81 found

Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1.  28
    Aaron Ancell (forthcoming). Democracy Isn't That Smart : On Landemore's Democratic Reason. Episteme:1-15.
    In her recent book, Democratic Reason, Hélène Landemore argues that, when evaluated epistemically, “a democratic decision procedure is likely to be a better decision procedure than any non-democratic decision procedures, such as a council of experts or a benevolent dictator” (p. 3). Landemore's argument rests heavily on studies of collective intelligence done by Lu Hong and Scott Page. These studies purport to show that cognitive diversity – differences in how people solve problems – is actually more important to overall group (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  2. Matthew A. Benton (forthcoming). Knowledge and Evidence You Should Have Had. Episteme.
    Epistemologists focus primarily on cases of knowledge, belief, or credence where the evidence which one possesses, or on which one is relying, plays a fundamental role in the epistemic or normative status of one's doxastic state. Recent work in epistemology goes beyond the evidence one possesses to consider the relevance for such statuses of evidence which one does not possess, particularly when there is a sense in which one should have had some evidence. I focus here on Sanford Goldberg's approach (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  3. Cameron Boult (forthcoming). An Explanatory Challenge for Epistemological Disjunctivism. Episteme.
    Epistemological Disjunctivism is a view about paradigm cases of perceptual knowledge. Duncan Pritchard claims that it is particularly well suited to accounting for internalist and externalist intuitions. A number of authors have disputed this claim, arguing that there are problems for Pritchard’s way with internalist intuitions. I share the worry. However, I don’t think it has been expressed as effectively as it can be. My aim in this paper is to present a new way of formulating the worry, in terms (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  4.  18
    Fabrizio Cariani (forthcoming). Chance, Credence and Circles. Episteme.
    This is a discussion of Richard Pettigrew's book "Accuracy and the Laws of Credence". I target Pettigrew's application of the accuracy framework to derive chance-credence principles. My principal contention is that Pettigrew's preferred version of the argument might in one sense be circular and, moreover, that Pettigrew's premises have content that go beyond that of standard chance-credence principles.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  5.  74
    J. Adam Carter (forthcoming). Virtuous Insightfulness. Episteme.
    Insight often strikes us blind; when we aren’t expecting it, we suddenly see a connection that previously eluded us—a kind of ‘Aha!’ experience. People with a propensity to such experiences are regarded as insightful, and insightfulness is a paradigmatic intellectual virtue. What’s not clear, however, is just what it is in virtue of which being such that these experiences tend to happen to one renders one intellectually virtuous. This paper draws from both virtue epistemology as well as empirical work on (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  6. David Christensen (forthcoming). Disagreement, Drugs, Etc.: From Accuracy to Akrasia. Episteme.
    We often get evidence concerning the reliability of our own thinking about some particular matter. This “higher-order evidence” can come from the disagreement of others, or from information about our being subject to the effects of drugs, fatigue, emotional ties, implicit biases, etc. This paper examines some pros and cons of two fairly general models for accommodating higher-order evidence. The one that currently seems most promising also turns out to have the consequence that epistemic akrasia should occur more frequently than (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  7.  28
    Charlie Crerar (forthcoming). Taboo, Hermeneutical Injustice, and Expressively Free Environments. Episteme:1-13.
    In this paper I draw attention to a shortcoming in Miranda Fricker's 2007 account of hermeneutical injustice: that the only hermeneutical resource she acknowledges is a shared conceptual framework. Consequently, Fricker creates the impression that hermeneutical injustice manifests itself almost exclusively in the form of a conceptual lacuna. Considering the negative hermeneutical impact of certain societal taboos, however, suggests that there can be cases of hermeneutical injustice even when an agent's conceptual repertoire is perfectly adequate. I argue that this observation (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  8. Helen De Cruz (forthcoming). Religious Disagreement: An Empirical Study Among Academic Philosophers. Episteme:1-17.
    Religious disagreement is an emerging topic of interest in social epistemology. Little is known about how philosophers react to religious disagreements in a professional context, or how they think one should respond to disagreement. This paper presents results of an empirical study on religious disagreement among philosophers. Results indicate that personal religious beliefs, philosophical training, and recent changes in religious outlook have a significant impact on philosophers' assessments of religious disagreement. They regard peer disagreement about religion as common, and most (...)
    Direct download (4 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  9.  45
    Sinan Dogramaci (forthcoming). Knowing Our Degrees of Belief. Episteme:1-19.
    The main question of this paper is: how do we manage to know what our own degrees of belief are? Section 1 briefly reviews and criticizes the traditional functionalist view, a view notably associated with David Lewis and sometimes called the theory-theory. I use this criticism to motivate the approach I want to promote. Section 2, the bulk of the paper, examines and begins to develop the view that we have a special kind of introspective access to our degrees of (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  10. Bob Fischer (forthcoming). C. I. Lewis and the Benacerraf Problem. Episteme.
