62 found

Year:

Forthcoming articles
  1.  30
    Scott Hill (forthcoming). From Isolation to Skepticism. Erkenntnis (3):1-20.
    If moral properties lacked causal powers, would moral skepticism be true? I argue that it would. Along the way I respond to various arguments that it would not.
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  2.  52
    Reid Blackman (forthcoming). Why Compatibilists Need Alternative Possibilities. Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Defenders of compatibilism occupy one of two camps: those who think that free will requires the ability to do otherwise, and those who deny this. Those compatibilists who think that free will requires the ability to do otherwise are interested in defending a reading of ‘can’ such that one can do otherwise even if determinism is true. By contrast, those compatibilists who think that free will does not require the ability to do otherwise tend to join incompatibilists in denying that (...)
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  3.  8
    Florian Boge (forthcoming). Interpreting Quantum Theory: A Therapeutic Approach. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis:1-7.
    Simon Friederich’s Therapeutic Approach to quantum theory (QT) sheds new light on the status of the quantum state. In particular, Friederich presents revisionary ideas on how to exactly differentiate objective from subjective elements of the theory and thereby improves upon previous stabs at an epistemic interpretation of quantum states. The book not only provides interesting perspectives for the cognoscenti but is also written with sufficient care and free of unnecessary technicalities so as to be accessible and worth reading for the (...)
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  4.  62
    David Bourget (forthcoming). Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions. Erkenntnis:1-18.
    This paper defends the view that perceptual ascriptions such as “Jones sees a cat” are sometimes intensional. I offer a range of examples of intensional perceptual ascriptions, respond to objections to intensional readings of perceptual ascriptions, and show how widely accepted semantic accounts of intensionality can explain the key features of intensional perceptual ascriptions.
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  5.  22
    Joshua D. K. Brown & James W. Garson (forthcoming). A New Semantics for Vagueness. Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Intuitively, vagueness involves some sort of indeterminacy: if Plato is a borderline case of baldness, then there is no fact of the matter about whether or not he’s bald—he’s neither bald nor not bald. The leading formal treatments of such indeterminacy—three valued logic, supervaluationism, etc.—either fail to validate the classical theorems, or require that various classically valid inference rules be restricted. Here we show how a fully classical, yet indeterminist account of vagueness can be given within natural semantics, an alternative (...)
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  6.  23
    Justin A. Capes (forthcoming). Freedom with Causation. Erkenntnis:1-12.
    Our actions have causes, some of which are beyond our control. Of that there can be no serious doubt. Some worry that this fact undermines the commonsense view that we perform free actions for which we are morally responsible. My aim in this article is to show that such worries are unfounded and, consequently, that pure non-causal theories of free action, according to which free actions must be entirely uncaused, are false. My argument for this conclusion doesn’t presuppose the cogency (...)
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  7.  18
    Colin R. Caret (forthcoming). The Collapse of Logical Pluralism has Been Greatly Exaggerated. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    According to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall, there are several distinct relations of logical consequence. Some critics argue that logical pluralism suffers from what I call the collapse problem: that despite its intention to articulate a radically pluralistic doctrine about logic, the view unintentionally collapses into logical monism. In this paper, I propose a contextualist resolution of the collapse problem. This clarifies the mechanism responsible for a plurality of logics and handles the motivating data better than the original (...)
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  8.  19
    Gustavo Cevolani (forthcoming). Fallibilism, Verisimilitude, and the Preface Paradox. Erkenntnis:1-15.
    The Preface Paradox apparently shows that it is sometimes rational to believe logically incompatible propositions. In this paper, I propose a way out of the paradox based on the ideas of fallibilism and verisimilitude. More precisely, I defend the view that a rational inquirer can fallibly believe or accept a proposition which is false, or likely false, but verisimilar; and I argue that this view makes the Preface Paradox disappear. Some possible objections to my proposal, and an alternative view of (...)
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  9.  52
    Yishai Cohen (forthcoming). Fischer's Deterministic Frankfurt-Style Argument. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    According to the Dilemma Defense, it is question-begging against the incompatibilist defender of the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) to assume that the agent in a deterministic Frankfurt-style case (FSC) cannot do otherwise in light of causal determinism, but is nevertheless morally responsible. As a result, Fischer (Philos Rev 119:315–336, 2010; Analysis 73:489–496, 2013) attempts to undermine PAP in a different manner via a deterministic FSC. More specifically, Fischer attempts to show that if causal determinism rules out an agent’s moral (...)
