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  1.  5
    Joseph Gottlieb (2016). Transitivity and Transparency. Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):353-379.
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  2. Marcela Herdova (2016). Nothing to Fear: Swap Cases and Personal Identity. Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):315-337.
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  3. T. Parent (2016). The Modal Ontological Argument Meets Modal Fictionalism. Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):338-352.
    This paper attacks the modal ontological argument, as advocated by Plantinga among others. Whereas other criticisms in the literature reject one of its premises, the present line is that the argument is invalid. This becomes apparent once we run the argument assuming fictionalism about possible worlds. Broadly speaking, the problem is that if one defines “x” as something that exists, it does not follow that there is anything satisfying the definition. Yet unlike non-modal ontological arguments, the modal argument commits this (...)
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  4.  12
    Robert Pasnau (2016). Therapeutic Reflections on Our Bipolar History of Perception. Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):253-284.
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  5.  3
    Bradley Rives (2016). Concepts and Analytic Intuitions. Analytic Philosophy 57 (4):285-314.
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  6.  14
    Amie L. Thomasson (2016). Metaphysical Disputes and Metalinguistic Negotiation. Analytic Philosophy 57 (4).
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  7.  13
    Brian Garrett (2016). Tim, Tom, Time and Fate: Lewis on Time Travel. Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):247-252.
    In his well-known time travel story, David Lewis claims that there is a sense in which Tim can go back in time and kill his Grandfather and a (more inclusive) sense in which he cannot. Lewis describes Tim’s predicament as semi-fatalist, but holds that this does not compromise Tim’s freedom or his ability to kill Grandfather. I argue that if semi-fatalism is true of Tim, it is true of everyone, and that this is a troubling conclusion.
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  8.  11
    Sajed Tayebi (2016). Indexicality, Agency, and Opacity: In Defense of the Received View. Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):236-246.
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  9.  38
    Ross P. Cameron (2016). On Characterizing the Presentism/Eternalism and Actualism/Possibilism Debates. Analytic Philosophy 57 (2):110-140.
  10.  19
    Delia Graff Fara (2016). Further Steps Towards a Theory of Descriptions as Predicates. Analytic Philosophy 57 (2):91-109.
    Descriptions are predicates. Here, I'll take this to mean either of two basically equivalent things: that they have extensions as their semantic values, sets of entities, in the broadest sense; or that they have type-〈e,t〉 functions as their semantic values, functions from entities, in the broadest sense, to truth values. An entity in the broadest sense is anything that can be the subject of a first-order predication. Examples are individuals, pluralities, masses, and kinds. Here I'm including entities in this broadest (...)
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  11.  29
    David Killoren (2016). Why Care About Moral Fixed Points? Analytic Philosophy 57 (2):165-173.
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  12.  82
    Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (2016). Reasons and Guidance. Analytic Philosophy 57 (2):214-235.
    Many philosophers accept a response constraint on normative reasons: that p is a reason for you to φ only if you are able to φ for the reason that p. This constraint offers a natural way to cash out the familiar and intuitive thought that reasons must be able to guide us, and has been put to work as a premise in a range of influential arguments in ethics and epistemology. However, the constraint requires interpretation and faces putative counter-examples due (...)
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  13.  41
    John Broome (2016). A Linguistic Turn in the Philosophy of Normativity? Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):1-14.
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  14.  25
    Bob Fischer (2016). Hale on the Architecture of Modal Knowledge. Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):76-89.
    There are many modal epistemologies available to us. Which should we endorse? According to Bob Hale, we can start to answer this question by examining the architecture of modal knowledge. That is, we can try to decide between the following claims: knowing that p is possible is essentially a matter of having a well-founded belief that there are no conflicting necessities—a necessity-based approach—and knowing that p is necessary is essentially a matter of having a well-founded belief that there are no (...)
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  15.  5
    Martin Montminy & Andrew Russo (2016). A Defense of Causal Invariantism. Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):49-75.
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  16.  21
    John Morrison (2016). Perceptual Confidence. Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):15-48.
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  17. Alyssa Ney (2016). Microphysical Causation and the Case for Physicalism. Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):141-164.
    Physicalism is sometimes portrayed by its critics as a dogma, but there is an empirical argument for the position, one based on the accumulation of diverse microphysical causal explanations in physics, chemistry, and physiology. The canonical statement of this argument was presented in 2001 by David Papineau. The goal of this paper is to demonstrate a tension that arises between this way of understanding the empirical case for physicalism and a view that is becoming practically a received position in philosophy (...)
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  18. Stephen Yablo (2016). Ifs, Ands, and Buts: An Incremental Truthmaker Semantics for Indicative Conditionals. Analytic Philosophy 57 (1):175-213.
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