    Realists about modality offer an attractive semantics for modal discourse in terms of possible worlds, but standard accounts of the worlds—as properties, propositions, or causally-isolated concreta—invoke entities with which we can’t interact. If realism is true, how can we know anything about modal matters? Let's call this "the Benacerraf Problem." I suggest that C. I. Lewis has an intriguing answer to it. Given that we’re willing to disentangle some of Lewis’s insights from his phenomenalism, we can take the following line. (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  11. Bryan Frances (forthcoming). Worrisome Skepticism About Philosophy. Episteme:1-15.
    A new kind of skepticism about philosophy is articulated and argued for. The key premise is the claim that many of us are well aware that in the past we failed to have good responses to substantive objections to our philosophical beliefs. The conclusion is disjunctive: either we are irrational in sticking with our philosophical beliefs, or we commit some other epistemic sin in having those beliefs.
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  12.  10
    Karyn L. Freedman (forthcoming). Quasi-Evidentialism: Interests, Justification and Epistemic Virtue. Episteme:1-14.
    In this paper I argue against what I call ‘strict evidentialism’, the view that evidence is the sole factor for determining the normative status of beliefs. I argue that strict evidentialism fails to capture the uniquely subjective standpoint of believers and as a result it fails to provide us with the tools necessary to apply its own epistemic norms. In its place I develop an interest-relative theory of justification which I call quasi-evidentialism, according to which S has a justified belief (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  13.  78
    Michael Hannon (forthcoming). Skepticism About Meta-Skepticism: Meditations on Experimental Philosophy. Episteme.
    Drawing on new empirical data, a group of experimental philosophers have argued that one of the most popular and influential forms of skepticism is much less interesting and much less worrisome than philosophers have thought. Contrary to this claim, I argue that this brand of skepticism remains as threatening as ever. My argument also reveals an important limitation of experimental philosophy and sheds light on the way professional philosophers should go about the business of doing philosophy.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  14.  45
    Epistemic Injustice (forthcoming). David Coady. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  15.  18
    Faik Kurtulmus & Gürol Irzik (forthcoming). Justice in the Distribution of Knowledge. Episteme:1-18.
    In this article we develop an account of justice in the distribution of knowledge. We first argue that knowledge is a fundamental interest that grounds claims of justice due to its role in individuals’ deliberations about the common good, their personal good and the pursuit thereof. Second, we identify the epistemic basic structure of a society, namely, the institutions that determine individuals’ opportunities for acquiring knowledge and discuss what justice requires of them. Our main contention is that a systematic lack (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  16.  20
    Finlay Malcolm (forthcoming). How to Insult and Compliment a Testifier. Episteme.
    Do we insult, offend or slight a speaker when we refuse her testimony? Do we compliment, commend or extol a speaker when we accept her testimony? I argue that the answer to both of these questions is “yes”, but only in some instances, since these respective insults and compliments track the reasons a hearer has for rejecting or accepting testimony. When disbelieving a speaker, a hearer may insult her because she judges the speaker to be either incompetent as a knower (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  17.  24
    Aidan McGlynn (forthcoming). Epistemic Entitlement and the Leaching Problem. Episteme:1-14.
  18.  81
    Andrew Moon (forthcoming). Independence and New Ways to Remain Steadfast in the Face of Disagreement. Episteme.
    An important principle in the epistemology of disagreement is Independence, which states, “In evaluating the epistemic credentials of another’s expressed belief about P, in order to determine how (or whether) to modify my own belief about P, I should do so in a way that doesn’t rely on the reasoning behind my initial belief about P” (Christensen 2011, 1-2). I present a series of new counterexamples to both Independence and also a revised, more widely applicable, version of it. I then (...)
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  19. Jennifer Nagel (forthcoming). The Social Value of Reasoning. Episteme.
    When and why does it matter whether we can give an explicit justification for what we believe? This paper examines these questions in the light of recent empirical work on the social functions served by our capacity to reason, in particular, Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of reasoning.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  20.  13
    Richard Pettigrew (forthcoming). Jamesian Epistemology Formalized: An Explication of 'The Will to Believe'. Episteme:1-16.
    Famously, William James held that there are two commandments that govern our epistemic life: Believe truth! Shun error! In this paper, I give a formal account of James' claim using the tools of epistemic utility theory. I begin by giving the account for categorical doxastic states – that is, full belief, full disbelief, and suspension of judgment. Then I will show how the account plays out for graded doxastic states – that is, credences. The latter part of the paper thus (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  21.  20
    Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring (forthcoming). A Higher-Order Approach to Disagreement. Episteme.