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  10. Bob Fischer (forthcoming). The Moral Objection to Modal Realism. Erkenntnis:1-16.
    If David Lewis's modal realism is true, then there are many, many people. According to Mark Heller, this is bad news. He takes modal realism (MR) to imply that "there are at least some cases in which it is permissible to let drowning children drown when it would be easy to save them." But since he holds the reasonable view that this is never permissible, he thinks that MR is false. Here, I argue that Lewis needn't be troubled by this (...)
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  11.  53
    Matthew Frise (forthcoming). Internalism and the Problem of Stored Beliefs. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    A belief is stored if it is in no way before the subject’s mind. The problem of stored beliefs is that of satisfactorily explaining how the stored beliefs which seem justified are indeed justified. In this paper I challenge the two leading internalist attempts to solve this problem. Internalism about epistemic justification, at a minimum, states that one’s mental life alone determines what one is justified in believing. First I dispute the attempt from epistemic conservatism, which states that believing justifies (...)
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  12.  35
    Roberto Fumagalli (forthcoming). Why We Cannot Learn From Minimal Models. Erkenntnis:1-23.
    Philosophers of science have developed several accounts of how consideration of scientific models can prompt learning about real-world targets. In recent years, various authors advocated the thesis that consideration of so-called minimal models can prompt learning about such targets. In this paper, I draw on the philosophical literature on scientific modelling and on widely cited illustrations from economics and biology to argue that this thesis fails to withstand scrutiny. More specifically, I criticize leading proponents of such thesis for failing to (...)
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  13.  3
    Alex Grzankowski (forthcoming). The Real Trouble with Recalcitrant Emotions. Erkenntnis:1-11.
    Cognitivists about the emotions minimally hold that it is a necessary condition for being in an emotional state that one make a certain judgement or have a certain belief. For example, if I am angry with Sam, then I must believe that Sam has wronged me. Perhaps I must also elicit a certainly bodily response or undergo some relevant experience, but crucial to the view is the belief or judgement. In the face of ‘recalcitrant emotions’, this once very popular view (...)
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  14.  19
    Jan Heylen (forthcoming). Why is There Something Rather Than Nothing? A Logical Investigation. Erkenntnis:1-29.
    From Leibniz to Krauss philosophers and scientists have raised the question as to why there is something rather than nothing. Why-questions request a type of explanation and this is often thought to include a deductive component. With classical logic in the background only trivial answers are forthcoming. With free logics in the background, be they of the negative, positive or neutral variety, only question-begging answers are to be expected. The same conclusion is reached for the modal version of the Question, (...)
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  15.  17
    Terence Horgan (forthcoming). Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem, II. Erkenntnis.
    In “Generalized Conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty Problem,” Anna Mahtani and I offer a new argument for thirdism that relies on what we call “generalized conditionalization.” Generalized conditionalization goes beyond conventional conditionalization in two respects: first, by sometimes deploying a space of synchronic, essentially temporal, candidate-possibilities that are not “prior” possibilities; and second, by allowing for the use of preliminary probabilities that arise by first bracketing, and then conditionalizing upon, “old evidence.” In “Beauty and Conditionalization: Reply to Horgan and Mahtani,” (...)
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  16.  31
    Alex Kaiserman (forthcoming). Necessary Connections in Context. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    This paper combines the ancient idea that causes necessitate their effects with Angelika Kratzer’s semantics of modality. On the resulting view, causal claims quantify over restricted domains of possible worlds determined by two contextually determined parameters. I argue that this view can explain a number of otherwise puzzling features of the way we use and evaluate causal language, including the difference between causing an effect and being a cause of it, the sensitivity of causal judgements to normative facts, and the (...)
