François Jacob viewed the living world as interconnected by reproductive links, suggesting that biology should not limit itself to studying individual organisms given their ephemeral nature. He believed that reproduction was the cause and purpose of life, asserting that the genetic program played a crucial role in physiology and evolutionary biology, offering a potential unifying framework for biology. While acknowledging the importance of Jacob’s idea of reproduction as a nexus, there are criticisms regarding his reliance on genetic programs. Various approaches (...) to understanding the causes of reproduction—including formal, material, and externally scaffolded factors—are explored and highlight some perspectives that extend beyond the concept of genetic programming. Furthermore, criticisms and objections to the organizational aspects and significance of reproduction in life are addressed. Finally, the relational nature of reproduction is presented as a crucial aspect that necessitates considering collaborative and distributed models. (shrink)

Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences: From Philosophy of Nature to Philosophy of Physics introduces us to the philosophy of physics of logical empiricism. However, here the expression “philosophy of physics” does not refer to a consolidated area of philosophy but to the set of concepts, methods, and analyses relating to general relativity, quantum mechanics, and other physical theories that were developed by the members of the logical empiricist movement. Because of the thoroughness with which it treats an issue so (...) unjustly disregarded in the literature, Logical Empiricism and the Physical Sciences is an essential work not only for HOPOS readers interested in the intellectual origins of recent philosophy of physics but also for those interested in general philosophy of science. The main aim of this book is to overturn many of the inherited prejudices about how the logical empiricists—Carnap, Reichenbach, Frank, Neurath, and Feigl, among others—related philosophically to the physics of their time. (shrink)

In The Logic of Life, François Jacob reconstructed the history of heredity from the seventeenth century to the present, emphasizing the role of physics in the development of biology. Quantum mechanics provided questions, methods, and techniques to molecular biologists. In the 1960s, physics also provided the organizational model. Jacob worked on the creation of the European Molecular Biology Laboratory, on the model of CERN (European Organization for Nuclear Research). I argue that reflection on the relation between molecular biology and physics (...) played a part in the making of The Logic of Life. Between the mid-1960s and the early 1970s, Jacob focused on relations between the “genealogy” of his molecular biology work and the development of physics at scientific, institutional, and historical levels. He thus brought molecular biology to the attention of a larger public, following the history of the Institut Pasteur, whose public mission had to be reaffirmed to grant its survival. With The Logic of Life, Jacob became an influential intellectual who engaged with scholars in human sciences. He promoted his view of the development of molecular biology as a model for a possible new discipline: bioanthropology. (shrink)

The Bernays-Müller debate was a dispute in the early 1920s between Paul Bernays and Aloys Müller regarding various philosophical issues related to “Hilbert’s program.” The debate is sometimes mentioned as a sidenote in discussions of Hilbert’s program, but there is little or no discussion of the debate itself in the secondary literature. This article aims to fill this gap and to provide a detailed analysis of the background of the debate, its contents, and the impact on its protagonists.

In his Zur Einstein’schen Relativitätstheorie, Ernst Cassirer presents relativity theory as the last manifestation of the tradition of the “physics of principles” that, starting from the nineteenth century, has progressively prevailed over that of the “physics of models.” In particular, according to Cassirer, the relativity principle plays a role similar to the energy principle in previous physics. In this article, I argue that this comparison represents the core of Cassirer’s neo-Kantian interpretation of relativity. Cassirer pointed out that before and after (...) Kant, the history of physics presents significant instances in which the search for formal conditions that the laws of nature must satisfy preceded and made possible the direct search for such laws. In his earlier years, Cassirer seems to have regarded principles like the energy principle, the relativity principle, and the principle of least action as a constitutive but provisional form of a priori, imposing specific limitations on the form of the allowable laws of nature. Only in his later years, by attributing an autonomous status to these statements of principle, did Cassirer attribute a definitive but merely regulative meaning to the a priori. This does not impose specific requirements on natural laws but only a motivation to search for them. (shrink)

