. Upshot: Jonas was not defending an unrestrained anthropomorphism but, rather, a “zoomorphism,” which offered a rigorous, considered view of the deep phylogenetic origins of purpose and mind. Jonas did not reject science per se, but an alienated, rigid conception of the latter. His work helped pave the way to a richer science of mind.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  113.  1
    P. Vermersch (2016). Notes on the Coupling Between the Observer and the Observed in Psycho-Phenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):391-393.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Going Beyond Theory: Constructivism and Empirical Phenomenology” by Urban Kordeš. Upshot: This commentary supports the view of the target article concerning the interest of taking into account the coupling between the observing scientist and the subject, and applying it in particular to the study of subjective experience. I propose to identify three aspects of coupling: the technical conditions of coupling between the observer and the subject being observed in order to guide introspection; the requirements (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  114.  8
    M. Villalobos & D. Ward (2016). Lived Experience and Cognitive Science Reappraising Enactivism’s Jonasian Turn. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):204-212.
    Context: The majority of contemporary enactivist work is influenced by the philosophical biology of Hans Jonas. Jonas credits all living organisms with experience that involves particular “existential” structures: nascent forms of concern for self-preservation and desire for objects and outcomes that promote well-being. We argue that Jonas’s attitude towards living systems involves a problematic anthropomorphism that threatens to place enactivism at odds with cognitive science, and undermine its legitimate aims to become a new paradigm for scientific investigation and understanding of (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  115.  3
    S. Vörös, T. Froese & A. Riegler (2016). Epistemological Odyssey: Introduction to Special Issue on the Diversity of Enactivism and Neurophenomenology. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):189-204.
    Context: In the past two decades, the so-called 4E approaches to the mind and cognition have been rapidly gaining in recognition and have become an integral part of various disciplines. Problem: Recently, however, questions have been raised as to whether, and to what degree, these different approaches actually cohere with one another. Specifically, it seems that many of them endorse mutually incompatible, perhaps even contradictory, epistemological and metaphysical presuppositions. Method: By retracing the roots of an alternative conception of mind and (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  116.  3
    D. Ward & M. Villalobos (2016). Authors’ Response: Enactivism, Cognitive Science, and the Jonasian Inference. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):228-233.
    Upshot: In our target article we claimed that, at least since Weber and Varela, enactivism has incorporated a theoretical commitment to one important aspect of Jonas’s philosophical biology, namely its anthropomorphism, which is at odds with the methodological commitments of modern science. In this general reply we want to clarify what we mean by anthropomorphism, and explain why we think it is incompatible with science. We do this by spelling out what we call the “Jonasian inference,” i.e., the idea that (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  117.  2
    K. Werner (2016). Presentation of the World: Gibson and Husserl on the Interplay Between the Objective and the Subjective. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):317-319.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: In this commentary, I focus on several issues concerning the notion of presentation. I argue that Fultot, Nie and Carello do not pay sufficient attention to these problems, despite the fact that Gibson, compared here with Husserl, may be regarded as one of those thinkers who made an important contribution to this.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  118.  2
    J. M. Windt (2016). We Need to Go Deeper! Conceptual and Methodological Considerations on the Depth of Dream Experience. Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):429-432.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Exploring the Depth of Dream Experience: The Enactive Framework and Methods for Neurophenomenological Research” by Elizaveta Solomonova & Xin Wei Sha. Upshot: This commentary aims to sharpen the conceptual distinction between the breadth and the depth of dream experience. I discuss several possible readings and argue that the best one construes breadth and depth as distinct but complimentary research strategies distinguished not just by the kinds of evidence they rely on, but also by the (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  119.  3
    K. Zahidi & J. V. Eemeren (2016). Radical Enactivism and Ecological Psychology: Friends or Foes? Constructivist Foundations 11 (2):320-322.
    Open peer commentary on the article “Perception-Action Mutuality Obviates Mental Construction” by Martin Flament Fultot, Lin Nie & Claudia Carello. Upshot: We examine whether there are any irreducible contradictions between ecological psychology and radical enactivism. We concentrate on two points of contention between the two approaches: the relevance of neural structures in understanding perception and the use of semantically loaded concepts in theorizing about perception.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues