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  1. Frederick R. Ablondi (2002). Kelly and McDowell on Perceptual Content. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.
    [0] In a recent issue of _EJAP_, Sean Kelly [1998] defended the position that perceptual content is non-conceptual. More specifically, he claimed that John McDowell's view that concepts involved in perception can be understood as expressible through the use of demonstratives is ultimately untenable. In what follows, I want to look more closely at Kelly's position, as well as suggest possible responses one could make on McDowell's behalf.
     
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  2. István Sn Berkeley (2002). Gilbert Ryle and the Chinese Skeptic: Do Epistemologists Need to Know How To? Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.
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  3. Anthony Chemero (2002). Introduction. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.
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  4. Daniel Dennett (2002). Re-Introducing The Concept of Mind. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.
    _shazam!–_ the explosive generation of £100.03 of ordinary cash (minus a small quantity extracted by the bank) plus, perhaps, a few stray photons or quarks or gravity waves. He wonders: What kind of containers does the bank use to hold the anti-cash till the regular cash arrives? How are they insulated? Can you store cash and anti-cash in the same box and somehow prevent them from getting in contact? Might there be zombanks that only _seemed_ to store cash and anti-cash? (...)
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  5. Gibert Ryle (2002). Ryle's Last Letter to Daniel Dennett. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.
     
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  6. Hartley Slater (2002). Namely Riders: An Update. Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy 7.
    I here recall Ryle's analysis of Heterologicality, but broaden the discussion to comparable analyses not only of Heterologicality but also other puzzles about self-reference. Such matters have a crucial bearing on the debate between representational and non-representational theories of mind, as will be explained.
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  7. Sean D. Kelly (2002). What Makes Perceptual Content Non-Conceptual? Electronic Journal of Analytic Philosophy.
    the world. 1 Whereas the content of our beliefs, thoughts, and judgements necessarily involves "conceptualization" or "concept application", the content of our perceptual experiences is, according to Evans, "non-conceptual". Because Evans takes it for granted that we are often able to entertain thoughts about an object in virtue of having perceived it, a central problem in.
     
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