Although it has not been much noticed, reproduction is the central theme of François Jacob’s important history of biology, La logique du vivant (The Logic of Life). In a book ostensibly devoted to heredity, this molecular biologist had reproduction integrate levels of organization from organisms to molecules and play a major role in each historical transition between them, not just in the influential argument for a shift “from generation to reproduction.” Moreover, I claim, La logique was the first general history (...) of (research on) reproduction. Earlier histories had tackled only aspects of generation and reproduction; none historicized the latter. Jacob’s innovation came out of the rising prominence of reproduction in neo-Darwinist studies of populations and in his own field, the cellular genetics of bacteria and their viruses, and engagement with history and philosophy of science. The discovery of bacterial “sex” enabled microbial genetics but, ironically, led Jacob to a sexless concept of reproduction. This approach molded a history that reached across the living world but slighted sex and the complexities of reproduction in multicellular organisms. Readers can learn from its strength and limitations. (shrink)

François Jacob’s The Logic of Life: A History of Heredity has shown an enduring relevance for the history and philosophy of biology. In this article, resisting the received view that regards this book merely as an application of Foucault’s archaeological method, I reconstruct a silent debate between François Jacob and Jacques Monod. More precisely, I argue that Jacob’s history of biology offers a riposte to Monod’s claims in Chance and Necessity. First, I show that the distinction between a “history of (...) ideas” and a “history of objects” captures two ways of looking at the history of science that characterize Monod’s and Jacob’s own approaches. Next, I present Monod’s search for a “theory of the natural selection of ideas.” Then I argue that the concept of “integron,” introduced by Jacob in his conclusion, covertly undermines Monod’s argument for the use of evolutionary models of cultural and scientific change. These contrasting perspectives shed new light on why the Nobel colaureates and former colleagues expressed little interest in each other’s books. More generally, the Monod-Jacob divide illustrates the use and rejection of biological models in writing the history of science and the importance of situating Jacob within his own milieu. (shrink)

In this article, I propose a novel way of understanding the mechanisms of academic transfers in the context of the Second World War by looking at the role of membership and referral systems in determining an applicant’s success. Using largely unexplored archival data from the Society for the Protection of Science and Learning, held at the Bodleian Library, and the British Federation for University Women, held at the British Library of Political and Economic Science, this articles presents the case of (...) Rose Rand. She was a philosopher and one of the core members of the Vienna Circle who spent her professional years in exile, first in the United Kingdom and later in the United States. Her academic journey in the United Kingdom lasted almost 16 years. In that time, Rand never managed to obtain a permanent academic post despite the fact that her philosophical work is deemed relevant today by the experts and historians of her field. By reading and combining new and previously unused biographical data and personal and professional correspondence, this article shows the crucial role that memberships and personal referrals had in determining the success of her academic transfer. (shrink)

In this article, the concept of integron as it appears in François Jacob’s book The Logic of Life is discussed. It begins by locating the concept within the overall structure of Jacob’s book. The book is conceived as a history of heredity, with the central historical chapters framed by an epistemological discussion of the notions of program in the introductory chapter and of integron in the concluding chapter. A detailed analysis of the concept of integron follows, including that of reproduction (...) on which it relies. It is then compared with the concept of hypercycle as developed around the same time by Manfred Eigen and Peter Schuster. The article concludes on a note on name-coining in the sciences with a focus on Jacob’s own practice. (shrink)

The movement known as Deutsche Physik (German physics) evolved hand in hand with National Socialism. It represented a marginal but vocal group of German scientists and science scholars who profiled themselves as defenders of “Aryan” science and called for the elimination of the “Jewish spirit” that they saw as epitomized by Albert Einstein’s relativity theory and as dominating the natural sciences, even in Nazi Germany. This infamous movement is most associated with the Nobel laureate physicists Philipp Lenard and Johannes Stark, (...) who founded it and gave it its initial political impetus during the early years of the Third Reich. However, in its main and final phase, between 1937 and 1943, the movement was no longer led by Lenard and Stark but by the philosopher of science Hugo Dingler (1881–1954) and his Munich-based circle. Tracing the development of his career until 1937, this article examines how Dingler came to play this role both despite and because of the significant differences between his and the better known Lenard-Stark strand of Deutsche Physik. Special attention is paid to Dingler’s subversive use of theoretical principles—particularly his framing of his work as a radical search for certainty—to advance the movement’s antiscientific agenda. (shrink)

This article unearths little-studied accounts of the status and role of hypotheses in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century Germany. German thinkers regarded hypotheses, including those about unobservable causes for visible effects, as legitimate and necessary ingredients of scientific inquiry. They debated the nature of probable hypotheses resulting from inductions, proposed heuristics for making causal hypotheses, and advanced criteria for assessing and testing them. My survey of these rich and multifaceted discussions shows that many themes and topics that we commonly associate (...) with modern philosophy of science were discussed decades earlier by authors of educational and practice-oriented books on logic: consequential testing, underdetermination, auxiliary hypotheses, the problem of unobservable entities, fallibility, and elaborate methodologies of observation and experimentation. It also illuminates the long-term history of present-day criteria for hypothesis evaluation. (shrink)