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  17.  24
    Jeff Kasser (forthcoming). Two Conceptions of Weight of Evidence in Peirce’s Illustrations of the Logic of Science. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    Weight of evidence continues to be a powerful metaphor within formal approaches to epistemology. But attempts to construe the metaphor in precise and useful ways have encountered formidable obstacles. This paper shows that two quite different understandings of evidential weight can be traced back to one 1878 article by C.S. Peirce. One conception, often associated with I.J. Good, measures the balance or net weight of evidence, while the other, generally associated with J.M. Keynes, measures the gross weight of evidence. Conflations (...)
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  18.  41
    Shieva Kleinschmidt (forthcoming). At It Again: Time-Travel and Motion. Erkenntnis:1-14.
    The At-At Account of motion is the extremely popular view that, necessarily, something moves if and only if it’s at one place at one time, and at a distinct place at a distinct time. This, many believe, is all that motion consists in. However, I will present a case in which, intuitively, motion does not occur, though the At-At Account of motion entails that it does. I will then turn to the only tenable response that avoids revising the At-At Account: (...)
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  19.  16
    Ansten Klev (forthcoming). Identity and Sortals. Erkenntnis:1-16.
    According to the sortal conception of the universe of individuals every individual falls under a highest sortal, or category. It is argued here that on this conception the identity relation is defined between individuals a and b if and only if a and b fall under a common category. Identity must therefore be regarded as a relation of the form \, with three arguments x, y, and Z, where Z ranges over categories, and where the range of x and y (...)
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  20.  25
    Christian Loew (forthcoming). Boltzmannian Immortality. Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Plausible assumptions from Cosmology and Statistical Mechanics entail that it is overwhelmingly likely that there will be exact duplicates of us in the distant future long after our deaths. Call such persons “Boltzmann duplicates,” after the great pioneer of Statistical Mechanics. In this paper, I argue that if survival of death is possible at all, then we almost surely will survive our deaths because there almost surely will be Boltzmann duplicates of us in the distant future that stand in appropriate (...)
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  21.  29
    Giovanni Merlo (forthcoming). Three Questions About Immunity to Error Through Misidentification. Erkenntnis:1-21.
    It has been observed that, unlike other kinds of singular judgments, mental self-ascriptions are immune to error through misidentification: they may go wrong, but not as a result of mistaking someone else’s mental states for one’s own. Although recent years have witnessed increasing interest in this phenomenon, three basic questions about it remain without a satisfactory answer: what is exactly an error through misidentification? What does immunity to such errors consist in? And what does it take to explain the fact (...)
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  22.  34
    Kevin Morris (forthcoming). The Combination Problem: Subjects and Unity. Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Panpsychism has often been motivated on the grounds that any attempt to account for experience and consciousness in organisms in purely physical, nonexperiential terms faces severe difficulties. The “combination problem” charges that attributing phenomenal properties to the basic constituents of organisms, as panpsychism proposes, likewise fails to provide a satisfactory basis for experience in humans and other organisms. This paper evaluates a recent attempt to understand, and solve, the combination problem. This approach, due to Sam Coleman, is premised on a (...)
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  23.  28
    Toby Napoletano (forthcoming). Why Truth-Conditional Semantics in Generative Linguistics is Still the Better Bet. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    In his “Meaning and Formal Semantics in Generative Grammar” (Erkenntnis 2015, 61–87), Stephen Schiffer argues that truth-conditional semantics is a poor fit with generative linguistics. In particular, he thinks that it fails to explain speakers’ abilities to understand the sentences of their language. In its place, he recommends his “Best Bet Theory”—a theory which aims to directly explain speakers’ abilities to mean things by their utterances and know what others mean by their utterances. I argue that Schiffer does not provide (...)
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  24.  81
    T. Parent (forthcoming). Content Externalism and Quine's Criterion Are Incompatible. Erkenntnis:1-15.
    Externalism holds that the content of our utterances and thoughts are determined partly by the environment. Here, I offer an argument which suggests that externalism is incompatible with a natural view about ontological commitment--namely, the Quinean view that such commitments are fixed by the range of the variables in your theory. The idea in brief is that if Oscar mistakenly believes that water = XYZ, the externalist ontologically commits Oscar to two waterish kinds, whereas the Quinean commits him to one (...)
