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Forthcoming articles
  1.  6
    Mark Alfano & Brian Robinson (forthcoming). I Know You Are but What Am I? Anti-Individualism About Intellectual Humility and Wu-Wei. Logos and Episteme.
    Virtues are acquirable, so if intellectual humility is a virtue, it’s acquirable. But there is something deeply problematic—perhaps even paradoxical—about aiming to be intellectually humble. Drawing on Edward Slingerland’s analysis of the paradoxical virtue of wu-wei in Trying Not To Try, we argue for an anti-individualistic conception of the trait, concluding that one’s intellectual humility depends upon the intellectual humility of others. Slingerland defines wu-wei as the “dynamic, effortless, and unselfconscious state of mind of a person who is optimally active (...)
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  2. Rodrigo Borges (forthcoming). A Failed Twist to an Old Problem: A Reply to John N. Williams. Logos and Episteme.
    This is a reply to John N. Williams’ paper “Not Knowing You Know: A New Objection to the Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge'” (2015). That paper argues that Peter Klein’s defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. Klein himself answered a version of this objection in his (1971). Williams’ paper adds a new twist to the 1971 objection. I argue that Williams’ objection misses its target because of this new twist.
     
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  3.  6
    Cameron Boult (forthcoming). Excusing Prospective Agents. Logos and Episteme.
    Blameless norm violation in young children is an underexplored phenomenon in epistemology. An understanding of it is important for accounting for the full range of normative standings at issue in debates about epistemic norms, and the internalism-externalism debate generally. More specifically, it is important for proponents of factive epistemic norms. I examine this phenomenon and put forward a positive proposal. I claim that we should think of the normative dimension of certain actions and attitudes of young children in terms of (...)
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  4.  2
    Brian Hedden (forthcoming). Believing and Acting: Voluntary Control and the Pragmatic Theory of Belief. Logos and Episteme.
    I argue that a attractive theory about the metaphysics of belief—the prag- matic, interpretationist theory endorsed by Stalnaker, Lewis, and Dennett, among others—implies that agents have a novel form of voluntary control over their beliefs. According to the pragmatic picture, what it is to have a given belief is in part for that belief to be part of an optimal rationalization of your actions. Since you have voluntary control over your actions, and what actions you perform in part determines what (...)
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  5.  5
    Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (forthcoming). Weighing the Aim of Belief Again. Logos and Episteme.
    In his influential discussion of the aim of belief, David Owens argues that any talk of such an ‘aim’ is at best metaphorical. In order for the ‘aim’ of belief to be a genuine aim, it must be weighable with other aims in deliberation, but Owens claims that this is impossible. In previous work, I have pointed out that if we look at a broader range of deliberative contexts involving belief, it becomes clear that the putative aim of belief is (...)
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  6.  8
    Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (forthcoming). Weighing the Aim of Belief Again. Logos and Episteme.
    In his influential discussion of the aim of belief, David Owens argues that any talk of such an ‘aim’ is at best metaphorical. In order for the ‘aim’ of belief to be a genuine aim, it must be weighable with other aims in deliberation, but Owens claims that this is impossible. In previous work, I have pointed out that if we look at a broader range of deliberative contexts involving belief, it becomes clear that the putative aim of belief is (...)
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  7. Vincent Fella Hendricks & John Symons (forthcoming). Limiting Skepticism. Logos and Episteme.
     
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