Given Descartes’ metaphysical and natural-philosophic commitments, it is very difficult to theorize the pregnant human being as a human being under his system. Specifically, given (1) Descartes’ account of generation, (2) his commitment to mechanistic explanations where bodies are concerned, (3) his reliance on a subtle individuating principle for human (and animal) bodies, and (4) his metaphysics of human beings, which include minds, bodies, and mind-body unions, there is no available human substance or entity which may clearly be the subject (...) of pregnancy. The incompatibility of any of the three options found in (4) with (1), (2), or (3), together with other undesirable consequences should any be selected, results in what I call the pregnancy problem. The pregnancy problem (henceforth, PP) is a previously unconsidered problem for the Cartesian philosophy. Given PP, commitment(s) (1), (2), (3) or (4), or a combination of these, would have to be revised for Descartes’ system to avoid a variety of tensions; alternately, counterintuitive consequences may have to be accepted. Ironically, given Descartes’ interest in generation and medicine more generally, the Cartesian framework struggles to accommodate pregnancy in human beings. This may have implications for the systematicity and sex-neutrality of dualist metaphysics in general. (shrink)

Although Peano’s negative attitude toward infinitesimals—particularly, geometric infinitesimals—is widely documented, his conception of a single infinite cardinality and, more generally, his views on the infinite are less known. In this article, we reconstruct the evolution of Peano’s ideas on these questions and formulate several hypotheses about their underlying motivations.

A dominant strand of philosophical thought holds that natural kinds are clusters of objects with shared properties. Cluster theories of natural kinds are often taken to be a late twentieth-century development, prompted by dissatisfaction with essentialism in philosophy of biology. I will argue here, however, that a cluster theory of kinds had actually been formulated by William Whewell (1794-1866) more than a century earlier. Cluster theories of kinds can be characterized in terms of three central commitments, all of which are (...) present in Whewell’s work on classification. Like contemporary cluster theorists, Whewell claims that kinds are united by similarity, that many kinds do not have essences, and that there are “gaps” between kinds. Moreover, Whewell advises taxonomists to look for consilience (roughly, convergence) between different classificatory schemes, a recommendation that reinforces the identification of natural classes with property clusters. Thus Whewell was not only an early cluster theorist, but one with important insights into what a cluster theory of kinds means for the practice of classification. (shrink)

This article revisits Karl Popper’s falsificationist methodology with respect to three tasks. The first is to illuminate and systematize Popper’s methodological views in light of his core epistemological commitments. A second and related objective is to gauge which aspects of falsificationism should be identified as “conventionalist”—a label that Popper himself uses (albeit with qualifications) but that is compromised by and, thus, stands in need of elucidation because of Popper’s idiosyncratic understanding of conventionalism. Third, by elaborating Popper’s virtue-epistemological, dialogical model of (...) rationality, I show how Popper’s conventionalism, fallibilism, and critical rationalism form a coherent system. This system allows Popper to accord science the status of a privileged source of knowledge—without naïve appeal to authority. My systematization of Popper’s views yields an intrinsically and exegetically more satisfactory reading of Popper’s falsificationism than usual presentations. Thanks to its marked flexibility and methodological liberalism, it bypasses many standard objections but still offers sound and relevant methodological advice. With its “virtue-methodological” thrust, Popper sketches an original and promising approach to methodology, the fertility of which deserves further exploration for contemporary debates. (shrink)

In discussing instrumentalism in philosophy of science, John Dewey is rarely studied, but rather mentioned in passing to credit him for coining the label. His instrumentalism is often interpreted as the view that science is an instrument designed to control the environment and satisfy our practical ends, or likened to the Duhemian view that scientific objects are useful fictions for organizing observable phenomena. Dewey was careful to qualify the first view and denied holding the second. Furthermore, the observable/unobservable distinction does (...) not play any significant role in Dewey’s instrumentalism. The question then arises: Was the inventor of instrumentalism himself an instrumentalist? I present the key aspects of Dewey’s instrumentalismand contrast his views with the instrumentalism of Mach, Duhem and Poincaré. Dewey’s epistemological instrumentalism is global and not local; nevertheless, it is fallibilist and optimistic, rather than skeptical and pessimistic. Dewey’s ontological instrumentalism concerns the nature of scientific objects, regardless of whether they are observable or unobservable, and is fully compatible with realism about atoms or electrons. Dewey’s practical instrumentalism holds that becausescience provides understanding of the workings of nature rather than an exhaustive picture of reality, it is thebest instrument we have for the enrichment of experience. (shrink)

