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Forthcoming articles
  1. Dustin Stokes & Vincent Bergeron (forthcoming). Modular Architectures and Informational Encapsulation: A Dilemma. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-24.
    Amongst philosophers and cognitive scientists, modularity remains a popular choice for an architecture of the human mind, primarily because of the supposed explanatory value of this approach. Modular architectures can vary both with respect to the strength of the notion of modularity and the scope of the modularity of mind. We propose a dilemma for modular architectures, no matter how these architectures vary along these two dimensions. First, if a modular architecture commits to the informational encapsulation of modules, as it (...)
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  2. Kristen Intemann (forthcoming). Distinguishing Between Legitimate and Illegitimate Values in Climate Modeling. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-16.
    While it is widely acknowledged that science is not “free” of non-epistemic values, there is disagreement about the roles that values can appropriately play. Several have argued that non-epistemic values can play important roles in modeling decisions, particularly in addressing uncertainties ; Risbey 2007; Biddle and Winsberg 2010; Winsberg : 111-137, 2012); van der Sluijs 359-389, 2012). On the other hand, such values can lead to bias ; Bray ; Oreskes and Conway 2010). Thus, it is important to identify when (...)
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  3. Simonluca Pinna (forthcoming). The Philosophy of Quantum Gravity – Lessons From Nicolai Hartmann. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-18.
    An astonishing thesis in the philosophy of quantum gravity is that spacetime ”disappears” at the fundamental level of reality, and that the geometrical notions of ”length” and ”duration” are derived from the dynamics of the basic non–geometrical building blocks of the theory. Unveiling here the analysis of the concepts of spacetime, measure, and magnitude, given by the philosopher Nicolai Hartmann, I argue that the ”disappearance” thesis is too strong. The fundamental geometrical notions are, on the contrary, primitive and cannot be (...)
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  4. Gregor Betz (forthcoming). Are Climate Models Credible Worlds? Prospects and Limitations of Possibilistic Climate Prediction. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-25.
    Climate models don’t give us probabilistic forecasts. To interpret their results, alternatively, as serious possibilities seems problematic inasmuch as climate models rely on contrary-to-fact assumptions: why should we consider their implications as possible if their assumptions are known to be false? The paper explores a way to address this possibilistic challenge. It introduces the concepts of a perfect and of an imperfect credible world, and discusses whether climate models can be interpreted as imperfect credible worlds. That would allow one to (...)
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  5. M. Bryson Brown & Graham Priest (forthcoming). Chunk and Permeate II: Bohr’s Hydrogen Atom. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-18.
    Niels Bohr’s model of the hydrogen atom is widely cited as an example of an inconsistent scientific theory because of its reliance on classical electrodynamics together with assumptions about interactions between matter and electromagnetic radiation that could not be reconciled with CED. This view of Bohr’s model is controversial, but we believe a recently proposed approach to reasoning with inconsistent commitments offers a promising formal reading of how Bohr’s model worked. In this paper we present this new way of reasoning (...)
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  6. Mathias Frisch (forthcoming). Predictivism and Old Evidence: A Critical Look at Climate Model Tuning. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-20.
    Many climate scientists have made claims that may suggest that evidence used in tuning or calibrating a climate model cannot be used to evaluate the model. By contrast, the philosophers Katie Steele and Charlotte Werndl have argued that, at least within the context of Bayesian confirmation theory, tuning is simply an instance of hypothesis testing. In this paper I argue for a weak predictivism and in support of a nuanced reading of climate scientists’ concerns about tuning: there are cases, model-tuning (...)
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  7. Kareem Khalifa (forthcoming). EMU Defended: Reply to Newman. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-9.
    In his “EMU and Inference,” Mark Newman European Journal for Philosophy of Science, 4:55–74, 2014 provides several interesting challenges to my explanatory model of understanding :15–37, 2012). I offer three replies to Newman’s paper. First, Newman incorrectly attributes to EMU an overly restrictive view about the role of abilities in understanding. Second, his main argument against EMU rests on this incorrect attribution, and would still face difficulties even if this attribution were correct. Third, contrary to his stated ambitions, his own, (...)
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  8. Gavin A. Schmidt & Steven Sherwood (forthcoming). A Practical Philosophy of Complex Climate Modelling. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-21.
    We give an overview of the practice of developing and using complex climate models, as seen from experiences in a major climate modelling center and through participation in the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project . We discuss the construction and calibration of models; their evaluation, especially through use of out-of-sample tests; and their exploitation in multi-model ensembles to identify biases and make predictions. We stress that adequacy or utility of climate models is best assessed via their skill against more naïve predictions. (...)
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  9. Katie Siobhan Steele (forthcoming). Bayesians Care About Stopping Rules Too. European Journal for Philosophy of Science.
     
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  10. Nicholas J. Teh (forthcoming). A Note on Rovelli’s ‘Why Gauge? European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-10.
    Rovelli’s “Why Gauge?” offers a parable to show that gauge-dependent quantities have a modal and relational physical significance. We subject the morals of this parable to philosophical scrutiny and argue that, while Rovelli’s main point stands, there are important disanalogies between his parable and Yang-Mills type gauge theory.
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  11. Dingmar van Eck (forthcoming). Mechanistic Explanation in Engineering Science. European Journal for Philosophy of Science:1-27.
    In this paper I apply the mechanistic account of explanation to engineering science. I discuss two ways in which this extension offers further development of the mechanistic view. First, functional individuation of mechanisms in engineering science proceeds by means of two distinct sub types of role function, behavior function and effect function, rather than role function simpliciter. Second, it offers refined assessment of the explanatory power of mechanistic explanations. It is argued that in the context of malfunction explanations of technical (...)
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