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  1.  92
    Manuel García-Carpintero (2006). Nonconceptual Modes of Presentation. European Review of Philosophy 6:65-81.
    In a recent paper, Peacocke (2001) continues an ongoing debate with McDowell and others, providing renewed arguments for the view that perceptual experiences and some other mental states have a particular kind of content, nonconceptual content. In this article I want to object to one of the arguments he provides. This is not because I side with McDowell in the ongoing debate about nonconceptual content; on the contrary, given the way I understand it, my views are closer to Peacocke’s, and (...)
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  2.  6
    Sonia Sedivy (2006). Nonconceptual Epicycles. European Review of Philosophy 6:33-66.
    This paper argues that perception is a mode of engagement with individuals and their determinate properties. Perceptual content involves determinate properties in a way that relies on our conceptual capacities no less than on the properties. The “richness” of perceptual experience is explained as a distinctive individual and property involving content. This position is developed in three steps: (i) novel phenomenological description of lived experience; (ii) detailed reconstruction of Gareth Evans’ proposal that we are capable of genuinely singular thought that (...)
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  3.  18
    R. Meeks (2006). Why Nonconceptual Content Cannot Be Immune to Error Through Misidentification. European Review of Philosophy 6:81-100.
  4.  15
    Michael Tye (2006). The Thesis of Nonconceptual Content. European Review of Philosophy 6:7-30.
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