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  25.  11
    Cédric Paternotte (forthcoming). The Fragility of Common Knowledge. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Ordinary common knowledge is formally expressed by strong probabilistic common belief. How strong exactly? The question can be answered by drawing from the similar equivalence, recently explored, between plain and probabilistic individual beliefs. I argue that such a move entails that common knowledge displays a double fragility: as a description of a collective state and as a phenomenon, because it can respectively disappear as group size increases, or more worryingly as the epistemic context changes. I argue that despite this latter (...)
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  26.  7
    Luca Sciortino (forthcoming). On Ian Hacking’s Notion of Style of Reasoning. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    The analytical notion of ‘scientific style of reasoning’, introduced by Ian Hacking in the middle of the 1980s, has become widespread in the literature of the history and philosophy of science. However, scholars have rarely made explicit the philosophical assumptions and the research objectives underlying the notion of style: what are its philosophical roots? How does the notion of style fit into the area of research of historical epistemology? What does a comparison between the Hacking’s project on styles of thinking (...)
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  27.  27
    Jeroen Smid (forthcoming). Material Constitution is Ad Hoc. Erkenntnis:1-21.
    The idea that two objects can coincide—by sharing all their proper parts, or matter—yet be non-identical, results in the “Problem of Coincident Objects”: in what relation do objects stand if they are not identical but share all their proper parts? One solution is to introduce material constitution. In this paper, I argue that this is ad hoc since, first, this solution cannot be generalized to solve similar problems, and, second, there are pseudo cases of coincidence that should not trigger the (...)
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  28.  45
    Robert Smithson (forthcoming). Newman's Objection and the No Miracles Argument. Erkenntnis.
    Structural realists claim that we should endorse only what our scientific theories say about the structure of the unobservable world. But according to Newman’s Objection, the structural realist's claims about unobservables are trivially true. In recent years, many theorists have offered responses to Newman’s Objection. But a common complaint is that these responses “give up the spirit” of the structural realist position. In this paper, I argue that the simplest way to respond to Newman's Objection is to return to the (...)
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  29.  18
    Joshua Spencer (forthcoming). Counting on Strong Composition as Identity to Settle the Special Composition Question. Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Strong Composition as Identity is the thesis that necessarily, for any xs and any y, those xs compose y iff those xs are non-distributively identical to y. Some have argued against this view as follows: if some many things are non-distributively identical to one thing, then what’s true of the many must be true of the one. But since the many are many in number whereas the one is not, the many cannot be identical to the one. Hence is mistaken. (...)
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  30.  21
    Megan Henricks Stotts (forthcoming). Understanding the Intentions Behind the Referential/Attributive Distinction. Erkenntnis:1-12.
    In his recently published John Locke Lectures, Saul Kripke attempts to capture Keith Donnellan’s referential/attributive distinction for definite descriptions using a distinction between general and specific intentions. I argue that although Kripke’s own way of capturing the referential/attributive distinction is inadequate, we can use general and specific intentions to successfully capture the distinction if we also distinguish between primary and secondary intentions. An attributive use is characterized by the fact that the general intention is either the primary or only designative (...)
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  31.  18
    Sander Verhaegh (forthcoming). Blurring Boundaries: Carnap, Quine, and the Internal–External Distinction. Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Quine is routinely perceived as saving metaphysics from Carnapian positivism. Where Carnap rejects metaphysical existence claims as meaningless, Quine is taken to restore their intelligibility by dismantling the former’s internal–external distinction. The problem with this picture, however, is that it does not sit well with the fact that Quine, on many occasions, has argued that metaphysical existence claims ought to be dismissed. Setting aside the hypothesis that Quine’s metaphysical position is incoherent, one has to conclude that his views on metaphysics (...)
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  32.  65
    Jan Westerhoff (forthcoming). What It Means to Live in a Virtual World Generated by Our Brain. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Recent discussions in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind have defended a theory according to which we live in a virtual world akin to a computer simulation, generated by our brain. It is argued that our brain creates a model world from a variety of stimuli; this model is perceived as if it was external and perception-independent, even though it is neither of the two. The view of the mind, brain, and world, entailed by this theory has some peculiar (...)
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  33.  11
    Endre Begby (forthcoming). Language From the Ground Up: A Study of Homesign Communication. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Philosophers are often beholden to a picture of language as a largely static, well-defined structure which is handed over from generation to generation by an arduous process of learning: language, on this view, is something that we are given, and that we can make use of, but which we play no significant role in creating ourselves. This picture is often maintained in conjunction with the idea that several distinctively human cognitive capacities could only develop via the language acquisition process, as (...)
