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  1. Zsófia Zvolenszky (2015). Inferring Content: Metaphor and Malapropism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 55 (44):163–182.
    It is traditionally thought that metaphorical utterances constitute a special— nonliteral—kind of departure from lexical constraints on meaning. Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson have been forcefully arguing against this: according to them, relevance theory’s comprehension/interpretation procedure for metaphorical utterances does not require details specifi c to metaphor (or nonliteral discourse); instead, the same type of comprehension procedure as that in place for literal utterances covers metaphors as well. One of Sperber and Wilson’s central reasons for holding this is that metaphorical (...)
     
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  2. Irena Cronin (2015). On Aristotelian Universals and Individuals: The "Vink" That Is In Body and May Be In Me. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (45).
    G. E. L. Owen, in his influential article “Inherence,” talks of “vink,” a name he has created for a particular shade of the color pink, and this “vink” serves as an individual in the Aristotelian category of quality. Owen was one of the first to aim to discredit the belief that J. L. Ackrill and his camp espoused, the belief that Aristotle thought that ”general attributes are not in individuals, particular attributes are not in more than one individual.” I postulate (...)
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    Hili Razinsky (2015). A Live Language: Concreteness, Openness, Ambivalence. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (43):51-65.
    Wittgenstein has shown that that life, in the sense that applies in the first place to human beings, is inherently linguistic. In this paper, I ask what is involved in language, given that it is thus essential to life, answering that language – or concepts – must be both alive and the ground for life. This is explicated by a Wittgensteinian series of entailments of features. According to the first feature, concepts are not intentional engagements. The second feature brings life (...)
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  4. Dwayne Moore (2015). Mereological Essentialism and Mereological Inessentialism. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 15 (1):67-85.
     
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