    While many philosophers have agreed that evidence of disagreement is a kind of higher-order evidence, this has not yet resulted in formally precise higher-order approaches to the problem of disagreement. In this paper, we outline a simple formal framework for determining the epistemic significance of a body of higher-order evidence, and use this framework to motivate a novel interpretation of the popular “equal weight view” of peer disagreement—we call it the Variably Equal Weight View (VEW). We show that VEW differs (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  22. Michael J. Shaffer (forthcoming). “Filling In”, Thought Experiments and Intuitions. Episteme.
    Recently Timothy Williamson (2007) has argued that characterizations of the standard (i.e. intuition-based) philosophical practice of philosophical analysis are misguided because of the erroneous manner in which this practice has been understood. In doing so he implies that experimental critiques of the reliability of intuition are based on this misunderstanding of philosophical methodology and so have little or no bearing on actual philosophical practice or results. His main point is that the orthodox understanding of philosophical methodology is incorrect in that (...)
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  23.  34
    Paul Silva (forthcoming). Knowing How to Put Knowledge First in the Theory of Justification. Episteme.
    I provide a novel knowledge-first account of justification that avoids the pitfalls of existing accounts while preserving the underlying insight of knowledge-first epistemologies: that knowledge comes first. The view I propose is, roughly, this: justification is grounded in our practical knowledge (know-how) concerning the acquisition of propositional knowledge (knowledge-that). I first refine my thesis in response to immediate objections. In subsequent sections I explain the various ways in which this thesis is theoretically superior to existing knowledge-first accounts of justification. The (...)
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  24.  22
    Robert Mark Simpson (forthcoming). Permissivism and the Arbitrariness Objection. Episteme.
    Permissivism says that for some propositions and bodies of evidence, there is more than one rationally permissible doxastic attitude that can be taken towards that proposition given the evidence. Some critics of this view argue that it condones, as rationally acceptable, sets of attitudes that manifest an untenable kind of arbitrariness. I begin by providing a new and more detailed explication of what this alleged arbitrariness consists in. I then explain why Miriam Schoenfield’s prima facie promising attempt to answer the (...)
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  25.  48
    Dan Baras (forthcoming). Our Reliability is in Principle Explainable. Episteme.
    Non-skeptical robust realists about normativity, mathematics, or any other domain of non- causal truths are committed to a correlation between their beliefs and non- causal, mind-independent facts. Hartry Field and others have argued that if realists cannot explain this striking correlation, that is a strong reason to reject their theory. Some consider this argument, known as the Benacerraf–Field argument, as the strongest challenge to robust realism about mathematics, normativity, and even logic. In this article I offer two closely related accounts (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  26. Kenneth Boyd (forthcoming). Testifying Understanding. Episteme:1-25.
    While it is widely acknowledged that knowledge can be acquired via testimony, it has been argued that understanding cannot. While there is no consensus about what the epistemic relationship of understanding consists in, I argue here that regardless of how understanding is conceived there are kinds of understanding that can be acquired through testimony: easy understanding and easy-s understanding. I address a number of aspects of understanding that might stand in the way of being able to acquire understanding through testimony, (...)
    Direct download (3 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  27.  12
    Of Admissibility (forthcoming). Michael J. Saks. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  28.  12
    Explanationism All & Way Down (forthcoming). Ronald J. Allen. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  29.  25
    Masking Disagreement Among Experts (forthcoming). John Beatty. Episteme.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  30.  8
    Aphilosophical Assessment (forthcoming). Luciano Floridi. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  31. J. U. Baek (forthcoming). Acceleration Life Test. Episteme.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  32.  3
    Convergence Bayesianism & Social Epistemology (forthcoming). Michael J. Shaffer. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  33. António Marques Bessa (forthcoming). Uma Análise da Conflitualidade nos Países Africanos de Língua Oficial Portuguesa. Episteme.
    No categories
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  34.  16
    Michael A. Bishop (forthcoming). 2. The Flat Maximum Principle. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  35. Jacira da Silva Câmara (forthcoming). Pode o currículo da escola desenvolver valores em educação. Episteme.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  36.  59
    Social Character (forthcoming). Michael fuerstein. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  37. Giulia Colazzi (forthcoming). Feminismo y teoría fílmica, Valencia. Episteme.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  38.  4
    In Defense, Rule-Based Evidence Law & Epistemology Too (forthcoming). Frederick Schauer. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  39.  7
    Social Deliberation, Bayes Nash & Gabriele Tarde (forthcoming). J. McKenzie Alexander. Episteme.