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  34.  7
    David Alexander (forthcoming). Unjustified Defeaters. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    A number of philosophers have recently claimed that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters. However these claims have been made in passing, occurring in the context of defenses of other theses. As a result, the claim that unjustified beliefs can be defeaters has been neither vigorously defended nor thoroughly explained. This paper fills that gap. It begins by identifying problems with the two most in-depth accounts of the possibility of unjustified defeaters due to Bergmann and Pryor. It then offers a revised (...)
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  35.  8
    Jan Almäng (forthcoming). An Argument for Shape Internalism. Erkenntnis:1-18.
    This paper is a defense of an internalist view of the perception of shapes. A basic assumption of the paper is that perceptual experiences have certain parts which account both for the phenomenal character associated with perceiving shapes—phenomenal shapes—and for the intentional content presenting shapes—intentional shapes. Internalism about perceptions of shapes is defined as the claim that phenomenal shapes determine the intentional shapes. Externalism is defined as the claim that perceptual experiences represent whatever shape the phenomenal shape reliably tracks. The (...)
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  36.  4
    Seamus Bradley (forthcoming). Nonclassical Probability and Convex Hulls. Erkenntnis:1-15.
    It is well known that the convex hull of the classical truth value functions contains all and only the probability functions. Work by Paris and Williams has shown that this also holds for various kinds of nonclassical logics too. This note summarises the formal details of this topic and extends the results slightly.
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  37.  6
    Liam Kofi Bright (forthcoming). Decision Theoretic Model of the Productivity Gap. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Using a decision theoretic model of scientists’ time allocation between potential research projects I explain the fact that on average women scientists publish less research papers than men scientists. If scientists are incentivised to publish as many papers as possible, then it is necessary and sufficient for a productivity gap to arise that women scientists anticipate harsher treatment of their manuscripts than men scientists anticipate for their manuscripts. I present evidence that women do expect harsher treatment and that scientists’ are (...)
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  38.  7
    Gregg D. Caruso & Stephen G. Morris (forthcoming). Compatibilism and Retributivist Desert Moral Responsibility: On What is of Central Philosophical and Practical Importance. Erkenntnis:1-19.
    Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense :5–24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144:45–62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom (...)
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  39.  6
    Sungho Choi (forthcoming). Intrinsic Interferers and the Epistemology of Dispositions. Erkenntnis:1-34.
    It is held by some philosophers that it is possible that x has a disposition D but, if the stimulus condition obtains, it won’t manifest D because of an intrinsic interference. I will criticize this position on the ground that it has a deeply sceptical consequence, for instance, that, assuming that I am not well informed of the micro-properties of a metal coin, I do not know that it is not water-soluble. But I urge that this is beyond the pale, (...)
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  40.  4
    James DiFrisco (forthcoming). Time Scales and Levels of Organization. Erkenntnis:1-24.
    The concept of levels of organization, despite its widespread scientific currency, has recently been criticized by a number of philosophers of science. This paper diagnoses the main source of problems facing theories of levels. On this basis, the problems with the usual criteria for distinguishing levels are evaluated: compositional relations, organizational types, and spatial scales. Drawing on some work on hierarchies in ecology, I argue in favor of an alternative conception of levels defined by the criterion of rates or time (...)
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  41. J. Earman, C. Glymour & S. Mitchell (forthcoming). Special Issue Of. Erkenntnis.
     
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  42.  3
    Edward Elliott (forthcoming). Probabilism, Representation Theorems, and Whether Deliberation Crowds Out Prediction. Erkenntnis:1-21.
    Decision-theoretic representation theorems have been developed and appealed to in the service of two important philosophical projects: in attempts to characterise credences in terms of preferences, and in arguments for probabilism. Theorems developed within the formal framework that Savage developed have played an especially prominent role here. I argue that the use of these ‘Savagean’ theorems create significant difficulties for both projects, but particularly the latter. The origin of the problem directly relates to the question of whether we can have (...)