I present an exegesis of Henri Poincaré’s metaphysical position in three key essays within his book The Value of Science. In doing so, I argue for three theses: (a) that Poincaré’s metaphysical position in these sources is incompatible with his metaphysical position in his earlier book Science and Hypothesis; (b) that the phenomenological relationism defended by Poincaré in these sources is not a form of structural realism but rather a structuralist form of empiricism and (by design) has no greater metaphysical (...) commitments than constructive empiricism; and (c) that Poincaré holds in these sources that the existence of the external world is merely a convention. These theses serve to correct misconceptions about the consistency of Poincaré’s philosophical corpus, his positions on the realism-antirealism landscape, and the scope of his conventionalism. (shrink)

The Science of Proof offers a detailed history of how experts of forensic science first interfaced with the court system in 18th and 19th century France.

It is commonly thought that Dioscorides’s view on medicine is purely pragmatic, focused entirely on the effectiveness of medicines, and derived from trial and error. One reason for this interpretation is that Dioscorides himself wrote little about his theory of medicine. In this article, however, we argue that he would have arranged De Materia Medica in a way that would have been useful only to a skilled practitioner. This argument implies that Dioscorides had a medical theory, as the arrangement of (...) the content could not have followed a trial-and-error approach. It is only in the sense of having a theory that he is able to claim that his text is more “complete” than others. This article provides a historical overview of the text from its genesis to its reception and, ultimately, to its falling out of use. This article concludes with a series of hypotheses on the correspondence between theory and arrangement of the treatise, with the aim of narrowing scholarly conjectures about both. In the final analysis, we argue that an arrangement by family resemblance most closely corresponds to the theory that animates Dioscorides’s text. (shrink)

According to Newton and Clarke, Leibniz’s relationalism cannot make sense of distance quantities. Although the core of Newton and Clarke’s “argument from quantity” is clear enough, its details remain unclear because we do not know what its key term “quantity” means. This key term is still unsettled because, unlike Leibniz, who loudly voices his view of quantity in both his correspondence with Clarke and in his philosophical essays on quantity, Newton and Clarke are frustratingly terse when it comes to defining (...) quantity. Nevertheless, I think that it would be hasty to conclude that there is no way to expand our understanding of the term “quantity” as it appears in their argument. Although Newton and Clarke do not pursue a theory of quantity, their colleagues do, and the theory of quantity developed by their peers promises to deliver a historically rich perspective on Newton and Clarke’s argument from quantity. In this article, I aim to provide some historical context for Newton and Clarke’s argument from quantity by examining two criteria for quantity that were popular among their peers—what I call the “divisibility” and “precise increase and diminution” conditions. (shrink)

The 1980s, it is often claimed, was the decade when experimentation finally became a philosophical topic. This was the responsibility, the claim continues, of one particular movement within philosophy of science, called “new experimentalism.” The aim of this article is to complicate this historical narrative. We argue that in the 1980s, the study of experimentation was carried out not by one movement with one particular aim but rather in a diverse and open-ended way by people with different aims and backgrounds. (...) We then argue that from the late 1990s onward, this diversity disappeared and made room for disciplinary divisions—questions concerning experimentation became philosophical, others sociological, and so on. The reason for this, we claim, was that science and technology studies, philosophy of technology, and philosophy of science took over aspects of the 1980s study of experimentation. In this way, we argue, these elements became institutionalized, whereas others were forgotten. The importance of this process of institutionalization is illustrated by means of a discussion of other, similar approaches to the philosophy of experimentation that have not been able to ensure continuity because they did not find an institutional home. (shrink)

I argue that Émilie Du Châtelet breaks with Christian Wolff regarding the scope and epistemological content of the principle of sufficient reason, despite his influence on her basic ontology and their agreement that the principle of sufficient reason has foundational importance. These differences have decisive consequences for the ways in which Du Châtelet and Wolff conceive of science.