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Forthcoming articles
  1.  44
    Travis Timmerman (forthcoming). Your Death Might Be the Worst Thing Ever to Happen to You (but Maybe You Shouldn't Care). Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
    Deprivationism cannot accommodate the common sense assumption that we should lament our death iff, and to the extent that, it is bad for us. Call this the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption. As such, either this assumption needs to be rejected or deprivationism does. I first argue that the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption is false. I then attempt to figure out which facts our attitudes concerning death should track. I suggest that each person should have two distinct (...)
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  2. Elmar Unnsteinsson (forthcoming). Confusion is Corruptive Belief in False Identity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.
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  3. Elmar Unnsteinsson (forthcoming). Confusion is Corruptive Belief in False Identity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    Speakers are confused about identity if they mistake one thing for two or two things for one. I present two plausible models of confusion, the Frege model and the Millikan model. I show how a prominent objection to Fregean models fails and argue that confusion consists in having false implicit beliefs involving the identity relation. Further, I argue that confused identity has characteristic corruptive effects on singular cognition and on the proper function of singular terms in linguistic communication.
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  4.  7
    Stephanie Collins & Holly Lawford-Smith (forthcoming). Collectives' and Individuals' Obligations: A Parity Argument. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-21.
    Individuals have various kinds of obligations: keep promises, don’t cause harm, return benefits received from injustices, be partial to loved ones, help the needy, and so on. How does this work for group agents? There are two questions here. The first is whether groups can bear the same kinds of obligations as individuals. The second is whether groups’ pro tanto obligations plug into what they all- things -considered ought to do to the same degree that individuals’ pro tanto obligations plug (...)
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  5.  51
    Peter Fritz (forthcoming). First-Order Modal Logic in the Necessary Framework of Objects. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    I consider the first-order modal logic which counts as valid those sentences which are true on every interpretation of the non-logical constants. Based on the assumptions that it is necessary what individuals there are and that it is necessary which propositions are necessary, Timothy Williamson has tentatively suggested an argument for the claim that this logic is determined by a possible world structure consisting of an infinite set of individuals and an infinite set of worlds. He notes that only (...)
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  6. James Bohman (forthcoming). Constituting Humanity: Universal Political Rights and the Human Community. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
     
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  7.  4
    Robert Cowan (forthcoming). Epistemic Perceptualism and Neo-Sentimentalist Objections. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-23.
    Epistemic Perceptualists claim that emotions are sources of immediate defeasible justification for evaluative propositions that can sometimes ground undefeated immediately justified evaluative beliefs. For example, fear can constitute the justificatory ground for a belief that some object or event is dangerous. Despite its attractiveness, the view is apparently vulnerable to several objections. In this paper, I provide a limited defence of Epistemic Perceptualism by responding to a family of objections which all take as a premise a popular and attractive view (...)
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  8.  20
    Axel Gosseries (forthcoming). Cosmopolitan Luck Egalitarianism and Climate Change. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
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  9.  14
    Jennifer Hornsby (forthcoming). Intending, Knowing How, Infinitives. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-17.
    Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to (...)
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  10.  10
    Aaron James (forthcoming). . Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-19.
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  11.  4
    Rik Peels (forthcoming). Is Science Like a Crossword Puzzle? Foundherentist Conceptions of Scientific Warrant. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-20.
    This paper argues that the crossword puzzle analogy is great for scientific rationality, but not scientific warrant. It provides a critical analysis of foundherentist conceptions of scientific warrant, especially that of Susan Haack, and closely related positions, such as non-doxastic coherentism. Foundherentism takes the middle ground between foundationalism and coherentism. The main idea is that warrant, including that of scientific theories, is like warrant of crossword entries: the degree to which a theory is warranted depends on one’s observations, the extent (...)
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  12.  12
    Don Ross (forthcoming). Critical Notice of Ron McClamrock "Existential Cognition". Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
    McClamrock argues for a thesis he calls radical externalism' in the behavioral and cognitive sciences. In my paper, I contend that McClamrock's thesis, though true, is not radical. This is because he urges externalism with respect to cognitive task-individuation and task-explanation, both of which are standard practice in the relevant disciplines. Semantic externalism may remain contentious, I argue; but the sense in which philosophers continue to argue about it has little bearing on the actual conduct of cognitive science. I conclude (...)
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  13.  3
    Meghan Sullivan (forthcoming). An A-Theory Without Tense Operators. Canadian Journal of Philosophy:1-24.
    A-theorists think there is a fundamental difference between the present and other times. This concern shows up in what kinds of properties they take to be instantiated, what objects they think exist and how they formalize their views. Nearly every contemporary A-theorist assumes that her metaphysics requires a tense logic – a logic with operators like and. In this paper, I show that there is at least one viable A-theory that does not require a logic with tense operators. And I (...)
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  14.  46
    Robert Ware & K. Nielsen (forthcoming). Analyzing Marxism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy.
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