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  43.  6
    Daniel Giberman (forthcoming). Bent, Not Broken: Why Exemplification Simpliciter Remains a Problem for Eternalist Endurantism. Erkenntnis:1-20.
    One premise in David Lewis’s well-known argument from temporary intrinsic properties in favor of temporal parts is the intuition that material objects exemplify such properties simpliciter, that is, without qualification. The argument has spawned a large critical literature, with commentators questioning the simpliciter premise’s motivation, content, dialectical force, and status as an intuition. The present essay has two chief goals: to provide a novel framework for clarifying Lewis’s simpliciter premise and to explain how the resulting clarification upends a wide range (...)
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  44.  1
    Sune Holm (forthcoming). The Problem of Phantom Functions. Erkenntnis:1-9.
    This paper discusses a recent solution to the problem of artifact phantom functions by Beth Preston. A phantom function is a function associated with a kind of artifact that it is structurally incapable of performing. Preston proposes a criterion of artifact proper function according to which phantom functions can be proper functions. This paper argues that Preston’s criterion cannot ground the teleological and normative aspects definitive of proper functions and that the proposed criterion is not consistent with Preston’s account of (...)
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  45.  2
    Leendert M. Huisman (forthcoming). Learning From Simple Indicative Conditionals. Erkenntnis:1-19.
    An agent who receives information in the form of an indicative conditional statement and who trusts her source will modify her credences to bring them in line with the conditional. I will argue that the agent, upon the acquisition of such information, should, in general, expand her prior credence function to an indeterminate posterior one; that is, to a set of credence functions. Two different ways the agent might interpret the conditional will be presented, and the properties of the resulting (...)
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  46.  2
    Daniel Enrique Kalpokas (forthcoming). Experience and Justification: Revisiting McDowell’s Empiricism. Erkenntnis:1-24.
    In this paper I try to defend McDowell’s empiricism from a certain objection made by Davidson, Stroud and Glüer. The objection states that experiences cannot be reasons because they are—as McDowell conceives them—inert. I argue that, even though there is something correct in the objection, that is not sufficient for rejecting the epistemological character that McDowell attributes to experiences. My strategy consists basically in showing that experiences involve a constitutive attitude of acceptance of their contents.
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  47. Lorraine Juliano Keller (forthcoming). Against Naturalized Cognitive Propositions. Erkenntnis:1-18.
    In this paper, I argue that Scott Soames’ theory of naturalized cognitive propositions faces a serious objection: there are true propositions for which NCP cannot account. More carefully, NCP cannot account for certain truths of mathematics unless it is possible for there to be an infinite intellect. For those who reject the possibility of an infinite intellect, this constitutes a reductio of NCP.
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  48.  7
    Jakob Koscholke (forthcoming). Carnap’s Relevance Measure as a Probabilistic Measure of Coherence. Erkenntnis:1-12.
    Tomoji Shogenji is generally assumed to be the first author to have presented a probabilistic measure of coherence. Interestingly, Rudolf Carnap in his Logical Foundations of Probability discussed a function that is based on the very same idea, namely his well-known relevance measure. This function is largely neglected in the coherence literature because it has been proposed as a measure of evidential support and still is widely conceived as such. The aim of this paper is therefore to investigate Carnap’s measure (...)
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  49.  5
    Jürgen Landes & George Masterton (forthcoming). Invariant Equivocation. Erkenntnis:1-27.
    Objective Bayesians hold that degrees of belief ought to be chosen in the set of probability functions calibrated with one’s evidence. The particular choice of degrees of belief is via some objective, i.e., not agent-dependent, inference process that, in general, selects the most equivocal probabilities from among those compatible with one’s evidence. Maximising entropy is what drives these inference processes in recent works by Williamson and Masterton though they disagree as to what should have its entropy maximised. With regard to (...)
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  50.  3
    Jonathan Livingstone-Banks (forthcoming). The Contingency Problem for Neo-Conventionalism. Erkenntnis:1-19.
    Traditional conventionalism about modality claims that a proposition is necessarily true iff it is true by convention. In the wake of the widespread repudiation of truth-byconvention, traditional conventionalism has fallen out of favour. However, a family of theories of modality have arisen that, whilst abandoning truth-by-convention, retain the spirit of traditional conventionalism. These ‘neo-conventionalist’ theories surpass their forebears and don’t fall victim to the criticisms inherited through truth-by-convention. However, not all criticisms levelled at traditional conventionalism target truth-by-convention. Any conventional theory (...)
