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  1.  12
    Nicolo' Gaj (2015). The Scientific Relevance of an Individual Factor Needs More Than a Case Presentation. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):87-88.
  2.  16
    Daniel A. Helminiak (2015). Clarifying the Conception of Consciousness: Lonergan, Chalmers, and Confounded Epistemology. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):59-74.
    Applying Bernard Lonergan's (1957/1992, 1972) analysis of intentional consciousness and its concomitant epistemology, this paper highlights epistemological confusion in contemporary consciousness studies as exemplified mostly in David Chalmers's (1996) position. In ideal types, a first section outlines two epistemologies-sensate-modeled and intelligence-based-whose difference significantly explains the different positions. In subsequent sections, this paper documents the sensate-modeled epistemology in Chalmers's position and consciousness studies in general. Tellingly, this model of knowing is at odds with the formal-operational theorizing in twentieth-century science. This paper (...)
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  3.  76
    Jakob Korf (2015). Qualia in a Contemporary Neurobiological Perspective. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):39-44.
    Qualia are defined as subjective or private feelings associated with sensory and other experiences. This article argues that private feelings might be expressed by or in a personal brain and discusses possible neurobiological implications. Four issues are considered: Functional dualism implies that mental functions are realized as emergent properties of the brain. In practice, functional dualism is compatible with both substance dualism and pan-psychism. The (adult) human brain is the product of biological and environmental processes, including cultural influences, and is (...)
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  4.  14
    Matthew Soleiman (2015). Adjusting Our Epistemic Expectations: Explaining Experience with Nonreductive Psychophysical Laws. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):89-90.
    A response to Brian Earp's "I can't get no (epistemic) satisfaction: Why the hard problem of consciousness entails a hard problem of explanation.".
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  5.  7
    Matthew T. Soleiman (2015). Adjusting Our Epistemic Expectations: Explaining Experience with Nonreductive Psychophysical Laws. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):89-90.
  6.  10
    Christer Svennerlind (2015). From Being Unaccountable to Suffering From Severe Mental Disorder and (Possibly) Back Once Again to Being Unaccountable. Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):45-58.
    From 1965, the Swedish penal law does not require accountability as a condition for criminal responsibility. Instead, severely mentally disordered offenders are sentenced to forensic psychiatric care. The process that led to the present legislation had its origins in a critique of the concept of accountability that was first launched 50 years earlier by the founding father of Swedish forensic psychiatry, Olof Kinberg. The concept severe mental disorder is part of the Criminal Code as well as the Compulsory Mental Act. (...)
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