  40.  15
    When Experts Disagree (forthcoming). David Coady. Episteme.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  41.  30
    Rational Disagreement (forthcoming). Michael Bergmann. Episteme.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  42.  23
    On Dreaming & Being Lied To (forthcoming). Paul Faulkner. Episteme.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  43.  14
    Medieval Social Epistemology (forthcoming). Robert Pasnau. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  44.  6
    Network Epistemology (forthcoming). Paul Humphreys. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  45.  5
    Social Epistemology (forthcoming). Axel Gelfert. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  46.  43
    David Estlund (forthcoming). Elizabeth Anderson. Episteme.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  47.  6
    Recognizing Experts (forthcoming). Jörg Hardy. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  48.  13
    Objectivity Fallibilism & New Cynicism (forthcoming). Susan Haack. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  49.  8
    Comments on Miranda Fricker (forthcoming). Sanford Goldberg. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  50.  29
    Miranda Fricker (forthcoming). Linda Martín Alcoff. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  51.  7
    Elisa Heinämäki (forthcoming). Tyhjä taivas: Georges Bataille ja uskonnon kysymys. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  52.  3
    Jakke Holvas (forthcoming). Talousmetafysiikan Kritiikkiä. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  53.  38
    Epistemic Injustice (forthcoming). Miranda Fricker. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  54.  9
    of Criminal Justice (forthcoming). Larry Laudan. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  55.  14
    Not Simultaneously Justified (forthcoming). Franz Dietrich. Episteme.
    Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  56.  42
    Natural Kind (forthcoming). Kourken Michaelian. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  57.  4
    Ulrich Krause (forthcoming). Rainer Hegselmann And. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  58. A. Laine (forthcoming). Les Enfants-Nés-Pour-Mourir. Episteme.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  59.  4
    Leslie Marsh & Christian J. Onof (forthcoming). This is the Second Instalment of EPISTEME's Invitational Volume. We Would Like to Thank the Distinguished Writers Who so Kindly Agreed to Contribute an Article. A Special Thank You is in Order to Fred Schmitt Who, at Very Short Notice, Had to Assimilate the Papers That Comprise This Issue. [REVIEW] Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  60. Laura Mulvey (forthcoming). Placer Visual y Cine Narrativo. Valencia, Vol. 1. Episteme.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  61.  21
    Emily Murphy (forthcoming). Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Adina Roskies, teneille brown. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  62.  25
    Social Nature & Epistemic Justification (forthcoming). Jeremy Koons. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  63. Papa Amadou Ndiaye (forthcoming). Karl Popper le Realisme Et la Science. Episteme.
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  64.  6
    Assumed Objectivity (forthcoming). Evangelia (Lina) Papadaki. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  65.  9
    on Treating Oneself & Others As Thermometers (forthcoming). Roger White. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  66. Elina Paju (forthcoming). Lasten arjen ainekset: Etnografinen tutkimus materiaalisuudesta, ruumiillisuudesta ja toimijuudesta päiväkodissa. Episteme.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  67. Raúl Prada (forthcoming). La subversión de la praxis. La Paz. Episteme.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  68.  3
    Spousal Evidentiary Privileges (forthcoming). Edward Stein. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  69.  13
    Pure Epistemic Proceduralism (forthcoming). Fabienne Peter. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  70.  22
    Moderate Epistemic Relativism (forthcoming). Jonathan M. Weinberg. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  71. Josep Gavaldà Roca (forthcoming). La Telepolítica y Sus Récords València. Episteme.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  72.  3
    Erika Ruonakoski (forthcoming). Eläimen tuttuus ja vieraus: Fenomenologisen empatiateorian uudelleentulkinta ja sen sovellus vieraslajisia eläimiä koskevaan kokemukseen. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  73.  7
    Oliver R. Scholz (forthcoming). Frederick F. Schmitt And. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  74. M. Sérgio (forthcoming). Maurice Merleau-Ponty-o Corpo Ea Fenomenologia. Episteme.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  75. Amadeu C. Soares (forthcoming). Universidade em Angola: A sua criação em 1962. Episteme.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  76. Gustavo Ciraudo Fraga Solha & E. P. Silva (forthcoming). Onde está o lugar do conceito de gene. Episteme.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  77.  7
    Jan Sprenger (forthcoming). Stephan Hartmann, Carlo Martini. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  78.  32
    Epistemic Trust (forthcoming). Nancy Daukas. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  79.  15
    On Trusting (forthcoming). Pd Magnus. Episteme.
    Translate
      Direct download (2 more)  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  80.  7
    Causation Warrant (forthcoming). Susan Haack. Episteme.
    Direct download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
  81. Slavoj Zizek (forthcoming). La política de la diferencia sexual, Valencia. Episteme.
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    My bibliography  
 Previous issues
  
Next issues