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  51. Dordrecht Boston London (forthcoming). An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy. Erkenntnis.
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  52.  11
    Susanne Mantel (forthcoming). Three Cheers for Dispositions: A Dispositional Approach to Acting for a Normative Reason. Erkenntnis:1-22.
    Agents sometimes act for normative reasons—for reasons that objectively favor their actions. Jill, for instance, calls a doctor for the normative reason that Kate is injured. In this article I explore a dispositional approach to acting for a normative reason. I argue for the need of epistemic, motivational, and executional dispositional elements of a theory of acting for a normative reason. Dispositions play a mediating role between, on the one hand, the normative reason and its normative force, and the action (...)
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  53. Felix Meiner (forthcoming). International Journal of Analytic Philosophy. Erkenntnis.
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  54.  4
    J. B. Paris & A. Vencovská (forthcoming). Combining Analogical Support in Pure Inductive Logic. Erkenntnis:1-19.
    We investigate the relative probabilistic support afforded by the combination of two analogies based on possibly different, structural similarity within the context of Pure Inductive Logic and under the assumption of Language Invariance. We show that whilst repeated analogies grounded on the same structural similarity only strengthen the probabilistic support this need not be the case when combining analogies based on different structural similarities. That is, two analogies may provide less support than each would individually.
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  55.  8
    Kevin Reuter (forthcoming). The Developmental Challenge to the Paradox of Pain. Erkenntnis:1-19.
    People seem to perceive and locate pains in bodily locations, but also seem to conceive of pains as mental states that can be introspected. However, pains cannot be both bodily and mental, at least according to most conceptions of these two categories: mental states are not the kind of entities that inhabit body parts. How are we to resolve this paradox of pain? In this paper, I put forward what I call the ‘Developmental Challenge’, tackling the second pillar of this (...)
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  56.  2
    Gil Sagi (forthcoming). Contextualism, Relativism and the Liar. Erkenntnis:1-16.
    Contextualist theories of truth appeal to context to solve the liar paradox: different stages of reasoning occur in different contexts, and so the contradiction is dispelled. The word ‘true’ is relativized by the contextualists to contexts of use. This paper shows that contextualist approaches to the liar are committed to a form of semantic relativism: that the truth value of some sentences depends on the context of assessment, as well as the context of use. In particular, it is shown how (...)
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  57.  4
    Jesse R. Steinberg & Alan M. Steinberg (forthcoming). A Multiply Qualified Conditional Analysis of Disposition Ascription: Mapping the Conceptual Topography of Ceteris Paribus. Erkenntnis:1-17.
    Given that an analysis of disposition ascription cannot be made in terms of a simple subjunctive conditional, we present a multiply qualified conditional analysis that places disposition ascription within an implicit fundamental causal conceptual typography within which a disposition ascription is embedded, framed, and understood. By placing the multiply qualified analysis within an implicit causal matrix involving a focal cause, pathway of influence, mechanism of action, contributing/partial cause, mediator, extrinsic moderator,, intrinsic moderator, and manifestation, we show how this analysis evades (...)
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  58. N. Strobach (forthcoming). Review of Wölfl (1999), Forthcoming In. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis.
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  59. Dieter Teichert (forthcoming). Erfahrung, Erinnerung. Erkenntnis.
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  60.  3
    Frederik Van De Putte (forthcoming). “That Will Do”: Logics of Deontic Necessity and Sufficiency. Erkenntnis:1-39.
    We study a logic for deontic necessity and sufficiency, as originally proposed in van Benthem :36–41, 1979). Building on earlier work in modal logic, we provide a sound and complete axiomatization for it, consider some standard extensions, and study other important properties. After that, we compare this logic to the logic of “obligation as weakest permission” from Anglberger et al. :807–827, 2015).
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  61. Felix Meiner Verlag (forthcoming). An International Journal of Analytic Philosophy. Erkenntnis.
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  62. Lyman C. Wynne (forthcoming). Desintegration und Lebenspraxis. Erkenntnis.
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