Online research in philosophy

I criticize the idea that intellectual humility requires suspending judgment about p when you suspend judgment about whether your belief that p is reasonable, and sketch an alternative account of intellectual humility, on which it is a matter of adopting proper higher-order doxastic attitudes about the epistemic status of your doxastic attitudes. This suggests an alternative approach to the epistemology of disagreement, on which the question of the proper response to disagreement about p concerns the proper higher-order doxastic attitude to (...) adopt about the epistemic status of your belief about p. (shrink)

According to Interest-Relative Invariantism, whether an agent knows that p, or possesses other sorts of epistemic properties or relations, is in part determined by the practical costs of being wrong about p. Recent studies in experimental philosophy have tested the claims of IRI. After critically discussing prior studies, we present the results of our own experiments that provide strong support for IRI. We discuss our results in light of complementary findings by other theorists, and address the challenge posed by a (...) leading intellectualist alternative to our view. (shrink)